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Mediating Trans/nationalism: Japanese '*Jun'ai*' (Pure-Love) in Popular Media

Representations

A Dissertation Presented

by

I-Te Rita Sung

to

The Graduate School

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Comparative Literature

Stony Brook University

August 2016

Stony Brook University

The Graduate School

I-Te Rita Sung

We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the
Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend
acceptance of this dissertation.

**E. Ann Kaplan, Distinguished Professor, Dissertation Co-Advisor
Cultural Analysis & Theory**

**Krin Gabbard, Professor Emeritus, Dissertation Co-Advisor
Cultural Analysis & Theory**

**Jeffrey Santa Ana, Associate Professor, Chairperson of Defense
Cultural Analysis & Theory and English Department**

**Leo T.S. Ching, Outside Member, Duke University,
Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**

**Aaron A. Gerow, Outside Member, Yale University,
Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures**

This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School

Nancy Goroff

Interim Dean of the Graduate School

Abstract of the Dissertation

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Doctor of Philosophy

in

Comparative Literature

Stony Brook University

2016

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the *jun’ai* (pure-love) genre has flourished in Japan, both in works of popular literature and in film. This phenomenon coincides with a time when the country is seen by the media as being characterized by *soshitsukan* (sense of loss). In *jun’ai* films, the heroine is often the object of loss. This theme of loss in *jun’ai* therefore resonates with the Japanese social context, but this connection has not yet been fully elucidated. In this dissertation, I seek to explain why Japanese women, who are arguably treated as “other” within Japan, embody a transnationalism that is often controlled and restrained for the sake of maintaining a cohesive Japanese national identification. I examine a group of 21st-century Japanese and Taiwanese films that feature a *jun’ai* sentiment between the heroine and the male protagonist, arguing that the *jun’ai* sentiment shows a gap between the transnational imagination that individuals aspire to, and a national ideology that manages to bind subjects to the status quo. *Jun’ai*, as a subgenre of romance, is used as a national allegory for such purpose. To explain how the roles of *jun’ai* heroines are used to recuperate national identification, I also analyze the concurrent trend of transnational adaptations of Audrey Hepburn’s child-woman persona in television dramas and *OL* (office lady) fashion magazines, which have popularized a local version of “*otona-kawaii*” (adult-cute) women in Japan. In these media representations, women’s “foreignness” is controlled through the expression of pure-love and the image of women as “evolving” subjects who are capable of adapting to circumstances and mature through the process. Finally, in order to further explore the transnational potential of the genre, I examine the ways in which *jun’ai* is used as a national discourse in Taiwan.

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Kung-ziao Henry Sung (1948-2014), who would be very happy and proud to learn about the completion of this dissertation.

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Acknowledgments

One of my friends, who is a psychology major, once said, “You can know your classmates’ “dark side” simply by reading the title of their dissertations.” I suppose the same inference could be made for a dissertation written in the field of comparative literature and cultural studies. This dissertation is about love and transnationalism realized at the personal level. To some extent, it is inspired by my own search for the meaning of love, life, and the pursuit of knowledge in day-to-day existence. As my research and writing come together in the form of this dissertation, I realize I have been truly blessed with the luxury to invest years of efforts in this pursuit with the help of so many people without whom the completion of this work would simply have been impossible.

It is to my supervisors, Professor E. Ann Kaplan and Professor Krin Gabbard, that I owe my deepest gratitude to. They have demonstrated to me what an academic advisor and mentor should be; throughout the prolonged process of my writing, they have given me their unyielding trust and utmost patience, reading every page, going through multiple revisions of my manuscripts, and promptly offering me concrete suggestions to clarify my argument. Their careful, responsive attitude toward my work has helped me harness my writing in a scholarly fashion, and their comments and encouragements have always fueled my verve to complete the work. Since my research involves cross-disciplinary themes in the field of Japanese studies—a field that our program does not have specific faculty for—I am especially thankful for Professor Kaplan’s support and guidance along the way. Her keenness in argumentation and enthusiasm for the pursuit of knowledge have taught me a great deal and motivated me to become a scholar.

I am eternally grateful to my two external committee members: Professor Aaron Gerow and Professor Leo Ching. They have devoted a tremendous amount of time and effort reading through my manuscripts, offering me insightful comments, and directing me to the core materials for my research. In both written communications and during the oral defense, they have specifically pointed out ideas to develop for future study, and their encouraging comments on my work have boosted my confidence to advance my research. Their expertise and generosity in mentoring me will always be remembered and cherished.

I also want to express my heartfelt gratitude to the chair of my oral defense, Professor Jeffrey Santa Ana. During the process of preparing for my comprehensive exam and dissertation prospectus, Professor Santa Ana managed to discuss a great number of the texts with me. During those discussions, he always listened to my opinion and helped me develop my ideas into a well-rounded academic argument that I could continue to explore. I also want to thank Professor E.K. Tan, who introduced me to inter-Asia cultural studies when I first entered the program. I could never thank them enough for all the kind guidance they have offered.

Professor Iwabuchi Koichi at the School of International Liberal Studies at Waseda University, Tokyo, kindly agreed to be affiliated with me while I served as a Japanese Studies fellow under the Japan Foundation to conduct doctoral dissertation research in 2012. During my year-long stay, Professor Iwabuchi invited me to attend the academic conference he organized and never failed to encourage me to develop my academic research into working papers. His

works in inter-Asia and popular media studies have inspired me in shaping my own research. Therefore, I am greatly indebted to the Japan Foundation for providing me with this opportunity to study, observe, and do research in Japan.

I have been extremely fortunate to have Julie Bellemare, who is a Ph.D. student in Asian Art, as my copyeditor. Julie is patient, meticulous, and punctual as an editor, besides being well-versed in multiple languages and cultures. She has witnessed how this dissertation evolved from its rawest to its final form. Her contribution to its development has been immense.

Numerous friends and acquaintances have unfailingly encouraged and supported me emotionally to complete this dissertation, which include the dissertation writing group composed of my Stony Brook pals—Beth, Evren, Joana and Claire, and the discussion group I formed with Inin Chu. I have also enjoyed numerous friendly discussions with other graduate students hard at work in the library. I thank Mary Moran-Luba for offering me timely administrative support whenever I need it. Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, Su-chuen (Jane) and Kung-ziao (Henry), and my grandma Ha-me, the most persevering woman I have ever known, for their unconditional love and tolerance of such a “wayward” daughter and granddaughter.

Introduction

Mako, what do you mean by *junketsu* [purity]? Some people may be pure physically, but mentally impure. I wonder. I personally do not think it would be impure to permit everything in the case of someone I love most, before I marry him, although I know morally that would be wrong... I'm sure most people would assume that we have a so-called "deep" relationship. If they want to imagine so, let them do so. We were strongly united spiritually, but never physically. If I had known I was going to become [terminally ill] like this, I would have liked to give you everything (although you never asked for it), but at the same time I think our *junketsu* is what makes our relationship beautiful.

I think our love can stay within just the two of us... But, I also wonder if [our love] can give strength to those people who were disappointed in love because of their illness and disabilities. But above all, I'd love to let the whole world know that there exists a man like Mako who possesses such wonderful love [*aijo*]...¹

The *jun'ai* phenomenon that started in Japan in the beginning of the 21st century is a commercially successful genre of fiction that triggers romantic emotions. Following the box-office success of Yukisada Isao's *Crying out Love in the Center of the World* in 2004, an adaptation of a novel by Katayama Kyoichi, a *jun'ai* boom swept across the big screen: *Be with You* (dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2004), *Heavenly Forest* (dir. Shinjo Takehiro, 2006), *Song to the Sun* (dir. Koizumi Norihiko, 2006), *Rainbow Song* (dir. Kumazawa Naoto, 2006), *Nadasoso* (dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2006), *Koizora* (dir. Imai Natsuki, 2007), *Oto-na-ri* (dir. Kumazawa Naoto, 2009), and *Hanamizuki* (dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2010), just to name a few. Before their adaptation on film, many of these *jun'ai* stories appeared in postmodern media such as cell phone novels (*keitai-shosetsu*), making them easily accessible in people's daily lives. Although there is no consensual

¹ Quoted and translated from M. Oshima and M. Kono, *Ai to shi o mitsumete* (Gazing at love and death, 1963) in Sonia Ryang *Love in Modern Japan*, 83.

definition of the romantic genre of *jun'ai*, I have found that the following features are recurrent: (a) in terms of characterization, even though both male and female protagonists are young, the heroines are generally more mature and determined about their life pursuits than their male counterparts; (b) the male protagonist is portrayed as naïve, unsophisticated, and slow to detect the heroine's love for him; (c) in terms of setting, stories tend to take place in relatively insular environments, such as the countryside, a university or high school campus, or some "special secret site" known only to the couple; (d) a few recurring motifs include the disappearance of the angelic heroine from the protagonist's life (she may be inflicted with some incurable rare disease or she leaves Japan in the name of self-development); (e) upon her disappearance from the male protagonist's life, the protagonist is left to deal with his loss of the heroine. Thematically, the forlorn protagonist learns to live with this loss through an emotional reaffirmation of the heroine's love for him and heretofore, begins a healing process.² Although a *jun'ai* film does not necessarily involve the death or disappearance of a beloved someone, the sentiment of loss—and the cathartic effect of dealing with such loss—is characteristic of *jun'ai* as a genre.

***Jun'ai* pathos: A domestic sentiment of loss**

Through the release of tears and emotions over the loss of a beloved, consumers of *jun'ai* experience a process of healing. Iwai Shunji's *Love Letter* (1995), which relates a female protagonist's nostalgic love for her deceased fiancé, is a predecessor of contemporary *jun'ai* films. The Korean Wave (*Hallyu*) has also contributed to the Japanese *jun'ai* boom and in its emergence of the 21st century. Here, I look at *jun'ai* as a national discourse as well as allegory

² There are *jun'ai* films that deploy a reversed situation, in which the protagonist is female, and she is left to cope with the death of her love-object. Such examples are *Love Letter* (dir. Iwai Shunji, 1995) and *Koizora* (a.k.a. *Sky of Love*; dir. Natsuki Imai, 2007), *Nada Soso* (*Tears for You*; dir. Nobuhiro Doi, 2006) and *I Give My First Love to You* (dir. Takehiro Shinjo, 2009), to name a few. The reverse cases also testify that *jun'ai* is a romantic subgenre dealing with loss of the love-object.

that has emerged from the aftermath of Japan's "Lost Decade" (*ushinawareta junen*) in the 1990s.³ *Jun'ai* is comprised of two words: *jun* (purity) and *ai* (love). According to the Japanese dictionary *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten*, *jun'ai* means "disinterested, dedicated love." Purity primarily designates a feeling that is delicate and genuine, but it also carries connotations of innocence and ingenuousness. Because of this premature nature, *jun'ai*, as a feeling, is often transient and unreciprocated. It is often characterized by "*soshitsukan*" (sense of loss) over the loss of a loved one. In films, it tends to arise between young protagonists in secluded settings where they are helpless in fighting against life's various restrictions. In addition, purity in *jun'ai* also suggests sexual purity: either there are no explicit sexual scenes, or the spiritual qualities of the couple's love-making are emphasized, but *jun'ai* is depicted as an once-in-a-lifetime love that is devotional and genuine. Usually, it is the heroine who is more sensitive about her *jun'ai* for the male protagonist, but owing to life's various circumstances, she is unable to get her feelings across to the man she loves. Another noticeable fact is that while it is not unusual for contemporary Japanese female novelists to write about explicit sexual and erotic feelings, many popular stories categorized as works of *jun'ai* are written by middle-aged Japanese men, and the love that they describe is often platonic.⁴ For instance, Katayama Kyoichi (b. 1959), whose *Socrates in Love* (Katayama's original title of *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*),

³ Japan's Lost Decade is often discussed from an economic standpoint. See "Scenarios for Rebirth of the Japanese Economy after "the Lost Decade" ("失われた10年"と日本経済再生のシナリオ(柴垣和夫教授古稀記念号)." *武蔵大学論集* 51.2 (2003): 175-95. However, the anxiety about the loss is comprehensive in various aspects in Japan. Noticeably, it leads to contemplation about how it will change Japanese culture. See Kamiya Mitsuo's "The Succession and Continuity of Japanese Fundamental Culture: The Decade of Loss and the Anxiety towards Its Internal Loss" (神谷満雄. "日本における基盤文化の継承とその持続--失われた十年と内的喪失への不安. *日本文化* (2000): 93-105). Nevertheless, discourse about Japan's Lost Decade continues; the Tohoku Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami that took place on March 11th, 2011, made people pessimistic about Japan's economic future. Therefore, the Lost Decade, or "*Heisei fukyo*" (Heisei Recession; Heisei era starts from 1989; 2015 is Heisei 27) continues as Japan's Lost Decades.

⁴ Meanwhile, many popular Japanese female novelists' works, such as those of Yoshimoto Banana (b.1964), Ekuni Kaori (b.1964) and Yamada Eimi (b. 1959), are infused with motifs and fantasies related to the foreign. Yamada Eimi's novel, *Bedtimes Eyes* (1985) is especially famous for her graphic depiction of the Japanese female protagonist's sexual and physical obsession with African American men.

popularly recognized as a work of *jun'ai*, is the best-selling single-volume Japanese novel, which has sold a record 320 million copies as of May 2005, second only to the two volumes of Murakami Haruki's *Norwegian Wood* (1987) put together.⁵ Another male author, Ichikawa Takuji (b. 1962), whose original novels inspired the adaptation of the latter two films listed above, has also been widely acclaimed as a romance writer in Japan since his debut as an Internet novelist with *Separation* (2002). Yet, while the creators of these *jun'ai* stories are male, they would not be so successful were it not for the support of female audiences. Ichikawa mentioned that he started to write novels in 1997 for the sake of his wife when she was confined indoors due to her pregnancy.⁶ Katayama's novel *Socrates in Love* only became a national best-seller a year later when celebrity actress Shibasaki Kou wrote a glowing review for it in her column in *Da Vinci*, a Japanese monthly magazine dedicated to popular novels and comic books, mentioning how she read it in one breath with tears filling her eyes, and that she longed to experience a love as beautiful as the one portrayed in it.⁷ Her words were printed on the novel's sleeve as advertisement and Shibasaki herself was cast as a supporting actress in the adapted film version in 2004.

In terms of gender representation, director Yukisada of *Crying out Love* mentioned in his talk with Korean director Hur Jin-ho that female characters in his romantic films tend to act positively toward life, while men are mostly "useless guys" (*damena yatsu*) (*Aera* 54).⁸ Both

⁵ "読売ADレポート" *Ojo* : *adv.yomiuri*. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 June 2016.

<<http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/ojo/02number/200505/05toku3.html>>.

⁶ "「恋愛」を読みたい市川拓司さん×大河内奈々子さん b e ・ B O O K S 特集 (前編)." *Asahi.com* : - b e *Extra-BOOK*. N.p., 27 Sept. 2005. Web. 1 May 2015.

<<http://book.asahi.com/be/TKY200506080321.html>>.

⁷ "セカチュー現象のまとめ/世界の中心で、愛をさけぶ." *セカチュー現象のまとめ/世界の中心で、愛をさけぶ*. COPYRIGHT FUMI 2004, n.d. Web. 15 June 2016. <<http://www.alived.com/ai/sekachu.html>>.

⁸ Professor Aaron Gerow has reminded me that the depiction of "useless guys" has appeared in Japanese cinema for

directors' recent films are romantically tragic in nature.⁹ Hur's *April Snow* (2005), set in present-day Korea, is about love that begins as extramarital affair, while Yukisada's *Spring Snow* (2005) is a tragic romance between people of different classes. The Japanese film is adapted from Mishima Yukio's novel set in the early Taisho period (1912-1926). Due to the passive and immature personalities of many of the films' male protagonists, director Yukisada thinks of *jun'ai* as genuine love nostalgically belonging to adolescent times (*Nakeru Jun'ai* 9-10). Echoing his observations, Ichikawa, the author of these stories, admits that as far as he knows, readers who like his works share some of his own personality traits: honesty, and a certain reluctance to openly express personal desires and feelings.¹⁰ Ichikawa attributes the quiet, introverted, and innocent characters to his being a victim of mild social anxiety disorder in his adolescence, choosing to keep to himself and read novels in the library instead of mingling with friends.¹¹ He remarks that novelists tend to create fictional characters with distinct personality traits and personal problems, such as being addicted to alcohol and getting too involved in complicated interpersonal relationships, while he tries to depict ordinary people, doing ordinary things in their monotonous daily lives. To him, the majority of Japanese people are "law-abiding, earnest people who try not to disturb others."¹² Thus, he regards the passivity of his protagonists as rather unusual for mainstream representations of male characters, yet they are like ordinary Japanese men whose presence usually remains unacknowledged. The male protagonists in *jun'ai*

decades; for example, in Naruse Mikio's and Mizoguchi Kenji's works. These two directors are also famous for their portrayals of strong-willed female characters.

⁹ The leading protagonist of Hur's *April Snow* is Bae Yong-joon, whose Korean television drama *Winter Sonata* has led a Korean craze among Japanese housewives when it was broadcast in Japan by NHK in 2003. The tragic romantic sentiment of *Winter Sonata* resulted in part in the subsequent boom of *jun'ai* works in the early 2000s.

¹⁰ 丁, 文玲. "純愛故事永遠令人癡狂." 開啟你心中的純愛天堂 愛·小·說. 尖端出版股份有限公司, n.d. Web. 02 Apr. 2015. <<http://www.spp.com.tw/html/other/lovestory/authora1.htm>>.

¹¹ 王, 蘊潔. "市川拓司的魔幻氛圍 《14個月 Separation》 導讀." 開啟你心中的純愛天堂 愛·小·說. 尖端出版股份有限公司, n.d. Web. 02 Apr. 2015. <<http://www.spp.com.tw/html/other/lovestory/authora1.htm>>.

¹² Mermaiddock. "市川拓司 @ 離開地球的方法: 痞客邦 PIXNET ." 27 June 2007. Web. 02 Apr. 2015. <<http://mermaiddock.pixnet.net/blog/post/5536869-%E5%B8%82%E5%B7%9D%E6%8B%93%E5%8F%B8>>.

stories are mostly inarticulate and *yasashii* (gentle) type of men, and are depicted as in need of some sort of cultivation so as to individuate. They are different from the privileged elite group holding high-paying jobs, where men can enjoy better career prospects in Japan. They are also not part of the elite class who can travel overseas as Japanese corporate expatriates, a category that reflects the successful global expansion of Japanese business since the 1960s. All in all, they are by no means authoritative male figures conventionally associated with an old, paternalistic Japanese society. They are generally underrepresented. In fact, while it is impossible to draw an overall picture of the gender dynamics in contemporary Japanese society, average Japanese men have been faced with relatively important socio-economic responsibilities and high level of pressure due to their gender; studies point out that not only is men's suicide rate three times higher than women's, but victims of "*karoshi*" (death-by-overwork) are mostly males (Ehara and Yamada 39). As a result, men nowadays are encouraged to take off their "armors" (41). The gentle but emotionally passive male protagonists of *jun'ai*, therefore, reflect ordinary men's dilemmas and resonate with their feelings when faced with the frustrations of life.

In contrast with the male protagonist's indecisiveness, the heroine's support and affection is unflinching and compassionate. The genre's soothing and cathartic nature transpires when the protagonist finally realizes that the heroine loves him unconditionally, even when she needs to endure the pain of unreciprocated love and solitary death. Meanwhile, the male protagonist's belated realization of his love for the heroine constitutes the pathos of *jun'ai*, purging his great remorse until he finally acknowledges how much the heroine has sacrificed for him. As a result, in terms of sentiment, *jun'ai*, as a subgenre of romance, is a popular imaginary space where ordinary men's vulnerability can be expressed, and where the unsettling gender dynamics

underlying Japanese society can be resolved, albeit at the heroines' expense. This reveals the cultural ideology at play in gender representations in Japanese popular media.

The emergence of *jun'ai* in the beginning of the 21st century echoes the boom of "*iyasu*" (healing) cultural products that has arisen with the tremendous social pressure since the 1990s. The *jun'ai* heroine, with her genuine and unyielding love for the male protagonist, is a figure of *iyasu*. Furukawa and Denison point out that the devastating East Japan Earthquake of 2011 has accentuated the need for products and cultures bearing *iyasu* purposes (225). The *iyashi-kei* (healing type) boom, according to the authors, began earlier in the 1990s. Marc Hairston defines *iyashi* products as "anything (an artwork, a piece of music, a person, even a scenic view) that creates a sense of peace and spiritual satisfaction" (qtd. in Furukawa and Denison 230). Jonathan Watts relates the demand for *iyashi* products to the tremendous social pressure in Japan, and identifies women as its target audience. He refers to *iyashi* as "the marketing buzzword of the moment" and that its entering into Japanese daily parlance is due to the demand to "relieve *sutoresu*—stress" as Japan enters "a period of rapid expansion to one where people—especially young women—want to enjoy the fruits of their labors" (932). Specifically, Watts defines *iyashi* in the following activities: "English gardening, aromatherapy, reflexology, pets, and herbs have joined the traditional leisure pursuit of hot-spring bathing in a boom in *iyashi*, a word that conveys a mixture of healing, calming, and getting close to nature. Health counselors are recommending 'forest baths'—walks in the woods—for urban workers who need to wind down" (932). For Watts, the economic prosperity of the 1990s and its subsequent downturn are both the cause and effect of the *iyashi* boom that reconnects people with nature.¹³ Modern Japanese

¹³ The following website is an example that specifies *iyashi* products for female and male consumers. Many items cater to both sexes as well. In this website, the healing property of the ocean and its animals, such as jelly fish raising and observing, visiting aquariums, are particularly emphasized: <http://futamitc.jp/blog-entry-493.html>

people are faced with an intolerable amount of pressure at work, as evidenced by the alarming increase of “*karoshi*” (death-by-overwork). These frustrations have prompted the current generation “to pamper themselves [rather] than to follow their parents onto the corporate treadmill” (932). Engaging with *iyashi* products creates a personal time-out and space-out of ordinary life without upsetting the status quo. The causal effect between the social transformations since the 1990s and the emergence of *iyashi* provides an important background to my discussion of *jun'ai*.

The loss of a beloved someone in *jun'ai* stories is reflexive of a perceived loss of a stable and integral sense of mooring in present Japanese society. I will later address how the perceived loss of love resonates with the real-life social sentiment of Japan’s loss of economic power since the mid-1990s. The *iyashi* as well as *jun'ai* boom occurred synchronically in popular media such as in literature, films, anime, manga, music, and televised productions, which have created works geared toward soothing people’s minds by helping them ease the burdens of daily reality, even if just momentarily. As a prevalent social trend, the need to heal exposes a wound that has formed in Japan and that has not been properly treated. It is also a loss that has not been adequately mourned, and that thus repeatedly appears in diverse *iyashi* products and in the various films that feature *jun'ai* as a dominant sentiment.

Adapted from popular novels directed at a local audience, I see *jun'ai* movies as a domestic genre. Its contents, however, harbor imageries and motifs indicative of how Japan feels toward the outside world. In the stories, women, seen by many critics as potential “foreigners” within Japan, are often portrayed as an element that has to be contained and controlled in the national order. In my view, the characterization of the heroines parallels Japan’s national discourse and ideology, i.e. *kokusaika* (literally translated as internationalization), and I discuss these themes

and their correlation in more detail in the first chapter of this dissertation. There is a close connection between women and *kokusaika*. Both are oxymoronic and contested conceptions of the traditional and the modern: when represented as objects of *jun'ai*, women's potential threat to become "*fujun*" (impure) is concealed, while in *kokusaika*, the desire to internationalize Japan is in fact meant to domesticate the foreign. Women and the foreign, thus, under the national discourse of *kokusaika*, can be seen synonymously as elements that need to be stabilized within Japan.

In her studies of Japanese *furusato* (native place) and nostalgia against the background of *kokusaika* in the 1980s and 1990s, Jennifer Robertson has argued that, "Internationalization denotes essentially the same process as native place-making but from the vantage point of the provinces or the periphery." Moreover, the "catchword (*kokusaika*) has less to do with the non-Japanese world, and more to do with a discourse within Japan on nationness, in which case 'international' serves as a trope for, among other things, the substance of the multipolar, center-periphery relations promoted in regional developmental projects" (112-113). In other words, she sees *kokusaika* as focusing more on establishing the binary between Tokyo as "a world city" and *furusato* as a nostalgic symbol that is "experiential and sentimental, and mark concentric circles of interiority: for Tokyo residents, *furusato* is a provincial town, while for Japanese residing abroad, *furusato* signifies Japan" (117). Robertson further points out how women from *furusato* are gendered as a sign of nostalgia in Japan (124). The imagery of women as objects of purity, uncontaminated by outer influence, is also ambivalently embodied in the construction of *jun'ai* heroines. In the following sections, I first look at how literary traditions use the idea of "*jun*" (purity) as a means to regulate women's conduct before I venture to discuss how *kokusaika* ambiguously triggers individuals' transnational aspirations and imagination for foreign countries,

which are necessarily in conflict with its nationalistic intent. *Jun'ai* films and their heroines echo this contradiction, and they are ultimately used as a means to console the anxieties that it provokes. The theme of *jun'ai* resonates with the currently perceived *soshitsukan* (sense of loss) in the Lost Decade following the burst of the Japanese economic bubble in mid-1990s. The emergence of *jun'ai* at this particular time can only be studied in light of this social context, national sentiment, and transnational aspirations embodied in individual characters.

Crying out love in the center of the world in Japan

Jun'ai is perceived as a sentiment and pathos. Since it is but one kind of emotion derived from contemporary times, I refer to the current *jun'ai* trend as a subgenre of romance. Literary scholar Fujii Hidetada reads the sentimental pathos of *jun'ai* as a result of 'shackles' in life. For him, *jun'ai* is a Japanese literary sentiment, and he argues that literature in the third decade of the Showa period (1926-89) is characterized by *jun'ai* longing (43-45). This conceptualization of *jun* is directly related to Japan's state regulations regarding its female citizens' physical purity. Both Fujii and Sonia Ryang see the Ministry of Education's Fundamentals of Purity Education as an example of how the patriarchal Japanese government sets up *junketsu* (purity) as a principle to regulate young men and women's relationships. Here, the emphasis on '*junsuisa*' (purity) was directly associated with women's sexual purity. Moreover, the concept of 'pure' is defined by the purity of blood: "human reproduction must prioritize genetically pure blood [*ketto no junsui*] and the improvement of physique [*keishitsu no yuryoka*]; such a condition cannot be attained by *ranko* (sexual promiscuity) and must depend on [pure and virgin] marriage and marital fidelity" (qtd. in Ryang 68).

The emphasis on sexual purity, however, immediately invites the threat of the ‘impure’ (*fujun*). The very lack of definition of *jun’ai* allows people to define the concept from various perspectives. In some contemporary scenarios, *jun’ai*’s purity manifests in protagonists finding true love in illegitimate extra-marital affairs.¹⁴ Ryang expands the discussion of *jun’ai* in her work on love in modern Japan, in which she examines Watanabe Junichi’s bestseller *Shitsurakuen* (Paradise Lost), a story about an extra-marital love affair which ends in the couple’s double suicide, deeming it a phenomenal *jun’ai* event of the 1990s (112-16).¹⁵ Whether it is regulated in the guidelines of purity education or alternatively justified in unlawful affairs, purity is enforced by regulating women’s sexual transgression and making it conform to social norms. The theme of using death to show the purity of love is further elaborated in Tamaki Horie’s reading of the theme of *jun’ai shinju* (pure-love double suicide) (8-13). These various contextualizations of *jun’ai* in literature suggest the ambiguous existence of *fujun* in the ideal of *jun*. That is, if the extra-marital affair is based on the genuineness of love, it can also be seen as *jun’ai*. A “*jun*” type of love thus designates a love that defies the constraints of familial and marriage institutions, even though it often has to end tragically.

In response to the contemporary *jun’ai* craze in popular media, in 2005 *Kino Review* published an issue entirely devoted to discussions of love, inviting scholars, novelists, illustrators and critics to explore the sudden rise of popular *jun’ai* productions (Suzuki Takayuki). *Jun’ai* was thus conceptualized as a shared sentiment found in diverse fields of contemporary life in

¹⁴ For example, purity is equated to one’s essential pursuit of individual freewill, as can be seen in the phrase ‘*furin jun’ai*’ (extra-marital pure-love), which exalts love pursued by freewill rather than marriage instituted by the state or the family. The theme of *furin jun’ai* echoes the plot of Watanabe Junichi’s *Shitsurakuen* (Paradise Lost), whose ending features the couple dying together in sexual union. The desire to transcend the limitations of preexisting social institutions is embodied in the very ideal of *furin jun’ai*, and the extra-marital sex is used as a gesture of defiance against social institutions.

¹⁵ The other two phenomena she discusses are the craze over Korean actor Bae Yong-joon, which she refers to as Japanese housewives’ “*Yongfluenza*”, and school girls “aid-dating” (*enjokosai*, getting money from older men to buy things they want) (7).

Japan. Not only did the authors reflect on the influence of Korean popular films and television dramas, but *shojo manga* (comic books targeting adolescent girls) and the theme of homosexual *jun'ai* were all also included in the volume's comprehensive discussions of the emerging phenomenon (10-58).

According to Suzuki, *jun'ai* can be nationally grounded as patriotic love, as demonstrated by right-wing nationalist ideals inciting people to selflessly give away their lives for the state (111). For other critics, it can also refer to sexual and gender transgression with a focus on fulfilling one's personal desires (Shingu Kazushige 147). Throughout the volume, perhaps the most provocative interpretation comes from Ogura Kizo, who reads Japanese housewives' Korean craze, inspired chiefly by their affection for *Yon-sama* (an honorary and intimate name for Korean actor Bae Yong-joon, who plays the lead in Korean melodrama *Winter Sonata*), as redemptive of Japanese colonial rule over Korea between 1910 and 1945 (36).¹⁶ Following Ogura's reading of how Korea has transnationally ignited Japan's *jun'ai* sentiment, I also look at *jun'ai* as a consequence of Japan's transnational relations, although it is not responsive solely to Korean popular culture. I argue that *jun'ai* is reflective of how Japan has conceptualized its current national status in relation with several nations, including how the country deals with postwar occupation by the United States' military forces, and tensions with China and Korea resulting from the unsettled aftermath of wartime criminality, which has triggered a series of diplomatic clashes. During Japan's Lost Decade, international conflicts have foregrounded the theme of loss in *jun'ai* as a resonance of a national sentiment: the international controversies over Japan's prime minister Koizumi Junichiro's paying respect to wartime heroes (whom Japan's victims refer to as criminals) and military officials in the Yasukuni Shrine triggered anti-

¹⁶ *Winter Sonata* (KBS2, 2002) aired on Japan's public television network NHK in 2004.

Japanese demonstrations. The fervent protests from China and South Korea have shown how what Koizumi referred to as ‘a matter of the heart’ was in fact a diplomatic thing (Tsuneo Akaha 163).

Mouri Yoshitaka’s edited volume on the Korean craze in Japan acknowledges that some middle-aged female fans of *Winter Sonata* have acted in forming touring groups that take them across national borders to visit specific sites where important scenes were shot, making them proactive consumers of transnational cultures. However, little research has been done on how contemporary Japanese *jun’ai* films are directly influenced by a national discourse and ideology that is ambivalently subject to individuals’ transnational aspirations for life outside the confines of Japan. I argue that the ambivalence between national identification and transnational aspirations manifests itself in the characterization of *jun’ai* heroines, whose existence in turn parallels Japan’s national discourse of *kokusaika*—a national allegory that has become itself a nostalgic discourse in current times. By looking at how *jun’ai* is a domestic genre relevant to the need of the current Japanese context, I also want to use it to examine the country’s “national” turn. This is where this research can contribute to the study of *jun’ai* not only as a film genre, but also as a social and cultural sentiment.

It is true that *jun’ai* films come under a number of variations, and most of them do not display any evident transnational theme. Most would be simply categorized as romantic dramas. For instance, the erotic *jun’ai* movie *Furin Jun’ai*” (dir. Yazaki Hitoshi, 2010), and the urban pop romance in the late eighties *Shinjuku Jun’ai Monogatari* (Shinjuku Pure-love Story, dir. Nasu Hiroyuki, 1987), are films that only employ the term *jun’ai* in their titles in order to romanticize the couple’s love story. In addition, *Train Man: Densha Otoko* (dir. Murakami Shosuke, 2007) has opened up the dimension of *jun’ai* in the sub-cultural cyber world of *otaku*

(obsessive anime and manga fans) (Honda Toru, 2005). Films adapted from *shojo manga*, such as *Ai to Makoto* (Love and Truth, dir. Miike Takashi, 2012), *NANA* (dir. Otani Kentaro, 2005) and *I Give My First Love to You* (dir. Shinjo Takehiko, 2009) have carved out a realm which celebrates youthfulness and love as means to transcend life's various restrictions. All these examples come up with their own demonstration of *jun'ai*. However, due to my focus on how women are made to bear both a national intent and an exotic identity, I do not include the aforementioned films in my analysis.¹⁷

Instead, my selection of films focus on the decades that directly follow the discourse of the Lost Decade. I wish to contextualize a noteworthy social trend in not only the literary but also the cinematic representations following the success of films such as *Crying out Love in the Center of the World* and *Heavenly Forest*; that is, a social contextualization of the theme of loss in *jun'ai*, and how women are connected with such loss. In *jun'ai* films, loss is often represented by the death or disappearance of the love-object in a foreign place, and a protagonist who is left to deal with emotional bereavement. The connection of the heroine with the foreign is a noteworthy representation that reiterates Japan's socio-historical tensions with the outside world since modernization. Socio-anthropological studies have revealed gendered differences in how individuals are motivated to become more "internationalized" during the process. The foreign places in *jun'ai* do not necessarily represent an actual foreign setting, but respond to a social sentiment of loss yet to be identified and released. Thus, the sense of loss permeating these films should be understood with regard to Japan's Lost Decade since the mid-1990s and throughout the 2000s.

¹⁷ There is no doubt that these films also feature stories of *jun'ai*, but these films are also related in the discussions of cyber culture, anime and manga. By looking at these issues, the discussion would orient toward the capitalist background of globalization. It will be a topic to explore once I have clarified *jun'ai*'s current entanglement with Japan's national theme.

Meanwhile, *jun'ai* is primarily a domestic genre; with the exception of a few works, *jun'ai* films mainly cater to domestic and Asian markets, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Hong Kong.¹⁸ They are not intended to be screened overseas in large cinema houses, nor are they meant to participate in international film festivals. If some of them are sometimes available on DVD with English subtitles, they were not destined to be released on the Western circuit of venues. It becomes clear that some foreign elements function in *jun'ai* films through their symbolism in addressing Japanese audiences, including foreign ones who can accept a more reserved, albeit nonsexual, mode of expressing love. That being said, my research investigates *jun'ai* films' treatment of the heroine by comparing it with Japan's discourse about the foreign, which has provided a resourceful background to reflect on and understand the current boom of *jun'ai*.

Interestingly, studies of Western melodramas often discuss the genre in terms of its stylistic and emotional excess "marked by 'lapses' in realism, by 'excesses of spectacle and displays of primal, even infantile, emotions, and by narratives that seem circular and repetitive" (Linda Williams 143). The excessive emotions, which cannot be accommodated in women's daily lives, are released through tears shed over a "temporality of fantasy" that designates a pathos of "Too late!" (152). They address a female audience, as they depict women suffering for their social conditions. *Jun'ai* works also address a female audience by expressing a belated regret of love, even though they are mostly created by male authors. In contrast with the heroines' self-reflexivity in the narratives of melodramas, the creation of *jun'ai* heroines reflects more of a

¹⁸ Information was accessed by running individual film searches on release dates on the International Movie Data Base website. *IMDB*. 15 June 2016. <<http://www.imdb.com/>>.

male ideology. The heroine's love for the male protagonist is often unreciprocated due to their missed timing, or sealed with the death or disappearance of the heroine. The belated realization of love after the vanishing of the heroine makes it impossible for the male protagonist to properly mourn the deceased. He can only lament and ease his loss by carrying on with life. The wound is, in fact, buried unhealed in the heroine. Noticeably, this sentiment is shown repeatedly in *jun'ai* films. Thus, the emergence of the *jun'ai* subgenre echoes the perceived *soshitsukan* in daily life in an empathetic way that hints at a process in which one can imagine the easing of this feeling of loss.

While there are some romantic films that interpret 'jun' in *jun'ai* as non-sexual light romance whose purity refers to the simplicity of the storyline and the unsophisticated personality of the protagonists, the theme of loss features in the majority of stories that are considered works of *jun'ai*. There is a fine line between what is considered a domestic event and its transnational aftermaths. I see *jun'ai* as a domestic discourse that bears a national ideology, but it is also a consequence of how elements of foreignness have been regarded—whether being domesticated, adapted, controlled, or eliminated—in Japan.

The way in which a Japanese woman is turned into a *jun'ai* heroine is an important motif that I deal with in this dissertation. In literary works, women are often shaped according to the authors' ideology. In *jun'ai* films, the heroines are commonly represented as soon-to-be-lost, and thus as an absence. They are representational and ideological, instead of real. Elizabeth Ann Kaplan observes that in Hollywood cinema, a woman is often portrayed as being lifted out of her daily reality “onto the second level of connotation, myth; she is presented as what she represents for man, not in terms of what she *actually* signifies. Her *discourse* (her meanings, as she might produce them) is suppressed in favor of a discourse structured by patriarchy in which her real

signification has been replaced by connotations that serve patriarchy's needs (18). In a similar vein, I read *jun'ai* heroines as being conjured up to serve the social function of pulling together an integral Japanese identification. The attributes that associate the heroines with traditional gender roles are constructed so as to fill an existing gap in Japanese *kokusaika*, the national discourse dealing with its ideal relationship with the outside world. By examining how gender dynamics play out in these works, I believe that the gendered aspect of *kokusaika*, both practiced on the personal level in daily life and promoted as a norm in popular media, can shed light on how Japan positions itself in relation to others through a national allegory of *jun'ai*. Throughout this dissertation, I argue for a socio-cultural ground that contextualizes the fear of loss as it arises in the gap between a transnational desire and a local sentiment that parallels Japan's wish to control and contain elements of foreignness within its own culture. Thus, the pursuit of *jun'ai* relates closely to the pursuit of an integral cultural identification that has become crucial in contemporary Japanese society.

Ogura's reads Japanese housewives' affection for Bae Yong-joon as redemptive of Japan's national guilt felt for Korea. Although this topic is beyond the reach of my discussion here, his juxtaposition of a domestic life in Japan and a transnational desire to bypass it, is of great concern here. Imaginations (or aspirations) that are inspired by transnational contacts constitute what I refer to as 'transnational imagination', which designates an imaginary transcendence of national borders, regardless of historical conflicts, where one can dream of living as an unattached individual. In a broad sense, it can also be understood as individuals' cosmopolitan transcendence in order to stay above social and national constraints. 'Cosmopolitan' here is used to refer to individuals' utopian ideals, and will be defined in further detail below. Transnational contacts, while bringing more diversity to national culture, also generate the threat of a country

losing total control over its citizens' identification. I read the disparity between an individual's transnational aspirations and national identification as underlying the incarnation of the *jun'ai* heroine. Japan's stress on purity as a cultural and social value is thus a direct response to the demand for contacts with the foreign—a theme that resonates with contemporary calls for *kokusaika*.¹⁹ I use *kokusaika* rather than globalization (*gurobarizeshon*) in my discussion, following Jennifer Robertson's classification of the former being "used most often to convey the self-conscious pursuit of 'soft' or affective social relations within Japan," and the latter more about "'hard' economic and political linkage between Japan and other nation-states" (1998:113). The sentiment over loss is represented in *jun'ai* films as a personalized response devised to address a social sentiment.

Oguma Eiji has demystified Japan's postwar construction of its national self-image as "homogeneous" and "peace-loving." This public identity, however, is established to correct Japan's prewar imperialist image, whose purpose was to assimilate non-Japanese colonial subjects such as Taiwanese and Koreans into a multi-ethnic empire (Robert A. Fish 45). Since its defeat in World War II, the idea of Japan as consisting of a population sharing a single pure origin has been useful in uniting people to overcome postwar economic distress. As a result, the cultural belief that distinguishes a "pure" Japan from "contaminating" outside influences has become the ideological norm in postwar Japan (Oguma 249-270). Robert A. Fish's research on how 'mixed-blood' Japanese are viewed in the postwar period supports Oguma's argument. He points out that during prewar times, Japanese people's concern over the "degradation of Japanese identity through 'blood impurity'" mainly targeted the offspring of Japanese and Korean parents,

¹⁹ According to the news database ヨミダス歴史館 accessed on Jan. 16, 2013, the keyword *kokusaika*, or "internationalization" appeared for 193 times in the title of the news coverage during the Showa Period (1926-1989) and since the beginning of the Heisei Period (1989-), the number of times has surged to 8,720. The keyword "globalization" appeared twice in the news titles during the Showa Period and 2,921 times in the Heisei Period.

since those of European descent were often children of missionaries and of other respectable occupations (44). Nevertheless, the defeat and subsequent American Occupation (1945-1952), resulting in the establishment of numerous military bases in Japan, has contributed to the concern over the increase of ‘mixed-blood’ population “born to members of lower socioeconomic classes,” many of which “lived in single-mother households” (44). Noticeably, it is during these years that some mixed-blood children were seen as objects of pity, especially in the early 1950s when many of them reached school age and were in need of relevant social programs and education (45). This time corresponds to Japan’s publication of its Purity Education manual, in which women’s sexual purity is a primary concern, and the overpopulation of mixed-blood children arouses debates over whether they will challenge “the intrinsic nature of the Japanese people” (46). Here, although not broached in Fish’s discussion, I think what lies beneath the anxiety in the construction of a pure Japanese national identity is women’s sexual promiscuity with Western men.

Karen Kelsky’s research on Japanese women’s individualized practice of internationalism in the 1990s supplements studies on the shift of women’s national loyalty from a patriarchal, ‘feudalistic,’ and backward Japan that confines their social roles within the domestic realm, to an identification with the modern West that helps them liberate themselves (1996: 35). Kelsky aptly points out that some women’s ‘erotic’ and ‘romantic’ participation in internationalism is based on setting up the binary relationship of Japan and the West, evaluating and criticizing the former’s degree of *kokusaika* based on the ‘universal’ standard set by the latter (1996:34). These women’s “*akogare*” (longing) for the West is what I call “transnational imagination,” which I view as not limited to some internationalist-minded women but prevalent as a social discourse among ordinary male and female individuals in contemporary Japanese society.

One contributing factor of transnational imagination is derived from the cultural aspirations of *kokusaika*, which encourages individuals to assume the responsibility of building transnational connections. National intent and transnational aspirations are complementary as much as they are sometimes contradictory. Popular media productions do not fail to represent both the aspirational parts and the conflicting ones; the ambivalences are often borne by the individuals themselves, who are symbolic of a national objective. Due to women's perceived social marginality in Japanese society, the role of the heroines is generally to succumb to their genuine love and sacrifice themselves for the male protagonists who are associated with a gentle, mild, and passive Japan afflicted with a sense of loss. In these works, popular representations of transnationalism suggest a return to domestic identification, which contain and control the transnational connections that it wishes to establish in the first place.

In her feminist reading of internationalist women's narratives, Karen Kelsky identifies *kokusaika* as a "profoundly gendered process" (1996: 29). In my analysis of Japan's *jun'ai* stories, I also notice that the heroines are often characterized as having a closer affinity with the foreign. Sometimes it is a real foreign destination, and sometimes it is an imaginary place that the heroine longs to visit; in some films, the foreign elements hint at the heroine's early death. Overall, in most *jun'ai* films and romantic television dramas, these transnational imaginations are represented only as exotic backgrounds. Moreover, owing to the gendered transnationalism that has been associated with Japan's *kokusaika*, the sense of loss and its treatment is often borne by the heroines' unconditional love for the male protagonists, which in turn covers up the contradictions underlying the *kokusaika* discourse.

Therefore, the appearance of transnational imagery in a domestic subgenre such as *jun'ai* reiterates and responds to the paradox inherent to *kokusaika*. It further reveals that individuals

are passively subjected to the gap between their transnational aspirations and national identification. However, why does *jun'ai* emerge in the popular media at this particular juncture, during Japan's Decade of Loss? In addition, who is in need of the catharses expressed in the narratives? In the first two chapters, my analysis of *jun'ai* narratives will show how women in Japan become the scapegoat of this identification gap in *kokusaika*. In the third chapter, through an analysis of the recently popularized term "*otona-kawaii*" (adult-cute) in popular media such as romantic television drama and fashion magazines, I argue that women in Japan are encouraged to engage in processes of socialization and cultivation to live their split identities. By examining women's presence in *jun'ai* films, television dramas and fashion magazines, I believe that the paradox of *kokusaika* can be revealed in the way individuals negotiate their desire for transnationalism while maintaining a national-cultural identification. Furthermore, my analysis will show how "the domestic turn" in these popular cultural productions targeting local audiences has again revealed how gender dynamics are exploited in *kokusaika*.

The perceived threat brought by contacts with foreign elements, however, is not new. The issue began with Japan's attempts to modernize itself during the Meiji period (1868-1912). In the 1980s, when both the discourse of *kokusaika* and Japanese economic prowess were at their zenith, the complicity of internationalist-minded women and the West testified to their criticism of the asymmetrical treatment of women in Japanese society. As I identify the *jun'ai* sentiment as one characterized by loss, my selection of films addresses how the heroine tends to be portrayed as the object of loss.²⁰ Thus, her role opens up a significant space where *jun'ai* can be examined as negotiating the gap between transnational imagination and national identification.

²⁰ Even though male protagonists are portrayed as object of loss in *jun'ai* films, such as *Love Letter*, *Nadasoso* (Tears for You, dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2006), *I Give My First Love to You* and *Koizora* (Sky of Love, dir. Imai Natsuki, 2007), these male roles tend to have very understanding, caring and gentle (*yasashii*) personalities that are often associated with stereotypical female roles. However, there is no homosexual undertone to these characterizations.

The complexity of the heroine lies in women's double significance in contemporary Japanese culture. On the one hand, they are often portrayed as embodying the conventional role of a maternal love-object. On the other hand, they are symbolic of a modernizing Japan. Women's roles are examined closely in the first three chapters of this dissertation. In their characterization as *jun'ai* objects, they allow for a reintegration of Japanese identity against a disintegrated social background.

I understand *jun'ai* as having a dual identity, being both a genre and an emotion. These two dimensions are in fact intermingled with each other in film productions. In the following sections, I will first illustrate how the concept of purity has conventionally been used to foster an integral Japanese culture. Then, I will contextualize how Japan's *kokusaika* movement can be seen as contributing to individuals' sense of loss when faced with a transnational dream that cannot be realized. I am fully aware that life in Japan is a hybrid consequence of persisting interactions with other nations and its domestic situation. It is true that decades of *kokusaika* practices and the advent of globalization have rendered Japanese culture part of a universal culture, and that the original dichotomy between a 'rich' and 'new' America versus a 'traditional' Japan is no longer clear-cut. Nevertheless, the *jun'ai* sentiment of loss evokes the age-old binary of Japan versus the foreign, and enables ordinary individuals to resolve the gaps in their daily lives. The sentiment of loss in contemporary Japan makes it possible to look at *jun'ai* as a phenomenon paralleling the rise of *iyashi* products; they complement each other in responding to Japan's Lost Decade. The strong need for love's gentle but reassuring comforts is a psychological one related to its socio-historical context.

Purity as a guideline of love

Jun'ai films are mostly sexless. Even when sex scenes take place, the characters' bodies are never fully exposed. These particular aesthetics have led me to distinguish *jun'ai* from the strong romantic passion that most audiences are familiar with in romantic films from other countries; they are certainly different from soft porn or pornography, which is also an important aspect of Japan's film industry. *Jun'ai* values the platonic more than the corporeal. Therefore, while my discussion of the movie *Sayonara Itsuka* and *Tokyo Tower* in the second chapter suggests a number of sexual scenes, they are not explicit but distinguish themselves as more suggestive of the spiritual unification of the couple. I single out these films as a group because their foreign settings take the argument developed in the first chapter (*jun'ai* heroines as Japanese national ideology) a step further by unpacking the psychological conflicts of negotiating between transnational aspirations and national identification. The absence of strong carnal passion or the obscuring of such representations leads me to investigate the way love is conceptualized in *jun'ai* films. To do so, I use Doi Takeo's theory of *amae* (the desire to be loved and cared for unconditionally), which although essentialist in featuring Japanese cultural difference from the West, is helpful to understand why love's gentle and soothing qualities are emphasized in *jun'ai* films, and how love is often portrayed as vulnerable and on the verge of disappearance. I argue that in this regard, the foreign setting is used to reinforce the domestication of the *jun'ai* heroines, who symbolically also represent how Japanese women's liminal social place has continually subjected them to a patriarchal ideology that is present in current popular media representations.²¹

²¹ Kitano Takashi's *Dolls* (Doruzu, 2002), artistically stylized following traditional *Bunraku* puppet theater, could be seen as a critique of *jun'ai*. Heartbroken over her fiancé's marriage to the daughter of his boss, Sawako (Kanno Miho) committed suicide. Even though she did not die, it left her inflected with aphasia. Her fiancé, however, returns to her side and the two embark on a journey to unfamiliar places in Japan, with the stylized change of seasons in the background to suggest the passing of years. Throughout the journey, the couple is also tied together with a thick red rope, which symbolically suggests the heavy emotional bond (*kizuna*) that unites both of them. The heavy burden of

In Japan, the emotional clinging to the idea of purity is combined with a national identification that seeks to distinguish itself among interrelations with foreign influences. In this binary, Japanese culture, conceived as an integral entity, is considered pure, whereas forced foreign contacts, especially those enforced following Japan's defeat in World War II, are considered impure. Fujii Hidetada (1994) and Sonia Ryang (2006) define Japan's pursuit of purity from a socio-historical perspective that has to do with the postwar Purity Education Guidelines (*junketsu kyoiku*), legislation that was implemented in 1947 to protect adolescent schoolgirls from the 'immoral' sexual influences during the postwar years of political liberalism under the American Occupation. Ryang reads it as a manifestation of state control over the sexual behavior of citizens. According to her, the implementation of Purity Education was a "political technology" that controlled love as "a state apparatus" as it turned Japanese subjects into "self-policing, self-disciplining agencies of love" (2).

Ryang elaborates on the real-life romance of Miko (Oshima Michiko) and Mako (Kono Makoto), quoted at the beginning of this introduction, as the postwar model for pure love guided by Purity Education.²² The young couple's romance ended prematurely in 1963 when Miko, a female college freshman, died of chondrosarcoma, a rare cancer which consumed half of her face after having undergone several operations. Their love story became known to the whole of Japan when Mako compiled and published their love letter correspondence that lasted for three years, until Miko was too weak to write. Miko remained a virgin, even when she expressed that having sex with someone one really loves does not affect a person's purity (qtd. in Ryang 83). Their

the emotional bond, however, suggests how man and woman are bound and controlled by the invisible hand of society as well as the idea of love. I interpret Kitano's critique of *jun'ai* as reflexive of love as an ideal. Kitano's male perspective on how individuals are victims of cultural ideology will serve as a good ancillary topic in the future to reinforce my argument of how *jun'ai* is used as a cultural ideology in popular media.

²² Ryang uses 'pure love' in her discussion of Miko and Mako's love story. The literal use of the word 'pure' is meant to directly associate with Japan's state-implemented Purity Education. My choice of using *jun'ai* echoes the term's emergence in the early 21st century as a popular subgenre of romance in film and literature.

love was deemed so pure and beautiful that it was adapted into a film called *Ai to shi o mitsumete* (Gazing at Love and Death, dir. Saito Buichi, 1964), starring Yoshinaga Sayuri as Miko, and has been regarded as a “national romance” in postwar times, meaning that its appeal is universal in Japan.

Kobayashi Tatsuo, a Japanese scriptwriter and cultural commentator, posits this film as the predecessor of contemporary *jun'ai*, in that it introduced themes such as the young heroine's early death, the male protagonist left to deal with his loss, and the idea that *junketsu* (purity) comes with asexual connotations (214-55). As a result, Kobayashi attributes the contemporary *jun'ai* phenomenon, which often centers on young couples that are inexperienced in love, as a “first-love syndrome.” Interestingly, both Ryang and Kobayashi point out that the book's publication and popularity came just a year before the 1964 Olympics, when the Japanese economy had been lifted from wartime recession and the public eagerly anticipated being reckoned as a great state power. Overall, increasing interaction with the foreign in international events has made Japan become more conscious in retaining its ideal of purity, whether it is in people's sexual purity, as in the Purity Education Guidelines and the promotion of Japanese traditional cultures in *kokusai* (international) events.

Sexual scenes in *jun'ai* films are represented within a one-on-one relationship based on genuine love. Their romantic expression is thus in line with Miko and Mako's love story of the 1960s. Nonetheless, compared with real circumstances in the 1990s, *jun'ai* protagonists appear quite conservative. Public discourses in the 1990s often berated women's licentious sexual behavior and criticized their lack of morality as tarring Japan's international reputation.²³ Ryang

²³ The “Yellow Cab” controversy was targeted at Japanese women who seek foreign men for sexual pleasure or being sexually available for foreign men (yellow being a blasphemous term to talk about the Asian race, and yellow cabs being a widely recognized symbol of New York City for their availability in the metropolitan areas). These

blames the modern Japanese state for subjugating women's bodies with regulations such as the Purity Education Guidelines. She claims that various social phenomena concerning women's sexual "aberration," such as *enjokosai* (adolescent girls' dating older men for allowance), middle-aged housewives' craze over Korean star Bae Yong-joon, and the obsession with the issue of *furin*, or extramarital affairs, are reactionary to the Japanese state's "unnatural" control over women's sex since postwar times.²⁴ She points out that love and sex have been conceptualized differently in the postwar period; in the ancient poetry of the *Manyoshu* (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves) compiled around 759 CE, love is sacred but playful, and most noticeably, love and sex are celebrated as a whole (13-14). She maintains that the current exaltation of love over sex stems from modern Japan's adoption of Cartesian and Christian ideas, and that even Freud's idea of the libido is based on the premise of the distinction between love and sex (3).

Ryang has also points out that the extreme popularity of the pure-love story *Ai to shi o mitsumete* occurred simultaneously with Japan's march toward becoming part of a *kokusai shakai* (international world). The story and its adaptation into a movie coincided with Japan's preparation for the 1964 Olympic Games, a major event that immediately boosted *kokusaika* to full bloom. Ryang also remarks that *jun'ai* and Miko and Mako's story, hailed as a "national romance," reveals how women's body and physical health, associated with the concepts of purity and love, are especially valued when every citizen is motivated to participate in *kokusaika*. Noticeably, the emphasis on women's sexual purity was reactionary to the previous decade of

women were blamed for tainting Japan's international image. The whole dispute started in the late 1980s and lasted until the 1990s. Following the Yellow Cab dispute, domestically, it was young schoolgirls' "*enjokosai*" (school girls dating older men for money) that made women's bodies and sexual behavior the target of moral concern.

²⁴ The three problems that she discusses are housewives' "*Yongfluenza*," the sensational popularity of the novel *Shitsurakuen*, and lastly, schoolgirls' *enjokosai*.

the 1950s, when the American Occupation greatly frustrated Japanese nationalism and allowed open sexuality.

The 1990s echoed the concerns of the 1960s. The full-speed development of transnational trade in 1980s *kokusaika* boosted the Japanese economy and national pride as well as contacts with the transnational world. However, various social problems and the crash of economic prospects in the 1990s have unsettled wishes for national identification. Ryang further attributes the social sentiment of loss to Japan's anxiety over the "continuing record low birthrate and the onset of the aging society" (7). Both factors point to the decline of human resources. Adding to these worries is the aforementioned situation in which some Japanese women are regarded as the cause of social problems. Controversies over *enjokosai* have exposed how the loss of control over young women's bodies has sparked a larger social unease. Former Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro titled an essay in the leading literary journal *Bungeishunju*, "What I See in the Reality of 'Girl Prostitution'" with the subtitle, "A Virtual and Delusional Era— *Enjokosai* and *Jun'ai*". Even in the 21st century, Japanese women's bodies are still seen as bearing the future of Japan.

Thus, the emphasis that is placed on women's purity in terms of their bodies and romantic ideals shows Japan's Purity Education resulting in different gendered forms of reception. Ryang points out that contrary to some women's liberated behavior in looking for a love that also satisfies their sensual desire, men are "pushed [...] to look for pure bodies again and again" (106). This observation sets the background for me to address how real gender differences play out in *jun'ai* stories. In general, it is often men who put women in the role of their love-object, and symbolically, women exist only on the metaphysical level. The first chapter tries to answer why *jun'ai* love-objects have to die in a place associated with the foreign. Since they are mourned as loss, what does their death symbolize to the deprived protagonists?

But these *jun'ai* heroines are not only treated as pure-objects that hold an integral national identification; they are also seen as love-objects, who paradoxically embody love in a Japanese sense to suggest one's cultural roots, and love in a modern sense to connote cultivation. The mediating role of the heroine serves to bridge the gap between the transnational and national at a time when Japan is characterized by loss. In contrast to Japan's perceived loss is a transnational field imaginatively characterized by the ideal of abundance. This transnational realm, though suggestively allying with the concept of the West, is not the real West per se. In other words, since Japanese women are seen to embody the dual characteristics of the foreign and the traditional, the way in which the heroine is both rejected and longed for by the male protagonist suggests how her association with the foreign is purged by a renewed identification with Japan.

This binary of loss and abundance can be traced back to a Western logic of love illustrated by Plato in *The Symposium*. Its connection with *jun'ai* can be seen in *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*, the film that arguably instigated the *jun'ai* boom on the big screen in 2004, setting the tone for *jun'ai* as a love that mediates between domestic loss and foreign abundance. The English title was originally *Socrates in Love*, which is an obvious reference to the debate between Diotima and Socrates in *Symposium*. In her dialogue with Socrates, Diotima, the female intellectual, argues love to be an endless metaphysical pursuit of knowledge and beauty. She explains that *Eros* (love) is the orphaned son of Poverty (the mother) and Resourcefulness (the father). However, *Eros* is abandoned by his father, but later sets out on an eternal quest to reunite with him, a pursuit of knowledge and wisdom symbolized by his love for his father. Symbolically, this journey fuels his individuation, which is an eternal 'becoming' process motivated by admiration for the father's abundance. In *jun'ai* films, the Japanese state competes with an imaginary foreign abundance to regain its place as the father. My reading of *jun'ai* films

reveals that *jun'ai* sentiment tends to be resolved ideologically by a re-identification with the Japanese father. Interestingly, the role of the characters' natural father is primarily absent in the narratives; instead, paternal figures are replaced with benevolent male roles. Most importantly, it is through the heroines' pure love for the male protagonists that such re-identification with Japan is made possible.

In the following section, I will discuss how transnational aspirations end up being compromised in a more solidified cultural identification with Japan, which I argue to be related to Japan's national discourse of *kokusaika*.

***Kokusaika* (internationalization) and *Soshitsukan* (Sense of Loss) in Japan's 'Lost Decade'**

Japan's wish to "internationalize" itself began as a contemporary nationwide call in the late 1950s when it sought to play a more active role in international affairs as the country gradually became an important economic power, and reached its height during the 1980s. As a national discourse, the rhetorical promotion of *kokusaika* tends to put Japan and the rest of the world on a hierarchical scale of lack and abundance. That is, countries deemed inferior are to learn from the superior ones by adopting their standards, i.e. "world standard" or "Western standard." Therefore, much of the early movement hailed the West as a trendsetter. The reliance on universal standards implemented by the West metaphorically put Japan in an inferior position as an avid learner, and the West as its teacher. By the 1980s, when Japan's economic place in the world was secured, *Nihonjinron* (discourse on Japanese uniqueness) and other cultural discourses that redeemed Japan's confidence in its own culture flourished, but the metaphorical binary of lack and abundance, Japan versus the West still captures the momentum that pushes Japan on the eternal

quest to evolve with the times and to improve itself. As in Diotima's metaphor, Eros is a learner who is eager to learn from his love-object, the resourceful father.

Working as a pull factor that lures people to leave Japan in order to pursue wealth and opportunities, the idea of transnationality captures a utopian and humanistic longing that is often associated with the literal understanding of cosmopolitanism. My use of 'transnational' here has less to do with capitalism than with the utopian, cosmopolitan longing to transcend the confines of national boundaries. It should also be differentiated from the political ideals of a type of cosmopolitanism that is inspired by liberal humanitarianism to call for equal rights for exiled people, as illustrated in Jacques Derrida's *Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*. My use of transnational imagination has no definable political agenda, nor do people embodying such a wish suffer from any real political persecution. Transnational imagination can manifest itself in an individual's fantasy of living overseas after consuming movies or novels about other countries. It can also be expressed in daily practices, such as learning a foreign language, traveling or even migrating to an exotic place. Transnational imagination celebrates cosmopolitan existence in a liberal and personalized way.

Nonetheless, even though transnational imagination helps to capture a liberating mindset close to that of cosmopolitanism, its effectiveness is subject to *jun'ai* understood as a sentiment of loss. Transnational imagination is a desire fueled by a cosmopolitan ideal even when one does not leave Japan. According to Karen Kelsky, the internationalist mindset of women does not require their being physically abroad. Rather, it is more about absorbing the West into Japan. The embodiment of Western lifestyles within women's everyday life can be seen as acts of participation in modernity. In this case, the West is always represented as what Japan is not. Kelsky further observes that the former "reveals the presence of (a certain kind of) modernity,

inevitably set against the ‘traditionalism’ of the national/local” (87). In identifying with the West, Japanese women set themselves as foreigners within Japan. This argument instills in internationalist women some degree of political agency to defy the social restrictions that they feel when living in Japan.

However, *jun'ai* films represent their heroines in a different scenario. By evoking *jun'ai*, one is reconnected with one's “roots”; metaphysically, Japan is the national love-object that the transnationalism in the films works in the service of. Succumbing under nationalism is not a strategy unfamiliar to the way Japan has interacted with foreign countries. When looking at the transnational dissemination of its popular culture to other Asian countries, Koichi Iwabuchi shows that Japan's transnationalism operates with the biased national imperative that values other Asian countries based on the level of “coevalness” of their respective modernity. By looking at each region's vernacular modernity through a hierarchical lens, Japan continues to see itself a dominator in Asia (177, 194-5). In the title of my dissertation, I follow Iwabuchi's usage of a slash between ‘trans’ and ‘nationalism.’ This is to suggest that the transnational aspirations that individuals embody are often subject to the national imperative that generates such desire in the first place. Although transnational imagination seems to carry an individual across the confines of a bounded reality, it sustains and grounds itself in national ideology. I use ‘imagination,’ ‘aspirations’ and ‘desire’ interchangeably because this longing for the foreign often carries a fantastical quality that allows people to dream about life elsewhere so as to bear the current status quo.

In contrast with the alluring transnational pull-factor driving people to imagine themselves living outside Japan, the domestic *soshitsukan* resulting from numerous social and economic incidents since the mid-1990s have also generated a gloomy picture of Japan's prospects. This

metaphorically sets Japanese shortcomings against the belief that the foreign is a place of boundless resources. Economists explain Japan's losses since 1989 through a series of drops in numbers:

Japan's post-1989 GDP growth has averaged no more than 1.2 per cent annually, worse than that of any other major industrialized country. Japan's equity markets, after reaching a peak at the end of 1989, have fallen by 75 per cent. Japanese land prices have fared still worse with prices falling by 80 per cent, so that in 2002, Japanese land prices are below levels prevailing 20 years ago. (Saxonhouse and Stern 1-2)

The crash of the Nikkei Stock Average and asset prices led to a decrease in employment rates. Bankruptcy and the sudden surge of unemployment lowered people's future prospects. Blame was put on the Japanese government's ineffective fiscal policy and institutions (4-8). To make matters worse, the Great Hanshin Earthquake that took place in western Japan in 1995 took thousands of lives. The social disturbances following the Sarin Gas attack on the metropolitan subway by the religious sect Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 and child murder cases committed by an underage adolescent (Youth A) from an ordinary middle-class family in Kobe alarmed the public (Eades, Gill and Befu 2; Tomiko Yoda 20; Marilyn Ivy 2006: 204-08). Underneath Japan's image as a developed country lay a feeling of unease concerning its present and future. These social incidents of the late 1990s gave the impression that the fruits borne from the economic prosperity of the previous decades had turned sour, leaving people with a sense of insecurity. As mentioned earlier, such permeating anxieties gave rise to *soshitsukan*, making the public refer to the post-bubble period as "*Ushinawareta Junen*" (Lost Decade). Against this background, we can see how the *jun'ai* pathos speaks to Japan's shared desire to transcend an existential dilemma characterized by loss since the mid-1990s. Through the discourse of *jun'ai*, Japan seeks to heal the collective sentiment of loss by reintegrating national identification.

Japan's sense of loss versus foreign abundance

Since the Meiji period, elite male intellectuals have been sent abroad by the government to help with the tasks of Japan's modernization. Developing one's mental capacity abroad was considered helpful for Japan—bringing back modern Western learning, such as democratic thinking and advanced mechanical technologies, would 'save' Japan from being colonized, as other Asian countries were. A century later, gender and class seem less of an issue where transnational migration is concerned. The demography of those who travel abroad is far more complex and diverse. One is free to go abroad as long as one can afford it financially. Harumi Befu has classified six types of Japanese postwar emigration (26-37). The first group is a direct consequence of Japan's postwar recession: emigrants were sponsored by the emigration plan initiated by the government. Other categories include war brides and a more recent phenomenon resulting from international marriages. The emigration of Japanese corporate employees and their families to overseas branches as well as the service community that serves Japanese expatriates also constitute a large proportion of the postwar emigration demographic. Befu has an interesting but somewhat biased way of designating individuals who do not belong to the previous categories: he defines a fifth group of emigrants as those who 'forsake' Japan out of individual freewill in order to develop their individuality, which would otherwise not be allowed to flourish in the conventional Japanese society. Befu speaks highly of their pioneering spirit, and in this category, Japanese society is set in a binary against the foreign land. He refers to the sixth group as "drifters," whom he characterizes as young Japanese who fail to 'make it' in Japan and are thus sent abroad by their affluent parents. Befu devalues the last group as reflecting a postwar malaise associated with escapism from social responsibilities.

Nevertheless, I think there is a fine line between the last two categories, as individual freewill is something that may be formed later on while travelling abroad. Only a limited amount of privileged people are ever motivated enough to ‘forsake’ Japan. Besides, both groups are comprised of individuals driven by personal motives. What complicates today’s outward movement of population is that those who travel abroad unattached to any group identity can all be seen as motivated by individual freewill. Individual characters in *jun'ai* films belong to these last two categories. In fact, the artificiality of the categorization can be understood simply from the fact that those who make up the group of international spouses may simultaneously belong to either of the other two categories.²⁵

Befu’s observations were made during the 1980s, when Japan feverishly engaged in *kokusaika*. Currently, however, statistics show a decrease in the number of people who study abroad, suggesting the diminishing appeal of using the foreign to cultivate one’s individuality and professional skills. According to Eiji Hirose, Japan’s Economy Deputy Director, in the year 2012, Japanese study-abroad students in the United States have dropped by 40 percent compared to 14 years before (Yomiuri Shimbun, Nov. 18, 2012).²⁶ In addition to study-abroad students, the same report shows that the numbers of Japanese working abroad have decreased by 20 percent in five years, with approximately 120 Japanese companies operating overseas whose top-tier personnel now consists of people of foreign nationalities.²⁷ The recent drop of Japanese nationals overseas could be a consequence of several factors: the difference in the timing of academic

²⁵ In categorizing individual migrants, sociologist Yuiko Fujita has adopted a broad term, “cultural migrants,” which also includes those who are motivated by modern electronic media, foreign popular culture, such as Hollywood films, hip-hop or other Black African American culture (5, 10-11).

²⁶ 広瀬, 英治. “ [いっぴつ経上] 国際化時代の人材育成.” 読売新聞 [Yomiuri Shimbun] 東京朝刊 18 Nov. 2012: 11. CiNii. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.

²⁷ According to the *Monbusho* (Ministry of Education) website, there was a 10 percent decrease in the number Japanese citizens registered as studying abroad (59,923 persons compared with 66,833 persons in 2008) in the 2009 academic year (www.mext.go.jp).

semesters that leads to a different job hunting schedule, the lack of substantial economic incentives and sense of achievement abroad, the growing multicultural atmosphere within Japan, and the many cross-cultural adaptation issues that migrants need to cope with. Alternatively, it may have to do with a re-strengthening of cultural identification with Japan, corresponding to the *jun'ai* sentiment. Transnational aspirations in *jun'ai* films are represented superficially. For instance, in *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*, the heroine's dream of going to Ululu, Australia, is mainly due to her romantic ideas about the place being the center of the world. Therefore, the cultivation of the heroine's "individual freewill," depicted as stemming from her foreign experience, should be taken merely as a background against which to contrast the return of her identification with the male protagonist, whose presence is associated with a local Japan.

No national movement calls for its citizens' participation in coming into contact with the foreign as much as *kokusaika*, or internationalization, does. As a social and economic movement that was most fervent in the 1980s, the political aim of *kokusaika* was to allow Japan to take on a major stance in global politics. From postwar times, the need and the reality of interacting with the foreign has extended to all strata of society as a result of Japan's engagement in global capitalism. The consequence suggests a multi-ethnic presence in Japanese society, altering what used to be thought of as a homogenous race. Current newspapers have marked the inclusions of Japan's multi-ethnic identities: the presence of the Ainu (the indigenous people of Japan in Hokkaido), the Zainichi (permanent Korean residents of Japan) as well as the postwar influx of foreign labor from Mainland China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brazil have entered social discussions, albeit often discussed in terms of cultural difference and how mutual understanding can help prevent social conflicts (Yomiuri Shimbun, Sep. 29, 2012).²⁸ Multiculturalism and

²⁸ “〔郷土再生〕国際化の現場から（16）多文化共生 試行錯誤（連載）.” 読売新聞 [Yomiuri Shimbun] 東京朝刊 群馬 F.” 29 Sept. 2012: 31. CiNii. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.

cross-cultural communication have come to the fore in bringing up issues ranging from frictions over different living habits to activities that help maintain social harmony, such as in the promotion of ethnic festivals, government-sponsored language courses that target foreign learners of Japanese as well as Japanese learners of foreign languages (Yomiuri Shimbun, Sep. 26-27, 2012).²⁹

Culturally and in terms of worldview, *kokusaika* captures people's transnational dream to reach out for contact with the outside world. No matter what class or gender a person belongs to, every Japanese citizen is encouraged to engage in *kokusaika*-related activities that help broaden their horizons. Even if physical travel is unavailable, learning English or another foreign language at home in Japan is a *kokusaika*-inspired phenomenon that helps pave the way for real transnational activities. English is also present on the corporate scene, for instance, with Rakuten, a large Japanese online shopping website, and Yanai Tadashi, the president of the global clothing franchise Uniqlo, announcing the adoption of English as their workplace language in 2012 (Takahashi, "English at Work in Japan"). These cases testify to the need to engage in *kokusaika* as a shared civil movement regardless of gender and class.

Meanwhile, the desire for contact with the outside world arises from the loss felt within Japan in the post-bubble era starting in the mid-1990s. Various reasons have been cited in public news outlets to remind people of the need to leave the country for better job opportunities: "the decline of the birthrate and the aging of the local work force have cast a shadow of pessimism over the future of the domestic market. People have started to talk about the **necessary move** to

²⁹ “〔郷土再生〕国際化の現場から（13）海外戦略 人材育成に力（連載）。” 読売新聞 [Yomiuri Shimbun] 東京朝刊 群馬 F 26 Sept. 2012: 33. CiNii. Web. 18 Jan. 2013. “〔郷土再生〕国際化の現場から（14）教育もグローバル化急ぐ（連載）。” 読売新聞 [Yomiuri Shimbun] 東京朝刊 群馬 27 Sept. 2012: 31. CiNii. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.

enter markets overseas” (my emphasis, Yomiuri Shimbun, Jan. 8, 2013).³⁰ However, anxieties over the necessity to leave Japan have also been featured in the same newspaper. Kazuhisa Akiyama, chief director of Public Relations Division at Sanno Institute of Management, commented on the willingness of people aged under 30 to work overseas: “For the generation that has been raised under the atmosphere of stagnation in the post-bubble era, there are difficulties to face up with [abroad].... Meanwhile, with the ongoing globalization, one feels exposed to threatening risks [if they are not willing to work overseas]”.

Indeed, the public discourse in Japan tends to treat individual participation in *kokusaika* as a key solution to economic stagnancy, or at least a crucial mindset to adopt in order to deal with the lack of social momentum. World-renowned architect Ando Tadao, who is fondly referred to as a “world architect” by the Japanese public media, calls for today’s Japanese young generation to leave their comfort zone and apply themselves actively on the world stage. In an interview, when asked about what most Japanese people today are lacking, the architect answered:

People’s English ability is not enough. Their business sense is also not enough. Therefore, even if they are abroad, they can’t perform with self-confidence. I guess that’s the reality of today’s Japanese. Since they lack an internationalist perspective, they lack a sense of promptness in making judgments and decisions. As people of an island nation, Japanese have some good qualities such as being delicate, perseverant and coordinative. During postwar reconstructive times, these qualities have been exercised to their utmost capacity and contributed to amazing developments. However, in today’s global world, politeness does not win the competition. Instead of delicateness, cheapness and speed are sought after. The first thing to do now is to see the world from above. Pluck up the courage and go out, so that you will know for the first time what it is you want. Come to think of it, during the Meiji period, Post-World War II years and

³⁰ “ [今どきのシアワセ] (6) 閉塞日本脱出 働く喜び (連載).” 読売新聞 [Yomiuri Shimbun] 西部朝刊 西2社 8 Jan. 2013: 34. CiNii. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.

in the high-development years when the Japanese economy took the world by storm, Japan had a big goal. Japan is a strong race when its people have a concrete goal in mind. However, there is none of that now. Neither the leader nor its people have that.³¹

Ando exhibits nostalgia over Japan's capacity to create abundance as he tries to awaken the young generation to the need to strive for survival among other global competitors. It is by recognizing the loss of such social momentum that Ando emphasizes the importance of 'placing oneself on the world stage' in order to raise Japan out of its current stagnation. Ando's internationalist view and encouragement of today's youth reflects the current influence of globalization. The internationalist discourse that encourages individuals to go overseas is often coupled with the threat of a national risk that can only be resolved by people who have overcome great obstacles in their foreign experiences.

Popular works of literature resonate with such internationalist calls by igniting transnational dreams and desires, thus supporting individuals to become "*kokusaijin*" (international or transnational beings) and to act according to "world standards" even if they remain in Japan.³² This imaginary transcendence of national borders rests upon having an internationalist mindset without being abroad physically. The whole concept seems to be democratically available to everyone regardless of gender and class. However, various sociological studies that have examined Japanese women's transnationalism point out Japanese women are more favored in the

³¹ 上阪, 徹. "The Principles of Success [成功のコンセプト] Ando Tadao: The World and Japan." *WEB GOETHE* ウェブゲーテ. NIKKEI4946.com, Feb. 2011. Web. 27 May 2015. <<http://goethe.nikkei.co.jp/human/110329/>>

³² Gentosha Literary Publication, which specializes in popular literature and non-fiction books, published two works in Spring 2013, whose titles demonstrate how transnational imagination continues to be used in picturing the future of Japan: *Sekai Kijun De Yume O Kanaeru Watakushi No Benkyōhō: A Song of July (Using the World Standard to Realize Your Dream—My Study Method)* by Tomoko L. Kitagawa, and *Nihonjin Wa Nihon O Deruto Saikyō Ni Naru: Kaigai De Hatarakō Manabō Kurashite Miyō (Japanese is the Strongest When Developed Abroad: Work, Learn, Live Overseas)* by Koichiro Yoshikoshi.

West than their male counterparts, especially in cross-cultural relationships (Yuiko Fujita 101-18).³³

Thus, it should be noted that the current *jun'ai* representations created mostly by male authors portray their heroines based on their own conception of ideal womanhood. In fact, women in Japanese society have been used symbolically to serve various social purposes, which I examine in more detail in the following chapters. These male depictions of *jun'ai* heroines should be differentiated from real-life Japanese women. In socio-anthropological studies, women are shown to serve as dynamic agents in receiving foreign cultivation. They travel between Japan and foreign countries, mediating inter-cultural communication in personal ways that do not manifest in Japanese men's transnationalism. Karen Kelsky's studies of internationalist women and Shunji Yamashita's studies of Japanese women who choose to migrate to Bali for marriage have exposed the how women have been regarded as dispensable in Japanese society. In addition, with globalization legitimating the option of a transnational lifestyle, these women are seen as using transnational migration to 'solve' this domestic problem of gender bias, albeit by means of avoiding the issue. Therefore, the *jun'ai* heroine's unconditional love for the immature male character performs a redeeming function that comforts Japanese society in the idea that it holds people's sense of belonging and emotional mooring. These narratives serve more as national allegories than as critiques of Japan's gender issues; *jun'ai* soothes ordinary people's feelings of loss rather than opens up the problem for examination. Since the *jun'ai* sentiment targets ordinary people, they allow the audience to identify with the portrayed sense of loss while offering emotional solace to reaffirm a collective identity. The foreign settings in some *jun'ai*

³³ This is also a running theme in Karen Kelsky's *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dream*. Yuiko Fujita's sociological fieldwork was conducted with her Japanese informants in New York and London. The female informants generally agreed that their race and gender as Japanese women had been an advantage that had been unavailable to Japanese men.

films parallel their heroines' status as "foreigners" within Japan who will ultimately be "domesticated." Notably, in films that incorporate a foreign setting, the heroine hardly interacts with any locals, nor does she carry out any sexual transgression with a foreign lover. Instead, the foreign occupies a metaphysical space—exotic yet approachable, revivifying for an individual, an open space that one may enter and leave at will. In this regard, Marilyn Ivy's view of *kokusaika* as a nationalist discourse that covers up the intent to domesticate the foreign is useful for thinking about women's position in *jun'ai* films, which I will discuss in more detail in the following chapter. Both the heroine and her love are rendered pure and precious because she never stops loving the protagonist even when she physically leaves Japan.

As a male novelist, Tsuji Hitonari's individualized act of transnational migration could also illustrate how transnational imagination cultivates and refuels people's existential feelings toward life in Japan. Tsuji wrote two novels (*Calmi Cuori Appassionati* and *Sayonara Itsuka*), which as I argue in chapter two, are replete with *jun'ai* sentiments expressed from a male author's perspective. Similar to the characters he creates, Tsuji himself demonstrates a boundary-transcending wish. He made his debut in the entertainment business as a rock singer before becoming a novelist and winning the 116th Akutagawa Prize in 1997. He is someone who refuses to be confined to just one identity, and uses the alias Tsuji Jinsei in his other careers as a musician and film director. In 2003, at the age of 43, he moved to Paris with his newly-wed bride, Nakayama Miho, a popular singer and actress. In an interview with journalist Corinne Bret in the literary magazine *Ushio [Tide]* in 1993, he expressed his cosmopolitan wish, or his worldview, as an 'internal' integration of who he is as an individual: "I want to heighten the spiritual part inside me... I believe the universe, the earth, and humanity coexist within me as an 'individual'; I have everything inside me... I am inside everything... Therefore, I am not alone in this world

(my translation, 232).” Tsuji’s description of his cosmopolitan existence carries a spiritual tone that accentuates the idea of the transcendence of national borders. It implies that for Tsuji, national boundaries should not be taken as a limitation to personal development.

Since his migration to Paris, Tsuji has played the role of cross-cultural mediator by collaborating with various popular media, such as Japanese women’s fashion magazine *25ans*. *Allons ensemble à Paris* is a collection of his monthly columns in the magazine (January-December 2004), introducing his daily Parisian life to female readers. The differences between Paris and Japan dominate Tsuji’s transnational imagination for a so-called cosmopolitan life in the French capital, which he praises as “a sophisticated city for adults” owing to its history and respect for democracy and freedom (13-14). In his view, Paris is the ideal capital for leading a cosmopolitan life. Despite Tsuji’s transcendence of his nationality to assert his newly-found freedom in Paris, it is clear that he sets Paris’ abundance (in terms of its respect for individuality and democracy) in contrast with a Japanese lack.

Tsuji’s qualities as a cultural mediator define him as what sociologist Yuiko Fujita (2009) terms a “cultural migrant.” Tsuji’s transnational desire for Paris is romantically based on seeing France as a “playground” for aspirational adults. This rhetoric recalls Asada Akira’s concept of infantile capitalism, which defines Japan’s brand of capitalism as parallel to the postmodern celebration of “word play, parody, and all the other childlike games of differentiation” (275). Asada argues that this utopian celebration of borderless freedom is at the same time “a terrible dystopia”; as a matter of fact, children can play freely only when they are safely “protected” (276). The idea that Japan functions well under “a center-less” control is ideological. Through his celebration of Paris, Tsuji has come to establish the cosmopolitan city as a new

matriarch/patriarch, who provides a much-needed sense of security for the development of people's talents and personal growth.

Tsuji's migration is but one example sparked and encouraged by the age of *kokusaika*. Yet the two prefixes "trans-" and "inter-" preceding 'nationalism' suggest the nation as the fundamental unit interacting with other nations. Despite the fact that internationalism gives the impression of nations interacting on neutral grounds (akin to cosmopolitanism functioning as a utopian ideal), it is by no means egalitarian, operating instead on dynamically asymmetrical national interests. Dick Stegewerns focuses on internationalist discourses in Japan in the 1920s, bringing to our attention the complementary nature of nationalism and internationalism: "the dilemma of nationalism and internationalism is not an either/or question but a matter of finding the right ratio between these two 'isms' in order to bring about their inevitable co-existence" (5). Likewise, the transnational aspirations that are inspired by the national intent of *kokusaika* feature both a nation-transcending dream and a wish to preserve a solid national identity. These desires are embodied in the *jun'ai* heroine, who as a love-object, has to be contained in order for the two ideals to become fully integrated.

Chapter Descriptions:

In chapter one, I demonstrate how *jun'ai* films portray heroines as pure-love objects that bring a sense of integration because of their love's metaphorical abundance. Compared with previous decades, current *jun'ai* productions are reflexive of a period sentimentally termed the Lost Decade. As an embodiment of both a love-object and a pure-object, the *jun'ai* heroines' dual traits of being modern and traditional render their portrayals more symbolic than real. Meanwhile, these portrayals are complicated by Japanese women's elusive social status in Japan,

which often pushes them to associate with foreign imagery. The presence of foreign cities in *jun'ai* films, however, does not necessarily designate a real foreign country, city, or place, but symbolically echoes women's "foreignness" within Japanese society. By suggesting how the heroines' death parallels the domestication of the foreign within the national discourse of *kokusaika*, I attempt to contextualize the emergence of the *jun'ai* genre in Japan's Lost Decade.

Women as *jun'ai* love-objects as well as pure-objects are wish-fulfilling to both men and Japanese society in a patriarchal sense. Chapter two discusses *jun'ai* films that feature Japanese characters in a foreign setting. I argue that romantic narratives created by female authors offer a perspective that is oriented toward the realization of one's transnational aspirations and fantasies, and in some cases, they even reveal a more reflexive tone that illustrates the ambivalence between transnational lifestyle and Japanese identity. In contrast, male author Tsuji Hitonari's works suggest that it is only against a transnational background that the male characters' sense of loss becomes manifest. I use the concept of *amae* (primary-love, need-love) to examine whether this sense of loss results from the possible contradiction of *amae* expressed in a transnational setting. Is *jun'ai* still very 'Japanese' despite the fact that transnational or cosmopolitan lifestyles have become part of daily life in Japan? These two chapters will show how the representation of *jun'ai* heroines fosters people's re-identification with Japan.

In chapter three, I move away from *jun'ai* films but continue to investigate the roles of women created in popular media productions. In particular, I examine the emerging popularity of the phrase "*otona-kawaii*" (adult-cute) in popular *OL* (office lady) magazines and television dramas, which serve as productive sites to understand how transnational or cosmopolitan imagination is manifest in Japanese daily life. I argue that the creation of these *otona-kawaii* women is inspired by Audrey Hepburn's socially appropriate femininity in her screen persona as

a child-woman. The transnational re-appropriation of Hepburn's iconic child-woman persona makes especially evident how women's foreignness is domesticated through love and romance. In addition, this reading seeks to understand the ways in which *jun'ai* heroines are reproduced in the ever more accessible media forms of television dramas and fashion magazines. Both the creations of *jun'ai* heroines and *otona-kawaii* women share a socio-cultural meaning that speaks to an integral Japanese identity required in the current context.

Finally, in the last chapter of this dissertation, I move away from Japan to look at Taiwanese *jun'ai* films in order to understand how the island-nation struggles to stand on its feet in its postcolonial and transnational relationship with Japan. The term *jun'ai* (pronounced as *chun'ai* from the same written characters, 純愛) is used in daily vocabulary in Taiwan to designate love stories involving young protagonists who do not know how to deal with love in a sophisticated way. Whereas Taiwan is not featured in any of the Japanese *jun'ai* films that I analyze, Japan is everywhere in Taiwanese romantic movies of the 21st century. Taiwan being a country highly receptive to Japanese popular culture, the ambivalent legacy of 50 years of Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) has complicated this representation. Similar to how Western cities are viewed as models for Japanese modernization, Japan plays an important role in Taiwan's conceptualization of its own modernity. Seeing the influence of modernity as a domestic "phantasm," I argue that a number of Taiwanese films can aptly be categorized as *jun'ai*. Noticeably, in these films, a Japanese character serves both as the love-object and as the incarnation of the protagonist's transnational imagination. What differentiates these Taiwanese romantic films from their Japanese counterparts, however, are the gender issues involved in building a national allegory. No specific gender is used to consolidate a national identification. Ultimately, the chief purpose of looking at these Taiwanese appropriations of *jun'ai* is to examine whether a national allegory

evoked through individuals' primary sense of belonging to a specific social reality can open onto more positive 'transnational' resolutions than the relatively confined endings presented in Japanese *jun'ai* films.

Chapter One:

Women as Pure Love-Objects in “*Jun'ai*” (Pure-Love) Films

In *jun'ai* stories, much poignancy comes from the death of the heroine, whose transient life is often associated with a foreign land. In many cases, her death and act of leaving the protagonist for another country are interlinked. For instance, in *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*, Aki (Masami Nagasawa) requests in her last will to have her ashes cast at Ayers Rock in Uluru, Australia, a place she had never been to but dreamed of visiting. In *Rainbow Song* and *Heavenly Forest*, the heroines die respectively in California and New York. In *Be with You* (dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2004), a widely acclaimed *jun'ai* film, the heroine Mio (Takeuchi Yuko) mysteriously returns from her death a year later and stays with her beloved husband and son for three weeks until the rainy season is over. These examples suggest that dying and being abroad are rendered indistinguishable: on the one hand, both the realms of the dead and overseas are known for their foreignness; on the other, Mio's return from death is treated like someone who returns home from abroad. However, why do these *jun'ai* stories have to end in such a tragic way? What does it suggest about Japan's relationship with the idea of the foreign? Not only is death related to a sense of foreignness both inside and outside the country, it is also interwoven with traditional Japanese fantasy and myth. In *jun'ai*, foreign influence is portrayed as enlightening but potentially deadly. The contradiction, in fact, is not unfamiliar in Japanese literature and thought, which tend to see connections with the foreign as culturally sophisticated and exclusive only to a privileged few. In contemporary literary works, the dynamics that are drawn between male, female, and the foreign are intricate and deserve closer study.

The sacrificial postures of *jun'ai* heroines

In modern literature, Japanese women have often been portrayed as bearing the conflicting influences of the modern and the traditional. In renowned modern Japanese author Tanizaki Junichiro's *Naomi*, first serialized in *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* (Osaka Morning News) in 1924, Joji (the pronunciation of the name is similar to "George" in Japanese), the Japanese protagonist, is drawn to Western culture and becomes captivated by Naomi, a fifteen-year-old Eurasian-looking girl who works as a waitress in a modern café. As Joji is enamored by Naomi's looks, he decides to tutor her by paying for her English classes and education through Western movies. Naomi's modern lifestyle is portrayed critically, with her increasing sexual licentiousness with other men and gradual domination over Joji, who becomes subjected to her power. Tanizaki's story "Aguri" (in which the female protagonist's name Aguri puns with "ugly") published around the same time in 1922 presents a similar critique of westernization and how some women show an undifferentiating acceptance of Western culture in the superficiality of clothing and fashion. In a more nuanced manner, Kawabata Yasunari represents the ambivalent role women adopted when Japanese culture had to cope with a clash of values in the face of Western influence. In his works, he represents women as an aestheticized but dying part of Japanese traditional culture set against a modern, ever-progressing culture highly influenced by the West. In *Snow Country* (1947), one of the novels that contributed to the author's Nobel Prize award in 1968, the female protagonist Komako represents such aesthetics of beauty and transience. Komako is a provincial geisha confined to a snowy hot spring resort located deep in the mountains. Her love for Shimamura, a male dilettante and critic of Western ballet from Tokyo, is bound to fail, yet she never shies away from her genuine feelings. Komako's drive for life and love in her difficult situation suggests a pure struggle set in contrast with the urbane and detached Shimamura, who often compares the girl's efforts in life to that of a moth flying into the fire. If the mountain geisha represents a traditional, delicate and transient aspect of Japan, the urbane Shimamura inspires her

transnational imagination. They are foreign to each other. For Shimamura, women that he sees in the wintry snow country all represent a “vanishing” part of Japan; not only does the novel begin by introducing a woman’s vulnerable reflection in the window of a train moving toward the mountains, it also ends with Komako’s desperate dash toward a fire.

This theme in Japanese literature of women as complex embodiments of traditional beauty set against a transient life highly influenced by the modern West is also seen in Mishima Yukio’s *Spring Snow* (1969), the first story included in his novel *Sea of Fertility*. The story features a tragic love story in the early Taisho era (1912-1926) of a couple whose fate is doomed. Set against an atmosphere of modernization and Western ideas of liberated love, Satoko, the daughter of a fallen aristocrat, and Kiyooki, a boy from a nouveau riche family, fight in vain against conventional Japanese social structures. The story ends tragically with Kiyooki’s death, while Satoko becomes a Buddhist nun. Mishima’s story shares the motif of foreign culture sparking modern romance and clashing with conventional Japanese culture, a theme that sets up Japan’s hesitant acceptance of foreign culture, which I identify as a persistent feature of *jun’ ai*. It is understandable that the novel was chosen to be adapted into a period film (dir. Yukisada Isao, 2005) at the height of the *jun’ ai* boom.

The gender portrayal of *jun’ ai* heroines in the 21st century reiterates Japan’s ambivalent attitude toward contacts with the foreign. Even though Japan’s highly industrialized infrastructure and prosperity developed in the latter half of the twentieth century have elevated its status as one of the world’s economic superpowers, the abrupt burst of the economic bubble in the early 1990s and the unstable social and political atmosphere, which together culminated in the Lost Decade discourse, have uncovered a half-buried fear underlying Japan’s national identification. *Jun’ ai* films, as reifications of such public discourse, operate in the same vein as

the novels written by modern Japanese male authors. However, Japan's postwar participation in transnational capitalism, along with the domestic promotion of the national discourse of *kokusaika* (internationalization), has further complicated the representation of women's relationship with both the foreign and Japan.

In the name of pure-love, *jun'ai* heroines are portrayed as willing to endure pain and loss. Noticeably, in many stories, the male protagonists are young men whom the heroines have known since childhood or adolescence in their hometown in the countryside. Moreover, they tend to stay in Japan their whole life, which bespeaks their connection to current Japanese lifestyle and fosters their innocence in an uncontaminated setting. In comparison, the heroines, while sanctified by their genuine love for the male protagonists, are empowered but victimized by their capacity to love. Love, incarnated in the heroine, however, is treated ambivalently as potentially dangerous to the innocent men. In many *jun'ai* films, the heroines' love is even kept secret from the innocent men, and many of the heroines die alone in a foreign country. I argue that the heroines' genuine but potentially dangerous love not only reiterates a contemporary critique that characterizes Japanese women as susceptible to foreign influence, but also reinforces the traditional gender roles that contradictorily bind them to an identification with Japan. The heroines' sacrificial love echoes the national allegory that valorizes transient beauty. Their mythic struggle for love is traditional in a way that can be likened to the cherry blossoms that fall apart in the prime of their lives—a metaphor suggested in the title of Yukisada's film *Spring Snow*. The heroine's immanent death and the threat of separation both heighten the beauty and value of her love, making *jun'ai* a kind of love that embodies conventional Japanese aesthetics of transience and passing as well as what people generally see in romantic movies.

Thus, while the boom of *jun'ai* can be seen as a new phenomenon, it also reiterates a national discourse that addresses the fear of destabilized national identification.

Jun'ai films can be regarded as Japanese urban myths.³⁴ For instance, in *Girl in the Sunny Place* (dir. Takahiro Miki, 2013) adapted from a romantic bestseller, the heroine Mao (Juri Ueno) at first does not belong to the human world. She is a cat kept by a mysterious woman in the ancient city of Kamakura. In order to return the favor of a young boy who once saved her, Mao begs an old witch to transform her into a woman. With her new form as a human being, she becomes the boy's classmate and later falls in love with him. All the while, she knows that one day she will be turned back into a cat.³⁵ It seems that in the world of *jun'ai*, traditional legends survive even in today's world. The idea that death will separate the couple is thus to be taken symbolically. While *jun'ai* harks back to a pre-existing literary tradition in Japan, it associates the heroines with a traditional Japanese femininity. No matter how the heroine leaves the man, his sense of loss will be eased by realizing how much he has been loved.

Many *jun'ai* films feature a foreign setting. Noticeably, in many of them, the capacity to individuate in the Western (or foreign) land is portrayed as more readily available to Japanese women than to men. The association of modern Japanese women with modernizing foreign cultivation is not an unfamiliar theme in contemporary discussions about the relationship between Japanese women and the West. Given that *jun'ai* is a contemporary popular cultural production, Japanese women's relationship with the West should be considered by examining

³⁴ Barthes' sociological and semiological approach to "de-mystify" culture has led me to question the gendered representation of love, the *jun'ai* heroines, and the imageries that relate to foreign settings in the films. In *Mythologies*, Barthes illustrates how cultural-social significance is produced through first emptying a signifier's actual content meaning, and then conferring to it a different contextualized connotation that makes it symbolic. Thus, for instance, a red rose becomes a symbol of love. Barthes writes specifically and in a post-structural manner about Japanese culture in *Empire of Signs*. His perception as a foreign intellectual seeing Japan from the outside creates a space to think about everyday culture in relation with historical legacies.

³⁵ *Tsuru no Ongaeshi* (*Crane's Return of a Favor*) is a famous Japanese folklore featuring an animal transforming itself into a woman in order to return the favor of a human being.

how this affinity plays a role in current *jun'ai* films. According to social anthropologist Karen Kelsky, some elite Japanese women's affinity with the modern West began in the Meiji period (1868-1912) when only a few selected female study-abroad students sponsored by the government were sent to the United States to learn from Western cultures (36). A similar female study-abroad phenomenon in the early 1990s is discussed by Shinji Yamashita, who directly points out women's transnational migration as a consequence of Japanese patriarchy in the work arena. To be sure, the dynamics that are deployed between men, women, and foreign countries have changed dramatically over the past hundred years. Arguably, people nowadays can travel abroad either for leisure or study regardless of class and gender differences, as long as they can afford it financially. Nevertheless, in *jun'ai* films, the foreign still tends to be associated more closely with the cultivation of women rather than men.

It is important to bear in mind that the stories are written from the perspective of male authors, marking the heroines' death as an intriguing point from which to consider the dynamics between men, women, and the idea of being in a foreign land. The almost stereotypical representations of the gender dynamics of *jun'ai* characters have carved out a space in which to think about the emergence of this romantic subgenre within the broader social context of Japan's transnationalism. I argue that the ambivalence revealed in *jun'ai* pathos echoes the sentiments produced from Japan's discourse of *kokusaika*, which has been encouraging individuals to interact with the outside world in various aspects of life in Japan, ranging from improving diplomatic relations, increasing economic exchanges, and on the individual level, learning English.

Harumi Befu identifies *kokusaika*'s various associations with existing labels such as 'westernization' (*seioka*), 'modernization' (*kindaika*) and 'liberalization' (*jiyuka*), which has

allowed the movement to spread across Japan, but he also indicates that *kokusaika* paradoxically has made the country more nationalistic (241). According to Mark Lincicome's analysis of the education report published by the National Council on Educational Reform (established under Prime Minister Nakasone in 1984), "coping with internationalization" (*kokusaika e no taiō*) is an important issue that is consequential of Japan's economic power in the world. The aim of the report is to meet the challenge of "an increasingly interdependent community of nations that is openly critical of Japan's economic self-centeredness and cultural insularity... education must prepare future generations of 'cosmopolitan Japanese' (*sekai no naka no Nihonjin*) who can help Japan assume a role in the new world order commensurate with its standing at the forefront of the most advanced nations and make positive contributions not only in the economic arena, but in education, science, and culture as well" (qtd. in Lincicome 127). This statement implies that the nationalistic goal to reverse Japan's international image is conferred onto individuals—the alleged future generation of 'cosmopolitan Japanese' who are encouraged to acquire "the ability to communicate in one or more foreign languages, a thorough knowledge of foreign countries and cultures, a capacity to appreciate cultural differences, and an 'international consciousness' (*kokusaiteki ninshiki*)" (127). That is to say, *kokusaika*, as a national ideology, has in many ways devised for its future generation a nationalistic identity underneath a cosmopolitan wrapping. Moreover, the previous focus on economy in the *kokusaika* discourse expands to other cultural fields in order for Japan to reinforce its "cultural differences." The cosmopolitanism aspired to in the *kokusaika* discourse is thus grounded in a national cause that focuses on reinforcing the uniqueness of Japan rather than on an increasing exchange between Japan and the outside world. To be sure, people's reception of *kokusaika* as well as the different extent to which they aspire to the cosmopolitan dream is subject to individual social background and how directly one is exposed to foreign cultures. However, the popularized national allegory that underlies Japan's

kokusaika has created the general belief that by complying with this national discourse, one can become more cosmopolitan. As a result, rather than moving toward liberation from national boundaries, one actually becomes more rooted as a national subject.³⁶

Sylvie Guichard-Anguis remarks that in cross-cultural events where Japanese culture is presented overseas, Japan deliberately chooses traditional rituals and artifacts that are characterized by their deep representation of Japan. Namely, the ephemeral nature of Japanese cultural beauty is demonstrated by the Japanese themselves in the arts of *ikebana* (flower-arrangement) and *chanoyu* (*sado*, way of tea) (209-221). In these cultural settings, the role of the traditional is deliberately played up in the eyes of foreign spectators in order to create a Japanese national image that is delicate and inviting. But as much as Japanese society adopts a “self-orientalized” gaze of its own culture by internalizing the look of the West, it sustains its need to differentiate itself from the West.

In the case of *jun'ai*, what distinguishes a heroine as a cultural idea rather than a real-life Japanese woman is her dedicated love for the comparatively naïve male protagonist; it gives her a sacrificial stance as a traditional woman recreated in the male imagination. Even though she is simultaneously portrayed as modern in the avid pursuit of her own development, her genuine love for a man has compromised her independence. She is the embodiment of a Japanese society highly influenced by *kokusaika*; in other words, her cosmopolitan aspirations are always safeguarded and held back by someone that she identifies with in the Japanese homeland. In the process, her genuine and tenacious love provides a safe ground for the protagonist to mature. The heroine parallels and sustains Japan’s social discourse of *kokusaika*, which encourages

³⁶ For instance, the discourse of *Nihonjinron*, which argues for the uniqueness of the Japanese race, is paradoxically a cultural-social product of Japan’s global economic success in times of *kokusaika*.

internationalization only to foster national identification. Meanwhile, in contrast to real-life gender tensions in Japanese society, her love for the protagonist and her transient life alleviate the latent threat that is often associated with Japanese women's affinity with the West, which is portrayed as achieved at the expense of Japanese men in the discourse of women's internationalism in the 1990s (Karen Kelsky 1996). Thus, a *jun'ai* heroine mediates between the domestically-bound protagonist and a future that appears more fulfilling than her current life in Japan.

Therefore, in her very modest existence, the *jun'ai* heroine stands for the Japanese concept of *kokusaika*, a national construct based on a national ideology. She is able to reach out to the outside world, yet her transnational aspirations are always guarded by a connection with Japan that she is unable to sever. In this context, Japanese women are more symbolic than real. They are represented as both modern and traditional; they embody Japan's desire to rise with the West and the simultaneous anxiety of losing cultural roots. The women's presence in *jun'ai* films recalls what *kokusaika* stands for in Japan: a transnational aspiration rooted and confined in the national logic of advancing Japan's development. The heroines are used to boost the growth of the protagonists, leading them toward individuation. Meanwhile, the recurring motif of *jun'ai* heroines' transient life resonates with Japan's parallel contradiction in viewing women as susceptible to foreign influence, an elusive presence within Japanese culture, at least as early as Japan's modernization and westernization in the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the *jun'ai* heroine's 'death sentence' suggests the need to get rid of the foreign elements that would potentially hinder a cultural consensus within Japan.

Importantly, the *jun'ai* heroine's death is sanitized by concealing any graphic details through virtual means. The pain of death and separation are mitigated by 'technological

reproductions' of the heroine's image, such as photographs, audio recordings, or films, technological forms that modern Japan has excelled in producing, and which suspend the finality of death. For instance, in *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*, the heroine Aki's frail physical condition due to her terminal stage of leukemia has kept her in the isolated ward where Sakutaro (Moriyama Mirai), the boy she loves, can only see her through the glass window. Aki manages to communicate with Sakutaro by recording her words on audio cassettes, a novelty popular in the 1980s. When this film was released, there were discussions about how these 'retro items' facilitated the creation of a nostalgic atmosphere recalling Japan's emergence as an economic superpower ("*Nakerui*," 28-33). In the beginning of *Rainbow Song*, the news of Aoi's (Ueno Juri) death in a plane crash in California where she studied film production comes out of the blue. The rest of the film serves as a flashback to what has occurred between Aoi and Tomoya (Ichihara Hayato), the insensitive boy she has loved since college days. Totally unaware of Aoi's feelings for him, Tomoya only realizes how much he was loved when he is asked to lend a hand at her funeral. When Aoi's sister gives him a confessional letter written by Aoi years before, he realizes how much she cared for him. As he stays in her room to watch the old films they made together in college, he comes across a film in which Aoi plays the role of his dying wife. Unbeknown to Tomoya, Aoi had expressed her love to him at her deathbed through her lines in the film. Back then, he was just too insensitive to take notice. The film ends on a scene in which Tomoya finds a photo on Aoi's cell phone. It is a shot of a double rainbow he sent her just a few days before her deadly accident. Seeing that Aoi has cherished the photo and used it as her wallpaper screen, he breaks down emotionally. Every trivial moment treasured by Aoi has become ever-present evidence and a 'souvenir of love,' the meaning of which could not be grasped in time. The heroine's virtualized existence, therefore, mystifies her status as a "pure-love" object.



Still 1. *Rainbow Song*: Tomoya (Ichihara Hayato) takes a snapshot of a double rainbow with his cellphone.

The film *Heavenly Forest* demonstrates another instance in which technological reproductions are used to show the heroine's love for the protagonist as well as her affinity with modern Western culture. In this film adaptation of Ichigawa Takuji's novel *Collage of Our Life—Another Story*, the heroine Shizuru (Miyazaki Aoi) and Makoto (Tamaki Hiroshi) have been friends since their first day in college. Due to his skin allergy, Makoto tries to keep a distance from most people, but he finds Shizuru, who looks like an underdeveloped girl, easy to get along with. Meanwhile, there is a mysterious reason why Shizuru retains the looks of a child. She later reveals that she is suffering from a rare disease that becomes deadly with maturity, and that falling in love happens to accelerate the maturation process, leading to an early death. Shizuru's dilemma is that she becomes aware of her love for Makoto, but she also knows that he is more attracted to another girl, Miyuki (Kuroki Meisa), who looks much more mature. Shizuru decides to leave for New York to spur her personal growth. She wants Makoto to see her as a mature woman and fall in love with her. Six years later, Makoto is invited to attend Shizuru's photography exhibition in New York, but he does not see her among the visitors. The display includes several photographs she took of him and a full-length self-portrait of Shizuru herself, grown-up and beautiful. It is then revealed that Shizuru died as a result of her maturation and did not live long enough to see Makoto at her exhibition. At the cost of her life, she chose to battle

against her mysterious illness for the sake of love. In one photograph that captures the two kissing in the heavenly forest where they used to practice photography, a caption in English reads, “It was the only kiss, the [only] love I have ever known.” The photograph was taken at Shizuru’s request for her birthday, a day before her unannounced departure for New York. It is suggested that her love, while innocent, is enduring, wholehearted, and selfless. For these determined *jun’ai* heroines, obstacles such as death are what purify their love in its most genuine state. Shizuru could have saved herself from an early death by not falling for Makoto, but she conforms to the aesthetics of transience; that is, like the cherry blossoms that bloom and die at their prime, she chooses to die for her love rather than to bear a life without it. Like a martyr, she demonstrates to Makoto the lengths she could go for love. The only evidence of this love, however, are the photographs taken.



Still 2. *Heavenly Forest*: Makoto (Tamaki Hiroshi) sees Shizuru (Miyazaki Aoi), now looking grown-up and beautiful in her self-portrait.

As a subgenre produced domestically and targeted mainly at local audiences, *jun’ai* addresses a domestic sentiment through its often isolated settings in small towns and enclosed campuses. They can thus be regarded as a pre-social and liminal space yet to become a social reality. In some *jun’ai* films, the seemingly open and foreign world that the heroines finally

depart for also serves as a liminal space of becoming. Yet in the end, they either die abroad or move back to Japan. In the *jun'ai* film *Hanamizuki* (dir. Doi Nobuhiro, 2010), the heroine Sae (Aragaki Yui) comes from a small village in Hokkaido but works for a humanitarian organization in New York after graduating from Waseda University, a top-ranked private university in Tokyo. At the end of the movie, she returns to her hometown in Hokkaido and opens up a local English school where storybooks are read to the kids. In *Oto-na-ri* (dir. Kumazawa Naoto, 2009), the heroine Nanao (Aso Kumiko), a florist who moves to Tokyo from the countryside, dreams of traveling to France and spends all of her after-hours practicing French solitarily in her studio. She has a male neighbor whose voice she sometimes hears but has never met in person. As it turns out, this neighbor is an aspiring photographer who comes from the same hometown as Nanao. The movie ends with Nanao returning from her trip to France, and the voices of her practicing French with Satoshi can be heard from outside the screen. In these cases, because of her love for the male protagonist, the heroine returns to Japan, which she re-identifies as home. In other words, *jun'ai* films feature women's psychological individuation through transnational experience, which in turn helps them re-evaluate the virtue of their home in Japan.

As a result, *jun'ai* heroines re-affirm a transnational ambition that is grounded nationally. On the outside, their dream of going to the West for personal cultivation can be interpreted as driven by a personal desire for growth, which has been a commonly-held cultural value in Japan's modernization process; on the inside, they are drawn back emotionally by their love for a man in Japan. As previously mentioned, their embodiment of paradoxical values echoes Japan's *kokusaika* movement, in which transnational desire is dreamed with a firm base in Japan. Moreover, the nationalistic principles that govern *kokusaika* foster the distinction of Japan from its foreign counterparts. In a similar vein, *jun'ai* heroines are representations of cultural ideology;

the portrayal of their selfless, almost self-sacrificial nature is particularly evident in works created by male authors bearing the influence of Japan's gendered transnationalism, which will be examined in the next chapter. *Jun'ai*, as both a genre and an emotion, needs to be differentiated from a more interest-based or sexually-driven kind of love that tends to be featured in romantic films. In many *jun'ai* stories, love remains at a platonic level without the characters physically consummating their love; it is sometimes even represented as a crush, or a burgeoning and innocent state in which reciprocation seems impossible. In this unreciprocated form of love, it is clear that the delicate *jun'ai* sensitivity is distinct from the spontaneous flow of romantic passion more common in the West. As much as Japan participates as an active member of international society, national distinctions are maintained to secure the ideology of a stable identity.

Japan's *kokusaika* appears to be liberal whereas in fact, it furthers a nationalistic aim. As Marilyn Ivy has indicated, "*kokusaika* is a conservative policy that reflects the other side of a renewed sense of Japanese national pride, if not nationalism. It has thus been remarked that instead of opening up Japan to the struggle of different nationalities and ethnicities, the policy of internationalization implies the opposite: the thorough domestication of the foreign and the dissemination of Japanese culture throughout the world" (3). Ivy sees Japan's internationalization not as a process to attain multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism, but more of a one-way channel to spread its cultural and economic influence abroad and assimilate the foreign. Ivy's observations focus on the patriarchal perspective of *kokusaika* as a shared national mission. Aside from the top-to-bottom structure, *kokusaika* influences individuals' lives on several levels. The following sections supplement the neglected subjects of gender and class differences in current debates on Japan's *kokusaika*. As the presence of "foreign elements" within Japan has

aroused threats, fears, and hopes of change within Japan, issues such as whether the country can maintain its cultural identity among its interactions with the foreign remains a crucial concern when examining the gender dynamics laid out in *jun'ai* films. Through the heroines' symbolic absence from the protagonists' lives, we can examine how Japanese popular culture treats "foreign elements" (a dynamic that I will continue to investigate in the following two chapters), and how such representation deals with Japan's *kokusaika* practices, which involve inspiring transnational imagination in individuals and domesticating foreign elements within its culture.

Gendered transnationalism in times of *kokusaika* (internationalization)

The *jun'ai* heroine's transnational aspirations are always limited by her love for the protagonist, who represents a Japan yet to be motivated to grow. The gender representations in *jun'ai* films are symbolic of the real gendered participation in transnationalism. Social anthropological research of real-life international women by Karen Kelsky (2008), in comparison, suggest positive potential for Japanese women to rediscover their sense of value in the West. Her studies on Japanese internationalist women in the 1990s address the neglected gender aspect in the age of *kokusaika*. Yet the internationalist women in her research consist mainly of a selective class who get the chance to work for the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations. These women are successful in using foreign cultivation as a springboard to leave behind a patriarchal Japanese society that has put them at a social disadvantage. Kelsky maintains that for internationalist women, the West is viewed as the Mecca of modern humanism and democratic identification. It is placed hierarchically above Japan and idealized as a space where a woman's sense of existence can be renewed. Kelsky's discussion parallels the criticism against the so-called "Green-card Cinderella" phenomenon, wherein some women fetishize the permanent residency permit that allows them to stay in the United States (208-12). Overall, for

these internationalist women as well as the Green-card Cinderellas, the West is regarded as “a second chance” in life to embrace their true self (*jibun*) (97). In other words, Kelsky’s research suggests that compared with ordinary Japanese men, internationalist Japanese women take more advantage of Japan’s *kokusaika* when dealing with foreigners in and outside Japan. Meanwhile, Japanese women’s gendered advantage in terms of their transnationalism is a result of the complicit role played by Western men, who see the admiration of these women as a reaffirmation of their leading part in spreading universal values, such as equality and democracy (174). In other words, the West sustains its view of itself as a savior of Asian women whose social position in their home country is still gendered to their disadvantage. As a result, Japanese men and women tread on different paths in internationalization due to their gender difference. Anthropologist Tessa Morris-Suzuki has also remarked on the gender bias in European orientalist literature, in which Japan is characterized in split gender terms:

[The] Japanese [female] persona was therefore captured in repeated imagery of littleness and fragility, but at the same time it was also seen as having a timeless quality. In the words of Lafcadio Hearn [1850-1904], the charm of Japanese women ‘is the charm of a vanished world—a charm strange, alluring, indescribable as the perfume of some flower of which the species became extinct in our Occident before the modern languages were born.’ By contrast, male Japan was modernizing, militaristic, and menacing. The Japan of the Yellow Peril was unmistakably male. (112)

Similarly, in media representations, Hollywood movies that feature inter-racial romance between American men and Asian women, such as *Sayonara* (dir. Joshua Logan, 1957) and *The World of Suzie Wong* (dir. Richard Quine, 1960), seem to respond to the transnational imagination for strong Western patriarchs during the postwar Occupation period and the Cold War era, which propagated the prevalent Western individualistic spirit in the pursuit of love,

freedom and democracy. While these films attribute more agency to Asian heroines, these are still portrayed as in need of the Western heroes' salvation so as to transcend the various limitations of the conservative Asian societies depicted. Moreover, these films show that Asian women are more likely than Asian men to transcend national boundaries and assimilate into Western life—a transnationalism achieved at the exclusion of Asian men. Asian men are obscured or absent; for instance, there is a lack of identifiable Japanese male characters and in *Sayonara*, and the Mexican-born actor Ricardo Montalbán was cast in the role of a Japanese *kabuki* actor. In contrast to the emasculated Asian men, the male protagonists in these films are represented as larger than life—played by superstar Marlon Brando and William Holden, respectively. Their gallantry as well as their stature, macho attitude and savior-like qualities are set against the invisibility of Asian men in the films. These portrayals of male protagonists are completely different from the depiction of *jun'ai* male protagonists, who are innocent, gentle, and lacking strong motives to succeed. Curiously, remarkably few Hollywood blockbusters featuring Japanese-American inter-racial romance have been produced in recent years. Two period dramas, *Last Samurai* (dir. Edward Zwick, 2003) and *Memoirs of a Geisha* (dir. Rob Marshall, 2005) are both set in time periods when the presence of the West loomed large in Japan's modernization: the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century and World War II. Thus the portrayal of Japanese women in Western films still suggests a mutually complicit view of Japanese women and the West that remains relatively unchanged since half a century ago, when *Sayonara* and *The World of Suzie Wong* were made.

Compared with the emasculated portrayals of Asian men in American movies, Japanese films such as Yamada Yoji's Samurai trilogy (*The Twilight Samurai*, 2002; *The Hidden Blade*, 2004; *Love and Honor*, 2006) revisit Japan in the 19th century, when modernization and social

transformation took hold of people's imagination of the future. The samurais in Yamada's films are lowly ranked; their social status is crumbling and outmoded. Yet it is their upholding of their code of honor and their devotion to the ones they love that save them from being dishonored. Through these films, Yamada recalls a respectable Japanese patriarchy that is not emasculated, nor threatening or domineering. It is a redefinition of Japanese masculinity based on humanity. Meanwhile, there are movies about the breakdown of contemporary Japanese family units and the replacement with alternative families, such as Koreeda Hirokazu's *Nobody Knows* (2004) and *Like Father, Like Son* (2013), which won the 2013 Jury Prize at Cannes Film Festival. To different extents, these films depict a transforming patriarchy in public and in private. The current problem of family disintegration in Japanese urban settings not only reveals the issue of the lack of paternal figures, but also maternal ones that conventionally have been associated with a stabilizing force at home. The phenomenon of family disintegration in contemporary Japanese society is a complex one caused by various factors. Japanese people's gendered transnationalism and the different treatment of gender representations in Western film productions are but some examples of how contemporary Japanese patriarchy has experienced the threat of disintegration. In this phenomenon, the reassuring love of the *jun'ai* heroines is reserved for the male protagonists, and therefore noteworthy in re-affirming a Japanese identification.

Returning to the issue of Japan's gendered transnationalism, it is clear that some internationalist women's elusive status in Japan and their relatively easier reception in the West has caused them to be treated as "foreigners" (*ikokujin*) in Japan. Kelsky refers to these Japanese women's internationalism as an "eroticized internationalism." In other words, the gender disadvantages for women in a patriarchal Japanese society have turned out as advantages when they travel abroad. Even when most women do not have the chance to migrate to a foreign

country, they harbor a transnational imagination to help them mentally escape from the confinements and limitations of life in Japan. In fact, Kelsky's research has suggested that women's transnationalism has become a mentality that does not require them to go abroad physically. Women embody the foreignness in their own Japanese identity, which has already been disintegrated. Focusing on modern Japanese novels, Janice Brown maintains that the role of women in contemporary Japanese society, especially in an age highly influenced by globalization, has not been thoroughly discussed (164-71). Echoing literary scholar Mizuta Lippett Noriko's words, Kelsky illustrates how women are themselves foreigners within Japan and that "no matter where women live, they write from the strangeness and isolation of a foreign country" (qtd. in 121). People can stay in Japan their whole life while embodying a transnational imagination for somewhere else or live as a stranger in their own country. In this regard, Kelsky illustrates Japanese women's fluidity and defiance of a fixed identity:

Women who had resided in Japan for many years embodied a cosmopolitanism that was not entirely located in the foreign: in one sense, they were equally at home both in Japan and the West (to which they still traveled frequently for both business and pleasure); in another, they were equally jaundiced about the possibilities for fulfillment or a new *ikikata* [way to live] in any geographical region of the world. ... However, they resisted any essentializing identification of the self with either Japan or the West. (215-16)

In this trend dubbed by Kelsky as "erotic internationalism," transnationalism can be lived out domestically. However, though the sense of liberation has been real for these internationalist women, it remains more on the individual level and does not lead to any positive social change with regard to gender equality. Along with other feminists, Kelsky (2001) attributes these limitations to how most discourses on internationalist women have been confined to the locus of

the self, which rejects a “communal identity, whether derived from national or feminist solidarity” (221). In other words, the individuation of internationalist women, facilitated by foreign cultivation, is viewed as personal growth that “begins and ends in solitude” without affecting Japan’s social structure (223). Therefore, the nation-transcending desire exists ambiguously within the Japanese identity of these women; while staying in Japan means facing a society that continues to operate on conventional standards, people remain Japanese though they may engage in various activities to satisfy their cosmopolitan desire. Meanwhile, perhaps it is exactly one’s fixed identity as Japanese that enables a nation-transcending desire to emerge. When Japanese people are abroad, it may be that by being marked as Japanese, they are reminded of their identity. As Murakami Haruki, the world-acclaimed Japanese novelist, has said:

It is owing to my ‘responsibility as a Japanese writer’ that I try to appear in front of people as much as I can when I am abroad. It is a self-awareness that I had to develop abroad. As mentioned previously, when I lived overseas during the times of Japan’s bubble economy, I sometimes, too, felt isolated and awkward about the impression that ‘Japanese are faceless.’ When one encounters too much of this situation, it’s natural for me to think what I can do to help reverse this, not just for myself, but for other Japanese people living overseas. Even though I cannot be classified as a patriot (I feel myself more of a cosmopolite), when living abroad, whether I like it or not, I am conscious of the fact that I am a “Japanese writer.” People around me also look upon me as that, and I do, too. Without notice, kinsman-ship derives. It’s incredible. While I left the Japanese soil and ran away from its steadfast frame in order to become a so-called “expatriate,” as it turned out, I had no choice but to return to my ties with the original soil. Please make no mistake, it does not mean that I return to the soil per se but the relations with it. (295-96)

Transnational aspirations liberate how people conceive of national identity. As a result, it allows them to negotiate between two identities—one inspired by transnational imagination and a fixed national identity. In a ‘compromised’ way, travel, interaction with foreign acquaintances, working abroad, and even migration can shift one’s self-identification as a ‘cosmopolite’ or, following Aihwa Ong (1999), a “flexible citizen.” However, popular productions of *jun’ ai* are characterized more as a psychological yearning reflexive of the aspirations and limitations in life. While in real life, people’s cosmopolitan desire sometimes leads to real change in their national identity, such as giving up their Japanese nationality when they migrate to another country, most of the time it does not. Giving up one’s original national identity is often portrayed as a long process of mental struggle.³⁷

In fact, internationalization is promoted in a many-faceted way. As a national discourse, it presents Japan as a technologically and electronically advanced country to the outside world, and this image parallels the country’s role in globalization with the transnational exportation of products and soft popular culture such as anime, manga, and consumer-oriented technological devices. The national “Cool Japan” movement also often leads this global promotion of Japanese products.³⁸ Contrary to the “faceless” technology culture, Japan’s internationalization has a nationalist side that aims to showcase traditional Japanese culture and artifacts overseas to

³⁷ People’s transnational identity conflict is an important theme in Japanese director Oguri Kohei’s latest film *Foujita* (2015), which narrates the most famous and successful Japanese Parisian painter Foujita Tsuguharu’s life. During World War II, Foujita had to return to Japan and was appointed by the army to produce war propaganda paintings. Devastated by the Japanese political environment, Foujita moved back to France and became a French citizen in 1955.

³⁸ Responding to what Morley and Robins term “techno-Orientalism” and the popularity of Japanese anime and manga in the West, which “present new, dehumanized high-tech images of Japan”, Iwabuchi refers to the West’s “active erasure of bodily Japanese-ness” as its “monolingual illusion” of Japan (Global Culture 268). Iwabuchi argues that in contrast to Japan’s wide cultural presence in Asia based on its unique modernity, the products exported to the West are rather “odorless”, meaning that they lack a specific Japanese flavor. I see these exported “odorless” popular cultural products, such as digital technology, as corresponding to Japan’s state-operated “Cool Japan” campaign that began in 2002, which designates a male transnationalism that I wish to differentiate from Japanese women’s gendered internationalism carried out via men’s exclusion.

demonstrate Japan's difference from the rest of the world. Under this versatile public image of *kokusaika*—modern and traditional, free of national markers and full of Japanese cultural flair—Japanese culture is promoted as adaptable to different views. However, internationalization, seen in this regard, is more about promoting Japanese culture to the outside world than encouraging citizens to embrace a cosmopolitan identity to the degree of abandoning their Japanese identification.

Moreover, this type of internationalization should be differentiated from the internationalism of the 1920s. Japan's more clearly defined ideal of internationalism in the 1920s expressed a cosmopolitan wish based on the shared goal of heightening the country's political significance in the world; it was a political ideal unconcerned with self-interest, and solidly grounded in the idea of an integral Japanese identity. Moreover, its promoters were mainly male intellectuals.

The type of *kokusaika* promoted since the 1980s also bears a nationalist intent by asking for every citizen's participation. However, it invites citizens to hatch a transnational imagination without fully satisfying it. The cosmopolitan identification illustrated by Kelsky's internationalist women is a domestic cosmopolitanism; women's internationalism is personal and aspires to open to the outside world. In addition, Kelsky's studies show how women's promising transnationalism ends up leaving Japanese men behind. Compared with Japanese men who bear heavy social demands as national subjects, women can act on their transnational aspirations more freely. Whereas Japanese women have a relative advantage via allying with the West, ordinary men lack such an option, and their presence and participation of *kokusaika* operates mainly under the nationalist frameworks of corporate business and political affairs. As a result, this sociological observation suggests a fracturing of a solid identification with an integral Japanese

identity along gender lines. This social reality, however, has been bypassed in *jun'ai* films, suggesting that this romantic genre is based on male fantasy. The feeling of having fewer opportunities than Japanese women is shared by ordinary Japanese men who go abroad in search of work opportunities. This phenomenon has been documented by Yuiko Fujita's fieldwork in London and New York. However, aside from this research, few sociological studies have been conducted on this topic.³⁹ The underrepresented Japanese men who work and strive abroad clearly need to be studied so as to understand the impact of transnational aspirations on individuals. Although in today's age of globalization, ordinary Japanese men are as motivated to engage with the West as their female counterparts, the process can be more arduous.

Jun'ai is not only a subgenre; its booming at the time of the so-called Lost Decade suggests it is a sentiment, a pathos of national loss felt in current times. *Jun'ai* heroines' elusive presence and the hope and salvation that they embody capture and reinforce an ideology of male imagination and recreate women as the *jun'ai* object. Therefore, we need to reckon with how the foreign (often synonymous with death) functions in a subtle ways to further the separation (and longing) between the male protagonist and the heroine, while also looking at how contemporary Japanese society constructs its sense of loss in the presence of its ties with other countries. Japan's nationalist discourse thus offers an important social context in which the relation between individuals, Japan, and other countries can be studied. While *jun'ai* is a phenomenon of the early 21st century, it can also be seen as a national allegory for Japan. This aspect tends to be neglected, and the present study aims to make up for this lack of attention.

Striving to be pure: Japan's trans/nationalism as an internal struggle

³⁹ Both Kelsky's and Fujita's field research show Japanese men being marked as "unpopular" in the host country (111-14).

In *Discourses of the Vanishing*, Marilyn Ivy reminds us of the ‘problematic’ start of Japanese *kokusaika*, which has been haunted by what she refers to as Japan’s “national-cultural phantasms” of “modernity’s losses” (4-9). Although Japan has never been colonized by the West, as other Asian countries have, she attributes the fact that Japanese modernity has been created by emulating the West as contributing to its status as a “quasi-colonized mimic.” Because of this, Ivy sees Japan’s efforts to transcend its lag as predetermined to fail. She maintains that even though Japan “also threatens and challenges the modern colonizers in its state of ‘excess mimicry,’” it “can never succeed in effacing the difference between the western original and the colonized copy... Colonized mimics remain as ‘not white/not quite’ in Bhabha’s formulation” (7). In Ivy’s argument, reliance on the West for its modern infrastructures haunts Japan’s formation of a stable “national self-fashioning,” as “[t]he efforts to sustain that difference have never been without remainders, losses, and violences” (9). Ivy further defines *kokusaika* as a means for Japan to release an internal stress: “the foreign—because of its very threat—must be transformed into a manageable sign of order, a transformation indicated most clearly by what, in Japan, is perhaps the dominant political concept of the past ten years: internationalization (*kokusaika*). While internationalization elsewhere implies a cosmopolitan expansiveness (even while retaining the national frame), the Japanese state-sponsored version tends toward the domestication of the foreign” (3). The above examples of *jun’ai* heroines who are “sentenced to death” in films similarly parallel the domestication process in Ivy’s evaluation of Japan’s *kokusaika*.

Here, Ivy’s argument is in line with Diotima’s story of Eros pursuing his father’s resourcefulness as illustrated in *The Symposium*—the pursuit of love as an eternal becoming process. However, while attempts are made in Japan to close the gap between the transnational

and the national in *kokusaika*, there are simultaneous struggles to maintain a Japanese “difference” from the West. Thus, rather than becoming a complete mimic of the West, Japan’s “domesticating” desire exposes an anxiety to preserve its cultural integrity. In Kawabata’s *Snow Country*, the dilettante ballet critic Shimamura describes Komako’s futile efforts to distinguish herself as similar to those of a moth flying toward the fire. Similar to this geisha heroine, Japan makes futile attempts to assert its identity under the condescending gaze of the West. Just as the heroine embodies an upward (modernizing) momentum in her traditional role as a geisha, the more conventional characterizations of the *jun’ai* heroines (especially in their transient lives and untimely devotion to the protagonists) show the assertion of Japanese cultural identity when internationalizing desire captures the imagination.

Thus, at the heart of the struggle between the pursuit of transnational imagination and national identification in times of *kokusaika* is a fractured identification with Japan. On one hand, the desire to attain “world standards” (synonymous with Western standards) puts Japan and the West in binary and hierarchical positions, the latter occupying a higher status. Because of this imbalance, Harumi Befu and Hiroshi Mannari point out that the Japanese concept of internationalization is a problematic ideology with “a Western bias” (259).⁴⁰ As a consequence of its reliance on world standards, Japan adopts the West’s orientalizing view of other “less-modern” cultures. This is exemplified by Marilyn Ivy’s observation that Japan exoticizes itself in its advertising campaigns for domestic travel. While overseas travel is promoted as a luxurious way to expand one’s horizons, Ivy illustrates how Fujioka Wakao successfully produced domestic advertisement campaigns for the Japan National Railway with slogans such as “Discover Japan” in 1970, and later ‘Exotic Japan’ in 1984, capturing a sense of unfamiliarity in

⁴⁰ A similar argument about Japan’s internationalization can be found in Mouer and Sugimoto (270-1).

local places. The slogans immediately exoticize the local landscapes as places waiting to be explored by adventurous ‘pioneer’ travelers. Thus, the native places in Japanese countryside are promoted as foreign places. A self-orientalized gaze is also incorporated as a strategy to differentiate between center and periphery in the case of reproducing *furusato* (native hometown) in more local areas of Japan (Jennifer Robertson 1991; Marilyn Ivy 1995, qtd. in Ertl 86). In essence, by exoticizing and defamiliarizing the countryside to Japanese women—who were the major consumers for foreign travel thanks to the prosperity of the bubble economy and a less restrictive social demand at work that allows them more time to enjoy themselves, these campaigns wished to attract women to explore a different face of Japan in the same way that they had aspired to explore places overseas.⁴¹ These gestures, however, were used to bring urban travelers to understand the “real” Japan—unaffected, unpolluted, friendly, genuine, and pure. In certain *jun'ai* films, some of the characters’ hometowns are located in the countryside or in secluded places, which make them at once familiar and transient (soon to be lost), just like the pure *jun'ai* object. By inviting people to ‘discover’ Japan, this patronizing as well as orientalizing look is exercised to reclaim and re-control the “foreign” elements within the country itself. Meanwhile, female travelers are given a new role as explorers within their own country. They are thereby strengthening their re-identification with Japan.

Although internationalization encourages people to interact with the outside world, it does not truly support cosmopolitanism in a liberal sense, as increasing contacts with the outside world prompts the fear that Japan might compromise its traditional cultural identity. Due to this nationalist intent, Japan fosters traditional and customary impressions so as to demarcate cultural boundaries. *Jun'ai* stories in the beginning of the 21st century reinforce this conservative

⁴¹ East Japan Railway Company is now targeting its consumers at senior citizens: its affiliated club tourism company *Otona no Kyujitsu Club* (Adult Holiday Club) specifies its member at age 50 and above.

ideology. In the world of *jun'ai*, Japanese society reinforces this view, which may be somewhat countering a more open look at how Japan recreates itself vis-à-vis its Western adaptation. Sociologists such as Shunya Yoshimi and Koichi Iwabuchi view contemporary Japanese culture as already being a hybrid developed from the result of its historical and political interactions with other countries. Quite contrary to Ivy's view of Japan's loss in its modernization process, Shunya Yoshimi in "*Consuming 'America': from Symbol to System*" has a relatively positive attitude toward the country's adoption of Western structures. He argues that the very structure of opposition between 'Japan' and 'America,' and between 'internal' and 'external' was no longer clear from the 1980s onward, which led to inter-culturation. In the essay, he discusses how the urban planning of Ginza (a trendsetting area known since the beginning of the 20th century as the frontline of Western fashion in Japan) and the transplant of Disneyland in Japan in 1983 show how America has become "internalized" as part of Japanese everyday life, especially for baby-boomers who might demonstrate more familiarity with American popular culture than with Japanese traditional culture.⁴² He complicates the issue of Japanese identification: "The point is that this process was not the 'colonization' of Japan by American cultural imperialism, nor the mere 'domestication' of America into the Japanese context. Throughout the process, Japan has been externalized to the same extent as America has been internalized" (2000: 221). For Yoshimi, inter-culturation is a multi-directional process that not only shows how the West is indigenized in Japan's everyday life; the same is true of how traditional Japanese culture has been externalized and exoticized—as modern urban dwellers are encouraged by the advertising campaigns to uncover what they have missed in their own culture. In other words, we are living in an open society where boundaries are elusive and ever-shifting.

⁴² Yoshimi also elaborates on the urban planning and cross-cultural significance of Ginza in another essay, "Consuming America, Producing Japan" (2006).

Despite its hybrid postcolonial potential, Yoshimi's Japan (or at least that which represents a more "Americanized" Japan, such as Disneyland and Ginza) is sensitive to the commercial logic of global capitalism. He describes the strategy of exoticization as "the common denominator of the commercial phenomenon," which "functions on a reality that has been totally fictionalized" (221). Tokyo Disneyland, founded on the simulated construction of the American dream, is a manifestation of Japan's transnational imagination. However, since *kokusaika* is a far-extending movement across Japan, unbound by the walls of Disneyland's fictional property, the anxieties and fears that set back Japan's internationalism cannot be considered entirely resolved.

There is validity in both Ivy's observations about Japan's loss caused by its pursuit of modernity, and Yoshimi's view of a hybrid present-day Japan as useful in illuminating how Japan interacts with its internal foreign influences. But while Yoshimi sees the commercial logic of globalization lifting away concerns over the boundaries of culture, Iwabuchi reminds us to examine the nature of Japan's hybrid culture, paying particular attention to how essentialist beliefs about Japan complicate its representations. Supplementary to Yoshimi's view of how Japan "re-centers" a United-States-dominated globalization by way of exporting television dramas and a contemporary Japanese lifestyle to other Asian countries, Iwabuchi recognizes how Japan has taken pride in its domestication of foreign cultures. He refers to this as a Japanese 'strategic hybridism' so as to distinguish it from Homi Bhabha's idea of hybridity (1998: 71-84). He argues that hybridism satisfies Japan's imagination about its own ability to domesticate foreign cultures and turn them to its service. Due to the nationalistic nature of this domesticating process, he refers to hybridism as part of the effort to construct a Japanese cultural essence, which he refers to as Japan's "genius" in hybridizing itself (1998:71). In other words, no other

country can excel at incorporating so many cultural differences to recreate itself better than Japan. While cultural purity has become unachievable in Japan's attempts to build itself as a westernized and civilized country in Asia, the pursuit of "pure impurity" becomes the only way to attain this goal (1998: 82). That is, this ability to hybridize allows Japan to imagine that its culture remains stably flexible. Iwabuchi uses the metaphor of a sponge to illustrate Japan's perceived capacity to hybridize (2002: 54). Like a sponge that absorbs the moisture it needs without changing shape, Japan can take in the elements of foreign cultures it needs without compromising its cultural integrity.

Japan's expertise in domesticating foreign cultures without being transformed brings to mind the *Nihonjinron* discourse, which argues for the uniqueness of the Japanese race. The selective domestication process echoes to some extent Japan's xenophobic attitude towards perceived others. Interestingly, Takie Sugiyama Lebra attributes the rise of *Nihonjinron* discourse to "post-war Japan's increased exposure to alien peoples and cultures" (264-265). Lebra also asserts that with the increasing desire for foreign abundance since the postwar call for *kokusaika* and the push factor of its sense of loss in various economic, political, and social spheres since the mid-1990s, Japan's capacity to claim an integral identity has become a major issue. Japan's current *jun'ai* boom clearly expresses these sentiments. In fact, Yumiko Iida also sees a similarity between Japan in the 1990s and Japan in the 1960s, which is when *Nihonjinron* discourse became popular. She maintains that, "Building upon the *Nihonjinron* (the discourse of Japanese uniqueness) of the previous decades, contemporary Japanese discourse came to be filled with signs of a desire for transcendence and spiritual renewal, articulated by various revisionist voices calling for a restoration of conventional moral codes and traditional cultural

values” (3). Her use of “desire for transcendence” is similar to what I mean by transnational imagination, which makes use of foreign elements to transcend a confining daily reality.

In other words, the more Japan comes into contact with foreign cultures (presumably in practicing *kokusaika*), the more it can prove its cultural versatility in accommodating the foreign within itself. However, in the fictional world of *jun'ai*, pure impurity is not so much of a concern. That is, *jun'ai* seeks to recreate an essentialized pure world in Japan that is built upon the heroine's wholehearted dedication to the man she loves. Her exposure to other socializing forces, such as her contact with the foreign world, or even her imminent death—both of which could have transformed her—are not going to change her steadfast identification with her love. To be precise, it is “impure purity,” meaning the purity of feelings that people hold onto amongst competing emotions. It is the renewed obsession with purity that captures people's imagination for an ideal Japan, despite the fact that globalization has rendered the local rather porous to foreign influence. Therefore, it is this idealism that re-domesticates *jun'ai* heroines as an integral part of Japan: they become confined by their own pure-love.

Conclusion

If internationalist women reveal one aspect of the Japanese transnational imagination, *jun'ai* stories offer another from a male perspective: the vulnerable and sensitive feelings of those who are unable to achieve such transcendence. Due to their *jun'ai* qualities, the heroines cannot live as freely as their transnational imagination would like them to. In *jun'ai* films, they usually function solely to inspire the growth of the male protagonists. For instance, in *Hanamizuki*, without the heroine as a motive for growth, the transnational aspirations of the protagonist Kouhei (Ikuta Toma) would not be kindled—he would not have joined the business of deep-sea

fishing so as to create a chance for their reunion in another country. In *Oto-na-ri*, a light-hearted version of *jun'ai* romance, where death is not represented as a looming theme, the protagonist Satoshi (Okada Junichi) experiences a career breakthrough as a professional photographer after he is inspired by the heroine's efforts to cultivate herself. In most *jun'ai* films, the heroines are instrumental in the protagonists' individuation.

Overall, *jun'ai* heroines stand for an imminent loss; they die in isolation in a majority of *jun'ai* stories. Their embodiment of both traditional and modern values suggests an ambivalence of how women are being imagined in current times; their death and disappearance in the field of the unknown continue to mystify them with a sense of transience, which not only corresponds to how Japanese culture has posed itself in its contacts with other cultures, but also resonates with the *soshitsukan* discourse in Japan's Decade of Loss. In film-based portrayals, the *jun'ai* heroines' dedicated love and understanding personality point to the traditional virtues of Japanese women, who are loyal to Japanese values and men, even when they have to sacrifice their own interests. The creation of *jun'ai* heroines, thus, is based on an ideology and an idealized profile of what women represent for men.

The foreign and the West in these *jun'ai* narratives are symbolic representations that echo Japan's domestic concern for loss. Like the portrayals of the heroines, these representations of the foreign are fragmentary as well as ideological. They are superficial and mythologized. The foreign cities merely serve as a de-territorialized contact zone where the gap between Japan's *kokusaika* desire and its domestic cultural identification can be mediated. Thus, the domestication of the heroines through *jun'ai* parallels the condition of Japan's *kokusaika*, which encourages a nation-transcending ideal without the subjects actually debunking their national identity. These heroines are made to embody Japan's desire for modernization and its fear of

disintegration along the process of coming into contact with the foreign. Their death in the films, however, suggests that they are confined in a passive state of immobility. Japanese women, in their imaginary affective ties with the ideal of foreign abundance, become empty signifiers for the Japanese problem of national disintegration. Ironically, in *jun'ai* films, the heroine's death suggests a loss-stricken Japan that is unable to find its foothold without destroying the foreign within itself before starting to heal—a symbolic gesture that suggests rebirth and reconstruction. The following chapter continues to investigate Japan's struggles to contain individuals' transnational desires from a cultural psychological perspective in order to further define the nature of contemporary *jun'ai* pathos. By looking at films that incorporate foreign settings, the contrast between male authors and female counterparts will be addressed.

Chapter Two

“*Jun'ai*” (Pure-Love) and *Amae*: The Ambivalent Desire to Love

In *jun'ai* films, the heroine's death can be seen as a result of her marginalized social position in Japan, making her a victim of Japan's gendered transnationalism. The ambivalence between individual transnational imagination that drives a person to leave Japan and a national, cultural-based identification with Japan constitutes the acute pathos of *jun'ai* films that are deliberately set abroad. In this chapter, I examine four films in detail: *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* (Dir. Nakae Isamu, 2001), *Tokyo Tower* (Dir. Minamoto Takashi, 2005), *Sayonara Itsuka* (Dir. John H. Lee, 2010) and *I Have to Buy New Shoes* (Dir. Kitagawa Eriko, 2012).⁴³ What distinguishes these four films from the ones I have introduced in the previous chapter is the foreign imagery and setting that plays a crucial role in the romantic narratives. The representations of the couple's romance connote a love that is somehow nuanced: while all characters are Japanese, the flair of transnationalism sparks their love. Foreign settings help liberate the characters' feelings, which could not otherwise survive in Japan, where social conventions dominate over individuals' lives.

However, the expression of love in these films differentiates them from romantic films generally made in or inspired by the West: there is a sense of longing for the primary love-object, which points first to the *jun'ai* object, but then to one's cultural identification with Japan. In order to understand the nature of this love, the concept of *amae*, which was defined by Japanese psychologist Doi Takeo interchangeably as primary love, dependency-love and need-love, is

⁴³ The first three were published in the form of popular fiction before being made into films. Kitagawa Eriko is both the writer and director of *I Have to Buy New Shoes*. Tsuji Hitonari, who migrated to Paris in a self-exilic manner in 2003, is the author of *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* and *Sayonara Itsuka*. Ekuni Kaori is the author of *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* and *Tokyo Tower*. All three authors are literary celebrities in Japan. Since narrative is an important part of the *jun'ai* genre, I use the names of these authors when discussing the specific films inspired by their novels.

useful here to suggest its difference from romantic passion, which I define in this chapter as a more sexualized desire popularized with the global spread of Western romance products, such as films and romance novels. The distinction between *amae* and romantic passion implies that the former is associated with what is arguably a Japanese cultural understanding of love, situated within various social ties and not necessarily limited between two lovers, and the latter as highly influenced by the Western idea of romantic passion and sexual attraction that unites two individuals. William Reddy's comparative study of love and sexuality in the West in the twelfth century and Japan during the Heian period (794-1185 CE) illustrates how the historical context of each culture gives rise to different conceptualizations of love. He points out that love in the West has been viewed to embody the duality of true love and sexual desire; true love tames desire, just as one's appetite is pleasingly satisfied (4). The craving and lust has to be fulfilled by true love. This duality, however, is absent in Heian Japan, where desire itself is not related to love; desire connotes endless suffering, whereas sex itself exists as a pleasurable act to bring spiritual solace (5). Reddy's Western concept of love is what I refer to as romantic passion in this chapter in order to distinguish it from the *amae*-love that I observe in these films.

While I am aware that such classifications might run the risk of essentializing both a Japanese kind of love and love inspired by Western cultures, I find through textual analysis that in *jun'ai* films that involve a foreign setting, the cross-cultural difference in depicting romance lies in the inner struggle of the protagonists to compromise how they express their love in the foreign cities. Meanwhile, foreign imagery and settings play a significant role in the consummation of the Japanese couple's love, where the portrayal of romance is tinted with passion. This is why the films I discuss here belong more to romance than to the *jun'ai* genre. The struggles of love are nuanced to address the protagonists' primary longing for a connection

with the way love is expressed in Japanese culture. I argue that the types of primary feelings exhibited in these Japanese romantic films can be best understood as *jun'ai*, that is, feelings of *amae* that long to be replenished even in a transnational context. Since Doi theorized the concept of *amae* in psychological terms, my use of this concept relies on the imagery of a much-needed primary object, namely, the maternal love-object who is the source of a person's primary identification during the pre-oedipal stage. In addition, I argue this primary object ultimately suggests a longing for an integral Japanese identity—re-imagined metaphorically as a source of abundance against current times of loss. The ambivalence in compromising a Japanese way of love and a Western-inspired one finds resonance in the title of one of the films I discuss in this chapter: *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* (Between Calmness and Passion), which depicts a love caught between two seemingly contradictory emotions: calmness and passion.⁴⁴ Moreover, since the film is set in Florence, this contradiction is compounded with the cross-cultural difference between Japan and Italy. Throughout the film, memories of the couple's old days in Tokyo intersect with their current lives in Milan and Florence, respectively. Thus, love exists in a hybridized form of *amae* that has more to do with Japan (and romantic passion), and which finds its voice in the Italian settings.

Since the West can be seen as the birthplace of individualism, the transnational resolution of the protagonists' love runs parallel to their journey of individuation. These female protagonists tend to be portrayed as cosmopolitans and embrace a transnational lifestyle: in *Tokyo Tower* (2005), Shifumi is the owner of a chic European boutique in an expensive area of Aoyama in

⁴⁴ *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* is a two-volume novel, a collaboration between Ekuni Kaori's *Rosso* and Tsuji Hitonari's *Blu*. Published in two monthly journals, *Monthly Kadokawa* and *Monthly Feature* (Kadokawa Shoten Publishing), this collaboration began in 1997 and lasted two years until 1999. Ekuni wrote from the heroine Aoi's perspective and consciousness and Tsuji wrote from that of the protagonist Junsei. However, the two novels are like monologues. The success of the authors' work prompted them to cooperate again in the same format in *Ugan, Sagan* (*Right Bank, Left Bank*, Shueisha Publishing, 2008).

Tokyo, a place famous for its stylish atmosphere combining European fashion with Japanese attention to presentation. Because of her job, she flies to Paris on a regular basis and has a good command of French. The other heroine in the film, Kimiko, is a housewife who finds purpose and enjoyment in flamenco. Another “transnationally-active” woman worth mentioning in this film is Shifumi’s friend and mother of the young man with whom Shifumi has an affair. She is a successful and independent photographer. In the film, she smokes and has the same iconic bob haircut as Louise Brooks (1906-1985), a symbol of western modern womanhood in the 1920s. In *Calmi Cuori Appassionati*, the heroine Aoi is a *kikokushijo* (a returnee-child of Japanese migrants) from Milan, whose main spoken language in the film is English.⁴⁵ The heroine in *Sayonara Itsuka* (2010), Toko, is a mysterious Japanese woman who lives in Bangkok on the large alimony provided by her Chinese ex-husband. Lastly, *I Have to Buy New Shoes* (2012) features another Aoi, this time a lonely Japanese woman living in Paris as a freelance reporter writing for Japanese readers. The transnationality of these women reflects a gendered tendency in Japan’s transcultural imagination that sees the female, rather than the male, as holding the key to foreign modernity and inspiring a more cosmopolitan way of life for male authors.⁴⁶

The following textual analysis serves to tease out three major points about *jun’ ai* films that incorporate foreign settings as important backgrounds for the lovers’ romance. First of all, I argue that *jun’ ai* can be understood as *amae*, a concept key to the understanding of Japanese

⁴⁵ The role is justifiably played by a foreigner—Hong Kong actress Kelly Chen. The casting not only gives a cosmopolitan touch to the film, it also targets Chinese viewers outside Japan. In the novel from which the movie is adapted, both Aoi and the protagonist, Junsei, are *kikokushijo*, the former returning from Milan and the latter from New York. In the film, however, Junsei’s *kikokushijo* status is omitted. Instead, his Japaneseness is emphasized through the blood lineage from his paternal side. Since his mother’s death, he has been taken under the care of his grandfather, who is the chief-executive of the Japanese Painting Association. Junsei’s artistic identification with western art reinforces his transcultural desire for the West.

⁴⁶ There is a good amount of internationalist speeches made to call for Japanese women’s active engagement in the international affairs on men’s behalf. See Nanami Shiono’s keynote speech made at the Japan Foundation (2012). I have shown in Chapter One that the discourse is often made to emphasize the flexibility of a woman’s acceptance of new ideas in contrast with the heavier social burden borne by the Japanese men.

cultural psyche, which was theorized in postwar times by Japanese psychologist Doi Takeo in light of Japan's ever-increasing contacts with the West. Secondly, since Japanese authors create these stories to address Japanese audiences, foreign settings become part of the transnational imagination that is produced from a Japanese perspective. As a result, individuals' expression of lost love is also caught between a Japanese representation of love (as in *amae*) and a more "universalized" western way of expressing romantic passion. Thirdly, the difference in gender among the authors who create these *jun'ai* stories also informs their transnational imagination and the way they translate feelings of lost love into words.

My reading suggests that male and female authors of *jun'ai* have taken on nuanced resolutions toward how love is represented, which can be seen as a hybrid form of romantic passion along with a Japanese sentimentality of love. This composite love directly responds to today's Japanese society, in which *kokusaika* (internationalization) and globalization are promoted concurrently with a strengthening of Japan's national identification. While male and female romance authors differ in their sensibility to sentiments of lost love, they can be viewed as connoting a re-identification with Japan as a source of primary cultural identification. My concern lies in how this hybrid form of love reconciles *amae* with foreign settings, in which love is generally represented as erotic passion.

***Jun'ai* as *Amae* as "Primary Love"**

In these films, the representations of romantic relationships are portrayed as simulating the affection and bonding between a child and a primary love-object that embodies a metaphorical abundance and the potential to nourish the child's individuation process. In many cases, it is represented by a female figure. For instance, *jun'ai*Toru in *Tokyo Tower* falls desperately in love

with his mother's friend; Junsei in *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* attributes his intimacy with his Italian mentor Giovanna to his (lack of) memory of his mother; in *I Have to Buy New Shoes*, Aoi's attachment to her Japanese young friend reminds her of the pain of losing her son as well as her youthful days in Tokyo, where she was brought up. As much as the child needs the primary object, the feeling is in fact mutual. These cases demonstrate that *jun'ai* develops from a cultural experience in a foreign country based on a mutual dependence that brings two people to relate to each other. Moreover, this longing for the primary object ultimately points to Japan as the object of nostalgic loss.

The psychological concept of *amae* was theorized by Doi Takeo in the 1950s when he was sent to the United States as an exchange researcher. He noticed that while westerners also demonstrate feelings of emotional fragility and the wish to depend on someone, it is mostly restricted to lovers and expressed in religious scenarios where one is subject to God's power and benevolence (171). As a result, the concept of *amae* itself can be viewed as a product of postwar cross-cultural interactions. *Amae* literally means "sweet." It denotes the need to depend on someone else's favor. Doi identified the lack of a direct translation of the term *amae* in Western languages, contrasting it with the Japanese incorporation of the term in various derivations. He took this as a sign that the West treats the lingering emotions of primary love differently from Japan. Doi further argued that the West's emphasis on values that encourage "self-help" and "autonomy," stemming from eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, has fostered an unprecedented belief in rationalism and individualism (*The Anatomy of Dependence*, 23-36). In opposition, Japanese culture is seen to put a high value on a traditional family organization that is continually dominated by the pre-war "ie" (household), a "quasi-kinship unit with a patriarchal head and members tied to him through real and symbolic blood relationship" (Yoshio Sugimoto

147). This hierarchical structure has dominated the postwar Japanese corporate system, forming an overall “vertical” impression of how Japanese society operates (Nakane Chie 87).

Individuation for the Japanese, therefore, does not involve a complete independence, but is seen as a naturalized phenomenon secured in the hierarchical structure.⁴⁷

In order to overcome these cross-cultural differences, Doi introduced the concept of *amae* to the West through Freud’s model, comparing it to a baby’s pre-Oedipal dependence on the mother for her oceanic abundance. Doi agrees with Freud that every kind of love has “an infantile prototype” in the form of libido-transference (Doi 170). Nevertheless, while Freud uses transference and sublimation to explain how an individual learns to deal with his libido loss through artistic creations, Japanese people perpetuate the desire for co-dependence in various other social relations based on the mother-child model.⁴⁸ Doi states:

There is a continuity between children and adults so far as *amae* is concerned.

Thus we may use the word *amae* to describe the relationship between lovers, friends, husband and wife, teacher and student, even employer and employee.... I think it must be clear from what has been said above that *amae* involves **a certain psychological dependence**, because one who wants to *amaeru* **requires another person who senses one’s need and can meet it**. Thus *amae* is vulnerable and, being susceptible to frustration, it undergoes various transformations. (165, my emphasis).

In the West, Doi finds that Hungarian psychologist Michael Balint’s theorization of “primary or primitive love” is a more adequate translation of *amae* (*Understanding Amae*, 188). The use of

⁴⁷ Traditional Japanese rites of passage are well-orchestrated, following conventional ways of celebrating the process of growing up: *Hinamatsuri* (Doll Festival, Girls’ Day, celebrated on March 3rd), *Kodomo no hi* (Children’s Day, held on May 5th), *7-5-3 Festival* (blessing ceremonies held at shrines for girls aged 7 and 3, and boys aged 5), and *Seijin no hi* (Coming-of-Age Day, celebrated on the second Monday of January for young adults turning 20). In other words, Japanese society is still seen as the guardian of its young citizens.

⁴⁸ Sublimation in artistic creations is generally attributed to people of outstanding genius. Freud approves of its positive influence on society by saying, “Sublimation is the transformation of sexual impulses in contributions to the development of civilization” (qtd. in Radden 273). For him, sublimation lifts the melancholic out of his “unhealthy” and unproductive condition by offering a positive social purpose.

“primary” captures the libidinal need that is attached to the love-object. While it is sometimes represented by the heroine, the ultimate object that offers a sense of replenishment and belonging is the identification with Japan as the object holding the primary longing, *jun'ai*

As Doi points out, in the Japanese case, there is no strictly defined boundary between adults and children as far as *amae* is concerned. Adults, male and female alike, are allowed to be vulnerable at times in given complicit social scenarios without jeopardizing their position in the social hierarchy. In contrast to the West where interpersonal intimacy and vulnerability is mostly limited to close family members, Doi sees Japanese society as reserving more space and compassion for adults to express helplessness in front of any individual. He shows that the social extension and acceptance of *amae* differentiates Japan from the West in terms of love:

Not only patients, but ordinary adults, can allow themselves to indulge in the feeling of helplessness at times.... one would perhaps gratify one's dependency wishes to a greater extent in Japan than in the United States.... [F]or the Japanese mind, to be helpless is a basic fact of human existence that cannot be eliminated or resolved. What one can do for helpless beings then is, in essence, to have pity and sympathy for them, or, to put it in psychoanalytic terms, to identify oneself with their helplessness. I think this is the Japanese notion of love and affection. (*Understanding Amae*, 33)

According to Doi, the major difference between *amae*, a Japanese type of love, and eros, love driven by romantic passion as it is commonly conceptualized in the West, lies in the former's non-sexual aspect. Doi claims that *amae* is “a universal nonsexual drive for close dependent affiliation” (173). In Japan, *amae* can sometimes flow spontaneously in platonic relationships between father and son, teacher and pupil, employer and employee and *senpWeai* and *kohai* (senior and junior).⁴⁹ It sometimes even appears replete with “homosexual feelings” that “do not

⁴⁹ It would probably make sense to understand the same-sex teacher-student *amae* through the ancient Greek teacher (a much older and knowledgeable man) and student (a much younger boy or man) relationship. This homoerotic

necessarily develop into this restricted type of homosexuality”, regarding which Doi remarks, “Japan... is the ideal place for enjoying friendship with members of the same sex openly and unashamedly” (113-114).⁵⁰ *Amae*, therefore, is not an erotic kind of romantic passion, but it sometimes creates a grey zone of appearing so, especially in the heterosexual pairing of *jun'ai* stories.

Responses to Doi’s theory of *amae* have taken place across several different disciplines. However, most criticisms coming from cultural studies, especially in Japanese area studies, have categorized and dismissed it as part of the *Nihonjinron* literature, which frequently falls into the trap of essentializing Japanese culture as stable and unique.⁵¹ Doi’s theory of *amae* has not been favored in social studies either, as it presupposes both Japanese and Western cultures as essentially immune to change. The cultural essentialization comes from both sides: as Naoki Sakai has observed, “behind Westerners’ as well as Japanese insistence on Japanese cultural uniqueness looms an equally obstinate essentialization of the West” (17). Namely, Doi’s reading of *amae* as a uniquely Japanese cultural trait in turn disregards the fact that the concept of the West itself comprises a wide range of heterogeneity. The binary that sets Japan apart from the West has cast the former in a state of vulnerable regression, and attributes the latter with a more

relationship is described by Diotima in her conversation with Socrates as a passionate search for truth and knowledge. For Doi, however, this relationship is not necessarily sexual. The reference to ancient Greeks’ teacher and student relationship echoes the English title of “*Crying out Love in the Center of the World*,” (dir. Yukisada, 2004) which is *Socrates in Love*. Its love story has nothing to do with same-sex love. As in the ancient Greek model, the act of *amae* can also be understood as “taking someone under one’s wing” to show favor and protection. In return, the protected needs to show devotion to his protector.

⁵⁰ When Doi was in the United States as a researcher, he noticed that Americans give precedence to lovers or married partners as companions when attending social occasions. In contrast, Japanese people find it natural to attend such occasions with friends and colleagues of the same sex (114).

⁵¹ Many works categorized under *Nihonjinron* discourse appeared at a time when Japan enthusiastically promoted *kokusaika* in the 1960s as Japan’s miraculous economic success enticed foreign countries to search for Japan’s secret by looking for the qualities that marked its uniqueness. In a complicit way, this curiosity about Japanese know-how boosted and helped Japanese regain people’s trust in the nation and their national identification. As suggested by its title, Ishihara Shintaro’s book *The Japan That Can Say No*, written in collaboration with SONY co-founder Akio Morita in 1989, is a manifesto of Japan’s increasing confidence in its national power, explicating how its successful economic rise can provide an alternate to an economy dominated by the United States.

independent and mature status as a civilization. At the same time, it also assumes Japanese culture to be vulnerable and ephemeral, a perspective that reiterates the West's orientaling gaze on Japanese culture.

Today, perhaps the most significant contribution of Doi's theorization of *amae* is in the field of psychology, because it depathologizes "the wish to be loved or to be taken care of" even as adults (Young-Bruehl and Faith Bethelard 47).⁵² Cross-cultural psychology has used Doi's theory productively to compare and contrast Japanese and American ways of child-rearing.⁵³ In addition, *amae* is useful in understanding the psychological complexities faced by Japanese-Americans, whose rearing environment and schooling sometimes exposes them to multiple sets of conflicting values. Other Western psychologists have devoted themselves to applying the theory of *amae* in their clinical practices in the West.⁵⁴ It is exactly in areas where cultural differences are accentuated to study the "incommensurability" of cultures that Doi's theory of *amae* remains useful. Throughout his career, Doi has continually universalized his theory in numerous seminars, conferences and writings as one that is shared in human psyche, as if fighting against the essentialist label. In Japan, *amae* is not just regarded as a positive cultural trait. Doi recognizes how the prevalent feelings of *amae* are responsible for the failure of Japanese youth's counterculture in the late 1960s and various social issues that he attributes as Japan's modern social pathologies, such as becoming an increasingly "fatherless society," people's "sense of isolation," and "the feeling of being victimized" (*The Anatomy of Dependence*, 142-65). Meanwhile, Doi acknowledges how *amae* has always existed in the West, although mostly between lovers, among family members, and in the religious belief in God's salvation

⁵² Elizabeth Young-Bruehl and Faith Bethelard's co-written book on *amae* refers to it as Japan's "cherishment" culture (*Cherishment: A Psychology of the Heart*, 2000).

⁵³ See Frank A. Johnson's *Dependency and Japanese Socialization*, New York University Press, 1993.

⁵⁴ See Daniel Freeman's "Amae: East and West" in *Freud and the Far East*.

(*Understanding Amae*, 41). In other words, Doi concludes that *amae* in the West is largely manifest in “private” settings of romantic expression; for instance, he holds Erich Segal’s *Love Story* (1972) as exemplary. In contrast, *amae* as romantic love in the Japanese context is relatively absent in his discussion. He substitutes such lack with a personal anecdote of how he was surprised to find that his American colleagues tend to attend social gatherings with the company of their spouse, whereas this phenomenon was rare in the Japanese milieu in his time (*The Anatomy of Dependence*, 114). Social bonding in public among members of the same sex is mentioned as the norm in Japan. Thus, for Doi, while feelings of *amae* may be universal to a certain extent, in the West they find their extension beyond the oedipal stage mostly in romantic love.

Daniel Freeman agrees with Doi’s suggestion that the Western concept of romantic love based on two individuals’ freewill is different from the *amae* shown in conventional Japanese couples; that the former fosters “the need to create formal affiliative affectionate ‘contracts’ with one another” could be a result of the need to “transcend our separateness and bridge the gap between us” (77). Freeman also modifies Doi’s definition of *amae* by pointing out that it is not “a steady continuous drive or need” (75). He supports his claim by using Mahler’s concept of “refueling” by illustrating the wish for *amae* as the periodic need to “[revisit] the mother to whom one has an already-established attachment. Its goal is to achieve reassurance, to reaffirm and fortify one’s established sense of basic trust, worth, and intactness” (75). In this desire to retreat to a safe and sufficient state, the maternal object is symbolized by someone who can “refuel” an individual with psychological reassurance. In the romantic films set abroad, Japan is the primary object that holds such identification.

Freeman therefore contributes to universalizing, namely, accommodating the theory of *amae* in Western psychological studies, what Doi had posited earlier. Doi referred to *amae* in an abstract sense as a feeling of vulnerability “susceptible to frustration” that “undergoes various transformations” (165). Even in Japan, where Doi thought *amae* to be tacitly understood, the feeling has taken many disguises in the form of transference. It is a feeling that needs to be met by two people who are willing to reveal their vulnerability and respond to each other’s *amae*. How has this changed today, with Japanese society becoming more “Westernized” and “individualistic” in times of *kokusaika* and globalization? Does *amae*, as a tacit understanding and unconditional acceptance of the other person, still influence the way love and affection is expressed?

Doi’s efforts have been mainly focused toward understanding *amae* as a non-pathological human need. However, it is other psychologists’ subsequent analyses that have prevented *amae* from being pigeonholed as an essential Japanese characteristic. Daniel Freeman cites Dr. Tezuka in a conference talk to explain that “healthy functional *amae*” should be differentiated from “unhealthy maladaptive *amae*”, as the latter one misleads the public to see *amae* as passive indulgence (qtd. in Freeman 76). Moreover, Freeman sees the healthy and functional form of *amae* in a positive light, in that it contributes to “the progressive intrapsychic growth and the development of both of the participants” (71). The positive perspectives on *amae*, whether they classify it as ‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy,’ see the subject’s ultimate individuation and growth as maintaining well-being. Cultural difference, however, is not pictured as a hurdle. In his comparative study of love in the twelfth century, Reddy proposes to refer to love in a universal sense as a type of emotion akin to “longing for association” (6). Association, he maintains, “is a general term that can refer to any significant relationship and therefore does not tie the

investigator down to a specific conception of sexual partnerships. Whether as transgression, as norm, or as ideal, the longing for association can bring partners (including sexual partners) together in more or less enduring collaborations in a wide variety of cultural contexts, but not in all.” (6)

I find Reddy’s usage of longing for association very similar to the concept of *amae*. In defining *jun’ai* as primary longing for a solidified identification with Japan, I recognize that transnational imagination for the outside world is deliberately incorporated to suggest the protagonists’ growth from their dependency state to an independent one. Romantic love that is set in the West, or infused with transnational imagery, is used to hint at a personal triumph in transcending inseparable connections with Japan. However, the inner struggles shown in individual protagonists reveal the conflicts in turning feelings of *amae* in the foreign land to compromise as romantic passion. While I am aware that by setting up the binary of *amae* and romantic passion, aside from attributing the former to a Japanese expression and the latter a Western one, I might run a similar risk as Doi in essentializing Japan and conflating it with the even larger concept of the transnational. Yet I do it for several reasons: first, even though this group of films is generally categorized as romance rather than *jun’ai*, I find that the expression of love is colored with pre-oedipal and oedipal feelings that tend to portray the heroines as their primary object of identification, which is how *amae* is first defined by Doi: as a maternal abundance. As a result, Doi’s theory of *amae* is useful to explain how the couple’s romantic dynamics are deployed. Second, in the plot, the heroines’ transnational desire for the foreign land mediates an imagination from the national to the transnational, which corresponds to the elusive connection that modern women have had with Japan. Fourth, it is in the form of romantic love between the heterosexual couple that feelings of *amae* extend to foreign countries. Fifth, it is in

the overseas setting that some of these Japanese couple's illicit love affairs become naturalized as romantic passion; in other words, the foreign land normalizes what is deemed as illicit passion in Japan. Sixth, the pathos of *jun'ai* is produced when one feels it difficult to compromise one's dependency desire and transnational aspirations; this is often a burden for the characters. Since the dependency desire and transnational aspirations are manifest as the two ends of a domestic identification and a transnational one, an individual is torn between the two identifications. Noticeably, it is the persistent difference between Japan and the foreign that some of these films try to overcome through the transnational extension of *amae*.

In justifying *Nihonjinron* in understanding Japanese culture, Takie Sugiyama Lebra writes against critics who disparage *Nihonjinron* based on how it “perpetuates the ‘myth of homogeneity’” (Sugimoto 1997; Weiner 1997; Goodman 1991). Lebra argues that this “myth” also circulates as a cultural reality:

My question is whether this homogeneity was a mere ‘illusion,’ having nothing to do with reality.... I agree with Weiner's historical account except his calling Japanese homogeneity an ‘illusion,’ which I think sends a wrong message that he did not intend—namely, that a sharp dichotomy exists between homogeneity as illusion and heterogeneity as reality. The national myth of homogeneity, no matter whether, when, how, and why it was invented, elaborated, and enforced, did become a cultural belief that is shared collectively. This does not deny the existence of heterogeneous segments of the population. (266)

In other words, even though essentialist discourse seems to be blind to the heterogeneous composition of Japanese and Western populations, besides the understanding that no culture is immune to inter-culturation, Doi's theory of *amae* provides a useful entry point in understanding the protagonists' struggle to express love in current Japanese *jun'ai* films. Moreover, despite the

fact that globalization has made life in Japan porous to foreign influence, cultural difference remains an entry point leading to deeper cross-cultural understanding. In current Japanese popular media, essentialized cultural differences continue to entice people to learn about other cultures. The popularity of the weekly television program *Japa-Zuma The World* (Japanese Wives in the World; Mainichi Broadcasting System Inc. TBS; April 2013-), which introduces exotic cultures through the eye of Japanese women who marry overseas, testifies not only to how cultural difference appeals to people's curiosity for the outside world but also to the idea that Japanese women continue to serve as transnational mediators today. Therefore, while I am conscious that my use of romantic passion refers to a simplified popular imagination of the West that is often seen in movies, I hope that my discussion will clarify how the *jun'ai* pathos derives from a sense of loss in Japan, which often finds its expression in bridging the gap between a national reality and a transnational aspiration.

In most films, love is represented as the intimate bonding experience of people from the same cultural background. *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* is about two people living apart in Italy, Junsei (Takenouchi Yutaka) and Aoi (Kelly Chen), keeping a promise they made ten years earlier in Tokyo to meet on top of the Duomo in Florence on Aoi's 30th birthday. In the film, Junsei's enduring feelings for Aoi and his affection for his Italian art-restoration mentor Giovanna (Valeria Cavalli) speak to his irresolvable primary longing for his mother, who committed suicide when he was still a toddler. Tellingly, it is often in the sequences in which Junsei poses nude for Giovanna's sketches that he reminisces about his mother. In one scene, he poses for her in the fetal position. In this moment, Junsei is seen as basking indulgently in a mutual feeling of *amae* from Giovanna, whose presence helps him restore the lost times when he was still one with his mother. Meanwhile, Junsei's body is bathed in the soft light of the sunset,

freezing him in time as in a painting; Giovanna is portrayed as a creator of artistic timelessness. To Junsei, Giovanna signifies sublimity and abundance: “Giovanna is not only my teacher. For me whose mother died early, she is like a mother to me. My daily life under her guidance feels safe and comforted as if I were held in God’s palms” (my translation, 13). From this line, it can be seen that there are two levels to Junsei’s *amae* towards Giovanna: first, a Japanese one between mentor and mentee, and a second one between God and a pious believer.

When Takanashi (Shina Kippe), a Japanese colleague in the same restoration workshop, accuses Junsei of being unfairly favored by Giovanna because of an illicit liaison, Junsei denies the charge by saying that he is close to Giovanna only because she reminds him of his mother. It is significant that Takanashi, as one of only two Japanese employees in an otherwise all-Italian studio, points out that the *amae* between Junsei and the matriarch in the work place can be mistaken for romantic love. Likewise, *amae* arouses jealousy, as is the case among siblings competing for the attention of their mother. Takanashi is sensitive to the mutual flow of *amae* between Junsei and Giovanna. In contrast, Junsei’s Italian colleagues take no offense at his being favored by her. This is of course the point of view of the author, Tsuji Hitonari. What is worth noting is that Takanashi, as Japanese, is sensitive to the ambiguity of *amae* in this transnational setting.

What complicates the feeling of *amae* abroad is Giovanna’s suicide, the motive of which is never made explicit. In her suicide scene, we hear only the sound of gunshot, followed by blood splashes on her sketches of Junsei. Takanashi later reveals to Junsei that Giovanna was jealous of his talent. This conjecture, however, does not seem in line with Giovanna’s self-destructive behavior, which includes shutting down the restoration studio and departing from both Florence and Junsei’s life. One cannot help but ask whether or not what Junsei refers to as his “nonsexual”

affection towards Giovanna was mutual. The only clear thing is, like Junsei's mother's death, Giovanna's suicide cuts off his *amae* toward her and forces him to individuate. Ultimately, this turn of events hints at the idea that *amae* is incompatible with a transnational setting, in which love is more conventionally understood as romantic passion between two individuals. *Amae*, which is the need to return to the abundance of the maternal object, is different from romantic passion; it instead tends to be portrayed under the disguise and facilitation of romantic love.

Tokyo Tower (2005) is also a film that uses elements of foreignness to reconcile the difference between *amae* and romantic passion. It consists of two love affairs between young men and married women who are much older. Rather than criticizing the illicit affairs as morally wrong, the film treats them as the women's chance to liberate themselves from latent but pervasive patriarchal control. In other words, romance, especially one associated with the western ideal of love, is interpreted as a woman's coming-of-age, albeit well after adolescence.

The affairs with younger men who are financially unstable compared to the women's husbands are at the same time entrapping these women into the dual roles of mother and romanticized love-object. Noticeably, the young men's desire for them is represented as a strong primary identification between mother and child. The recurrent motifs of bathroom, bathtub, and incessant rain falling down outside during the affairs invoke the oceanic flow of *amae* in a pre-Oedipal sense. An Oedipal tension, however, is shown clearly in two scenes in the love triangle among Toru (Okada Junichi), the young protagonist, and the married couple, Shifumi (Kuroki Hitomi) and Asano (Kishitani Goro). In a scene when Asano, the husband, arrives unannounced at the resort house by the sea where Shifumi takes Toru to spend the night, his intrusion heightens the Oedipal tension between father and son to compete for the mother's love. As the screeching sound of car breaks terminates the quiet bliss shared by the two lovers, Shifumi

hurriedly begs Toru to hide in the dark bathroom, as if being pushed back inside the mother's womb. In another scene, Toru's mother, Shifumi's old-time friend, breaks the secret of their affair to Asano. Before attending the important business party that Shifumi helps to organize, Asano confronts Toru near a private swimming pool. As both men stand on top of the springboard, Asano clearly has a more athletic physique than Toru. He knocks the young man down into the pool, leaving him defenselessly struggling in the water; it is a gesture that mocks Toru as still being a baby. Despite the blow, Toru turns up at the party, drenched. Indifferent to the looks of Asano's guests, comprised mostly of western business partners, Toru seeks Shifumi's comfort through the crowd. He buries his wet hair in her lap to beg for her love, like a fragile newborn.

Even though Shifumi is portrayed as a mature woman, operating her own boutique with goods imported from Paris while helping with her husband's business, she is portrayed as still in search of herself. Much like the dreadful dream that she often has, in which she is left in an unfamiliar place to find her way out, she does not feel in charge of her own life even in her 40s. The film is about her maturing with love when she is finally capable of charting out her own journey. Toru, in this sense, is her companion on the way toward individuation.

The urbane quality of the individualized transnational lives led by upper-class *hitozuma* (married women) fulfills the viewer's romantic and passionate imagination for a liberated self through contact with elements of the foreign. The film shows women's revival of their libido, otherwise repressed by the traditional institution of marriage. Moreover, it portrays women as active subjects who love and create a meaningful life of their own. Kimiko (Terajima Shinobu), another *hitozuma*-heroine in *Tokyo Tower*, reawakens her libido when she starts learning flamenco. In the steaming sauna scene on a date with Koji (Matsumoto Jun), her relatively

younger lover, in the Love Hotel, her transformation into a lively and lustful woman intimidates him, and he feels his youthfulness threatened for the first time by her growing forthrightness, as he later tells his friend Toru. In these *hitozuma*'s lives, foreign lifestyles and longings save them from drowning in the conventionality of marriage.

Noticeably, their search for liberation of their true selves is conflated with the western idea of romantic passion, as manifested in their libidinal drive. Yet at any rate, romantic passion is also bordering on *amae*, which designates the feeling of helplessness of someone who longs to be comforted. In this regard, *amae* and romantic passion co-exist and form a new hybrid kind of love, which leads them to personal individuation. In other words, mutual *amae* re-appropriates the romantic passion of their extra-marital affairs, turning romantic passion into a claim for personal freewill. The affair between Kimoko and Koji ends precisely with their mutual individuation, achieved by Kimiko's *amae* satisfied by Koji. Her individuation is perfectly captured when she accomplishes a great flamenco dance on stage. Koji is the one who truly appreciates Kimiko's magnificence as he knows how she has cultivated her self-will along the way. Mutual *amae* between them flows especially in the last scene, in which Kimiko chases after Koji in her car upon receiving his flower bouquet after her performance. She bids him farewell in a way that leaves an indelible memory on him: she deliberately crashes into his flashy new car on the road, seriously damaging it, and tells him that she would not pay for the damage and that by this loss she believes that she will remain on his mind for the rest of his life. On the one hand, the strong desire to be loved and the belief of being forgiven unconditionally is the very expression of *amae*. On the other, their *amae* is expressed when they are mutually aware of each other's individuation. The farewell scene is recognized as the beginning of their independence. In this regard, *amae* supports independence, which is often considered a western trait. Even

though it originally develops out of a mutual need to attend to each other, Kimiko and Koji's love affair blossoms into each person's own independence.⁵⁵

Compared with Ekuni Kaori's feminine take on love, which blends *amae* and romantic passion, male author Tsuji Hitonari's works show more ambivalence, which often leads to his treatment of *amae* and romantic passion as two irreconcilable emotions. This is especially evident in *Sayonara Itsuka*.

***Sayonara Itsuka*: Ambivalent love in an age of internationalization**

Sayonara Itsuka features conflicted feelings of *amae* in a foreign setting in which love is predominantly treated as passion. The movie is set in 1970s Bangkok, during the height of Japan's internationalism. Yutaka, the male protagonist, is caught between *amae* and passionate love, which manifests itself in his passion for Toko and his *amae* for his wife—the former characterized by his libidinal drive, the latter as a social obligation that he needs to carry out as a Japanese subject.

When Japan's economy ranked high in the transnational arena, Japanese men were hailed as “corporate warriors” (*kigyo-senshi*), who were armed and dedicated to serve corporate interests above personal ones. Yutaka is one such character, while Toko is a Japanese woman living independently in Bangkok. She is represented as the femme fatale who appeals to Yutaka's passionate desire but is deemed disruptive to Japan's conventional social order. The two of them have previously met in Bangkok in 1975, where Yutaka was dispatched three months before his wedding to his boss' daughter, Mitsuko. The purpose of his job in Bangkok was to facilitate the expansion of his company, Eastern Airlines, in the Southeast Asian market. Even though the

⁵⁵ Doi analyzes this famous quote from *Love Story* (dir. Arthur Hiller, 1970) to explain *amae* as taking someone's unconditional love for granted (64-82).

affair between Yutaka and Toko lasts for only three months and the two lovers cease to see each other after Yutaka's marriage, their love endures for 25 years until Toko's death in Bangkok in 2000. For all those years, Toko faithfully waits for Yutaka's return, holding onto a faint hope of reunion. The conflict between love as passion and love as *amae* is embodied in Yutaka's plight as a Japanese man with transnational dreams. His wife Mitsuko is portrayed as an ideal "good wife, wise mother" type. Yutaka's decision to marry her helps fulfill his cultural-social duty, but also has to do with his career prospects in a Japanese transnational corporation. His fate carries the aspirations as well as the burdens of Japanese subjects in an age that moves at full speed toward internationalization. Metaphorically, Japanese internationalization at the time is a coming-of-age for the nation-ego shaping itself through the intimate ties it wishes to build with other foreign countries. Yutaka embodies this ego in formation. Toko and Mitsuko represent Yutaka's split between his id and superego, which results in his entrapment between his passionate love for Toko and his need-love for Mitsuko. As a result, his individuation can only be achieved when he recreates his ego through a struggle between his inner selves.

While romantic passion dominates the interpretation of love as the main way to express individuality, *amae* is associated with a Japanese way to express love. The two expressions as noted are posed as a binary. In a philosophical poem composed by Mitsuko, she muses, "At the time of death, there are people who remember themselves to be loved and there are others who remember themselves loving; which one are you?" (50-1).⁵⁶ She tells Yutaka that she is

⁵⁶ The role of Mitsuko is reminiscent of May in Edith Wharton's *The Age of Innocence*. Even though the two stories are set one hundred years apart, they deal with how capitalist modernization transforms old aristocratic societies. During such times of transformation, there was always concern over the disappearance of innocence (pure) against the influence of sophistication (impure). Wharton depicts how May demonstrated her innocence as a woman who is brought up in the aristocratic class of old New York; she is portrayed as seemingly unable to imagine another way of existence outside that particular social structure. However, Wharton also points out that her innocence could be due to her intimate knowledge of how society operates. May's apparent naivety could be seen as a sophistication that held on to the decorum of the old New York aristocratic class, when, at the turn of the twentieth century, that very society was crumbling. In *Sayonara Itsuka*, Mitsuko could also be seen as matriarch protector of the society that

definitely one of the latter—some-one who remembers she has loved someone dearly. When Yutaka in turn asks Toko the same question, she answers that she would remember herself as being loved. In contrast to Mitsuko, who takes up the role of caretaker and mother, Toko's answer suggests the more self-centered role of a child to be cared for. Mitsuko's interpretation of love overturns the binary that puts romantic passion above *amae*. Her love takes up the active role of giver, transforming the supposed passivity of *amae* into the agency of a mature adult. Love, for Mitsuko, is the active preservation of an environment in which *amae* can be sustained. In other words, her love is in accordance with society, in contrast to Toko's romantic passion, which isolates her from the Japanese community. We do not know whether Mitsuko would also define love as passion, but she tells Toko that the status of a mistress will never be like that of a wife. Thus, Yutaka's struggle between Mitsuko and Toko is portrayed as a choice between either a sense of social belonging or a self that turns against Japan in order to follow his spontaneous flows of passion (the call of the *id*).

Paralleling the irresolvable love triangle among Toko, Yutaka and Mitsuko, *amae* and love are mutually “untranslatable” in the context of Japan's internationalization. Mitsuko is not merely associated with an idealized Japan, she is the positive incarnation of Japan's internationalization. She is portrayed as representing Japan in a culturally legitimate way. But she is also represented as more manipulative in the movie than in the novel, especially in the scene in which she pays a visit to Toko in Bangkok, a plot absent from the original. A week before her scheduled wedding with Yutaka, Mitsuko visits Toko unguarded in the latter's hotel room. She asks her to leave Yutaka for the sake of his career prospects. Even though she enters Toko's room as a guest, her demeanor shows the confidence of a matriarch, inspecting the room

as if it were her own property. Mitsuko is the dutiful wife and also a woman of modern learning. She is introduced as a descendant of Japanese aristocrats on her mother's side (12). Besides graduating from the prestigious Tokyo University with a major in western arts, she facilitates Yutaka's transnational business by showcasing her cultural adeptness in Japanese traditional arts of *chado* (the way of tea, tea ceremony) and *ikebana* (flower-arrangement) to his western customers while on business trips in France and Germany (174). Mitsuko's positive support of Yutaka's career advancement satisfies the two goals of Mouer and Sugimoto's observation of internationalization: one is the "smooth promotion of 'Japan's national interests'" (269); the other is to support cosmopolitanism by "[making] vague references to international brotherhood and goodwill among nations" (270). Japan's internationalism in this film remains fundamentally a national imperative.

In contrast with Mitsuko's ideal internationalization, Toko's transnational life in Bangkok is represented as a disreputable one motivated by self-interest. As Japanese, Toko's exotic appearance and liberated way of life ostracizes her from the Japanese community, which looks down on her as a case of uncontrollable westernization and exoticism. Rather than staying in Southeast Asia with a justified cause (for business or with her family), she lives by herself in the luxurious Oriental Hotel, in a room named after the famous British writer W. Somerset Maugham (1874-1965). The anecdote of the author traveling there during the interwar period is an inter-text that imparts an atmosphere of colonial heritage to the area. The room next to "Somerset Maugham" is named after Joseph Conrad and occupied by a white couple.

For Thai people, Japanese postwar economic performance there coalesces with white prestige in a postcolonial and neocolonial situation, which thus westernizes the existence of Toko in the hotel. However, for the Japanese working in Bangkok, Toko is not a respectable westerner,

nor is she one of them. Other Japanese expatriates treat her as an unwelcome excess of Japan's transnationalism, embodying the licentious consumerist desire caused by transnational interactions, that has to be kept under control and ostracized. Thus, the film criticizes the source of Toko's wealth by representing her Chinese ex-husband (his nationality is specified in the novel but left out in the movie) as some despicable being, cuddling with a young white woman in a dimly lit bar in one scene. Even indoors, he is wearing dark sunglasses, which cast him in the shadow of his capitalist wealth. In other words, in contrast with Mitsuko's idealized transnational mediation, Toko's cosmopolitan lifestyle is condemned for her association with tainted foreign money, the source of which is kept hidden in the film.

However differently treated, Toko and Mitsuko are two sides of the same coin as they reveal the nationalist basis of Japan's internationalism. Under the overarching ideals of transnational freedom in Bangkok hides a stratified hierarchy of race, class, and gender asymmetries that distinguish the Japanese expatriates from the real life of the locals. Another problem is how individualism is made to conflate with hedonism, socially jeopardizing the national integrity that it seeks to maintain. *Sayonara Itsuka* deliberately represents Toko as the antagonist of Japan's internationalization, the threat and danger that needs to be kept at bay. Her so-called "cosmopolitan" liberated lifestyle is inconsistently portrayed as she falls in love with Yutaka. Despite her exoticism, which distinguishes her from other Japanese expatriates in Bangkok, she proves herself to be the most "Japanese" by waiting faithfully for Yutaka in Bangkok for twenty-five years. Her self-imposed sacrificial role is akin to that of Madame Butterfly. In the end, both Toko and the Oriental Hotel become nothing but the repetition of a stereotype of Asia—loyal and obedient. The film's melodramatic ending suggests that Toko is still, after all, a Japanese woman. Her love for him is pure and devotional just like *amae*, not

simply a short-lived passion. Ironically, it overturns the cosmopolitan façade that she used to maintain, transforming the hotel from cosmopolitan haven to a shelter as well as a nostalgic obsession.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Toko's tragedy results from her *jun'ai* for Yutaka: while she remains unchanged, the whole world outside her sanctuary has changed. In 2000, the Oriental Hotel operates as a transnational franchise and Yutaka is being promoted as C.E.O. of his airplane company. Toko becomes the scapegoat of an individualized *kokusaika* that is different from institutionalized transnationalism in the 21st century. In the end, her mental confinement and death in Bangkok also makes her an outcast as well as a phantom clinging to an ideal of love.

The exotic representation of Toko puts her paradoxically as a symbol of a modern cosmopolite and a conventional oriental woman. Bangkok, in a similar way, is orientalized as an obedient object subjected to Western neocolonial power, which Japan has been a part of. Japan's prominence in Thailand during its early times of *kokusaika* reenacts an orientalized view of Southeast Asia as a promising new market, paralleling its pre-World War II imperial legacy in the region. The names of Yutaka's company, "Eastern Airlines," and that of the hotel, "Oriental Hotel," remind people of Thailand's colonial history and its current presence in the global market economy. Throughout the film, Thailand is never shown as liberated from foreign forces. Besides Japan, western domination casts a colonial look at how Bangkok is represented. For example, in the opening sequence introducing the city, it is represented as a lively southern "paradise"—a marketplace. The audience is led to identify with Yutaka's vision as he strolls in a local market of exotica: a close-up of a naïve-looking boy's hair being shaved and a man walking leisurely with an elephant among the crowds. The shots are followed by Yutaka's amused looks

⁵⁷ Tsuji's original might be blamed for this inconsistency. He does not give a convincing account of the transformation of Toko from someone who seems at first rebellious and brave in defying traditional expectations of her to a demure "white lily," who piously waits for her man to return.

as the sights kindle his transcultural imagination for Southeast Asia as a place of abundance. The opening sequence is followed by a welcome party held for Yutaka in an American bar, in which he is introduced to the exotic-looking Toko, who is instantly transformed into the object of Yutaka's transnational desire.⁵⁸

Tsuji's description of the Thai people does not escape from an orientalist perspective either: they are portrayed as obedient and loyal, while Japan and the West are still treated as superior in the setting of an international hotel. Toko, as a long-term guest in the Oriental Hotel, is treated as "a family member" and matron. The staff is shown extending their hospitality to Yutaka by addressing him as "Mr. Manaka" (Manaka is Toko's family name), which legitimizes Toko's relationship with him in the space of the hotel. Moreover, at some point during her 25-year stay when she can no longer afford to stay in the hotel, they hire her as V.I.P. manager to serve Japanese guests. Perhaps this plot makes sense in light of Japan's overpowering economic presence in Southeast Asia since the 1970s. Meanwhile, it is also a gesture of *amae* extended from the author Tsuji's point of view. Even when the heroine becomes seriously ill at the end of the film, the global franchise hotel continues to honor Japan's transnational power in Bangkok by allowing her to stay in the Somerset Maugham room again, and dignifying her with the best care during Yutaka's second visit to the hotel twenty-five years later. Thus, the myth of Toko as an urban legend in the hotel represents an extension of *amae* projected to an orientalized

⁵⁸ Toko is Yutaka's *id*, representing his libidinal desire for transnational prominence. The mirroring of Yutaka's transnational desire in Toko is represented in several scenes in which the images of the two persons are conflated as each other's reflection. In one scene in Yutaka's home, Toko seduces Yutaka by wearing his pajama pants and underwear vest. In another scene in which Yutaka decides to end their affair right before his wedding with Mitsuko, Toko, in a state of despaired drunkenness, kisses him with her dark red lipstick, messing up his face. When Yutaka looks at himself in the mirror, Toko's emotional desperation is merged into his own through the image of his red-smearred face. In addition, what is implicitly revealed here is that Yutaka, too, like Toko, is unable to imagine another dream beyond the capitalist structure that has nourished his transnational desire in the first place. In the film, Toko gave him a pricey antique Benz model car, a symbol of western mechanical modernization that he has longed for. Yutaka's transnational desire, as that of Toko's, is shown satisfied by material consumption of luxury foreign goods that he has criticized her for. In fact, he is not so different from her.

Thailand, highly infiltrated by Japanese colonial legacy. In Tsuji Hitonari's depiction, despite the change of time and the influence of ever-increasing globalization, the Oriental Hotel remains a royal palace, its staff "family-like" and loyal to their Japanese matron, Toko.

However, even though Tsuji presents Toko as a victim of romantic passion that is unacceptable to the Japanese community, she is as much victimized by her orientalized devotion to Yutaka—one that is confined by fate and loyalty. In other words, rather than being truly transnational and cosmopolitan as she is first depicted, her relatively westernized way of expressing romantic passion is tamed by a traditional way of loving. Tsuji justifies Toko's inconsistency through the idea that love changes (or brings out) a person's nature. That is, love transforms Toko's passion to a mellow note of faithfulness, obscuring the gap between love as romantic passion and love based on stability in affiliated social institutions. Thus, what is at stake in the love triangle is in fact a cultural issue, which becomes even more problematic today when the current generation is believed to live more freely than past generations.

As a result, even though Yutaka's generation fails to break away from a Japanese society perceived as restrictive and confining, the ambivalence between *amae* and love is dealt with by Yutaka's elder son in a sequence toward the end of the film that appears to be incompatible with the romance between Toko and Yutaka. The film somewhat resolves the problem of love through a relief of tension between Yutaka and his son. Close to the end, we see Yutaka's son rebelling against him and his Japanese work ethic. In contrast to Yutaka's submission, his son chooses to follow his own individuality, performing as a singer in a rock band. Meanwhile, Yutaka has just been promoted to CEO of his company, a dream finally realized after multiple sacrifices: his id, and the vitality of his being. Rock music is culturally coded as a western expression of personal freedom and as an assertion of one's individuality against the establishment. The resolution of

their family drama ends with Yutaka attending his son's live concert, in which parent-child love and *amae* have become indistinguishable and conflated in expressions of individuated passion in rock music. Curiously, the father-son reconciliation is totally absent from the original novel, which focuses mainly on the ill-fated couple's romance. This reconciliation sequence in the film suggests Yutaka's own individuation as well. He has grown from being labeled a Japanese "koseinen" (good youth) who lives by the rules of social decorum, into an independent adult that can live freely to pursue his heart's desire, as shown in his turning down of the CEO appointment. While Tsuji's original novel shows the unbridgeable gap of a transnational desire as represented in romantic love and an *amae* love that is built upon social relationships, the film reunites these two types of love in a contemporary world dominated by the global language of music. The chaotic emotional distress that results from the split between Yutaka's id and superego is compromised by the suppression of his id, symbolically at the expense of Toko's destruction.

A Collaborated Monologue: *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* and *Tokyo Tower*

Calmi Cuori Appassionati is a novel consisting of two volumes: a collaboration between Ekuni Kaori's *Rosso* and Tsuji Hironari's *Blu*, with the former writing from the heroine Aoi's perspective and the latter from that of Junsei. Both novels narrate the years of the couple's separation in the form of monologue. The film version of *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* is set in Italy ten years after two star-crossed lovers separated from each other in Tokyo. In the film, Florence is depicted as a hometown dearer than Japan to the two protagonists, Junsei and Aoi, whose identity as *kikokushijo* (returnee-children) easily confers on them the status of cosmopolites. Despite the foreign background, their love is a hybrid of Japanese sentiment of *amae* and westernized romantic passion, the latter inspired by Japan's transnational imagination for foreign lifestyles. Junsei's becoming an art conservation student in Florence, the birthplace of

Renaissance art and humanities, echoes his transnational desire. Instead of creating his own artwork, the film portrays him as a conservator whose work is to restore the aura of the western originals in an act of mimicry. In restoring the aura, he recalls his primary longing for maternal abundance, blurring the difference between Japan and the West in his maternal identification. Florence is sealed in time and preserved as a live museum, which satisfies his transcultural imagination for a timelessness that he no longer finds in Japan. Moreover, by engaging in art conservation, he imagines himself participating in a universal history that he has heretofore played no part in. If Junsei's life in Japan represents an enclosed personal history that he cannot alter or return to, this sense of loss is redeemed in Florence. In contrast to the West, Japan is represented as a place of rapid changes and loss. In Junsei's trip back to Shimo-Kitazawa, Tokyo, he finds that the shops he used to frequent with Aoi during their college days have been torn down and replaced by unfamiliar new businesses, cutting off the primary ties with his past and portraying him to be fueled by a renewed identification with the West.

Thus, Junsei's restoration of Renaissance paintings lacks any postcolonial potential to subvert the asymmetrical relationship of the West and Japan. The West is still valorized in Junsei's transnational imagination, replacing what he thinks can no longer be saved in Japan. It is with the guidance of the West that Junsei treads the path of his individuation. His awakening is suggested by his change of vehicles—from an old bicycle that often breaks down to a scooter, which makes it easier for him to cruise the streets of Florence. Finally, in the last scene, he arrives earlier than Aoi in Milan on the *Eurostar* train, a powerful emblem of western modernization. The development of Junsei's character coincides with his identification with the West as his new homeland, a route that leads him not only to his independence, but also to his codependence with Aoi—a hybrid love of *amae* and passion. The novel celebrates Europe as an

extension of “home” by focusing on Junsei’s stream of consciousness: “The glistening steel of the train reflected the setting sun. On the track is the train that traverses Europe in its glamour ... I’ll live my life wherever this train takes me to” (my translation, 259). As suggested in the passage, Junsei’s vision of his reunification with Aoi mediates the fulfillment of his transnational imagination for the West. However, such transnational imagination of triumph is actually based on an active incompatibility between *amae* and passion, of which one manifestation is the death of Giovanna, Junsei’s substitute maternal love-object.

Compared with male author Tsuji Hitonari’s ambivalence in reconciling *amae* with romantic passion in the protagonists’ individuation, female author Ekuni Kaori hybridizes the two ideas. In Shunya Yoshimi’s words, “Japan has been externalized to the same extent as America has been internalized” in the process of Japan’s contact with the United States (221). Ekuni Kaori thus blurs the difference between Japan and the West. It is through familiarizing the exotic and exoticizing the familiar that I see Ekuni bringing Japan a step closer to the West. For instance, in the movie *Tokyo Tower*, an affinity is drawn between the two cities of Tokyo and Paris through the symbolic meaning of towers—modern romance is mediated through Ekuni’s comparison of the Tokyo Tower with the Eiffel Tower. Moreover, rather than showing the protagonists caught in the difference of *amae* and passion, as in most of Tsuji’s works, Ekuni actively makes *amae* a springboard for mutual independence for both heroine and protagonist. In popular culture, the Eiffel Tower is seen as an emblem of the humanist attainments of love and liberty, which in turn the Tokyo Tower becomes a simulacrum of. The Tokyo Tower is portrayed by Ekuni as giving lovers courage and hope to face their destiny. Structurally modeled after the Eiffel Tower, the Tokyo Tower has served as a Japanese postwar symbol of modernization since its construction in 1958. Its emblematic presence gives the couple’s romance a cosmopolitan touch. A panoramic

shot at the beginning of the film captures the spectacular tower surrounded by the neon-lit metropolis. In the background, Norah Jones's romantic song "Sleepless Nights" sets the atmosphere and presents Tokyo as another modern capital set for chic urban romance. Were it not for the Japanese language used in the film, the hypermodern texture of the cityscape could easily be mistaken for any other modern city, such as New York, London, or Hong Kong.

Shifumi and Toru's love is consummated in Paris, the "original" site of freedom and love. In the final shot, as the couple embraces on a bridge, the camera pulls away to give a panoramic shot of Paris before the ending score and credits start playing. This time the song is Yamashita Tatsuro's passionate vocal piece, "Forever Mine." The scene echoes the opening sequence, in which a song in English accompanies the shot of Tokyo Tower. Finally, the panoramic image of Paris is followed by a still shot of a glistening tower framed in a mirror hanging in the interior of a house. It leaves the audience wondering whether the couple ended up living in Paris or in Tokyo. In fact, the film suggests that with love, Tokyo can be another Paris, and maybe vice versa. Tokyo Tower is pictured as bridging people's transnational imagination for a better place where love can break away from conventional restrictions. With this simulation, the film offers an imaginative gateway that reinvents Tokyo as a place of liberation and love. Through this parallelism, Tokyo Tower becomes the visual carrier of the protagonists' desire for freedom and romance; Tokyo is another Paris. Ekuni's active imagination has resolved to turn Tokyo into Paris. Moreover, she blurs the difference between *amae* and romantic passion as if they were as indistinguishable in the West as in Japan. Thus, the transnational setting serves as an extension of "home," obscuring national and cultural boundaries and making the West a substitute for the lost primary abundance of Japan.

Noticeably, Tsuji and Ekuni articulate their transnational imagination differently: the former shows more ambivalence and struggles to reconcile *amae* and romantic passion, while the latter conflates the two emotions through a process of exoticization and familiarization, which “westernizes” Japan and “orientalizes” the West in popular romances targeting Japanese readers. Ekuni’s rather positive outlook shows that she is highly inspired by a transnational imagination contextualized in Japan. Meanwhile, Tsuji, like most male *jun’ai* authors discussed in the previous chapter, adopts a westernized orientalized look at the heroines’ love, which sees *amae* and passion as two distinct kinds of emotions that are ultimately irreconcilable. In the male author’s works, the death of the heroine therefore seems to be the only solution to the protagonist’s struggle. In contrast to Ekuni’s relatively optimistic portrayal of transnational lifestyles, female scriptwriter and director Kitagawa Eriko’s movie, *I Have to Buy New Shoes* (2012) reveals the existential dilemma in her romantic portrayal of a *jun’ai* heroine’s transnational life.

Women’s sacrificed presence in domestic transnationalism

Women’s absence tends to be represented as a necessary compromise in meeting a domestic demand for transnationalism. Kitagawa Eriko is a popular female scriptwriter whose 1990s primetime television dramas not only won her overwhelming ratings among young working women in urban Japanese cities but also the title of “*koi no kamisama*” (love goddess) in Japanese media (Eva Tsai 49). Kitagawa has been known for capturing the nuanced feelings of female protagonists in search of their true selves in love and in day-to-day life. Importantly, she portrays a generational difference in individuals’ transnational desire, particularly in how women position themselves in the transformation process.

I Have to Buy New Shoes is a three-day romance between a Japanese woman living in Paris and a young Japanese man visiting the city for the first time. The heroine, Aoi (Nakayama Miho), works as a freelance journalist for a small Japanese press agency in Paris.⁵⁹ On the surface, she is an object of envy, as she has the chance to realize her transnational dream in the most romantic city in the world. Under this romanticized façade, however, her French neighbor later reveals that she lives a solitary life and that Sen (Mukai Osamu), the young protagonist, is the first man that Aoi has taken home since she ended her unhappy marriage with a French man, and the subsequent loss of their five-year-old son in an accident.

Curiously, Sen is an unwilling tourist in Paris, going there only to accompany his little sister, who is in fact using him to cover her true motives. She comes to Paris to see her boyfriend, a Japanese art student based in the city to pursue his career. Although the plot of this film, like other films also set abroad, captures people's imagination of Paris as the most romantic city in the world, what sets it apart is that for the whole three days, neither Sen nor his sister show any strong transcultural desire for Paris. It is clear that for them the city is just another tourist site for a short-term visit. Their romantic feelings for the love-object do not transfer to Paris, as neither Aoi nor Sen's sister's boyfriend can instill any transnational desire in Sen and his sister. With their age difference of twelve years, there is a generational gap between Aoi and Sen in terms of their transnational imagination. Aoi single-mindedly moved to Paris at the age of 23 to pursue her desired Parisian life. Even after many misfortunes, she remains in love with Paris and continues to live there. In contrast, Sen sees Paris only as a tourist destination.

⁵⁹ The role is played by Nakayama Miho, the same actress who played Toko in *Sayonara Itsuka*. She got married in 2002 to Tsuji Hitonari, the musician and novelist who wrote *Calmi Cuori Appassionati* and *Sayonara Itsuka*. The couple immigrated to Paris in 2003. Thus, life imitates art for Nakayama Miho, who has been living in Paris for over ten years. In July 2014, the couple divorced. Since then, Nakayama Miho has been flying back and forth between France and Japan to continue her acting career in Japan.

Interestingly, during Sen's three days in Paris, Aoi shows avid interest in his reporting of what happened in Japan during her years of absence, as she eagerly asks about the latest popular cultural icons. In their conversation, it is Sen's cultural familiarity with Japan that is desired, rather than Aoi's transnational knowledge about Paris. Suffice it to say that even though Aoi guides Sen around Paris, Sen is actually Aoi's transnational mediator, reconnecting her with home in Japan. This explains Aoi's immediate familiarity with Sen and her treating him as a family member: bringing him back to her own place, playing the tune her son loved on the piano, recalling sentimental stories about her beloved cat that went astray and never returned, preparing food for him, and cuddling on the floor with him, which are all loving acts of *amae*. Aoi's buried melancholia over losing her family is also revealed when Sen is gone. She feels distressed, as if losing her son again. Sen temporarily satisfies for her desire for *amae*, the kind of longing that is understandable but not readily translatable to her life in Paris.

As an atmosphere of parting hangs over the two of them on Sen's last day in Paris, he asks to see Aoi's favorite spot in the city. Aoi takes him to see the magnificent Eiffel Tower, which is a source of comfort for her in times of distress. Roland Barthes attributes the myth surrounding the Eiffel Tower to it being a "pure signifier," whose emptiness of meaning can harbor infinite interpretations: "[the Tower] ultimately reunites with the essential function of all major human sites.... the Tower can live on itself: one can dream there, eat there, observe there, understand there, marvel there, shop there; as on an ocean liner (another mythic object that sets children dreaming), one can feel oneself cut off from the world and yet the owner of a world" (17). In other words, the condensed form of the Eiffel Tower embodies a universal omnipotence, echoing the position of the West as a symbol of eternal resourcefulness. Its very porous structure ties together abstract yet abundant imaginations.

Upon seeing the grand tower in front of her, she recalls what she used to tell her son, “In Tokyo, Japan, where I was born and raised, there’s Tokyo Tower, just like a friend of the Eiffel Tower. I’ll take you there. I’ll surely take you there one day” (201). For Aoi’s generation, the Eiffel Tower is an iconic symbol of transnational desire. Seeing the tower standing so magnificently in front of her, Aoi is reconnected back with Japan through Tokyo Tower’s simulated cultural significance, which allows her to draw an intimate connection between the two towers. Here, however, the Eiffel Tower is Aoi’s substitute for a lost object of *amae*—not only her Tokyo, but also her son, a “product” of her transnational desire. Her multiple losses are also related to her frustrations of living abroad.

In contrast to Aoi’s solitary life devoid of any real fulfillment of *amae* in Paris, Sen demonstrates a close familial relationship with his sister. He proudly claims that his sister sees him as her “*omamori*” (amulet) requesting his company whenever she experiences something big in her life, such as attending entrance exams or traveling abroad. This is of course the mutual *amae* between Sen and his sister, a feeling that is reciprocated even when she lies to him and leaves him stranded in the foreign streets of Paris. She knows for certain that her brother would never forsake her for any reason. Kitagawa’s film in turn suggests that Japan is a place of abundant *amae*, while the West has become a place of loss.

While set in a romanticized Paris, *I Have to Buy New Shoes* reveals transnational desire fulfilled with a sacrifice. When Sen asks Aoi to stand in front of the Eiffel Tower for him to take a souvenir picture, he conflates Aoi with an impression of Paris by saying, “For me, Paris is the Eiffel Tower and Aoi.” Sen would not have the slightest transnational desire for Paris were it not for Aoi, yet his love for her and Paris is not strong enough to make him move there. As Aoi poses and smiles for the picture, she asks Sen, “I’m smiling, am I not?” However, each photo-

still taken of her and the Tower is shown to fade to black; her existence in Paris is directly represented as a void, an absence. The blackened photos seem to suggest that in order to pursue her transnational desire there, Aoi needs to offer something vital in exchange. Like the Tower, she is turned into a relic; that is, she becomes more symbolic than real: she symbolizes all transnational Japanese women in the 1990s who have left Japan in search of their true selves in the West. The irony is that this true self is captured as a non-presence.

Barthes remarks on the “price,” the necessary sacrifice a foreigner has to make in order to claim a transnational sense of belonging in Paris:

Of all the sites visited by the foreigner or the provincial, the Tower is the first obligatory monument; it is a Gateway, it marks the transition to a knowledge: one must sacrifice to the Tower by a rite of inclusion from which, precisely, the Parisian alone can excuse himself; the Tower is indeed the site which allows one to be incorporated into a race, and when it regards Paris, it is the very essence of the capital it gathers up and proffers to the foreigner who has paid to it his initiational tribute (14).⁶⁰

In return for a life in Paris, Aoi has given up on her Japanese sense of belonging. In other words, her absence in the photos taken by Sen is comprised of her partial existence in Paris and partial connection to Tokyo. It has become the entrance fee she has paid for realizing an imaginatively truer self.

Therefore, I read Aoi’s broken high heel, which led to her encounter with Sen in the streets of Paris as a symbol of her frustrated “Cinderella” status.⁶⁰ The broken heel shows Aoi’s transnational glamour temporarily thwarted, revealing her fragile position in Paris where she needs to find her “standing” again. However, Kitagawa still manages to give the audience some

⁶⁰ In the next chapter, I will talk about the wide application of the Cinderella motif in Japanese television drama, which is often based on an Audrey Hepburn-inspired child-woman persona.

hope. At the end of the film, Sen sends Aoi a pair of new shoes from Tokyo. As she walks out of her apartment in her new heels and sits contentedly on a bench in the last shot, her smile suggests the gift as solace from someone who understands her loneliness underneath her seemingly glamorous pursuits overseas—an understanding gift of *amae* from home.

Conclusion: The sense of loss produced in asymmetrical Internationalism

In the coda of the novel *Calmi Cuori Appassionati*, novelist Ekuni Kaori acknowledges the help of a group of Japanese-Italians in Milan who served as her informants for the novel. She writes, “I owe gratitude to the principal of the Japanese School in Milan, who has shared with me many pleasant tales about setting up the school... and those melancholic youths whose perceived sentiments spoke more than words and have allowed me to get a sense of their life abroad” (my translation, 274). This quote reveals the coexistence of optimistic and introspective modes of transnational experience. Moreover, it hints at a sense of solitude that always exists underneath an apparently exciting transnational life. The ambivalence of not knowing where to belong is echoed in another passage that illustrates her motive in writing this novel: “What constitutes this novel is the simple fact: ‘life is composed of where one is’ and another simple fact: ‘life is composed of where one’s heart longs to be’” (274). The disjuncture between where we are and where we dream to be is that between reality and transnational desire, which continuously makes people imagine alternative selves. In addition, it suggests what Eng and Han describe as “a melancholic machine” when they refer to the process of assimilating into a different culture, as in the case of immigrants (349). Even though the transnational background of the four films that I have examined is representational, they symbolically reveal a personalized transnational desire hatched and encouraged in Japan in the process of its *kokusaika* and globalization.


Despite the liberal atmosphere that is attributed to transnational settings, love in these films is mainly *amae* in nature, illustrating a persistent desire to be cared for unconditionally. The conflict lies in how Japanese subjects who are cultivated with such emotional reliance on their love-object's abundance accommodate their double identification—one with the foreign, and the other with Japan as its primary object. The protagonists' love manifests itself mainly in the form of a lost *amae* in the foreign land. Moreover, *amae* and passion are portrayed as a binary of cultural difference, with passion associated with foreign contexts. The expression of love in these films therefore fluctuates between a more “universal” form of romantic passion and the lingering longing for *amae*. The protagonists' resolution of this ambivalence becomes a tale of personal individuation. This allows them to chart their lives within a new map of transnational ventures, what Doi saw as a Japanese way of extending social ties.

Regardless of the cosmopolitan façade that each of these films put forth, love and its loss cannot be understood without taking into account the portrayal of *amae* as an extended longing for connection even when the Japanese subjects are in a foreign country. While transnational contexts are portrayed as new promised lands where lost abundance can be retrieved as new relationships of dependence are built, the process is depicted as a struggle. Reciprocity from the new object of love in the foreign settings often results in frustrated feelings of loss in the subjects' failure to have their unconditional primary love fulfilled. *Jun'ai*, as a result, becomes the mediator that incorporates the need for *amae* with romantic expression through passion. *Jun'ai* heroines, as transnational mediators, compensate for their physical and structural absence from Japan through their ultimate independence and individuation; but cosmopolitan as they may seem, they are in fact suffering from multiple absences in the transnational settings as well. The sense of loss, as a result, discloses a cultural difference that is not easily dismissed in Japan's

transnational desire to internationalize itself. Women's internal struggle to have a transnational lifestyle and a fulfilled life in Japan is shown to be resolved in some contemporary romantic television dramas targeting a female audience. In the chapter that follows, I illustrate how these portrayals correspond to how popular media reincorporate women as an integral part of Japanese society.



Stills 3 and 4. *Sayonara Itsuka* and *Calmi Cuori Appassionati*: Longing for love in an exotic place.



Stills 5 and 6. *Tokyo Tower* and *I Have to Buy New Shoes*: Women's

transnationalism is demonstrated in the line, "Paris teaches me how to live."

Chapter Three:

Transnational (Dis)connections: Audrey Hepburn and the “*Otona-Kawaii*” (Adult-Cute)

Women in Japanese Popular Media

In the previous chapters, I argued that the boom of *jun'ai* at the beginning of the 21st century in Japan responded to a prevalent sentiment of social loss that had begun in the mid-1990s. With its thematic depiction of *jun'ai* heroines succumbing to their love for the Japanese male protagonists, the romantic subgenre can be seen as reinforcing a sentimental re-identification with Japan. The process of the heroine succumbing to her love is achieved by overcoming women's perceived roles of “foreignness” and “transnationality” within Japan. These characterizations correspond to a contemporary Japanese society that engages in internationalization—a comprehensive movement that has continually invited the country to open up to outside influences, while also raising the old fear of losing an integrated cultural identification.

The term *jun'ai* conjures up immediately the couple's dilemma and difficulty in consummating their love. The television dramas that I choose to discuss here, however, can be more adequately labeled as “romantic dramas” than as *jun'ai*. The word ‘romance’ readily implies a happy ending for the couple, even though the genre of romance is used more broadly to include both tragic and comic endings. The television viewing public prefers dramatic works featuring lighthearted, romantic consummation. While the extreme popularity of the *jun'ai* novel *Crying out Love in the Center of the World* had been adapted and aired as an 11-episode television drama two months after the film's release by TBS (July-September 2004) as a spinoff of the *jun'ai* craze, most *jun'ai* sentimentalism remains confined to films rather than television.

At first glance, television dramas and films are two different media forms, the latter having more potential to open itself to lyrical contemplation. However, my analysis shows that while television heroines are comparatively more self-reflexive about their survival in Japanese society, they are just as conditioned by their social circumstances as their *jun'ai* counterparts. They are mostly down to earth, working to support themselves. Compared with *jun'ai* heroines who make a self-sacrificing gesture that ostracizes them from Japan, romantic television drama heroines demonstrate themselves as constituents of Japanese society. Interestingly, the popularity of *jun'ai* films and romantic dramas coincide as the two sides of the same coin in the portrayal of Japanese women. While *jun'ai* films are therapeutic for a paternalistic Japanese society, the characterization of the heroines' socialization process in television functions in the same way to bring the previously alienated elements—Japanese women—back within the embrace of society. Interestingly, it is done through a transnational icon: Audrey Hepburn. To understand this phenomenon, I argue that the transformation of Hepburn's child-woman persona is used as a reference for an ideal womanhood that Japanese women can emulate in order to bring together the seemingly incompatible wishes to retain childlike spontaneity while acting independently and sophisticatedly. Facilitated by romance, these contradictory qualities are portrayed as naturally embodied by the heroines. As a result, Japanese society, as a nourishing environment, is re-imagined as a benevolent patriarch that allows differences to coexist, serving the same aim as *jun'ai* films in addressing a domestic need to consolidate national-cultural identity.⁶¹

Women, in the Japanese pursuit of transnationalism, are thus potentially used to overcome such fear of disintegration. In my previous chapters, I have shown how this is especially evident

⁶¹ Professor Leo Ching rightfully points out that many television dramas in the 1980s and 1990s have also dealt with both male and female characters negotiating conflicting identities in the public and private realms. What differs in the case of the heroines in the three dramas examined here is the way in which tension is portrayed as relieved in the genre of romantic comedy, providing a space for conflicting identities to coexist.

with several male authors' *jun'ai* creations. In this chapter, I examine how the alleged “transnationality” associated with female characters is adapted in dominant mass media that speak directly to female readers and audiences—fashion magazines and television dramas targeting Japanese women whose transnationality is assimilated and kept under control. Moreover, I argue that this is achieved through the transnational idealization of a Western female icon—Audrey Hepburn, especially her early screen personas of the 1950s and early 1960s, which continue to be popular in Japan's current mass cultural productions. I posit that the transnational adaptation of Audrey Hepburn's child-woman persona has inspired the current phenomenon of the “*otona-kawaii*” (adult-cute), a term popularized by fashion magazines in order to actively re-solidify Japanese women's social and cultural identification with Japan.

I investigate Japanese media's transnational use of Audrey Hepburn's screen archetype as a child-woman in three major aspects. Firstly, I lay out how her child-woman archetype has been centered on what can be referred to as a ‘Cinderella motif,’ which emphasizes a woman's socialization process achieved through foreign cultivation.⁶² Secondly, given that Audrey Hepburn has been tremendously popular in Japan and that many heroines in the television dramas that I discuss here are responding to her child-woman persona, I argue that Hepburn's “socially appropriate femininity”, which Rachel Moseley defines as an exertion of freedom within the limits of social norms, has reinforced the image of women as malleable social beings (106).⁶³ Since Japanese transnational adaptations of Hepburn's child-woman persona have their

⁶² Both Rachel Moseley (2005) and Gaylyn Studlar (2013) use “Cinderella” to refer to Audrey Hepburn's overall theme in her film works. The former focuses on how fashionable consumer items made popular in Hepburn's films are used to transcend class; the latter looks at how Givenchy and the Parisian haute couture fashion at the time contribute to the popularity of Hepburn's “elite but democratic, androgynous but hyperfeminine, womanly but juvenated” looks, which mystifies Hepburn as a contemporary fashion icon (234).

⁶³ The continual popularity of Audrey Hepburn in today's Japanese society is phenomenal. According to Japanese website <http://audreyhepburn.ko-co.jp/tag%25E5%25B1%2595%25E7%25A4%25BA%25E4%25BC%259A>, between March 2007 and April 2013, there were 18 exhibitions in Japan focusing on Hepburn's fashion style (accessed on Feb. 5, 2014).

contextual variations, I examine relevant representations from *OL* (office lady) fashion magazines, which use the term *otona-kawaii* to refer to this newly recognized form of womanhood. Thirdly, I argue that on the one hand, the style of *otona-kawaii* echoes Hepburn's child-woman persona and her socially-appropriate femininity; on the other hand, the newly-coined term indicates a domestic turn in recent years that emphasizes a re-identification with life in Japan. In addition, while the word *otona* (adult) is itself a sex-neutral term, *kawaii*, which means cute, has been a field of cultural contestation in Japan. The word *kawaii* carries abundant cultural meanings for women in Japan, and the current use of *otona-kawaii* in *OL* fashion magazines as well as in television dramas have created a new social category for ideal womanhood. In other words, the transnational adaptation of Hepburn's child-woman persona in the current representations of *otona-kawaii* women has helped to construct a socially-appropriate femininity in Japan. Most importantly, it is through love and marriage that women re-consolidate their social roles in Japan.

Audrey Hepburn's child-woman archetype and the Cinderella motif

Hepburn's child-woman style endures until today in Japanese mass media, even when it has come out of fashion in the West. The three primetime television dramas that I discuss here cover a span of thirteen years: *Yamato Nadeshiko* (Fuji TV, *Perfect Woman*, 2000), *Hotaru no Hikari* (NTV, *Glow of a Firefly*, 2007, 2010), and *Last Cinderella* (Fuji TV, 2013). I chose these three dramas to show how transnational imagination is gradually replaced by a re-identification with a local Japanese reality. All of the characterizations of the heroines pay tribute to Hepburn's child-woman archetype: the materialistic heroine Sakurako (Matsushima Nanako) in *Yamato Nadeshiko* is a Japanese version of Holly Golightly from *Breakfast at Tiffany's*.⁶⁴ Hotaru in

⁶⁴ Korean TV station SBS bought the remake rights of *Yamato Nadeshiko* from Fuji TV due to its tremendous

Hotaru no Hikari represents a Japanese version of child-woman that subtly modifies Hepburn's archetype. In *Last Cinderella*, we can see an officially pronounced farewell to the Cinderella motif developed after Hepburn's model and an introduction of Japanese *otona-kawaii* women.⁶⁵

Hepburn's child-woman persona was established from a series of early films, most prominently in *Roman Holiday* (1953), *Sabrina* (1954), *Funny Face* (1957), *Breakfast at Tiffany's* (1961), and *My Fair Lady* (1964). Film critic Gene Ringgold aptly defined Hepburn's child-woman characteristics as someone "who is sophisticated enough to understand life's harsher aspects and naïve enough to believe that uncomplicated, whole-hearted love can surmount them" (585). In other words, a child-woman faces a complex world by remaining innocent, lovely, and persevering at heart. She individuates with grace and is finally rewarded with the male protagonist's love, as well as with social recognition. The romantic love story of the child-woman, as a result, marks the achievement of her individuation and socialization process, which transforms her from a girl to a lady.

Even for audiences in the United States, Hepburn had been introduced as offering a "difference" from ordinary American femininity. Publications providing biographical background traced her maternal lineage to the Dutch royal family, and highlighted how hiding away from the Nazis resulted in her destabilized childhood and small appetite, and later, how her dream to become a professional ballerina was cut short due to her height and an injury to her leg

success in Asia. Interestingly, when the drama was produced in Korea in 2003, it was re-titled *My Fair Lady*, purposefully conflated with another Hepburn signature film.

⁶⁵ Besides these three, *Dokushin Kizoku* (*Single Noble*; 2013), made in the same year as *Last Cinderella*, directly appropriates Hepburn's *My Fair Lady*. The drama series use scores from *Moon River*, *My Fair Lady* and various film motifs from *Sleepless in Seattle*. Since the drama deals mainly with "child-man," I did not include it in the main text of this chapter. The male protagonist is characterized after Professor Higgins in *My Fair Lady*. He lives a European aristocratic lifestyle as a confirmed bachelor. His interactions with the heroine suggest that he is as much in need of mental individuation as the child-woman. His "childish" nature is shown by his eccentric addiction to leather shoes and his defiantly spoiled attitude toward his aunt, who holds a large share of the film production company he operates.

(Zhuang 2005, 34-7). In Norton Mockridge's coverage of Hepburn's theatrical debut in *Gigi*, the title first praises her as an "Explosive European Beauty," while the subtitle goes on to compare her sprightly performance as that of an elf (*New York World-Telegram*, 1951). In another theatrical performance, *Ondine* (1954), Hepburn plays the mythical creature of a water nymph. Interestingly, Mockridge's initial appraisal of Hepburn foresaw how the public would come to appreciate her charm as otherworldly, whether it is associated with her European cultivation or the magical flair that comes with her alternative roles impersonating extraordinary people.

In "The Face of Garbo," one of his essays in *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes aestheticizes the face of Greta Garbo as a myth, and that of Hepburn as merely an event: "Garbo's singularity was of the order of the concept; that of Audrey Hepburn is of the order of the substance" (57). Barthes remarks that Hepburn's screen image is "'individualized' both thematically (woman as child, woman as kitten) and as a person (almost unique specification of the face, which has nothing of the essence left in it, but is constituted by an infinite complexity of morphological functions)" (57). In these characterizations, Barthes suggests that the meaning of Hepburn's face is fixed, typecasting her as a child-woman, thus limiting her on-screen personas. On the one hand, Barthes's observation is correct in reflecting Hepburn's waning popularity in the West in the 1970s when she stepped away from the big screen to be with her family after the release of *Wait until Dark* in 1967; on the other hand, Barthes could not have anticipated Hepburn's enduring transnational popularity in Asia even until today, when her fashion styles and child-woman representations continue to circulate in fashion magazines, advertisements, CGI commercials and exhibitions worldwide.⁶⁶ Hepburn's transnational influence has not only been sustained by media globalization, but also by the Japanese social context that continues to value the socio-cultural

⁶⁶ One of Hepburn's CGI appearance for *KIRIN* beverage can be seen in <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaTlfFgRrtM>

meaning of Hepburn's child-woman femininity. I argue that we can understand Hepburn's child-woman style as a modern myth not merely by analyzing her particular brand of femininity, but also through thinking about how Western icons have been used in the Japanese social context.

According to Richard Dyer, a star's iconic endurance is generated from its structured polysemy, which "frequently speak[s] to dominant contradictions in social life—experienced as conflicting demands, contrary expectations, irreconcilable but equally held values—in such a way as to appear to reconcile them" (225). Dyer's analysis of a celebrity's image thus expands upon Barthes' critique of the limitations of Hepburn's significance, especially in her transnational stardom, which has made her a timeless and classic icon not just for her child-woman roles but also for her elevated status as a muse for fashion in Asia. In view of her continual popularity in Japan, what types of cross-cultural significance does her child-woman persona carry? Also, how can *otona-kawaii*, a term currently popularized in fashion magazines, be viewed as a new ideal of Japanese womanhood? How does it negotiate the apparent conflict between being childlike and mature at the same time?

Hepburn's child-woman persona echoes Hepburn's own personal demonstration of a respectful relationship with a patriarchal society and her dream of building a loving family. Rachel Moseley notes that this is a personal feature of Hepburn that contributes to her special brand of socially-appropriate femininity, which exercises freedom only within the limits of social norms (106). This observation makes sense when we consider how Hepburn's personal life testifies to it. In her biographies and interviews, Hepburn mentioned that she valued her family more than her career, and that she preferred to stay in Europe rather than Hollywood for film-shooting so as to stay close to them (138-40, Zhuang 2005). Their home was in Switzerland, away from the hustle and bustle of city life. However, marriage was not always a bed of roses for

Hepburn. As soon as she became famous, she decided to get married to actor and director Mel Farrow and reduced her number of appearances in films. After their marriage failed, she gave up her film career entirely for her second marriage, which unfortunately also ended in divorce. Contrasting with Marilyn Monroe's eventful life filled with scandals over love affairs, substance abuse and stories about her sentimental struggles resulting from an unhappy childhood, Hepburn seemed to deal with her marriage problems with relative grace and resilience. In the last five years of her life, she devoted herself to charity and took up the position of Goodwill Ambassador for underprivileged children at UNICEF. She visited over fifty countries, even when cancer impaired her health. Throughout her life, Hepburn's femininity coincides with her being held universally as a transnational and cosmopolitan ideal. As a result, Hepburn's status as a timeless and classic icon of style and femininity today has to take into consideration her harmonious relation with society, which is what appeals to people in Japan.

Anne Hollander aptly points out that it is Hepburn's personal features, such as her slender physique, that brings out a fresh perspective which defines modern womanhood: "[Her style represents] a vibrant, somewhat unaccountable readiness for action but only under expert guidance. This was naturally best offered in a self-contained, sleekly composed physical format: a thin body with few layers of clothing.... Women, once thought to glide, were now seen to walk" (qtd. in Moseley 102). Even though Hollander's comment dwells upon the aspect of fashion, it also refers to the child-woman's willingness to learn: she is eager to cultivate herself by learning from an authority figure. In the narratives, the Cinderella motif manifests itself as the child-woman kindles her desire for social significance and class mobility. Moreover, it is European cultivation that provides the opportunity for her transformation. In a sense, Hepburn's emerging fame echoed Hollywood's fascination with Europe during the 1950s. *Funny Face*

illustrates how Parisian high fashion contributes to elevating a girl's consciousness, transforming her into a woman with elegant taste. *Sabrina*, *Love in the Afternoon*, and *Charade* all use Paris as an important setting in which to teach the heroine how to love and to live. Similar to the role of the fairy godmother in fairy tales, European cities are crucial in elevating a woman's class and cultural taste.

Symbolic of a patriarchal society softened by the heroine's respectful love, Hepburn's child-woman is often paired with a much older man: both Humphrey Bogart (*Sabrina*) and Fred Astaire (*Funny Face*) are older than Hepburn by 30 years; Gary Cooper (*Love in the Afternoon*) by 28 years, Cary Grant (*Charade*) by 25 years and Rex Harrison (*My Fair Lady*) by 21 years. Thus, the image of Europe as one of mature cultivation is obvious. The child-woman's unthreatening and amiable femininity rewards her with the consummation of love. At times she challenges the patriarch, but she never intends to disrupt his order. This is how she negotiates with his authority so as to live continually under his protection. For instance, in *My Fair Lady*, Eliza, the poor flower girl, is able to change the snobbish bachelor, Professor Higgins (Rex Harrison) without discrediting his authority. In the last scene of the film, missing Eliza's presence in his house, Professor Higgins is still too stubborn to admit his feelings for her. In his solitude, he begins to play aloud a recording of Eliza's voice as he sits quietly on the couch, when suddenly he notices a change in her intonation, and knows that the real Eliza is back. He then hides his exhilaration by sitting back, putting his hat over his face and asking Eliza to bring him his slippers as though he is not surprised at all. For an arrogant man like Professor Higgins, this concealment of happiness expresses reconciliation. He finally succumbs to his feelings for Eliza and the domestic bliss that she has instilled in the house. Eliza also steps toward

reconciliation by giving up her past occupation as a flower girl in exchange for an upper middle-class domestic life.

If Hepburn's child-woman represents a femininity that seems acceptable to women themselves, it is suggested not by her marrying a rich husband at the end of the film, but rather because she cultivates herself while softening the male protagonist's attitude. In other words, both women and men make concessions. The male protagonists represent the patriarchal and dominant order in the films, but each is represented to have their own specific weakness. The ending of *My Fair Lady* suggests the reversal of roles in the Cinderella story. In the last scene, Professor Higgins, like Cinderella, waits at home for his princess to come and don him with the slippers. The glass-slipper motif becomes a metaphor for the magical touch of love that works wonders for both men and women. In the empty living room, there is a possibility of Eliza not returning. Like Bernard Shaw's original play *Pygmalion*, Eliza could have awakened her female consciousness and chosen not to return. Whether or not she decides to take him back, the decision lies with her. Yet, with the love she has cultivated for the protagonist, it is certain that she will come back.

Therefore, love can be seen as setting the limits of the child-woman's transgression. She is a learning subject that seeks to improve not just her life, but also that of the male protagonist and the society in which their marriage is a testimony to her positive agency. In romantic films about child-women, love contradictorily serves as both cause and effect to reward the characters' efforts at bettering themselves. Love, in this case, is as mythical as Cinderella's glass slipper. It is invisible but guides how a socially-appropriate woman should act so as to move up the social ladder.

In defining the function of a star, Dyer reminds us that in order for the star to be significant to a particular society, he or she must compromise with its seemingly contradicting values (225). Specifically, Gaylyn Studlar points out that, “Hepburn’s inscription of filmic fashionability succeeds in solving the contradictions inherent in the transformation of the playful adolescent female of androgynous body and immature sexuality into the securely heterosexual woman comfortable with conventional femininity” (234). Hepburn’s child-woman’s femininity negotiates with patriarchal society by adopting the social rules of lady-like behavior. Meanwhile, sex does not seem to be a concern in child-woman femininity. Even though Hepburn plays the role of a call-girl in *Breakfast at Tiffany’s*, this aspect of her persona is never stressed. The image of a child-woman remains pure; her sex will be sanctioned by the genuine love that she reserves for the male protagonist. This is due to the distinctive social category of the child-woman. Similarly, in the depiction of *jun’ai* heroines, sexuality is often left unaddressed or held back from explicit representation. This absence has to do with the *jun’ai* heroines being a male creation. The concept of sex is nonetheless as complicated as love when social context is taken into consideration. There is a gendered difference in how both sex and love are perceived and represented. As pointed out in my discussion of the movie *Tokyo Tower* in the second chapter, in the writing of female novelist Ekuni Kaori, female sexual awakening is treated as loaded with an individual’s potential to assert personal agency, while it is treated as a conflict with social demands in the case of male author Tsuji Hitonari’s *Sayonara Itsuka*. Likewise, in popular media texts such as television dramas and fashion magazines, it is important to note the gendered subtext in terms of whom these media texts address and whether they carry a social ideology.

I have heretofore argued that Hepburn’s child-woman relies heavily on European cultivation. In Japanese fashion magazines, European high-end branded goods and cross-cultural

experiences are essentialized as horizon-broadening for the cultivation of a young working woman's cultural taste. Moreover, with fashionable items displayed in a narrative style that brings readers to identify with the featured models in a series of consecutive issues, *OL* fashion magazines have served the purpose of sustaining the ideology that the elevation of one's social class and taste is achievable through capitalist consumption of foreign goods and experiences. This capitalist consumerism echoes the Cinderella motif, whose glass slippers and royal outfits all help to equip her to enter the palace ball.

The Cinderella motif works extremely well in fashion magazines in promoting clothing fashions. The popularity of Hepburn's child-woman style serves to mythologize young girls' desire to dream beyond their current status. Hepburn's style as Holly Golightly in *Breakfast at Tiffany's* (1961) still circulates widely today even though the movie was made over 50 years ago. In many ways, Holly Golightly is the archetypal modern Cinderella woman who dresses up as someone she is not: raised in the Midwest, she embodies the 'trans-local' wish to enter an elite social circle in Manhattan. Several posters of *Breakfast at Tiffany's* (which have become iconic of Hepburn's child-woman fashion) showcase Hepburn's slender figure clad in overlarge accessories, such as her long black gloves, long cigarette-holder, gaudy jewelry, oversized sunglasses, a wide-brimmed hat and a stylish lady's walking stick to go with her signature black dress by French designer Hubert de Givenchy. The big, long, and oversized items, in contrast with Hepburn's slim physique and Holly's dream of class ascendancy, give away the child-woman's aspiration to social significance, like a little girl putting on her mother's makeup and high heels to express her wish to grow up. Most importantly, in order to achieve that aim, she is willing to live under such a disguise, hiding her true self underneath her expensive clothes.

Similarly, Japanese primetime television dramas also feature women living split identities, while subsequently showing how these dualities are resolved by love.

Adaptations of Hepburn's Cinderella motif in 21st century Japanese television dramas

The television drama *Yamato Nadeshiko* (2000), created as the world was entering the 21st century, features a self-reflexive story on the Cinderella motif: women are often forced to take on a disguise if they want to be socially recognized. As a result, they adopt a split representation in order to fit in. "Yamato" is the word designating Japaneseness; "Nadeshiko" refers to the delicate flower of *dianthus superbus*. Put together, *Yamato Nadeshiko* brings to mind the image of Oshin, a Japanese ideal of female perseverance and postwar revival.⁶⁷

However, the behavior of the television drama's heroine, Sakurako (Matsushima Nanako), is far removed from this national ideal. She was born and raised in a poor fishing village, which explains the audience's identification with her as an aspirational protagonist. Sakurako believes in the Cinderella fairy tale that by marrying someone wealthy and cultured, she will transform into a high-class lady. Therefore, acting as her own fairy godmother, she spoils herself by spending her whole flight attendant salary on brand-name clothes, which she believes will buy her the entrance ticket to dating upper-class men.

Much like Holly Golightly in *Breakfast at Tiffany's*, Sakurako aims not just for money, but also for an elevation in social status. Also as a parody of Eliza's father in *My Fair Lady*, who with Professor Higgins' help becomes a cruise captain, Sakurako lies about her father being a captain and later asks him to play the part when both of them are invited for a formal dinner at

⁶⁷ "Oshin" is the name of a woman and the title of a television drama comprising a total of 297 episodes (Apr. 1983-Mar. 1984, NHK). Following the enthusiastic reception of the drama in Japan, it was broadcast and well received in several foreign countries. Its popularity was attributed to Oshin's strength in surviving hardship when faced with the turmoils of life. She became an impersonation of the positive endurance of the Japanese spirit. In Tessa Morris-Suzuki's words, she helped alter Japan's "criminal" wartime image when the drama was broadcast abroad (130-135).

her future in-laws. In addition, she pretends to be living in a luxury apartment in Daikanyama, one of Tokyo's most fashionable and wealthy neighborhoods. While she does live in that area, it is in fact only in a shabby old house soon to be torn down for renovation. Following the principle of capitalist consumerism, Sakurako maintains her appearance as if caring for a marketable commodity. She goes to spas and keeps herself updated with the latest news about potential bachelors. She continues to attend *goukon* (matchmaking parties) even after she becomes engaged. Interestingly, even though all of Sakurako's female colleagues feel uneasy about her morals, they help her conceal her lies because Sakurako is the only one brave enough to put in action what they all think: if a man can choose a woman for her outward appearance, so can a woman select a man according to his wealth and family background. In many ways, Sakurako's performance as a decent and diligent flight attendant in the transnational service industry is symbolic of a woman's promising future aided by personal transnational experience. Sakurako's problematic morals, however, reflect the disjunction between social ideals and real life, which makes her behave inconsistently. Meanwhile, the male protagonist Otsuke stands metaphorically for Japan at a time of economic downturn—sensitive, vulnerable, discouraged, and in need of a strong partner to help him restore his faith and stand up again to face life's harsh blows. Sakurako's discovery of her true feelings for Otsuke can be seen as a metaphor for discovering her place in Japan. Even though the story still ends with a transnational flair when Otsuke takes up a post-doctoral position in Boston and Sakurako proposes to him there, Sakurako's awakening and "domestic" turn (she quits her job as a flight attendant to be at Otsuke's side to support him) suggest abandoning her independence for love, rendering her into an ideal woman, a Yamato Nadeshiko—a Japanese version of an idealized "My Fair Lady."

In *Hotaru no Hikari* (Light of Fireflies; *hotaru* literally means firefly), the theme of a woman living within split selves is a major source of comic effect. The domestic turn echoes Hepburn's "My Fair Lady" effect by manifesting in the idea of "home in Japan" depicted with loving feelings of nostalgia. The recurrent motif of the "*engawa*" (the open corridor attached to the side of the house in a traditional Japanese house) reminds Hotaru (Ayase Haruka) of her carefree childhood at her grandmother's house in the countryside. Animated opening credits run at the beginning of each episode, giving viewers the familiarity of watching cartoons, just as in childhood. This animated sequence depicts Hotaru's early years in the Japanese countryside. As if telling a bedtime story, Hotaru narrates an anecdote about fireflies told to her by her grandmother: "It is only with the cleanest water that fireflies are able to survive and create the magical little light in their tiny bodies." The imagery evokes nostalgia for a Japan that is free from contamination, physically or spiritually. It is also the most ideal place to nurture and cultivate the individuation of a girl as innocent as the heroine Hotaru. In this mental journey to an imagery of a pure land, Hotaru, now an urbanite in downtown Tokyo, is reconnected with her roots in the heartland of Japan. This association is also suggested in Hotaru's job as a space renovator. She takes pride in instilling new meanings to traditional buildings, transforming them into cafés and restaurants that offer a moment of peacefulness for their customers. Her favorite *engawa* and *tatami* are introduced as open spaces for mental retreat and relaxation. Most importantly, they are spaces for interacting with family members. Traditional Japanese elements are treated as the spiritual center of metropolitan Tokyo.

The comic effects and relaxing elements of this television drama lie in how Hotaru keeps her naïveté as an adult. Hotaru's landlord is the father of her serious-looking manager (Fujiki Naohito) in the office, whom Hotaru calls *Bucho* (meaning "department head") not just in the

office, but also in private as his nickname. The landlord immediately takes a liking to Hotaru when the two meet at a traditional drinking house in Tokyo where she is celebrating her first day in the city. Telling her he is going to spend some time away traveling out of the country, Bucho's father rents her his house without asking her to sign a lease. When Bucho happens to need to move back to his father's house, he is shocked to find a very sloppy "*himono-onna*" (dried-fish woman) occupying the house. At first Bucho cannot recognize that the woman in the house is his neat and responsible employee, whom he sees every day in the office. At work, Hotaru is depicted rather more like a Japanese salaried man. She is diligent and hard-working. Whenever her job requires it, she works overtime to meet its demands. She can even perform "*dojousukui*" (weather fish-scoop), a traditional and comical folkdance, to please her customers. She is the ideal working woman of 21st-century Japan, yet extremely casual at home.

Yamato Nadeshiko and *himono-onna* both highlight the fact that social circumstances push women to adopt split identities. Love, however, masks such a critique of women's disadvantageous social position. By conflating love with the search for her true self, the female protagonist's original problem of having to live as split selves can be bypassed. Their childlike aspects—comically represented as a disregard for showing demure femininity—are re-interpreted as a sign of ingenuity. Audiences like them because they are spontaneous and innocent enough to retain their true colors without causing any real damage to the existing social norms. This is what resonates with the popularity of Hepburn's child-woman persona. Moreover, the process of finding love parallels the heroines' process of integration into Japanese society. Cultivation in this sense is not achieved through transnationalism, but by bringing one to re-identify with core Japanese values. As a result, Hotaru's double life—being *himono-onna* at home and functioning as a diligent *OL* at work—although portrayed as comical shows a Japanese

society transforming with time: while it used to push women into adopting a split representation of themselves in order to fit in, it now harbors the capacity to embrace their duality.

An analysis of the transformation of the child-woman in Japan has to take into consideration how men are represented in these television dramas. In both *Yamato Nadeshiko* and *Hotaru no Hikari*, men are portrayed as understanding and considerate. Bucho is Hotaru's superior in the office; he is divorced due to his previous negligence of the needs of his wife and daughter. Otsuke is a mathematician who takes over his father's rundown fish shop after his father's death, giving up his academic career in the United States. Otsuke is thus a member of the social elite caught in a dilemma between developing his individual career and his familial duty to care for his mother. Both Otsuke and Bucho therefore represent Japan in some vulnerable state: the former has lost hope to develop his professional talent in mathematics, and the latter is trying to get over his divorce. In the process of falling in love with the child-women heroines, both men regain confidence in themselves and find their purpose in life. .

While the heroines' struggles to fit in are represented as comical in the stories, it is their awareness of what society expects of them as women—and their failed attempts to live up to those standards—that the audience identifies with. This gap, however, is often portrayed as being filled by another common denominator in the Cinderella motif: the love of the prince. In the classic case of the Cinderella motif, women are pictured as indulging in the dream of being saved by a man fully capable of providing them with wealth and class ascendancy—a fate resting on winning the man's favor and using it to facilitate cultivation. In the fairy tale, the prince ultimately recognizes Cinderella even without her glamorous outfits. Likewise, in Japanese television dramas, the heroines' split identities are resolved with the male protagonists' love, accepting them for who they are. This theme of socialization through the male protagonist's

unconditional love has dominated the Cinderella motif in Japanese *otona-kawaii* television dramas. The male protagonists' support still holds the key to the heroines' social acceptance. In Hepburn's child-woman archetype, romantic love helps her transform from a girl to a woman, thus shedding off her habitual impropriety. Now, the difference in Japanese television dramas is that they allow these heroines to retain their socially "inappropriate" traits. The love of a tolerant male protagonist who accepts the heroine for who she is becomes the crucial theme of Japanese Cinderella stories in the 21st century. These dramas suggest that at least in the domestic haven created by the male protagonist's romantic love, women no longer need to put on a pretense of appropriateness. They are allowed to retain their dual characteristics as *kawaii* adults and remain true to their hearts in a contemporary society that is tolerant and open to its women.

By the average standards of a Cinderella-inspired narrative, the male characters in *Last Cinderella* are not without their own issues. The only salaried man in this television drama is sexually impotent due to diabetes. The other two male characters do not hold office jobs, but work in industries that are less restrictive: Rintaro (Fujiki Naohito) works as a hairstylist and Hiroto (Miura Haruma) is a "*furita*" (freeter, a Japanese expression referring to part-timers who engage in various odd jobs). Here the Cinderella motif works in reverse to suggest that a strong-minded woman, just like a modern-day prince (or the last Cinderella) is able to choose and support the partner of her choice.

The two major male protagonists in *Last Cinderella*—Rintaro and Hiroto—represent a shift in public views of how women situate themselves in Japan. Aired in the spring of 2013, the title of this television drama seems to bid farewell to the old Cinderella motif, which tends to put the heroine in a passive position. It is a romantic comedy featuring the love story of the 39-year-old heroine, Sakura, a woman who is by Japanese social standards far from being marriageable.

However, the revision of the Cinderella motif here lies not so much in its removal but in a nuanced perspective when addressing women's agency in making choices.

The Cinderella motif is altered by Sakura's final decision, which reveals that love's cultivating function can be disassociated from a foreign city and rest instead in Japan, where the heroine finds her sense of belonging. The paradigm shift is marked by Sakura's ultimate choice—whether to go to New York with Rintaro or to remain in Tokyo with Hiroto. Were this a television drama produced in the 1990s, the heroine might have chosen to fly away with Rintaro to New York, as the West was represented as a place where both of them could cultivate and develop themselves professionally.⁶⁸ For Sakura, Rintaro's love is warm and calming, like drinking water, which is necessary but tastes plain; Hiroto's love is rejuvenating, full of romantic surprises and happy expectations for the future. The complexity lies with the social perceptions of women who approach the age of 40. On the official website set up for *Last Cinderella*, a poll was conducted asking the audience to choose of the two male protagonists, which one Sakura should be with. Rintaro is Sakura's long-time friend and colleague at the hair salon. He has come to realize that Sakura has always been on his mind when she starts dating Hiroto. Upon being promoted and relocated to New York, he confesses his feelings to Sakura and asks her to go with him. The other male protagonist, Hiroto, counters the learner-teacher dynamic established by Hepburn's child-woman and her much older male partner. He is a man seventeen years Sakura's junior. He works as a freelancer and aims to become a professional BMX biker. Both Hiroto and Rintaro are equally handsome. The poll showed that the majority of the audience supported

⁶⁸ Many romantic TV dramas in the 1990s incorporated a foreign setting to conclude the story. They often end with the heroine leaving for a foreign country with the man of her choice. Such examples are *Long Vacation* (Fuji TV, Apr.-Jun. 1996), *Oishii Kankei* (*Delicious Relationship*, Fuji TV, Oct.-Dec. 1996) and *Overtime* (Fuji TV, Jan.-Mar. 1999). This pattern of going abroad at the end was concurrent with the upward momentum embodied in the internationalist woman's transnational desire to leave Japan and dream about changing the course of her life through trans-cultural capital accumulation.

Rintaro, who won over his young rival by 20,522 votes out of a total of 3,746,194.⁶⁹ Sakura's final choice, however, goes against the poll result; she chooses to bid farewell to Rintaro and the opportunity to work in New York so as to stay in Tokyo with Hiroto.

The votes in favor of Rintaro reveal a divergent attitude towards the well-being of a 39-year-old heroine. As the poll did not ask for the age and personal background of participants, we cannot judge whether the viewers favoring Rintaro were about the same age as the heroine. Neither can we know whether they were supporting him because they identified with the professionally cultivating life he has in mind for Sakura, or if they were merely supporting the actor Fujiki Naohito, who has been a popular male icon in Japanese romantic television dramas since the 1990s.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the high number of votes won by the young Hiroto cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Sakura's choice to start a life with a much younger man living on an unstable income represents women's changing attitudes toward love. Judging from the closeness of the poll results, her decision can also be seen as an acceptable one for a lot of people. Ultimately, *Last Cinderella* cuts off the ties that associate a woman's cultivation with the West. She can be self-sufficient in Japan, even providing the young hero with the necessary support and love to nurture his growth.

Last Cinderella demonstrates how the heroine Sakura is able to live under the label of "oyaji-joshi" (old-man woman), a term that is used to introduce her in the advertisement of the television drama. This term echoes child-woman: the word *oyaji*, while generally referring old men, also carries a popular cultural subtext in Japan that humorously describes how the fact of aging enables men to cast away their sense of shame in showing their true colors. The condition

⁶⁹ See the official blog managed by the production staff at: http://blog.fujitv.co.jp/Last_Cinderella/index.html (accessed on Feb. 6, 2014). However, one cannot dismiss the fact that sometimes television dramas problematize the results in order to challenge their viewers and stimulate ratings.

⁷⁰ Fujiki Naohito also plays Bucho in *Hotaru no Hikari*.

of being senior in society allows them to show little for certain social etiquettes. Comically represented in popular conceptions, an *oyaji* can live in a wayward manner as they wish without being censured by public opinion. An *oyaji-joshi* is easy to get along with. As in the gender-neutral term of the “child” in child-woman, the gender specificities of an “old-man woman” are blurred. Instead of awaiting her fate passively as a socially appropriate woman, Sakura makes her own choices in love and lifestyle without having to comply with social expectations of women her age. With this transformation, 21st century Japanese television drama heroines reinvent the Cinderella motif by maintaining their true colors. Most importantly, in the process, they rediscover Japan as a loving place that allows this transformation to happen.

The *otona-kawaii* phenomenon in fashion magazines

In romantic television dramas, the love of an understanding male protagonist allows the heroine to retain her childlike nature as she gradually becomes more socialized. Namely, child-women in Japanese television dramas do not focus on the transformation from child to woman as much as on making peace with these two characteristics in a single person. While the stories first show women living split identities either in public or in private, they posit love as the solution that dissolves these splits into a natural coexistence. This process of naturalizing the dual characteristics of the *kawaii* and the *otona* is more complex in *OL* fashion magazines, the first public media to use “*otona-kawaii*” as a set phrase. In *OL* fashion magazines, the concept of *otona-kawaii* is used in juxtaposition with fashionable goods for sale; the term is thus closely tied to the logic of capitalist consumerism. In this respect, it follows the Cinderella motif as well as the Hepburn child-woman archetype more closely than the recent transformation shown in television dramas. The *OL* fashion magazines that have popularized the usage of *otona-kawaii* are *More* (Shueisha Inc.) and *With* (Kodansha Publishing), which target *OL* readers. In my

discussion of the current *otona-kawaii* phenomenon, I also look at fashion magazine *InRed* (Takarajima Publishing), which describes its readership as women in their thirties. Even though the former two magazines do not specify the age of their readers, judging from the age of the models they use and the actresses featured on the cover page, they target a readership mostly in their twenties and early thirties, whose age corresponds to the child-women heroines in the television dramas discussed. These magazines demonstrate how the fashion buzzword changed from *kawaii* in the decades before the 2000s to *otona-kawaii* in the 2000s to include women who are slightly older than the former age group of female readers in their twenties. Moreover, although not all *otona-kawaii* women are *OLs* by occupation, the term suggests a social category that women can relate to, just as not all readers of *OL* fashion magazines are necessarily office ladies working in Japan. In addition, the relatively lower hierarchical status of the so-called *OLs* in Japanese corporate culture makes the term resonate with women's perceived lower status in the job market. Furthermore, I use these fashion magazines because the term *otona-kawaii* can be seen as a current transformation of *kawaii*, of which some scholars have debated the potential to reflect women's agency within Japanese society. In its current use, *otona-kawaii* promotes women's harmonious embodiment of their social roles and encourages them to embrace the status quo, which resonates with the social message of Hepburn's unthreatening child-woman femininity.

Overall, the Cinderella motif underlying Hepburn's child-woman persona suggests that both taste and class are learnable by every woman through practice, when supplemented with the right commodities to "upgrade" their beauty. For instance, in *My Fair Lady*, all the procedures that contribute to Eliza's transformation into a lady are demonstrated as lessons consisting of daily exercises in pronunciation, intonation, social etiquette, dancing, dress, and conversation skills.

Class and taste, as a result, are not a natural gift but acquirable in proportion with one's personal aspirations. In contrast to the current "domestic" and "localized" turn seen in the television dramas, *OL* fashion magazines still rely heavily on the idea of transcultural cultivation in introducing non-Japanese lifestyles to their readers. It has been a conventional practice for these magazines to present snapshots of ordinary European women on the streets and their fashion sense. Oftentimes, the model's excursion is detailed with a local map so that the readers can use it as a tourist guide, should they embark on their own trip. Not only is knowledge about foreign countries introduced, but the readers' imagination of exotic journeys is also fulfilled through the simulation of the models' enjoyment of life to their heart's content. Fashion model Saki's monthly column "*Lady Shugyo*" (Lady Cultivation) once recorded her travels in "Lady-like England," during which she sampled English high tea, visited Buckingham Palace, bought floral printed tableware at *Cath Kidston* and took the double-decker bus (104-112, *With*, Global Chinese Edition, Oct. 2006). Echoing the child-woman archetype, it is during these foreign travels that the cross-cultural cultivation often seen in Hepburn's films is reenacted and thus reaches Japanese female readers' daily lives.

There is a similar domestic turn with the popularity of the *otona-kawaii* style in fashion magazines. However, before I introduce this shift, it is crucial to address how this transformation is based on the conventional rhetoric that motivates women to cultivate themselves. Not only serving as a medium for knowing about high-end fashion trends in the West, *OL* magazines introduce lookalike items that are more affordable for these young working women, transnationally brokering and democratizing what could at first seem inaccessible to some of them. These consumer items are thus simultaneously class-specific and classless. They are class-specific as they demonstrate the wealth of the well-to-do; classless because mass production and

postmodern pastiche have deconstructed the aura that comes with the luxuries that indicate class. Like the much-acclaimed ending in *Breakfast at Tiffany's*, although not everyone can afford to shop at a high-end international jeweler, having initials engraved is affordable to most people. In this movie, the on-screen consummation of romantic love conceals the myth of class segregation, imposing on the child-woman the roles of consumer and mediator; her transformation allows her to arrive at a higher level of the self. Moreover, motivated by the desire to reach a higher social class, she becomes a complicit in capitalist consumption. Similarly, in *OL* fashion magazines, the narrative strategy parallels a woman's "evolution" in her state of mind and her aesthetic sense in clothing style, presenting readers with a simplified conflation of a woman's cultivation with transnational consumption.

The signifiers of the "classic" style used to bring out a woman's social status are disguised as classless. Rachel Moseley neatly illustrates the fine line between Hepburn's classic style and its classlessness. She describes the concept of class in the 1990s as "a structuring absence," pointing out that the word 'classic,' "refers to a hegemonic style of dress which is acceptably neutral—inoffensive because free of the signs of working-class femininity or other unacceptable forms—a little black dress, for instance" (196). In other words, just as the word 'classic' may be used to suggest an inoffensively neutral style, it also constitutes a modern myth that hides the social reality of class distinction. Thus, the classic style worn by a woman displaces her from her original class and from temporal and spatial specificities in order to project her to the mythically universal level of the classic and the classless.

Similar to Hepburn's socially-appropriate femininity, Japanese fashion magazines promote a femininity that is unthreatening to dominant social norms. These magazines are also different from television dramas, as the latter aim to show the process of the heroines' transformation,

while the former focus on representing the result—the images of how women present themselves in public. Noticeably, through the commodities showcased and marketed to work wonders for women's physical appearance, fashion magazines reinforce the idea of women as avid learner-consumers. Besides introducing international brand stories, special attention is given to instructing the readers on how to dress properly for a specific occasion in domestic Japanese society. A fixed feature in every monthly magazine illustrates how a model uses limited clothing items to coordinate 30 different dress styles for the various social purposes of the month. In these columns, the model is given a virtual role as an *OL*. During weekdays, she is seen giving a presentation in the office, going to lunch with customers, attending “*joshikai*” (getting together with female friends) after work, or drinking with friends on a Friday night out in a trendy lounge in downtown Tokyo. On weekends, she may be doing grocery shopping, going out on a date, visiting her boyfriend's parents for the first time, or attending her friend's wedding reception. For these various occasions, readers follow how she is properly dressed in pages familiarly laid out in the format of comic books, reminiscent of girlhood times when one eagerly follows the life of fictional characters in the narratives.

However, if a child-woman is valued for her potential to become a lady, the *otona-kawaii* woman refers to a present state in which an adult woman can keep her childlike nature. Although Hepburn's child-woman persona has gone out of favor in the West, Japanese popular media has taken advantage of her socially-appropriate femininity to represent the *otona-kawaii* style. The harmonious relationship between the *otona-kawaii* women and society revises the often-ambivalent social meanings that have been attributed to the word “*kawaii*.”

The idea of cultivation is as central for Hepburn's child-woman as it is crucial in mediating the creation of Japanese *otona-kawaii* women. Hepburn's particular physiognomy heightens her

socially-appropriate femininity, thus influencing today's *otona-kawaii* style. Japanese critics have always acclaimed Hepburn's beauty as "transparent" (*toumeina utsukushisa*), "unaffected" (*muzousa*), and "innocent" (*mujaki*), giving no sense of pressure or threat to people around her (Minami 81-99, 93).⁷¹ Unlike Marilyn Monroe's curvaceous figure, which represented an idealized female body in the West in the 1950s and early 1960s, Hepburn's slender and slim physique is likened to the average of Asian women. Her elfin persona adds to her blithe and sex-neutral presence, immortalizing her as "*eien no hito*" (eternal being), a term universalizing her existence across time and national boundaries. Moreover, even though she never cross-dressed for her roles, her face and disposition are described using sex-neutral terms, such as boyish and *shonen*-like (youth-like), terms praising the transparent quality of her charm, unmarked by gender, class, nor age.

In terms of outward fashion, *otona-kawaii* women tend to represent femininity in a gender-neutral way that stresses the model's ability to make other people around her feel at ease; laces and frills are far from an *otona-kawaii* women's style. However, the playful mixture of mannish or boyish fashion styles is only represented on a superficial level. Female qualities such as caring, understanding and loving are emphasized. Inspired by Hepburn and her child-woman personas, *otona-kawaii* women may look more boyish and casual than sexy on the outside, but their demeanor blends femininity with an unaffected air. The magazines often supplement the narratives constructed around the models' pictures by emphasizing how they value their social roles as women. Modeling for "Fashionable Uncle Shoes for *Otona-Relax* Style" for *InRed*, actress Kichise Michiko dresses her slender but feminine body with a pair of handsome trousers

⁷¹ Minami Toshiko compiles Japanese film critics' comments on Hepburn from Hazumi Arihiro, Tsukuda Kimihiko, Kinoshita Tarou, Minagawa Masaaki, and Minami Toshiko in the edited volume (Tokyo: Hagashoten, 1971).

and a gentleman's hat.⁷² The "Uncle Shoes" are a variation of the Oxford style, traditionally worn by men. Accompanying this "boyish" or "mannish" style is an interview on Kichise's life as a newlywed, in which she mentions, "I feel it is brilliant for a woman to have a fulfilled inner life. I myself care a lot for my family. If I can keep the radiance from this inner happiness shining, it will be wonderful" (24-27, Sept. 2011). Oftentimes, *otona-kawaii* actresses and models demonstrate a pride to become wives and mothers, and embrace their gender identity as women.⁷³

Even though the word *kawaii* is often used to describe young kids, its current application in *otona-kawaii* disregards age as its primary designator. Yomota Inuhiko argues that *kawaii* in women's magazines has come to refer to inner qualities such as understanding, patience and tolerance (137). He points out that *YuYu*, a lifestyle magazine targeting female readers over fifty, breaks the age specificity that has been associated with the word *kawaii* by introducing five professionally successful women as "cute adults" in a special column in its September 2005 issue (137). In fact, in the current usage of *otona-kawaii*, it is stressed that precisely because a woman matures with age that her innate wisdom is developed. Inuhiko's observation on the "maturation" of the word *kawaii* echoes how in the idea of *otona-kawaii*, women are seen as human beings on the ever-cultivating route of social evolution.

⁷² Shinohara and Kichise costar in Fuji Television's latest drama *Otona-joshi* (adult women; October-December, 2015), where they play the role of single women in their early 40s, who are economically independent, but stumbling on the road to find the right man to marry.

⁷³ The emphasized roles as mother and wife bring to mind "housewife feminism" identified by Shiota Sakiko as mainly focusing on "improving middle-class women's lifestyle". Liddle and Nakajima critique its political validity by pointing out how such femininity is based on a traditional Japanese womanhood: its "essentialist maternalism [is] based on the glorification of motherhood, which looks back both to the state's mobilization of women's reproductive power during the war, and to earlier 'matriarchal' times when women's fertility was celebrated" (11). Regarding the return of this trend in the 1990s, the authors observe that the declining birthrate in the 1990s has prompted Japanese society to encourage women to "give first priority to marriage and the family" (Liddle and Nakajima 318).

The lack of a fixed definition of *otona-kawaii* makes its meaning elusive and derivative of several other similar terms that correspond to gender-neutral fashion and makeup trends. For instance, a special feature in *InRed* punctuates the column with words like “*otona-kakkoii*” (adult-handsome), “*otona-casual*” and “*onna-mae*” (handsome woman) (34-65, Sept., 2014). The female model puts on either a dress or a pair of pants with a simple but elegant design as readers are led to believe that she knows her charm, strength, and confidence lie in the maturation of her character. Alternatively, she is described as environmentally conscious, insisting on eating organic foods and wearing clothes made of natural fabrics. In another column on personal lifestyle, an *otona-kawaii* woman is creating her own space at home by putting her insights about interior design and decoration into practice, after having been immersed in either foreign travels or cross-cultural interactions. In some cases, she is absorbed in making handicrafts, ranging from patchwork to leather goods. It associates her with the more traditional role of homemaker while empowering her as an active creator of meaning in her own life, as she does things not by necessity, but out of pleasure.⁷⁴ Overall, these women’s magazines present an image of today’s *otona-kawaii* women engaging in a mutually nurturing and appreciative relationship with Japanese society.

The idea of *otona-kawaii* reiterates the importance of a child-woman’s cultivation. It corresponds to Barbara Sato’s research on a prevalent discourse of *shuyo* (cultivation) in the 1920s in mass journals targeting modern women. In Japanese, the word “cultivation” can be translated and understood as *shuyo* or *shugyo*.⁷⁵ Barbara Sato, in her studies of Japanese

⁷⁴ The proliferation of publications that use the term *otona-kawaii* in their title are mostly works that feature female hair-braiding, interior design and decoration, and handicrafts.

⁷⁵ See Sato’s differentiation of “*shuyo*,” “*shugyo*,” and “*kyoyo*” (Notes to Chapter 4, 200). *Shuyo* refers to character-building, moral training, promoting spiritual and cultural growth in activities such as reading, etiquette-training, efficient home and time management, and cultural activities. I follow Barbara Sato in using the word *shuyo* to refer to the process of cultivation and socialization (115). The curricula and training involved in developing a woman’s

women's mass journals of the 1920s, discusses how the idea of *shuyo* facilitated modern women's socialization process by highlighting the importance of love and cultivation in marriage (134). At a time when arranged marriages between people of similar class and background were the norm, the idea of women continuing to develop themselves after marriage was promoted as a way to enhance spiritual compatibility with their husbands, who were referred to as the "masters" (*gosshujin*) of the household (143). Japan's increasing militarism in the interwar period furthered gender divisions and placed women firmly in the domestic field as wives and mothers, for instance in the promotion of the "*ryosai kenbo*" (good wife, wise mother). The ideal of women's spiritual growth in the 1920s could be seen as an attempt to delineate women's social functions within marriage, aside from biological ones. Thus, *shuyo* can be understood as a self-elevating mindset developed in popular publications so as to help women become socialized beings, with the idea of love treated as its means and ultimate reward. Likewise, through various activities and consumptions associated with *shuyo*, an *otona* (adult) woman in contemporary times takes up the role of a functional social being in and for Japan.

Today, the ideal of *shuyo* still resonates well with the positive social significance of a woman's cultivation. It circulates positively in Japanese fashion magazines targeting young working women and is categorized as *otona*. Although capitalist consumerism operates in these fashion magazines through the rhetoric of elevating a woman's taste with the act of consumption, there is a gradual shift toward refocusing on Japanese life and aesthetics. Transnational and foreign cultivation is still important, but a woman's cultural identity as Japanese and her social role as a working woman or a mother are stressed in order to recreate an ideal Japanese womanhood.

shuyo or "*kyoyo*" are called "*shugyo*." The word *kyoyo* has been in use to refer to liberal arts training in college curriculum.

Thus, *otona* qualities are emphasized so as to revise the idea of *kawaii*. Two newly launched women's magazines by Takarajimasha publishing in March 2014 testify to the recent *otona* trend: both *Otona Muse* and *Otona no oshare techo* (Adults' Fashion Notebook) target female consumers above the age of 35. In fashion magazines that previously used *otona-kawaii* as their fashion policy, the fashion buzzword has now also changed to *otona*. The title of an interview with actress Ayase Haruka (the heroine in *Hotaru no Hikari*), widely acclaimed as an *otona-kawaii* icon, identified the actress as being on a journey of "evolution" toward being an *otona* (*With*, February 2014). Whether fashion magazines are now turning to the maturity of *otona* as the ultimate goal of women's "evolution" and cultivation, or whether this targeted age group is known to be one that possesses the largest appetite for consumption (as those *otona* women's adolescent years corresponded to the time when the Japanese economy was at its strongest), these are issues to be examined as discourses continue to develop.

In fashion magazines, there is no mention of age as the indicator of a woman's stage in her "evolution" from an *otona-kawaii* woman to an adult. Instead, one aspires to incorporate the innocent disposition of childhood into the sophisticated world of adulthood. The state of having retained a spontaneous easiness in coping with life as an adult woman is depicted as the ideal of a woman's "evolution." "Evolution" (*shinka*) often appears in fashion magazines, and it is used in a quasi-Darwinist sense to suggest progress and advancement of the new female ideal to better fit in modern society. The process of retaining one's innocent qualities in the course of individuation is valued as a strategy for contending with increasing social obligations. The magazine *More* (Shueisha Inc.) demonstrates its *otona-kawaii* ideals through popular primetime television actresses. In a special interview titled "*Otona-kawaii-ism*" conducted with 28-year-old actress Kanno Miho, the editor asked the actress the secret of how she balances her maturity as

an adult with her innocence (*mujakisa*) and transparency (*toumeikan*) as a *shojo* (young female). The terms used to characterize Kanno Miho are the same as those used to describe Hepburn. Kanno answers, “One should do things wholeheartedly but without confining oneself to rules” (16-17). She further comments, “[b]eing an adult allows me to get in touch comfortably with the world and various interpersonal relationships. Making quality time for oneself is important. In addition, I look forward to knowing different people and I adopt a positive attitude to enjoy life” (18).

Kanno’s unpretentious curiosity for exploring the outside world is a key trait of the *otona-kawaii*. The child-like spontaneity and interest in people and the world at large adds to the charm of her social identity as an adult. Similarly, when interviewed in *More*, the popular actress Shinohara Ryoko (*Last Cinderella*) attributes keeping a lively interest at work to her maintaining the curious and enthusiastic mind of the “*shoshinsha*” (beginner) (12). Shinohara’s success as a popular television actress, along with her singing debut as a member in the girls’ singing group “Tokyo Performance Dolls” in 1990, her theatrical performances, and her marriage in 2005 with famous theater actor Ichimura Masachika, 24 years her senior, have made her a positive case of a woman who knows what she wants in life. She is an icon of *otona-kawaii* in Japan.

If Hepburn’s “Cinderella” child-woman turns to European cultivation with the purpose of elevating her social status, Japanese *otona-kawaii* women acquaint themselves with transnational sophistication only to unearth and rediscover the inner beauty of their true selves. The idea of *otona-kawaii* popularized in young women’s fashion magazines is closely related to the representation of child-women in Japanese television dramas. Both Ayase Haruka and Shinohara Ryoko, leading actresses in *Hotaru no Hikari* and *Last Cinderella*, frequently appear on the cover of *More*, *With*, and *InRed*, magazines in which *otona-kawaii* has been popularized to

address female consumers in their late 20s, 30s and 40s.⁷⁶ Shinohara Ryoko has even had her monthly column, titled “*Hokori Monokatari*” (Pride Story), in *InRed* for over 10 years since the magazine launched in 2004. In the column, Shinohara talks about her private life mostly through the simple joys of being a woman in her late 30s. These writings demonstrate how an *otona-kawaii* woman cherishes what she has and lives up to the social roles expected of her at her current age. Her true self in everyday life is often shown through her role as a working mother, which is a legitimate and respected social place. To emphasize this genuine aspect of her identity, a snapshot of herself without makeup often accompanies her column, a very unusual practice among Japanese female celebrities. In the column, she recalls sweet memories of spending time with her kids, or shares health-conscious recipes that she has prepared for her family. At Christmas time, she writes about decorating the Christmas tree with her sons, and the sort of blissful moments she used to cherish in life as a child and now as a mother.

Though presented as a fashion style, *otona-kawaii* is understood more as a mindset adopted to cope with the requirements of women’s socialization. It constitutes a collection of unpretentious inner qualities, similar to those naturally possessed by a child, which usually wear out gradually as a person individuates and gets frustrated by life’s tasks. These virtues include frankness, curiosity, spontaneity, and open-mindedness. As mentioned above, Shinohara attributes her current sense of happiness to keeping the state of mind of a beginner. She further advises, “Continuing to pile up experience but holding onto the enthusiasm you had as a beginner is important in both love and work. Always keep your mind as intent as the first time you put down things in your planner book...” (12 *More*, Nov. 2006). Offering advice regarding some women’s anxiety in finding the right person to marry, the relaxed and confident actress

⁷⁶ Besides Shinohara Ryoko, a few other frequent *otona-kawaii* iconic females in *InRed* include fashion model Ryo, pop singer Mochida Kaori and movie actress Aso Kumiko.

answers, “The time will come naturally as you continue to train yourself in both life and work” (15). Here again, love and marriage is seen as a natural reward as long as a woman cultivates herself.

The advice that Shinohara gives to her female readers in the beginning of the 21st century echoes the idea of cultivation, or *shuyo*, which Sato analyzed in women’s magazines published 80 years before. Sato argues that mass magazines at the time served the social function of educating modern women. The upward mentality encouraged in women’s magazines continues to incorporate women as an integral part of Japanese society. Similarly, *shuyo*, or cultivation, plays an equally important role in the concept of *otona-kawaii*. The situations that are shown in television dramas and explicated in fashion magazines help rationalize women’s social responsibilities. In both instances, the ideal of *shuyo* sustains women’s lives in a linear, forward-moving fashion, evolving toward creating a better style of femininity. In fact, *otona-kawaii* is often depicted as an “evolution” or a “better” version of the *kawaii*, one that adapts well to current times. In *More* (206, Dec. 2006), actress and model Hasegawa Kyoko was praised as an “Evolving Beauty” who never stops bettering herself in a special interview with the editor. In another issue, the famous Japanese model Yano Shiho has also been acclaimed as the magazine’s “Ever-Evolving Muse” based on how she continues to beautify herself in ways corresponding to her age and social roles over the years (254, *More* Sep. 2005). By positing these women’s charm as evolutionary, these media uphold *otona-kawaii* as the new ideal in Japanese womanhood.

Otona-kawaii child-women in *OL* fashion magazines in the 21st century should also be differentiated from the cultural category of *shojo* (teenage females, also understood as girl-women), in which an otherworldly and fantastical mental world is sometimes depicted as non-

conformist (John Whittier Treat 286).⁷⁷ While *otona* recognizes and preserves a woman's social place in Japan, the word *kawaii* has carved out a more ambivalent zone of cultural contestation; that is, from the "little rebellion" of *shojo* against women's overall marginalized social status in Japan in the late 1970s and 1980s to the country's current emphasis on *kawaii* as a way to promote its national "soft-power" in the global market.⁷⁸ The relationship between *OLs* and Japanese society during the 1980s and 1990s has been depicted as an evasive one, which can be understood from the conceptualization of *kawaii* in popular media in relation to its female consumers. Studies of *kawaii* have stretched across various social groups. *Kawaii* began as commercial promotion in the 1970s, a time of economic prosperity and active production and consumption of commodities. Sharon Kinsella examines the various ramifications of *kawaii* aesthetics: in the invention of "cute handwriting" (*shojo moji*, "adolescent-female characters," written or printed in a round-shaped way), and the "fancy goods" industry of Sanrio Company Ltd. (222-28). Christine R. Yano also traces Sanrio's transnational promotion of Hello Kitty, the

⁷⁷ *Shojo* is often discussed in the context of comics and animation; some *shojo* are depicted as aficionados infatuated with "Lolita" costumes, which are clothes styled after Victorian or Rococo dresses decorated with laces and frills. In special gatherings, these dreamingly-clad *shojo* would carry a lace-framed basket or suitcase and a sun parasol to roam around the Harajuku area in downtown Tokyo where youth subcultures of all sorts flourish. *Shimotsuma Monogatari* (*Kamikaze Girls*, dir. Nakashima Tetsuya, 2004) is an individuation film about such a *shojo* living in the countryside of Shimotsuma city. The movie shows her transcending the inconvenience of her surroundings by imagination stylized in *shojo* fashion, which is represented in the film's postmodernist pastiches of Japanese Lolita fashion. For the heroine, dressing up as a Lolita *shojo* mainly serves to satisfy her personal desire to transcend the daily reality and has little to do with exciting other people's pedophilic desires. Whether or not sexual arousal is involved in this obsession and whether it is in the "performer" or the viewer is an issue that needs further investigation. It is reminiscent of an idealized childhood times when girls play house in their secluded haven. In *Shimotsuma Monogatari*, female bonding is also treated as the main theme in *shojo*'s interrelationships. It is also clear from the clothing fashion that an *otona-kawaii* woman is not a *shojo*. An *otona-kawaii* woman's style, as is often represented in *OL* fashion magazines, is simple and elegant. Their adeptness and common sense in dressing themselves properly for different occasions is also emphasized.

⁷⁸ *Kawaii* has also been discussed recently in relation to Japanese cultural policy along the line with the popularity of Japanese anime and manga in overseas markets. This phenomenon is part of Japanese government's "Cool Japan" campaign, which began around 2003. Its aim is to promote Japan's "soft" culture to the world in the wake of its imminent economic decline. In contrast to the "Cool Japan" that addresses a transnational audience, *otona-kawaii* targets mainly Japanese females. Due to the scope of my focus on child-women, I have left out the discussion of how *kawaii* has been discussed in "Cool Japan." According to Yano, the goal of this campaign is to promote Japan's national image as "Marketable, Youth-oriented, Feminine, Playful, Pop Japan" (259). For research on *kawaii* and "Cool Japan," see also Allison (2006) and Iwabuchi (2002, 2008).

globally-circulated *kawaii* icon, and the cultural controversies surrounding the conflation of national image with commercial and political causes, which she sees as leading a wave of problematization that she terms “Pink Globalization” (252-68).

Kinsella argues that the relative marginality of women in the Japanese work field and the economic prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s allows them to carry what used to be their adolescent hobbies into adulthood as a gesture of nonconformity. They are able to seize the days before marriage to “[savor] their brief years of freedom as unattached urban socialites through decadent consumption, and also [express] their fear of losing that freedom and youth through the cute aesthetic” (245). This yearning to retain the freedom associated with carefree days of childhood is captured by Watanabe Kayoko, chief editor of young women magazine *SWEET*, in the subtitle she has created for the magazine: “28, The Declaration of Being a Girl Forever.”⁷⁹ In her words, being cute as women offers a liberating possibility to rebel against the linear progression of time and the corresponding obligations relative to a woman’s age and social roles. Above all, this rebellion, though small, can be assisted by the act of consumption.

However, an *otona-kawaii* woman is not a *shojo*, which has become a sub-cultural term in Japan. *Shojo* is both idealized and fetishized, as it captures the ambivalent relationship between women and Japanese society through the idea of *kawaii*. In the 1970s and 1980s, *kawaii* was associated with a time-defying wish of *shojo*. Later, some young ladies used makeup, outfits and “*burikko-suru*” (pretending to talk or behave like innocent young girls) behavior to simulate the carefree and indulgent attitude of girls so as to deny their age-related responsibilities as adult women.⁸⁰ *Otona-kawaii* women are different. The word *kawaii* refers more to their unpretentious

⁷⁹ See the official website of *SWEET*: <http://tkj.jp/sweet/> (accessed on Feb. 5, 2014)

⁸⁰ Women, who are the main target consumers of *kawaii*, are categorized as “cute ladies” by Sharon Kinsella (243-45). They are *OLs* who enjoy some years of freedom to spend money solely for their own pleasure and cultivation,

and genuine state of mind than their outward appearance. They do not wear “fantasy goods” printed with or derived from cartoon characters, such as Hello Kitty or Snoopy. Moreover, *otona-kawaii* women are portrayed as grown-ups who face and deal with life’s difficulties while maintaining grace. Most importantly, the major difference between a *shojo* and an *otona-kawaii* woman is their level of socialization: the former is often seen as pre-social if not potentially anti-social, while the latter tries to live up to her social roles with ease.

Therefore, the use of *kawaii* in *otona-kawaii* satisfies two groups: one is the consuming female public; the other is the Japanese popular media. Since the promotion of *kawaii* aesthetics began in the 1970s, the term reminds adult women of the carefree days of childhood when young girls can live free from social obligations. Yet this freedom is problematic, as it is based on the condition that the rest of society will take up major responsibilities. As a result, the liberty that a *shojo* presumably enjoys reaffirms the status of the Japanese patriarch. In other words, the *shojo* lacks the defying potential to rebel against society. However, the use of the word *kawaii* does hint at such a potential to act non-conformatively. Yano illustrates the current discursive complexities of *shojo* through three of its synonyms: “girl-child,” “sex-child,” and “consumer-child,” in which *kawaii*, facilitated by capitalist consumption, is “part of the masquerade of adult women as *shojo*” (55-6). This sexualized aspect can be regarded as part and parcel of the discussion surrounding the valorization of *shojo* in Japanese society with regards to the pedophilic desire revolving around the idea of *kawaii*, and I agree with Treat’s observation that a *shojo*’s sexual agency is not as passive as it may seem, even though it is hard to pin down as heteronormative, an *otona-kawaii* woman is after all not a *shojo*. Treat suggests the complexity

as well as young housewives who have turned their avid consumption of *kawaii* items during their adolescence to home appliances and lifestyle goods designed to make home-living an extension of such aesthetics. However, the issue of class is barely discussed. The items promoted as *kawaii* in the magazines targeting the general female public are advertised as available at affordable prices.

and mystery of a *shojo*'s sexuality: "While others may sexually desire the *shojo*...the *shojo*'s own sexual energy, directed as it is toward stuffed animals, pink notebooks, strawberry crepes, and Hello Kitty novelties, is an energy not yet deployable in the heterosexual economy of adult life in Japan (363). The nonsexual aspect of the *otona-kawaii* woman is not totally unrelated to the conventional idealization of *shojo* in public media representations. In addition, it is due to the ambiguity of a *shojo*'s sex that both the *otona-kawaii* women and the Japanese popular media are able to take advantage of what they need from the versatility of the concept of *kawaii*. The purer the child-women are in terms of sex, the more the concept of *otona-kawaii* can function in the service of a socio-cultural ideology.

A domestic turn of Japanese *otona-kawaii* women in romantic television dramas

In television dramas, love serves the function of leading the heroines to discover their social place in Japan. Their re-socialization process does not require that they hide their "split identities" and "imperfections"—being materialistic, sloppy at home or behaving more like a man, as these personal traits are all thought of as unaffected and perceived as *kawaii*. The term *kawaii* has come to embody a Japanese characteristic, making *otona-kawaii* a new social category and identity that does not contain the slightest rebellious potential against the patriarchal aspects of Japanese society, but instead constitutes a way to reestablish ties with it. Here, even though television dramas and fashion magazines are two different forms of media, they complement each other in creating the image of today's *otona-kawaii* women available for public consumption and identification. In other words, with the popularity of the term as well as its representations in Japan, *otona-kawaii* accommodates what used to be irreconcilable traits for an ideal woman. As a result, popular media help Japanese society shed off its image as a patriarchal nation-state, which has been portrayed as very demanding and restrictive for women.

Even though the recent domestic return of child-woman heroines in television dramas is inspired by Audrey Hepburn, a Western icon, they show only lukewarm interest in transnational cultivation. Transnational connections are laid out as options for these heroines, only to be later rejected by them. In other words, if Hepburn's child-woman archetype transforms into a lady through European cultivation, Japanese heroines would rather retain their idiosyncrasies as Japanese. Noticeably, foreign places gradually become empty signifiers that function symbolically as an old ideal for the *otona-kawaii* heroines of the Japanese television dramas examined in this chapter. In *Yamato Nadeshiko*, the earliest of the three, transnational imagination of foreign cultivation is still evident in the characterization of the Cinderella-inspired heroine. Sakurako's job as a flight attendant is stereotypical of a woman's superficial transnationalism. The television drama's ironic title *Yamato Nadeshiko*, however, calls to mind a traditional Japanese woman who is mentally persevering and emotionally supportive of the man she loves. In the end, Sakurako fulfills this ideal by helping Otsuke achieve his dream in the United States.

The more obvious transformation in the domestic turn of *otona-kawaii* women takes place in *Hotaru no Hikari* and *Last Cinderella*. Adapted from *manga* (comic books), the film version *Hotaru no Hikari: Roman Holiday*, released in 2012, directly uses Hepburn's *Roman Holiday* as a reference. Hotaru is a Japanese child-woman in her own right. In the film, Hotaru and Bucho go to Rome for their honeymoon. Hotaru herself is not subject to a romantic idealization of Rome, and only agrees to go there to please Bucho, who greatly admires Audrey Hepburn. From the moment they board the airplane, Hotaru is conscious that she is a tourist representing Japan. During the flight, she is constantly watching her manners so as not to reveal her sloppiness as a *himono-onna* (dried-fish woman). However, instead of following the trope of emphasizing how

European experience liberates the mind and results in awakening, the movie goes in another direction. In Rome, she helps Reiko (Matsuyuki Yasuko), a *himono-onna* in self-exile, to regain her faith in life. Reiko is an internationalist woman who went to Rome in the 1990s to study classical architecture. Before a tragic car accident that took away the lives of her husband and daughter, everything had been perfect for her. She was an exemplary Japanese woman of the previous decade, who was able to achieve self-realization in the West. After the accident, Rome had become a place in which to escape her pain and true feelings, that is, until she meets Hotaru, whose very presence reminds her of the loss of her true self and sense of direction in the West.

Conclusion

Current Japanese re-appropriations of child-women in popular media not only reflect the symbolic influence of Hepburn's transnational stardom and style, but also a major transformation that speaks to a paradoxical need in Japanese popular media of solidifying people's sense of cultural identification. In keeping with the operation of the Cinderella motif in Hepburn's child-woman stories, the consummation of romantic love in marriage is treated as a reward that guarantees a certain social status for the child-woman. The difference between Japanese child-women and their Hepburn prototype lies in the way European cultivation is gradually replaced with a re-solidifying of the heroines' social place in Japan. Paralleling this process, Japanese society accommodates the idea of *otona-kawaii*, allowing women to negotiate their split identities while refashioning Japan's social image as a benevolent patriarch. As a result, *otona-kawaii* women no longer need to resort to leaving Japan with the purpose of seeking foreign cultivation, a strategy that had previously been adopted to counter women's perceived gender disadvantage within its borders.

If *jun'ai* reacts to the current state of Japanese society by resolving an individual's ambivalence in transnational imagination and national identification through its heroines' unconditional love, the new social identity as *otona-kawaii* women serves the same purpose by speaking directly to the female public in Japan. Women's fashion magazines bolster my argument that these role models embody ways in which being both *otona* and *kawaii* can co-exist in a woman, despite the side effect that such an image is often exploited as a new commercial category in the service of capitalist consumerism. In this case, Hepburn's socially-appropriate femininity works well in Japan to recreate a feminine ideal that responds to current needs. Interestingly, it is by representing a gender-neutral image of Japanese women, either as innocent and spontaneous as a child, or jokingly derogated as *himono* (dried-fish) or *oyaji* (old man), that they cease to be threatening to Japanese men.

In the next chapter, I return to *jun'ai* in the transnational context, shifting my focus to post-colonial Taiwan, where individuals' transnational desires mingle with the need to secure a sense of national identity. By looking at recent Taiwanese films that feature a Japanese lover, I will investigate the ways in which these films may evoke sentiments of *jun'ai* akin to those of Japanese *jun'ai* films.

Chapter Four

Overcoming the Orphan Complex: Taiwanese Cinema and its Japanese Lover in the Post-Millennium

Taiwanese audiences have been receptive to *jun'ai* films from Japan since their introduction to the country. Most discussions surrounding the *jun'ai* genre in Taiwan in the first decade of the 21st century have seen it as a subgenre of romance. The phenomenon has led local film productions to introduce the term “*chun'ai*” (Mandarin for *jun'ai*, which shares the same characters in Chinese as in Japanese) as a new commercial category for romantic films originating from Japan.⁸¹ In a special column on *chun'ai* in a 2011 issue of *CUE.*, a lifestyle and film magazine, the editors presented the phenomenon of *jun'ai* from other countries (34-51). Besides Japan and Taiwan, examples of films were drawn from Korea, Hong Kong, and Thailand. *Chun'ai* was described as a universally popular commercial genre in Asia. However, it would be oversimplifying to read the phenomenon of *jun'ai* merely as a profitable trend in each country's national film market. Therefore, my goal in this chapter is to supplement the lack of socio-political discussions on Taiwanese films that feature a pure-love sentiment. I argue that the Taiwanese *chun'ai* sentiment encourages individuals to secure a national-cultural identification, and shares the pure-love sentiment present in Japanese *jun'ai* films. Most importantly, it is in the

⁸¹ A seminar titled “*Chun'ai* Literary Trend” was held in Taipei on June 30, 2005. In the seminar, *chun'ai* was mainly seen as a filmic phenomenon dominated by romantic sentimentalism; Japanese films, such as *Love Letters*, *Crying out Love in the Center of the World*, are seen as iconic films in setting the tone for the *chun'ai* trend in Taiwan (blog.roodo.com). Since the transnational appreciation of these Japanese works and their sentimentalism coincides with the prevalence of Japanese popular culture in Taiwan, it has drawn both the popular media and critics' attention to Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan, concerns over Taiwan's national identity, postcolonial and neocolonial status have been raised and discussed in relation to Japanese popular cultural presence in Taiwan. However, this *chun'ai* seminar, comprised of scholars active on popular media, mainly attributed Taiwan's *chun'ai* trend to young people's emotional need for genuine love as a universal theme, without relating this need for love to the current socio-political context in Taiwan.

concurrent desire for transnational ties that the protagonists are shown as strengthening their domestic sense of cultural belonging.

In addition to the linguistic closeness that facilitates the translation of Japanese *jun'ai* to Taiwanese *chun'ai*, the historical-political conditions that have subjected Taiwan to Japan's colonial rule should be problematized further in the re-contextualization of this term in Taiwan. This historical background positions Japan as the symbolic patriarch in Taiwan's pursuit of modernization, resulting in the flourishing of coming-of-age themes in many Taiwanese films linked to Japanese figures: when Japanese characters appear, they are often objects of primary identification, with Taiwanese characters in the corresponding role of a child.

Meanwhile, the child-parent ties that have been established between Taiwan and Japan resonate with domestic debates in Taiwan over the island's dynamics, not just with Japan but with yet another looming, formidable paternal figure—China. These complicated struggles have been discursively (re)constructing the internal relationships—historical, political, and affectual—among three generations in Taiwan, rendering possible the current generation's nostalgia toward Japan without any direct exposure to the colonization experienced by their grandparents' generation. Observing how Japan mediates a historical continuity across different generations in Taiwan, I argue that the cultural translation from *jun'ai* to *chun'ai* serves a domestic purpose to rekindle identification within Taiwan across different generations. I distinguish the three generations in this chapter based on the difference of age and cultural background: the grandparents' generation refers to the Taiwanese generation that has direct experience of Japanese colonization before 1945 and I chiefly refer to the group that was born during 1920s and 1930s in Taiwan; the middle, or the parents' generation refers to the children of the grandparents' generation, who were born during the 1940s and 1950s. However, this group also

includes those born to Mainlander Chinese parents who moved to Taiwan with the Chiang Kai-shek-led KMT government around the year 1949. In other words, the cultural background of the middle generation is already mixed. The current, or the grandchildren's generation is the children born to the middle generation in Taiwan.

In Taiwan, *chun'ai* has boomed at a time when the local film industry was at its worst financially. According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Culture, the market share of Taiwanese films in 2003 was a meager 0.3% (Taiwancinema.com). The relative box-office success of the urban gay romance *Formula 17* (dir. Chen Yin-jung, 2004) and light romances such as *Blue Gate Crossing* (dir. Yee Chin-yen, 2002) testify to the use of romance as a profitable strategy to attract local audiences back to the movie theater. The written character of "chun" in Chinese connotes innocence, as does "jun" in Japanese. Like its Japanese counterparts, *chun'ai* in Taiwan is understood as a kind of innocent love unrelated to sex or transcending social restrictions, I focus on its latent (trans)cultural desire. In my view, the films that involve a Japanese lover mirror the Japanese *jun'ai* phenomenon most strongly. *Cape No.7* (dir. Te-Sheng Wei, 2008) is an example of this transnational appropriation. The box-office success of this film saw the beginnings of the revival of the local Taiwanese film industry. In this film, romantic love is but one of many themes. The film features a disillusioned youth, Aga, returning to his hometown in southern Taiwan. Getting recruited in a local band and opening for Japanese singer Atari Kosuke at a live concert, Aga finally finds new hope through love. Paralleling the love story between Aga and the band's Japanese manager Tomoko, another love story unfolds some 60 years earlier. In a package of seven misaddressed love letters written in 1945, an unfulfilled love story is revealed between a Japanese schoolteacher and a female Taiwanese student with the

Japanese name of Tomoko. The package was sent posthumously by the schoolteacher's daughter in Japan.

This film appealed tremendously to local Taiwanese audiences. Various explanations for the film's 'miraculous' success at the local box-office in 2008 were put forth, including word of mouth, and two minor typhoons that allowed people a break from work and thus more time to go to the movie theater (Ruxiu Chen 146).⁸² Moreover, the catchy use of pop music, added to a context of colonial history, has indeed contributed to the film's success. Arguably, this film was considered as bringing a first sign of hope to the struggling local film market. Following this success, other domestic films contributed to a slow but steady growth. Since 2012, the yearly market share of domestic films has accounted for over 10 percent of total movie ticket sales (Taiwancinema.com). With this modest improvement in local film reception, people have cited *Cape No.7* as marking a turning point in envisioning a future when Taiwanese films are both entertaining and representative of local sentiments. As a commercial film rich in cultural subtexts, especially those involving Taiwan's entangled feelings for Japan, I see this film as an important piece of evidence in examining how *jun'ai* is appropriated in Taiwan; it responds to a local sentiment that involves not only the aftermath of Japanese colonization but also the desire to speak to a lost middle generation, whose sense of alienation has been a shared theme in Taiwanese New Wave movies. While the transnational appropriation of *chun'ai* in Taiwan expresses a will to promote the country's visibility, *chun'ai* as a sentiment speaks to a reintegration of Taiwanese identity.

⁸² This film is the second highest grossing film in Taiwanese film history. The first is Hollywood blockbuster *Titanic* (dir. James Cameron, 1997).

As seen previously, the desire for *Nippon-dashutsu* (leaving Japan) was fundamental to the transnational imagination of Japan's *kokusaika* during its decades of loss. Similarly, Taiwanese *chun'ai* films promote a contextualized cosmopolitanism with the aim of retrieving an integrated local identity. Besides *Cape No.7*, films such as *Somewhere I Have Never Traveled* (dir. Tien-Yu Fu, 2009), *Sumimasen Love* (dir. Yu-hsien Lin, 2009), and *Spider Lilies* (dir. Zero Chou, 2007) all involve the character of a Japanese lover. In these films, love mediates between national identification and transnational desire. However, I argue that these Japanese lovers should not be interpreted as a form of Taiwanese nostalgia for a previous primary object, but rather that the roles of these Japanese lovers stand in for a lost but essential part of the integration of a Taiwanese identity. That is to say, the presence of Japanese lovers should be understood as a current desire to bring together different generational junctures in building a Taiwanese identity.

Even though in these Japanese and Taiwanese films, *jun'ai* derives from a context in which national-cultural identification is challenged by cosmopolitan desire, the portrayal of transnational imagination is different in Taiwanese *chun'ai* films, and would be more aptly characterized by the term 'transnational consciousness'; this is more politically nuanced in suggesting individuals' capacity to negotiate their national identification and cosmopolitan longing on the grounds of their social reality. One major reason is that there is a tradition in Taiwanese New Wave movies to depict contemporary Taiwanese society in a social-realist style.⁸³ While these Taiwanese *chun'ai* films are all popular films catering to the general public, their political agenda is more evident than in Japanese *jun'ai*, which is mainly expressed as a personal sentiment.

⁸³ Director Wei Te-sheng had worked as New Wave director Edward Yang's assistant and vice director before he made his own movies. Director Tien-yu Fu was encouraged by New Wave scriptwriter and director Nien-jen Wu to become a filmmaker. Her *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled* is produced by Wu, who was very touched by the simplicity of the story.

Transcending the orphan complex

The metaphor of the orphan, who is abandoned by his/her parents and continues to fear being forsaken again by foster parents, testifies to the Taiwanese worry of being cast aside in favor of more powerful nations. In Taiwan's modern history, Japanese colonization (1895-1945), the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalists' authoritative rule, and the United Nations recognition of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful Chinese government in 1971, which led to Taiwan's loss of its United Nations membership, are all incidents that have fostered the country's sense of forlornness among the international community. The first use of the word "orphan" to describe Taiwan can be traced to the title of Wu Cho-liu's novel, *The Orphan of Asia*, written during the last stage of Japanese rule between 1943 and 1945 (Wu, *Introduction IV*).⁸⁴ Through the fate of the protagonist Tai-ming Hu, Wu illustrates how colonialism distorts an individual's mentality as a human being. In the novel, Tai-ming ends up going insane. He is pulled between Japan and China, and exploited by both; he is ultimately a victim of their double abandonment. His tragic fate allegorically presages a political impossibility for the Taiwanese people to claim a unified identity (Leo Ching 176).

The fear and experience of being left behind by the Japanese primary love-object echoes existing discourses about Taiwanese people's 'nostalgia' for Japanese colonial rule. However, the nostalgia is ambivalent, as the brutality of colonization counters the humanitarian ideal of interracial justice. This sentiment of nostalgia has also been attacked by Chinese nationalists, who regard Taiwan's affinity with Japan as a sign of racial and cultural betrayal. Nostalgia for Japan, however, is relative and is only sustained when compared with the discontents generated toward the later Kuomintang-led Chinese Nationalist governance. The generation that has

⁸⁴ The novel was published under the title of *A Distorted Island* in 1957 (*Yugamerareta Shima*, Tokyo: Hirobashobo).

undergone Japanese colonization and the subsequent Chinese handover first experienced colonial modernization, and then postwar recession. The forced deportation of Japanese settlers from Taiwan due to Japan's defeat in World War II has called forth the sense of forlornness of Taiwan as an orphaned child. Following the departure of the Japanese rulers, the Mainland Chinese also governed Taiwan in an authoritative manner. Their unequal treatment of local Taiwanese people has led to a series of tragic civil conflicts and persecutions, making identification with this Chinese stepfather difficult. Taiwan's continual condition as disposable is captured vividly by the remarks made by Wen-heung in *A City of Sadness*, Hou Hsiao-hsien's 1989 film which earned him a Golden Lion: "We Taiwanese are the most pitiful. First come the Japanese, and then come the Chinese. We're eaten by everyone, ridden by everyone, but cared for by no one."

The presence of Japanese lovers in current Taiwanese films whose protagonists have had no direct experience of Japanese colonization is remarkable. The portrayed intimacy with Japan in popular cinema is reactionary to a circulating populist sentiment toward establishing a local Taiwan identity that is free from being overshadowed by the Great China ideology. As a result, it can also be viewed as a consequence of the current generation's affection toward the grandparents' generation and desire for recuperating a fractured consensus usually represented by the generational gaps that need to be mended in the films. Some post-colonial critics and scholars, who were alarmed by the intimacy between Taiwanese and Japanese characters in *Cape No.7*, deplored the film's use of love, music, and local popular humor as obscuring the racially humiliating experience of Japanese colonization and confirming the continual self-deprecation of Taiwan in still having to look up to its former colonizers (Formosan-ideology.blogspot.tw; News.163.com).⁸⁵ These comments demonstrate a deeply rooted national ideology that continues

⁸⁵ Scholars and critics who are often cited from the newspaper are former presidential policy advisor Jieli Xu, research fellow at Academia Sinica Taiwan I-chung Chen, and journalist Feng Wang.

to place the colonizer and the colonized in a binary that cannot be transcended. Moreover, viewing the appearance of a Japanese character in a Taiwanese film as an unfavorable representation to national consensus dismisses the intricate potential that helps turn a former colonial trauma to a transnational connectivity.

The omnipresence of Japanese contemporary popular cultural productions in Asia, especially in Taiwan in the 1990s, has also contributed to the presence of Japanese elements in these Taiwanese films (Koichi Iwabuchi 121). As a result, Taiwan's current views toward Japan are both historical and imaginary: a contradiction of mixed feelings resulting from both negative and positive historical narratives. Negative views stem from Japan's World War II criminality in China and elsewhere, while positive ones emerge from the colonial modernity remembered by the elderly generation, in addition to exposure to contemporary popular culture due to Taiwan's participation in global capitalism. In other words, Taiwan's perceived affinity with Japan is a hybrid of postcolonial imagination informed by historical, cultural, and economic factors. Symbolic of the primary object, Japanese lovers in recent Taiwanese films should therefore be viewed as hybrid constructs of a Taiwanese imagination. They are, however, neither unproblematic representations of the real Japan, nor symbols of an imaginary Japan that has been tormented by the guilt of having forsaken Taiwan. Instead, they are incarnations of all that is absent and lost in Taiwan's path toward self-identification. Thus, they may be symbolic of the absent middle-generation in these films. I agree with Japanese essayist Arai Hifumi in seeing this lingering affection toward Japan in film not as a wish to return to Japan, but as a farewell to history (43).⁸⁶

⁸⁶ She reflects, "the more times I see this film [*Cape No.7*], the more I disagree with it being a film about the star-crossed love of Japan and Taiwan. It is not a work that suggests 'Taiwan's desire to be colonized' as one Taiwanese critic said. Japan has long descended from Taiwan. What is to be wrapped up is the memory of love in turmoil, or it

These films are ramifications of Japanese *jun'ai* for two reasons. First of all, Japanese presence, as a symbol of modernity in Taiwan, is a manifestation of a current transnational desire that suits the need of Taiwan to assert its self-identity. Secondly, the Japanese lover is imagined as filling in the role of the missing primary (parental) love-object. In all of these films, the natural father or mother is either absent or dysfunctional. Yet the presence of the Japanese character stands in for their absence as the protagonists' primary identification. In contrast to Japanese *jun'ai* films, which feature purely heterosexual romance, their Taiwanese *chun'ai* counterparts contain homosexual themes that help lay out a democratic Taiwanese social reality. *Spider Lilies* is a lesbian drama whose lead roles are played by iconic mixed-blood actress Isabella Leong and popular idol-singer Rainie Yang, who are both heterosexual in real life. Its director Zero Chou, however, is lesbian and has been making films that demonstrate her political agenda as a queer director. By having famous mainstream actresses star in her film, however, Chou intends to boost the visibility and box-office of her production. In terms of themes, the lesbian romantic *chun'ai* film "queers" the conventional heterosexual romance in *jun'ai* and demonstrates an ultimate self-imposed severance and independence from the primary love-object. *Somewhere I Have Never Traveled* also contains a homosexual theme to some extent, except that the "queering" potential is cut short in the plot of the male protagonist's tragic fate.

The Japanese lover in Taiwanese romantic *chun'ai* films serves as a *jun'ai*-object, or primary love-object, for the Taiwanese protagonists. The female protagonist Jade in *Spider Lilies* fondly remembers Takeko, a girl of Japanese and Taiwanese parents, from her childhood. She instantaneously falls in love with her when the two meet again years later. For Jade, Takeko stands in place of her parents who left her in the care of her half-blind grandmother. This

is the specter of history" (43).

attachment to the Japanese character also takes place in *Sumimasen Love*. Chie Tanaka, the Japanese actress in *Cape No.7*, plays herself in the film. Her one-day excursion in Kaohsiung, Taiwan's southern harbor city, is conflated with the male protagonist Huai-cheung's chance to reunite with his long-departed father. Huai-cheung's father went abroad in one of the cargo ships anchored in the harbor. Despite the years, Huai-cheung's longing for his father has never abated, and he secretly wishes for his return. In one of these periods of waiting when he is absorbed in fancying his father's appearance, the Japanese heroine Chie Tanaka appears. From that moment on, she is seen as the reincarnation of his father, his primary object. This conflation is a romantic but wishful misrecognition. If for an earlier generation, the nostalgia for Japanese modernity was a result of colonial affinity with Japan, the new generation's representational intimacy with Japan in today's cinema serves a double purpose. It does not only bring to mind a colonial memory related to their grandparents' generation in Taiwan, but through the plot of recognizing the Japanese lover as the new primary object, the lack of the lost middle-generation is imaginatively satisfied.

In these films, visibility plays a crucial role in the construction of identity. When orphans lose a parent, they also suffer from lack of attention in the form of either physical or visual contact. Vision, above all, is the sense that transmits attention. When parents overlook their children, those who suffer from the orphan complex demand to be looked at so badly that they sometimes become self-absorbed in feelings of neglect. I have observed that the narcissistic brooding over one's fate as an orphan is a frequent theme in New Wave Taiwanese cinema (starting from 1983), featuring auteur directors such as Edward Yang, Hou Hsiao-Hsien, and Ming-Liang Tsai. These New Wave films suffered from a lack of attention from domestic audiences, who shunned their serious themes and turned to Hollywood blockbusters and Hong

Kong films. These New Wave auteurs, instead, found global visibility via venues such as international film festivals. Their melancholic sentiment of forlornness and the alienating experience of urbanization appealed to serious-minded moviegoers. Different from both the previous generation, who experienced Japanese colonization, and the younger generation, New Wave directors can be treated as Taiwan's (parental) middle generation.⁸⁷ The gap that prevented them from totally identifying with their fathers' generation is also an important theme in their movies. Films such as Hou Hsiao-hsien's *A Time to Live, A Time to Die* (1985), Edward Yang's *A Brighter Summer Day* (1991) and Nien-jen Wu's *Dosan: A Borrowed Life* (1994), are all illustrations of this. Their modernist and realist styles express a deep anxiety caused by a fragmentary identification with Taiwan set against a fast-paced, globalized world.

The theme of a self-reflexive emotional detachment taps into the issue of urbanization as Taiwan engages in global capitalism based on the American economic model. These films cover a range of different genres and styles such as tragicomedy, parody, and meta-narratives, which express a fragmentary postmodernist sentiment prevailing the late 1980s and 1990s (Wenchi Lin 26-68). The first generation of Taiwanese New Wave cinema, which I refer to here as representing a detached middle-generation, have found it difficult to totally identify with the Chinese patriarch (see *Good Men, Good Women*, 1995), but have also not found a sense of belonging in Japan, as their fathers' generation did (see *Dosan: A Borrowed Life*, 1994). Even the United States, a new object of Taiwan's transnational desire during the Cold War era, do not reciprocate this longing, suggested in the transnational fandom of Elvis Presley in Taiwan (see A

⁸⁷ The education of the middle generation, was instituted by the KMT-led Confucianist teachings associated with ideological identification with cultural China. During the individuation process of this generation, the promulgation of Martial Law (1949-1987) led by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the internal conflicts between nationalist and a nativist views are all major events that have made identity construction an ambivalent struggle. Moreover, the role played by the United States in implementing democracy has also turned it into another love-object of modernization to identify with. All these modernist conflicts in forming an integrated cultural identity are important themes featured in the Taiwan New Wave (June Yip 8-11).

Brighter Summer Day, 1991). As a result, thematically, they share an orphan complex akin to that of their parents' generation, who felt deserted by their Japanese primary objects. A similar sense of forlornness has therefore haunted these first two generations. The absence of the parents' generation in current Taiwanese films is thus reflective of this detached middle generation, whose sense of forlornness in finding a stable primary love-object to identify with has constituted much of the pathos in Taiwanese New Wave cinema.⁸⁸

Nostalgia is a byproduct of loss. The grandparents' generation has done little to address this lingering affection, or unreciprocated longing. In her book *On Longing*, Susan Stewart compellingly illustrates how loss and distance can be used to understand the act of souvenir collecting:

Nostalgia is a sadness without an object, ... the past it seeks has never existed except as narrative, and hence, always absent, the past continually threatens to reproduce itself as a felt lack... This point of desire which the nostalgic seeks is in fact the absence that is the very generating mechanism of desire. As we shall see in our discussion of the souvenir, the realization of re-union imagined by the nostalgic is a narrative utopia that works only by virtue of its partiality, its lack of fixity and closure: nostalgia is the desire for desire.” (23)

The desire to collect souvenirs as a way to retain memory constitutes what I see as transnational imagination, which is useful in understanding Taiwan's choice of Japan rather than China as its object of nostalgic longing. This choice has much to do with the existing distance between Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan's relationship with Japan was cut off overnight in 1945. Since this fate is irreversible, Japan has become a safe object for Taiwan to project its transnational

⁸⁸ See Wenchi Lin's *National Allegory and Identification in Chinese-Language Film* and Ban Wang's "Black Holes of Globalization: Critique of the New Millennium in Taiwan Cinema" in *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, Vol. 15, No.1, Special Issue on Taiwan Film (Spring, 2003), pp. 90-119.

longing onto, without instigating the real threat of re-colonization. In contrast, Taiwan is constantly reminded of its racial and cultural affinity with Mainland China, or ‘China-Other,’ and the frequent military drills along with the missiles targeting Taiwan across from the Strait serve as a constant reminder of China’s growing geopolitical strength. China continues to be a threatening presence. Therefore, despite some current discourses within Taiwan dwelling on the post-1949 diasporic longing for the ancestral and cultural China, it remains too dangerous an object to be desired.

Jing Sun explains the ‘usefulness’ of Japan for Taiwan’s three generations:

“For the older generation, cultural Japan has never faded in their memories. Democratization only set free and amplified their long-suppressed nostalgia toward their one-time motherland. The current ruling elites, although lacking personal experience with Japanese rule, certainly realize Japan’s vital security importance and seek to build new ties by calling Japanese attention to a shared democratic identity vis-à-vis an authoritarian China. For the younger generation, Japan is attractive for being their Paris next door. The anti-Japan voices, on the other hand, have become largely ostracized in all three layers of generations.” (799)

Sun’s observation about the young generation’s admiration for Japan is made in light of the easy availability of Japanese media products, popular culture, and the accessibility for Taiwanese to travel to Japan. It is a cultural identification that serves to blur national boundaries, yet at the same time it sees Japan as somewhere outside a Taiwanese reality where people can go and leave at will.

The desire to transcend time and space governed by Taiwan’s political history is clear in *Cape No.7*, in which the focus on turning back to the locality of Taiwan is regarded as the solution. It is portrayed as a place where temporal, inter-national, and multi-ethnic differences

are reconciled: the temporalities of 1945 and 2008, the lives of members of three generations, cross-cultural interactions between Taiwan and Japan, and cooperation between different sub-groups such as Hokkienese, Hakka, and aboriginal peoples. Linguistically, the omnipresence of Chineseness and globalization issues are represented in how Mandarin, English, and Japanese are spoken in the rural setting of Hengchun, the southernmost county of Taiwan. However, patriarchal influences are always softened. There are multiple father figures in the film, but none of them wields conventional patriarchal power: an aboriginal father, a Taiwanese stepfather, Grandpa old Mao who complains that nobody gives his musical talents in *yueqin* (moon zither) due respect; all of them are comically represented as the local faces of non-threatening fathers. Also, the Japanese teacher who was in Taiwan during Japanese colonial rule is not much of a patriarch, either, as he blames himself for his cowardice in abandoning his lover. Nor are their images beautified to signify an ideal love-object. Instead, feelings of nostalgia are evoked provisionally in order for the current generation to bid farewell to the idea of primary dependence.

From the beginning of the film, the theme of the local intermingling with the global is introduced when a group of young multinational models are sent to the little southern township for a photo shoot. Different from the metropolis-bound trajectory portrayed in Japanese *jun'ai*, the movie begins with its protagonist, Aga, cursing a comparatively metropolitan Taipei while heading south to his hometown for emotional solace.⁸⁹ The reversed trajectory back to the

⁸⁹ Taipei has been unfavorably portrayed as alienating in certain cinematic representations. Taiwan's New Wave auteurs, Edward Yang and Tsai Ming-Liang, each employ a detached modernist style to depict love in Taipei. In their portrayals, it is never an ideal city for love. *A Brighter Summer Day* (1991), the English title of Edward Yang's film, is a homage to Elvis Presley's song "Are You Lonesome Tonight?" The film's Mandarin title literally reads, "Adolescent Homicidal Incident at Ku-lin Street," which specifies a street in Taipei as it reminisces the claustrophobic atmosphere of a historical-political past. In it, the adolescent protagonist's budding love is thwarted amidst the turmoil of a patriarchal identification crisis set against a gloomy Taiwan governed by martial law. Similarly, Tsai Ming-Liang's *Viva L'amour* (1994), *The Hole* (1998) and *What Time Is It There?* (2001), make use of Taipei's 'unpleasant' urban experience, such as endless roadwork and incessant rain, to suggest Taipei as a bleak

heartland of Taiwan fulfills a localized transnational dream. Its positive outcome suggests that the Taiwanese appropriation of *jun'ai* constructs a localized version of cosmopolitanism that is able to rid Taiwan of its pre-existing sense of abandonment when interacting with the outside world. Noticeably, this localized cosmopolitanism works in parallel with the enhancement of these films' 'visibility,' and thus identification, among local audiences. They overwrite the story of nostalgia, as they leave local viewers with a clearer sense of their identity as Taiwanese. Throughout the process of self-identification, visual exchange between the subject and his/her lover is envisioned as reciprocal, a process which therefore heals a previous wound of being symbolically overlooked due to Taiwan's marginal position in global politics.

Historical infiltration is especially evident in *Cape No.7* when the motif of the ocean is used to bring together two epochs and two generations. After director Wei shows us the sepia picture of a girl in 1945, we see Aga in 2008, meditating about his future at the same beach. The parallel editing that juxtaposes two different times through the motif of flowing water allows for the healing of past wounds. Accompanying the images, a voiceover narrates the seven letters written by the departed Japanese teacher. Through this revelation, we understand the frailty not only of the Japanese teacher, but also of Aga, who is equally indeterminate about his future. Yet attention is focused on how the Taiwanese protagonists finally gather up the courage to face their own inner conflicts. These films are in themselves Taiwan's new coming-of-age films.

Cape No.7 offers a narrative space for the audience to look back in time, yet its purpose is to point out an up-to-date route for local Taiwanese to stand up for the future. Different from the first New Wave cinema, it does not indulge in a narcissistic world of self-pity. Its nostalgia

space to identify with. A signature in Tsai's films, Taipei is full of buildings that are dysfunctional and uninhabited. Dirty water leaks from cracks in the walls, suggesting the dysfunctionality of human emotions. As a result, love in Tsai's films is boredom and loneliness projected against the empty walls of the despondent city. Overall, Taipei is "an impotent city" incapable of love (Wenchi Lin 178).

should not be viewed as projecting transnationally to Japan. Rather, it can be viewed as the young generation's desire to get closer to their parents' generation, which kept a detached stance in identifying as Taiwanese. Through these populist and localized ways of bridging fragmentary identifications, the orphan transcends his past traumas and can finally grow. In other words, nostalgia is evoked in the service not of the past, but of the present and future.

In the process, love manifests itself in today's postcolonial context together with nostalgia to retain a 'soft' spot and heal the domestic traumas of separation and alienation. Its potential to cure is literally and lyrically performed in the film's final concert scene, which reconciles multiple differences within Taiwan: ethnically, transnationally, and across time. Director Wei had in mind to make "harmony in diversity" a main theme of the movie (watchchinese.com).⁹⁰ Besides the aboriginal father and son (Olalan and Rauma), Aga, played by Van Fan, is a Taiwanese pop singer with aboriginal ancestry, even though this background is not emphasized. Most Taiwanese speakers have their ancestry in the Fujian province of China. The alcohol salesman and bassist, Malasun, is cast as a Hakka from the nearby Baoli village. In addition, the Japanese singer Atari Kosuke is a folk singer from Okinawa famous for his unique Amami Island vocal style. His Okinawa background has made his appearance in the film less intrusive as a colonial patriarch. Noticeably, since Atari Kosuke has been categorized as '*iyashi-kei*' (healing type) by the Japanese popular music industry, Wei's casting of the *iyashi-kei* singer serves the purpose of easing the ethnic tensions latent in local Taiwanese politics. In a lyrical way, the concert bridges different times in history (1945 and 2008), ethnicities (Hokkienese, Hakka, aboriginal), age groups (from a 10-year-old keyboard player to a septuagenarian *yueqin* player in

⁹⁰ In the interview, Wei mentioned that when discussing issues related to ethnicity, people should avoid the idea of assimilation and try to understand how history has led to different viewpoints of different ethnic groups. (watchchinese.com).

the band), and their interaction with the trans-nationalists (represented by the Japanese characters, some multi-national models, and a white photographer working temporarily in Hengchun).

People from different ethnicities and backgrounds are seen as coexisting and collaborating with one another in the hybrid, post-colonial context of Taiwan.

During the local band's impromptu performance, Old Mao intuitively strikes up the folk song "Heideröslein" (*Rose of the Field*) on his *yueqin*. The song serves as a reminder of Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan, since it is a product of colonization: it was taught in Old Mao's primary school days when Taiwan was under Japanese rule. Composed by Franz Schubert in 1815 with lyrics from a poem written by Goethe in 1799, the song narrates how a boy picked up a beautiful wild rose in the field and kept it in his possession. It is a reminder of the obligatory primary school education implemented at the time to show the success of the Japanese modernization project, which qualified it as a non-Western colonizer. This legacy also reveals itself in Old Mao's tendency to behave like a student yearning for his teacher's approval whenever he talks to Tomoko, the Japanese manager of the band.

The purity of the *jun'ai* pathos feels especially acute when it is set against the hybridity of the concert scene. It reaches its climax when Atari Kosuke spontaneously joins with Aga in singing Heideröslein. His participation is a gesture of shared affection and friendship. Wei's intention to depict "harmony in diversity" is not only limited to Taiwan; it goes beyond national boundaries and the ambivalences resulting from colonization. During the chorus, the scene cuts from the stage to grandma Tomoko, now in her eighties, who has her back to the camera and her face concealed. The editing suggests that grandma Tomoko's wound, caused by an unreciprocated love, can be healed when she opens up the package of unsent letters that Aga, the

messenger of time, has delivered to her. It also suggests that the trauma caused by history is potentially curable through the mediation of the present generation.

In the final moments, the scene moves back in time to 1945. At the pier, a girl searches anxiously for her lover in the crowd, her hopes defeated when the ship departs for Japan. At this point, the singing cuts to a non-diegetic chorus of kids merrily singing Heideröslein in Japanese, the innocent voices of the children contrasting with the sad story of betrayed love. The colonial encounter that brings two people together also carries with it a hierarchy that alienates them. It is by contrasting innocence against such brutality that the pathos of *jun'ai* escalates in the film's ending. Love, originating from an innocent identification similar to how a child identifies with his/her primary love-object, is considered the purest of all affections. Similar to the protagonist in Wu's *The Orphan of Asia*, who went mad, it is when such love is disregarded that an individual's sense of identity is destroyed. In *Cape No.7*, the unaffected singing of the children's chorus has the effect of a purifying catharsis for the audience, who are for a moment encouraged to identify with grandma Tomoko at the pier.



Still 7. *Cape No.7*: Aga (Van Fan), a messenger in 2008 who travels back in time to 1945.

Boosting Taiwanese identity by increasing local visibility

The concert at the end of *Cape No.7* is a literal manifestation of Taiwan's desire to be an object worthy of attention. Simultaneously, it promotes Taiwan's local character. Town council representative Hong Kuo-jung (Aga's stepfather, whose name literally means "national pride") expresses the anxiety of being placed between the local and the global when he laments that young people nowadays dismiss the beauty in their hometown, adding that local government has no control over their own resources, as everything is managed in BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) fashion, which worsens the exploitation of locals. In order to fight this phenomenon, he insists on an opening act consisting only of local talents. His strong cultural identification with his locality and his antagonism toward foreign forces is typical of certain Taiwanese who hold strong views regarding Taiwan's local identity.

Undoubtedly, as a film that sought to attract local audiences back to the movie theater, *Cape No.7* was very successful. Its record-breaking box-office success in Taiwan not only revived hope for the local film industry, but also stimulated a noted increase in tourism to Kenting, the region where it was filmed (epochtimes.com). Tourists flocked to this southern township to look for the house of Aga and grandma Tomoko. They visited the beach where the concert took place and booked rooms at Hotel Chateau, the set of several of the film's major events. Local products also sold like hot cakes. The millet liquor bearing an aboriginal name (Malasun), was a new type of wine that director Wei requested the Farmers' Association of Nantou County to produce specially for use in the film. Its slogan, "A thousand years of tradition, a brand new taste" captured the imagination, as the locality recreated itself as a spectacle for consumption and attention. A month after the film's release, the millet liquor was launched, and newscasters proudly announced that it was the first Taiwan-brewed sake that successfully entered Japan's competitive market (*Liberty Times Net*, Nov. 20, 2009).

Through an intimate local atmosphere and consumable cultural commodities, there is no denying that *Cape No.7* promoted a Taiwanese reality in which harmonious ethnic integration is possible. Moreover, the practice of product placement strengthened a local identification with Taiwan as a place of marketability, conflating the film's local popular appeal with the desire to reach out for transnational recognition. Besides, roles were cast to cater to local humor and sensibility—that is, people in the south who only speak Taiwanese, and aboriginal characters whose marginal social status in Taiwan have made them seize every chance to let the 'Han Chinese' know how marvelous aboriginal culture is. Besides the obvious demands of box-office sales, the chief goal of this film was to foster identification with Taiwan's local experience.⁹¹ A presale edition of the original soundtrack was packaged in a stringed bundle similar to that sent to grandma Tomoko in the movie. Monologues read from the letters are included in the soundtrack. When unwrapping the bundle and listening to the CD, consumers were invited to access the bittersweet narrative of a personal experience, which allowed them to imagine themselves either as grandma Tomoko or Aga, a messenger across time, who happened to come across this package.

This desire to reach out for attention by promoting the local is also evident in two other films—*Sumimasen Love* and *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled*. Both appear at times to be promotional films for southern Taiwan. However, the problem of accommodating the local within their desire for wider global recognition is far from resolved, and reaching out for the outside world remains something of an unspoken wish.

⁹¹ Wei said in various occasions that he made *Cape No.7* in order to garner money for making *Seediq Bale* (2011), an epic film that deals with the historical Wushe Incident that took place between Taiwan aborigines and the Japanese colonizers in 1930.

Sumimasen Love, a film sponsored chiefly by Kaohsiung Municipal Government and premiered at Kaohsiung Film Festival in October 2008, is a 75-minute romantic tour of the harbor city. Director Yu-Hsien Lin mentioned that despite government sponsorship, no part of the filming was interfered with. The whole film was shot in Kaohsiung, and on its official blog, important shooting locations are listed in detail to attract potential tourists. The movie was filmed before the release of *Cape No.7*. In it, the ‘real-life’ career anxiety of the heroine Chie Tanaka has led her to leave Taipei and go to Kaohsiung for a one-day getaway. There, she meets a local boy named Huai-cheung, who accompanies her on a tour of his hometown. Southern Taiwan is treated as a stable, homey retreat. Among the places that Tanaka and Huai-cheung visit is an old marketplace soon to be demolished. There is an elderly woman who has been frying tempura (a localized ‘nostalgic’ food adapted from its Japanese counterpart since colonial times) dutifully for 50 years. Her contentment with her life serves as an emotional mooring for the confused young couple. Other places that are filmed through a nostalgic lens are an old Japanese shrine, and the couple’s quiet gaze at the setting sun in the harbor.

In contrast with the stable places that instill Huai-cheung’s nostalgia is a transforming Kaohsiung. Modern Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations, stylish riverside cafés and a trendy shopping mall featuring a Ferris wheel overlooking the international harbor city, all denote the city’s global engagement. Despite the characters’ affection for old Kaohsiung, its traditional aspects are already irretrievable. Huai-cheung is a young man who has yet to recover from an orphan complex caused by his father’s departure. He is constantly set against the image of an urbanizing Kaohsiung, leading the viewer to associate the city’s desire to globalize with Huai-cheung’s father’s own wish to go abroad and become more internationalized. This transnational wish cannot be tempered by Huai-cheung’s nostalgic yearning. His passive work attitude and his

defense of his father's departure do not offer a coherent account of him as a promoter of a nostalgic Kaohsiung. In a city that has opened itself to international tourism, Huai-cheung's nostalgia for both the old Kaohsiung and for his father seems inconsistent. Therefore, the binary of the local and the global remains unresolved, and the contradiction echoes Huai-cheung's proposal to Tanaka: when the NT\$500 bill inscribed with her contact information circulates back to his hands, the two will start dating. Curiously, love is transformed into a practical wish for 'money-exchange,' even though this transaction is simultaneously romanticized, rendering material the elusive serendipity of fate.

A transnational consciousness based on assimilating local differences

In a similar way, *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled* demonstrates how current Taiwanese films seek to build a coherent national identification through the redefinition of individuals' position vis-à-vis transnationalism and national identification. The difference from the previous two Taiwanese films lies in how their transnational imagination is based on a contextualized localism. This consciousness is demonstrated by how Taiwan is able to accommodate various local differences in constructing a contextualized cosmopolitanism. Ah-Gui, the female protagonist in *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled*, used to dream of leaving to a place where her colorblindness would not make her different from others. In the end, she finds this place in her hometown, a small harbor village in the south. Like *Cape No. 7*, this film reaffirms identification with local Taiwan. Since childhood, Ah-Gui has developed a close bond with her cousin, Ah-Xian, who introduced her to the outside world. The pair is united by their presumed difference from others—Ah-Xian is gay. Because of her colorblindness and his homosexuality, they perceive themselves as different from the rest of a seemingly small and homogenous familial community. Ah-Xian eagerly wants to go abroad; he shares with his cousin his knowledge of

exotic customs, foreign languages, and his dream of living in New York with his lover. Moreover, he promises to take her to “Colorblind Island,” supposedly located in the South Pacific, where all inhabitants are colorblind due to a genetic disorder. In the two characters’ transnational imagination, Colorblind Island becomes a metaphorical escape ideal for multiculturalism and cultural hybridity, as all differences are erased.

However, they never make it to the island. Betrayed by his lover and overwhelmed by the devastation of a relationship he has regarded as his only escape route, Ah-Xian attempts suicide by burning coal in his room. The suffocating experience leaves him paralyzed, terminating his transnational wish. In contrast with Ah-Xian, Ah-Gui does not lose hope. She decides to pick up where Ah-Xian left off, and realize their dream of going to the South Pacific. From this moment on, she begins to engage with other people—consulting travel agents and talking to her father, who had turned to alcoholism since his wife left him. She even says goodbye in Ah-Xian’s place to the boy who betrayed him. During these acts of reaching out, she realizes that even though her mother left her, she has been in fact cared for by the rest of her family members. They regard her as an integral member of the family. In the end, she realizes that her colorblindness does not make her different; it was her own blindness to this fact that isolated her.

In contrast to Ah-Gui’s retrieved connection with her surroundings, Ah-Xian’s transnational wish is dreamed at the exclusion of the local. He is a precocious young man who feels out of place in his hometown. Due to his homosexuality, he distances himself from the rest of the family. Ah-Gui only realizes that her cousin is gay when a Japanese backpacker (cross-racially played by a Taiwanese model, Wasir Chou, dubbed in Japanese by Kageyama Yukihiro, who also serves as the voiceover for the Japanese teacher in *Cape No.7*) visits the little harbor town by chance. When the Japanese man asks to see some unusual sights around town, Ah-Xian takes

him to a local church featuring a fresco of the *Last Supper*. All characters, however, are painted as Chinese, wearing ancient costumes. This hybrid artifact, a product of cross-racial interaction, is one object of difference and exotica that Ah-Xian can relate to in his hometown. As the Japanese traveler captures the details with his camera, Ah-Xian watches him with emotional intensity, as if transferring his transnational wish to the Japanese traveler. The two spend a night together. Ah-Xian displays earnest affection as he waves goodbye to the man, even when the motorboat transports him far away from the pier. Ah-Xian promises to write, but the Japanese backpacker seems lukewarm to the idea. The gap of emotions between the two men makes the farewell scene curiously resemble the satirical parting scene in Wang Jen-Ho's *Rose, Rose, I Love You*.⁹² The night with the Japanese man has kindled Ah-Xian's libidinal desire for the outside world. His homosexuality is conflated with cosmopolitanism, which is deemed capable of lifting him out of his confinement. For Ah-Xian, frustration lies in the fact that he has placed the key to a wider global experience with someone and somewhere else.

Thus, when Ah-Xian's lover betrays him, he loses hope altogether. As he burns coal in his closed room, he recites E. E. Cummings' poem "Somewhere I Have Never Travelled" as his final words. The poem suggests his sentimental passivity in moving beyond his local circumstances on his own. Projecting himself as the subject of Cummings' poem, he sees himself as a flower, succumbing to the magnificence of a powerful 'you':

your slightest look easily will unclothe me

⁹² Wang Jen-Ho's *Rose Rose I Love You* (1984) is a political satirical novel about Taiwan's economic dependence on the United States. It mocks postwar Taiwan for losing its integrity during the Cold War to the degree of becoming entirely dependent on the United States. The story's antagonist is a pedantic high school English teacher, Dong. In light of American G.I.s' temporary stopover in Hualien, he proposes a collaboration of four local brothels and organizes a crash course to teach the pleasure girls English and etiquette so that they can serve the visiting G.I.s well. All burlesques involved are justified by the cause of contributing to Taiwan's internationalization. The climax comes at the end, when the group sang "Rose, Rose, I Love You" in chorus as they see the American G.I.s off at the harbor, producing a sentimental parting spectacle. In this work, Taiwan's unabashed necessity to cling to an economically stronger nation is ridiculed.

though i have closed myself as fingers,

you open always petal by petal myself as Spring opens

(touching skillfully, mysteriously) her first rose

or if your wish be to close me, i and

my life will shut very beautifully, suddenly,

as when the heart of this flower imagines

the snow carefully everywhere descending...

The subject of the poem surrenders his own agency to His mystique and charm, making every ‘I’ in the poem written in the lower case. But in the film, Ah-Xian’s love leaves him with nowhere to belong. His powerlessness suggests a wrongly projected cosmopolitan dream denied before it could be realized.

In contrast, what has saved Ah-Gui from Ah-Xian’s tragic fate is the very locality she previously had tried to escape from. As she prepares for her trip, she starts to have real interactions with her surroundings. The fulfillment of her transnational wish, however, is literally portrayed as a dream. In the sequence, she visits Colorblind Island with Ah-Xian. She awakes feeling content about this fulfillment, goes out of the house and reevaluates her surroundings with new eyes—a small port town in southern Taiwan, her foul-mouthed but well-meaning grandmother fixing colorful umbrellas in the yard. In the clear sky, there is a double rainbow after a heavy thundershower. Everything in the locality remains the same, but freshened. She then smiles and starts humming a tune, suggesting her reconciliation with her environment, in which her difference can be assimilated peacefully. Ah-Gui’s renewed connection with her

locality indicates her individuation. However, her colorblindness, as a political metaphor, alerts to us multiculturalism's oversimplifying erasure of difference. Nothing substantial was solved.



Stills 8 and 9. *Sumimasen Love* and *Somewhere I Have Never Traveled*: Longing to surf the outside world.



Still 10. *Cape No.7*: A localized multi-national scene.

Building a context-based transnational consciousness

In *Cape No.7*, *Sumimasen Love*, and *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled*, love is incorporated in order to renew a sense of Taiwanese identity as local viewers rediscover their country's resourcefulness. This populist localism is not set against cosmopolitanism, but

presented as something that informs the construction of a contextualized cosmopolitanism, or a liberal localism. Noticeably, the re-localization process is crucial in defining a context-based transnational consciousness reinforced by a stabilized local identity. However, can we really call this emphasis on local identity a manifestation of cosmopolitanism? Shu-mei Shih, in her discussion of visibility and identity, maintains that cosmopolitanism can help assert an identity for Taiwan so as to combat the imminent danger posed by the major patriarch—"Great China." She argues that especially for such a marginalized country as Taiwan, cosmopolitanism is necessary (175). More specifically, Shih characterizes Taiwan's cosmopolitanism as a 'vernacular' one, which is differentiated from 'metropolitan cosmopolitanism' (172). She defines language use in Taiwan as "marginal people's interculturalism," which blends the vernacular language with that used by metropolitan intellectuals. Both cosmopolitanisms are the product of cross-cultural interaction in the form of hybridity. Since Taiwanese and other vernacular languages feature prominently in these films, they manifest Shih's vernacular cosmopolitanism in terms of language use (172). In addition, in the introduction of a volume on cosmopolitics, Bruce Robbins uses what Scott Malcomson termed an "actually existing cosmopolitanism" to refer to different modes of cosmopolitanism (2). The condition-based nature of the term allows high ideals to be more practicable within local contexts. Robbins explains that this actually existing cosmopolitanism is "a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance" (3). Like modernities currently understood in the plural form, cosmopolitanism has different adaptations according to particular national and societal needs. I interpret the term's definitional looseness as allowing leeway for the expression of personal transnational imagination. That is, contextualized cosmopolitanism warrants individuals a transnational consciousness that helps them find a footing in their national identification.

In these films, dependency ties to the (various) patriarchs are symbolically associated with characters bearing Japanese identity; they are ultimately cut off, but their relationship is emotionally strengthened as a result. In other words, in understanding that the Japanese love-objects are not the ones that are saving the subjects from their distress, the subjects have realized that their instant attachment to the Japanese lovers is nothing but temporary misrecognition. Attachment to the love-object is thus re-directed toward the locality. Aside from the three films examined above, the lesbian drama *Spider Lilies* also introduces Taiwan's cosmopolitanism as based on a localized self-identification. The international recognition gained by winning the Teddy Award for best gay and lesbian feature film at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2007 can be taken as a sign that homosexuality, as a universal theme, is used in envisioning Taiwan's cosmopolitan participation.⁹³

Most settings in the film seem virtual: Jade, the webcam girl who has had a crush on Takeko since the age of nine, lives in a tacky frilly room decorated solely for her webcam business. The exact location of the barren field where she spent her lonely childhood is left unspecified. In addition, the surreal tropical garden where Takeko tells stories to her brother every night simulates blissful parent-child moments. In this surreal world, the specificity of Taiwan is disguised as a representation of a universal human condition of existence. However, mention of the traumatic earthquake that took place in Taiwan on September 21, 2000 indicates that it is located somewhere on the island, in which case the film's cosmopolitanism is conceptually based in a local context. The virtual setting, while hinting at a local Taiwanese reality, excludes the possibility to identify with Taiwan as another national patriarch. Identifiable

⁹³ In fact, in Taiwan's democratic, liberal attitude toward homosexuality has been incorporated as part of its neoliberal politics. In 2003 when Taiwan had its first gay pride parade, former Taipei mayor (and former president) Ma Ying-jeou gave a speech during the event, recognizing the openness of Taipei as an international city.

roles are kept to a minimum: local Taiwanese people are barely seen in the film, giving it a very reclusive quality. As a lesbian film, the exclusion of male roles and the downplay of their power can be interpreted as its refusal to consolidate national power associated with the patriarch and heterosexual norms. Meanwhile, its “queering” potential allows it to define a newly-emerged local identity based on subverting individuals’ entrapment within socio-cultural politics.



Still 11. *Spider Lilies*: Jade (Rainie Yang) creating her own virtual identity on the Internet.

In *Cape No.7*, the re-localization process is used to connect Taiwan with the outside world by showcasing it as a place open to ethnic and racial difference. In *Spider Lilies*, it expresses a similar desire to connect with the global world by naturalizing gender alternatives, resolving what Ah-Xian could not have achieved in *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled*. In these films, Taiwan’s cosmopolitanism is suggested by a transnational consciousness that is popularized and localized so as to solve the existing identity conflicts that have resulted from various historical and political entanglements.

However, I do not see these films as challenging the metropolitan patriarch in any politically meaningful way. In these films, Japan, rather than China or the United States, is an already nonthreatening patriarch. At best, Taiwan’s interculturalism shows that the Japanese lovers no longer carry the sense of cultural abundance that has been attributed to them. Even though these Taiwanese subjects still want to maintain a friendly affiliation with the Japanese

love-objects, this merely reflects their transnational desire for the outside world so as to solidify a Taiwanese identity. The image of the Japanese lover is recoded and transformed to symbolize Taiwan's missing middle (parental) generation, which has been detached due to the country's fragmentary domestic politics. As a result, local identification informs the portrayal of a context-based cosmopolitanism that operates as a key strategy to solve Taiwan's own problem of identity fragmentation. Local identification is not implemented politically to challenge the dominant metropolitan powers, but to allow one to feel at ease in Taiwan's localized cosmopolitanism. Ultimately, while Taiwan's transnational consciousness works like Japan's transnational imagination to help the protagonists leave a local impasse and dream about a place with more liberties, love is evoked to consolidate a Taiwanese identity that seems less ambivalent than in the Japanese context, in which love is used to resolve the gendered asymmetry of transnationalism.

The haughtiness of the Japanese patriarch is not seen in these Taiwanese appropriations of *jun'ai*. Instead of providing any substantial guidance as resourceful primary objects, the Japanese characters seem to be as fragile as their Taiwanese counterparts. In both *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled* and *Spider Lilies*, Taiwanese actors play the Japanese roles. Their non-authenticity deconstructs the patriarchal potency of identity. In addition, Japanese actress Chie Tanaka, who plays in both *Cape No.7* and *Sumimasen Love*, speaks Mandarin with a heavy Japanese accent ridiculed by Aga, which undermines the superior stance she first tries to take. Atari Kosuke, the *iyashii* singer who also plays the role of the Japanese teacher in 1945 in *Cape No.7*, has no lines in the flashback scenes as a guilty man. He can only speak posthumously in the letters read in voiceover by another actor (Kageyama Yukihiro).

In *Spider Lilies*, the authority of the Japanese patriarch is also demystified. The restrictions imposed by the patriarch are represented by Takeko's homosexual guilt. Being born to a Japanese father and a Taiwanese mother, Takeko lives in-between two identities; she is called "Tsuzé" in Mandarin and Takeko in Japanese. Her hybridity is complicated by the actress who plays the role. Isabella Leong, of mixed of Portuguese and Macanese ancestry, shares with Takeko a complex identity resulting from the processes of colonization. After her younger brother starts experiencing post-traumatic stress syndrome following the September 21 earthquake, Takeko blames her own homosexuality for his plight. The night of the earthquake, she ignored her brother's request and was not there for him. Instead, she was spending the night at her girlfriend's house. Since then, she feels that her homosexuality has been in conflict with familial obligations. In order to help her brother regain his memory, she assumes parental responsibilities, reading him stories every night before he goes to bed. Just like their father, she also has spider-lilies tattooed on her arm. Her tattoo serves to connect her brother's identification with her as family; it also commemorates their Japanese paternal ancestry.

However, this souvenir also marks Takeko's deliberate neglect of her homosexual desire—a denial of self-identification. She does not allow herself homosexual feelings when Jade recognizes her to be the youth who has consoled her in her lonely childhood. The spider-lilies tattoo on her arm, therefore, also represents something she has yet to overcome, marking an actual incompleteness of becoming. In other words, the tattoo symbolizes a lack; it is a superficial substitute for the wholesome feeling of reunion with one's love-object. This symbol, however, is empty, and it is demystified when some gangsters chop off both arms of Ah-Tong, a frequent customer at Takeko's tattoo studio. His arms were tattooed with Takeko's masterpiece, the invincible 'ghost head,' which stands for patriarchal strength. The fantastical world that

Takeko constructs through her creations is but a simulacrum of the patriarchal world that she lives in, thereby disguising her guilt of being homosexual, which she falsely conflates with her brother's trauma. In the end, the fictional space of the patriarch has to be destroyed in order to liberate those it confined. This is achieved in a scene when Takeko literally tramples the spider-lily flowers growing in a field. It is Ah-Tong's severed arms that force her to wake up from the fictional world of patriarchal signs and finally face her personal lesbian identity.

Conclusion

Taiwan's historical trauma of abandonment—its orphan complex, a result of postcolonial sentiment, is dealt with in films that involve the presence of a Japanese lover. These films portray Taiwan as a place tolerant of multicultural difference that allows healing to take place. In the process, the theme of love enables local viewers to see Taiwan as a trans-local utopia. The lasting love for the Japanese lover, which I interpret as *jun'ai* pathos, echoes Japanese *jun'ai* films. This cross-cultural appropriation is made possible because Japan is no longer threatening to the formation of Taiwanese identity, echoing Shu-Mei Shih's idea that, "Translatability, . . . , is accepted only when it is nonthreatening" (60). In expressing a transnational desire to reunite with the Japanese lover, Taiwan has become conscious of itself as a grown-up subject equal to its Japanese lover. Thus, when Aga confesses his love to Tomoko in *Cape No.7*, he tells her compellingly, "Either you stay [in Taiwan], or I go with you [to Japan]." The two people are seen as equals, showing that the orphan complex that used to haunt the relationship between Taiwan and Japan has been overwritten. Taiwanese appropriations of *jun'ai* suggest how the unfavorable situation of a colonized state can be turned around, and bring about a healing process that helps bring back the middle generation into the fold of local identity.

Although I interpret these films' demonstration of transnational consciousness in Taiwan in a positive light, not all films are equally coherent. They have demonstrated to different degrees how local identification is restored: in *Spider Lilies*, *Sumimasen Love* and *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled*, the depiction of the local still feels confining at times, as in a narcissistic state of brooding, which subsumes the protagonists' aspirations under cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, as an overall effort, these films manage to assimilate local differences by turning the locality into a space of multi-cultural abundance, releasing it from its precarious orphan mindset.

As a result, nostalgia undergoes an essential transition in Taiwanese appropriations of *jun'ai*: by recognizing its misidentification with the Japanese lover, the subject realizes that what he is nostalgic about is actually the absent (parental) middle generation of Taiwan—an unattached component in the self-identification of Taiwan as an entity. Transnational desire, therefore, is employed to reignite the momentum to rebuild identification with the Taiwanese locality. In consequence, an enhanced local visibility benefits local bonding rather than fostering the presence of transnational powers within the locality.

Therefore, what saves the Taiwanese *chun'ai* from the pitfalls of the identification struggle between the national and the transnational is how protagonists come to uncover their own strength to mediate their coexistence in the local context of Taiwan. In this regard, the Japanese lover serves the positive purpose to fill in the internal gaps among the different generations, allowing Taiwanese translations of *jun'ai* to enable comparatively productive communication among disparate groups within its culture.

In contrast to its Japanese *jun'ai* counterparts, which look metaphorically at the domestic as a space of loss, Taiwanese appropriations show a relative optimism about the local, seeking to

work out a distinct cultural identity that incorporates cosmopolitan desire within domestic reconstruction. In the process, a contextualized cosmopolitanism based on local identification is no longer confined by the binary of the national and the transnational, but focuses instead on its cosmopolitan potential through a consolidated local identification. Nostalgia in *jun'ai* pathos, therefore, is evoked to facilitate the process of becoming, counter-balancing the asymmetrical power structure previously left by a colonial impossibility.

Conclusion

This dissertation is a thematic, social and cultural study in understanding Japan's *jun'ai* boom in the beginning of the 21st century and its transnational influence. The *jun'ai* romantic subgenre occurs not only in commercial films but also in popular literature; loss is a major theme in most of the stories. The shared theme of losing one's love-object corresponds to a current Japanese social condition often characterized by *soshitsukan* (sense of loss). With the boom of films and popular literature making loss a shared sentiment, I have argued that studies of *jun'ai* should be contextualized in Japan's current 'decades of loss' following the burst of its economic bubble and socio-political unrest in the 1990s.

Ryang has pointed out that in Japan, *jun'ai* focuses on women as the bearer of sexual purity, and examined how such discourse has come to strengthen the national image of the country throughout the twentieth century. My interpretation reinforces and expands upon Ryang's argument, emphasizing that *jun'ai* is closely connected to Japan's assertion of its national-cultural identity. The ever-increasing demands to interact with foreign countries result in people being subject yet again to the sense of insecurity permeating Japanese society in its current circumstances. Thus, *jun* in this case evokes the existing and not-fully-settled debates over Japanese ideas of social purity and stability vis-à-vis the ever-increasing need to interact with foreign others. Throughout the process, Japanese heroines are used to mediate between the two entities. Various *jun'ai* films thus linger on the impossible dream to retreat to a state of self-reliance.

This research began with an exploration of the portrayals of the heroines. It has shown that in the films, women are represented as objects of loss; they die, sometimes even in foreign

countries. At the same time, they are *jun'ai* objects; their unreciprocated pure-love for the protagonists constitutes the pathos of *jun'ai* as remorse. In other words, being portrayed as *jun'ai* objects often associates these heroines with the imminent loss of beautiful things. This thematic characterization of women is by no means new. Women have been represented in several works of traditional Japanese literature as essentially pure and delicate. However, this essentialist portrayal that associates women with a traditional aspect of Japanese culture is complicated by their connection with the foreign. In film, the heroine's affinity with foreign themes often stands as a symbol of modern cultivation, in contrast with a national sentiment of loss, wherein the male protagonist is incapable of comprehending and responding to the heroine's love for him.

There is a symbolic connection between this perceived lack in Japan along with apparently abundant foreign lands full of opportunities, and the post-war promotion of *kokusaika* (internationalization) in the country. This comprehensive national call registers a transnational imagination for individuals, allowing them to transcend the confines of everyday life in Japan without undertaking the actual journey of traveling abroad. What constitutes a major part of the *jun'ai* pathos, therefore, is the heroine's pure-love for the protagonist, sacrificing her transnational desire to develop herself outside Japan. In these cases, even though the heroine is portrayed as living overseas, her heart stays with the protagonist in Japan, turning her into a devotional figure such as those traditionally associated with idealized Japanese womanhood.

In this regard, *jun'ai* becomes an emotional bond that reconnects women back to Japan from a male perspective. The word *jun* is loaded with cultural and ethnic identification. It captures the Japanese ambivalence in maintaining a national image as a unique modern state, and in this fear, women are used as scapegoats to bear the biased views of foreign elements within Japanese culture. On the one hand, the very call for *jun'ai* reveals the gaps in sustaining an

integral cultural ideal of purity in today's world. On the other hand, the reiterated theme of purity pushes for a reconnection with the idea of an earlier Japan that was capable of holding together its people's identification when striving for shared national goals.

The *jun'ai* heroine's foreign affinity is complicit with her transnational imagination, which I have argued to be a byproduct of Japan's *kokusaika*. I examined newspaper reports and interviews to see how *kokusaika* has produced the Japanese public's dream of global involvement, yet also generated the anxiety of not being able to catch up with global trends. In addition, sociological studies interpret *kokusaika* as essentially operating on nationalistic concerns. These materials have prompted the view of *jun'ai* (both as sentiment and subgenre) as a comforting emotion that quells the tension caused by an individual's transnational imagination, a theme I argued to be even more essential in Japan's perceived decades of loss and in *jun'ai* films created by male authors. Thus, I have argued that the boom in *jun'ai* was a way of negotiating between transnational imagination and primary identification with Japan.

Jun'ai, as a result, signals a re-identification with Japanese cultural identity. In this re-identification process, the heroine is used to mediate the transformation from the transnational back to the national. The West has been regarded in Japan both as an object to assimilate with and a threat to be controlled. When *jun'ai* films are deliberately set in a foreign country, I argued that female authors write differently about love and romance than their male counterparts, as far as transnational desire is concerned. In female author Ekuni Kaori's *Tokyo Tower*, female characters are closely associated with an urban transnational lifestyle, which represents individual transnationalism as a loose form of cosmopolitanism. In Ekuni's stories, transnational imagination allows the heroine to easily conflate Tokyo with a foreign city such as Paris. This suggests an active simulation process in her transnational imagination that involves an

exoticization of Tokyo and a domestication of the foreign country. In contrast, male author Tsuji Hitonari's novel, *Sayonara Itsuka*, adopts an orientalizing approach that ultimately sacrifices the life of his heroine Toko in the name of love.

Many of these male authors' representations of the heroines' sacrifice for love capture the public imagination for *jun'ai* as an exalted, genuinely beautiful romance between a Japanese man and a Japanese woman in today's world. However, this portrayal glosses over the conflicting experiences that have always existed in Japan's transnational encounters with the foreign, especially in terms of an individual's gender. In this regard, I made use of existing sociological studies about modern Japanese women's complicity with Western men to discuss how women have been placed in an ambivalent position, at once transnational mediators and objects in need of control.

The renewal of the relationship between modern Japanese women and Japanese men is especially evident in the recent portrayal of *otona-kawaii* heroines in television dramas and fashion magazines targeting female viewers. The sometimes gender-neutral representations of the heroines in these media do not make them less desirable, but render the potential to fulfill their dual identity an attribute of today's Japanese society. Interestingly, contemporary women's "domestic" turn is facilitated by a transnational icon—Audrey Hepburn's onscreen persona in the 1950s and early 1960s. The long-lasting popularity of Hepburn's femininity taps into an ideal image of a socially appropriate femininity that suggests women's potential to maintain their individuality to an extent that does not clash with what the society expects of them.

Overall, the first three chapters of this dissertation argued that *jun'ai* originates from a Japanese sentiment that wishes to hold together an integrated cultural identity in the face of increasing contacts with the foreign. While many scholars see Japan as a highly globalized

country, this observation is usually confined to urban areas, especially in the fields of technology, economy, and capitalist consumerism. Meanwhile, ordinary people's sentiments when facing a comprehensive need for globalization are often left uninvestigated. Japanese government's longtime call for *kokusaika* has generated anticipation in closing the gap between reality and transnational imagination, but also insecurities and feelings of inadequacy.

As a result, the boom of *jun'ai* reveals the vulnerability of Japanese society after the economic bubble. Most noticeably, this sentiment reflects increasingly asymmetrical global ties. However, rather than treating the Japanese protagonists on an equal footing with Western subjects, *jun'ai* authors reiterate previous dynamics between Japan and the West, continuing to cast the two in a binary relationship. Moreover, it sustains previous colonial dynamics, placing Japan in the inadequate position of a child yearning for love. Throughout the process, *jun'ai* heroines are essential as mediators between the two. Since their personalized cosmopolitanism is mostly depicted as being built upon capitalist consumerism, which is exemplified by the upper middle-class heroines in Ekuni's novels and Kitagawa's films, these heroines rarely lead to any effective change in the social status of Japanese women.

Despite the fact that *jun'ai* pathos evokes ordinary people's desire to reach out for connections, the world that it depicts remains a safely enclosed one. The association of *jun'ai* heroines with traditional Japanese legends and the romantic realm of fantasy suggests that *jun'ai*, as a genre was developed to ease an internal anxiety instead of serving any true transnational purpose to connect with the outside world. In Naoki Sakai's conceptualization of cultural translation, *jun'ai* stories would fit more in the category of homolingual address as opposed to cross-cultural communication, which is heterolingual in its purpose to show the "sociality of the translator" (14). That is, if the *jun'ai* subgenre could be seen as a potential translator of a

Japanese sentiment felt at the moment, it reaffirms a national ideology rather than opening itself for communication.

***Jun'ai* in the transnational field**

The *jun'ai* genre sums up and responds to the sentiment of ordinary individuals experiencing feelings of inadequacy as global players. While this sentiment correlates with the national call for *kokusaika*, it is a phenomenon not limited to Japan; in several Asian countries wherein modernization processes have been based on Western models, the desire to catch up with the West and the more “advanced” countries captures individuals’ aspiration to improve themselves. As these countries adopt “world standards” set by the West, their construction of cultural identity is already a hybrid one. Therefore, the pursuit of a pure cultural identification begins in *jun'ai* as a futile one; it is already a lost love-object. It also foretells a delimiting result of the *jun'ai* angst.

Jun'ai films are used in both Japan and Taiwan with the purpose of consolidating national identification. In Japan, *jun'ai* heroines are symbolically likened to foreign elements within the country. In the end, they are sacrificed in their roles as mediators between transnational imagination and national identification in order to preserve the integrity of the homeland. In the case of Taiwan, protagonists seem eager to define an individualized cosmopolitanism in association with their local political context. Similar to their Japanese counterparts, the Taiwanese protagonists’ desire to cling to the Japanese lover for identification speaks to the protagonists’ individuation as well as their realization of transnational desire. But Taiwanese protagonists are different in that they are able to cut off such unrealistic expectations projected onto the Japanese lovers. They demystify the abundance otherwise associated with the transnational. As a consequence, they are able to heal the sense of abandonment that is usually deemed to define Taiwan’s political status. In addition, these protagonists also show that the

locality of Taiwan has the potential to be a source of abundance. Due to this relative potentiality in overturning the asymmetry between the local and the global, I used the term ‘transnational consciousness’ to stress Taiwanese political validity in contrast with transnational imagination in the case of their Japanese counterparts and predecessors.

Japanese essayist Arai Hifumi, who has published essays in Mandarin and has a following in Taiwan, wrote sentimentally about *Cape No.7* in her personal essay collection *Why Taiwan Makes Me Cry*. She mentioned that she has watched the film seven times, and each time she found herself moved to tears. Motivated by personal passion and responsibility as a scholar to address Japan’s negligence of its own colonial history, she attributes great importance to the film’s role in introducing missing elements to the one-sided understanding of Taiwan in Japan.⁹⁴ Following with the release of *Cape No.7* in Japan, surprising discussions and events took place: news reports covered how the film was used to learn Taiwanese in a language class in Tokyo, and how the male lead Van Fan’s songs had charmed his Japanese female fans, who followed him all over Tokyo when he was promoting the film. In the film’s official press conference in Tokyo, a female reporter expressed her love for Fan’s singing talent before she posed the sensitive question of why Taiwanese people love Japan so much even when colonialism has brought such traumatic scars in people’s memory.⁹⁵ Taiwan’s seemingly forgiving treatment of its Japanese colonizers has led to some public censoring of Japan’s past imperial cruelty. In Japanese popular media, Taiwan has been evoked with nostalgia as “Japan’s past” with regard to its unequal development in modernity (Iwabuchi 2002). After the film and especially after Japan’s devastating Tohoku Earthquake in 2011, Taiwan was confirmed as a friend and ally,

⁹⁴ Arai Hifumi’s academic essays are published under the name Hayashi Hifumi. She is currently a professor at Meiji University, Tokyo. Besides Arai Hifumi, Journalist Nojima Tsuyoshi published a book in 2015 that introduces Taiwan through films (*Ninshiki Taiwan Den’ei Eiga De Shiru Taiwan*). Both authors regard Taiwanese films as rich in cultural, social, and political subtexts that could supplement the lack of understanding of Taiwan in Japan.

⁹⁵ "海角七號宣傳 日記者告白：范逸臣很帥." *Chinatimes.com*. Chinatimes.com, 29 Sept. 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CI-FPlhNdWc>>.

considering that its relief donations topped those of the rest of the world.⁹⁶ In addition to these examples, real cross-cultural flows are taking place: in November and December 2014, there was a joint campaign held by Taipei MRT, Kaohsiung Metro, and Tokyo Subway to promote tourism across the three cities.⁹⁷ Transnational collaboration in popular media has continued to take place: Hou Hsiao-hsien was chosen by Shochiku Movie Studio to direct a film paying homage to Ozu Yasujiro for his centenary in 2003. The product is *Café Lumière*, which features Yo Hitoto, who is half Japanese and half Taiwanese, as its lead actress. In addition to Wei Te-sheng's *Cape No.7* and *Seediq Bale: Warriors of the Rainbow*, which both deal with Taiwan's ambivalence and angst under Japanese colonization, Umin Boya's *Kano* (2014, Wei Te-sheng serving as the film's co-producer with Jimmy Huang) is often regarded as a nostalgically flattering film that emphasizes the friendly bond between Taiwanese and Japanese individuals despite Japan's imperial authority. Recently, Japanese television drama superstar Kimura Takuya was invited by Taiwan's Tourism Bureau to promote tourism in Taiwan by starring in a commercial directed by Hong Kong's transnational director John Woo. The commercial was displayed on the giant television walls at the busiest intersection in downtown Shibuya in Tokyo. The commercial features Kimura Takuya in three daily scenarios where things in Japan do not go as smoothly as he wants. He then concludes each incident with the slogan: "Time for Taiwan." The commercial ends with the tagline: "Taiwan, close in distance and heart."⁹⁸ Even though the contents of these

⁹⁶ "311 台灣 62 億賑災 安倍臉書感謝：去年對台灣失禮了." *ETtoday.net*. *ETtoday.net*, 14 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.ettoday.net/news/20130314/174780.htm>>.

⁹⁷ "台北・高雄捷運與日本東京地鐵跨國合作 舉辦「好好 METRO-搭捷運拿好禮 PRESENT CAMPAIGN」!" *Traicy Taiwan*. *Traicy Taiwan*, 28 Oct. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.traicy.com.tw/archives/1012507749.html>>.

⁹⁸ The commercial can be viewed at YouTube <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsThyLvskPw>> (Lin, Miechen. "人在日本心留台灣 Time for Taiwan CM 60 秒.")

materials need to be read carefully, together they have constituted friendly gestures that can gradually reverse the previous hierarchy of colonizer and colonized.

However, Taiwanese adaptations of *jun'ai* do not necessarily mean that it has much transnational potential to circulate as a romantic film genre. The fact that these films are mainly circulating within Asian markets but not in the West also highlights the limitations of its transnational potential. In many cases, the phrase "*jun'ai*" is used in Japan to label romantic films made in Korea and China in order to facilitate their reception. It constitutes an interesting aspect of the transnationalism of *jun'ai*, which merits attention and further research, especially on the geopolitics of Japan and other Asian countries. While Korean television drama *Winter Sonata* has been arguably claimed as a milestone leading to the Japanese *jun'ai* boom in the beginning of the 21st century, it is in Japan that the term is applied to Korean romantic films. Korean romantic thriller *Addicted* (dir. Park Young-hoon, 2002), whose Korean title literally means 'poisoned' (*jungdok*) is renamed in Japan as *Jun'ai Poisoned*.⁹⁹ *Asako in Ruby Shoes* (dir. Lee Je-yong, 2001), a co-production between Japan and Korea with funding solely from Japan's Shochiku Studio, features a light romance that takes place between a Japanese girl and a Korean office clerk. Its Japanese title is *Jun'ai fu* ('*jun'ai* notation'). It can be argued that in Japan, a choice is often made to introduce Korean romantic films to local audiences with the familiar phrase *jun'ai*. One theme about this film that prefigures Japan's *jun'ai* boom is how a Japanese woman is haunted with a death that is associated with the foreign. Its young heroine Ayako (Tachibana Misato) is weary of life and wants to commit suicide on her flight across the International Date Line to Alaska. This film was released two years before the broadcast of

⁹⁹ Its DVD was released in Japan in 2004, two years after its release in Korea, coinciding with the broadcast of *Winter Sonata* in Japan. The film is remade into American film *Possession* (dir. Joel Bergvall and Simon Sandquist, 2009)

Winter Sonata in Japan. Thus, rather than saying *Winter Sonata* led to Japan's *jun'ai* boom, the sentiment already existed before and resonated with contemporary Japanese culture.

An even more curious case is how the People's Republic of China now embraces the term *chun'ai* (written with the same Chinese characters as Japanese *jun'ai*) to connote an innocent and genuine love that transcends life's various confinements. Zhang Yimou's *Under the Hawthorn Tree* (2010), which is set in rural China during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), is about a love that transcends class difference, although it ultimately cannot be consummated due to the male protagonist's death from leukemia. *Chun'ai* in the Chinese context has its own melodramatic features that center on dealing with a social conflict.

Still, there are some transnational complexities in Chinese adaptations of *jun'ai*. In 2011, filmmaker and actor Huang Lei was reported to cooperate with *Chun'ai* Film Studio, based in Shanghai, together with Japanese filmmaker Iwai Shunji, who has been acclaimed by Chinese popular media as the 'godfather of Japanese *jun'ai* films' with romantic films featuring light and lyrical representations of love, such as *Love Letters* (1995), *April Story* (1997) and *Hana and Alice* (2004).¹⁰⁰ In the joint press conference, the two filmmakers announced that they were working on a big screen *chun'ai* trilogy.¹⁰¹ Iwai Shunji mentioned that the first film he would work on as a producer for the joint project is *Zhi Jian Sha* (literally 'sand between the fingers'), which illustrates a cross-cultural romance set in Shanghai and Okinawa. Iwai commented that China nowadays "needs" *jun'ai* stories because what happens in Chinese society today has taken place in Japan in the late 1980s and 1990s, and that his previous films have illustrated such

¹⁰⁰ Chinese's interpretation of *jun'ai* dwells on the clean (asexual), young, innocent aspect of the word '*jun*.' It has less to do with the dependency wish for the primary object.

¹⁰¹ "純愛電影工作室"上海成立 岩井俊二黃磊加盟." *SINA.com*. SINA.com, 19 Oct. 2011. Web. 19 Dec. 2015.

<<http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/ent/film/sinacn/20111019/08512853120.html>>.

“cruel realities” provoked by materialistic pursuits that could well serve as reference for today’s China. Interestingly, the parallelism of a past Japan with today’s China reaffirms Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) observation that Japan adopts asynchronous global dynamics to view its Asian neighbors. In addition, when asked whom he had in mind to direct and act in his first feature film produced in China, Iwai said he preferred director Leste Chen and actress Gwei Lun-Mei, who are both Taiwanese.¹⁰² For the Japanese, *jun’ai* has thus become a local sentiment that helps evoke individuals’ transnational desire within a safe distance. In this instance, Taiwan is used as a mediator between Japan and China to facilitate their collaboration.

It seems that *jun’ai* also becomes a potential channel for Japan to safeguard against the powerful economic rise of Korea and China. Ironically, both Korea and China were objects of Japanese imperial invasions in the first half of the 20th century, with Korea under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. The rising power of both countries has posed a threat to Japan’s leading place in Asia. Thus, the way Japanese people understand their popular culture through *jun’ai* is tinted by these new regional dynamics. In addition to the above examples in commercial films, a Japanese woman named Keiko Kobayashi initiated a humanitarian project in China by building an elementary school there; in 2005, she subsequently released a fundraising film called *Jun’ai*. Her project bears the same title, stressing the cosmopolitan humanitarian potential of a Sino-Japanese collaboration for world peace.¹⁰³

Interestingly, all these gestures were made against the background of the fervent Diaoyu/Senkaku islands territorial row and disputes over Japan’s exclusion of wartime criminality and historical responsibilities from its school textbooks. These racially sensitive

¹⁰² “岩井俊二：物質年代，需要純愛。” 中國評論新聞. www.CRNTT.com, 21 Oct. 2011. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1018/7/6/5/101876529_2.html?coluid=154&kindid=0&docid=101876529&mdate=1021094820>.

¹⁰³ The website link of Kobayashi’s *Jun’ai* Project is: http://jun-ai.biz/index_j.html

political issues have incited numerous conflicts and protests in China and Korea. Meanwhile, the recent passing of security bills in Japan (September 2015) has allowed national defense forces to engage in international conflicts with its allies even when its territory is not under direct attack. While unconstitutional, the bill was passed in light of territorial disputes with China and threats from North Korea, despite numerous domestic protests. Against this increasing nationalist fervor, Tokyo is holding the 2020 Olympic games, which calls for its citizens' active identification with Japan as a leading player in the world arena. At this juncture when internationalization has to work harmoniously with the national identification of Japanese citizens, the transnational application of *jun'ai* in understanding popular media produced in China and Korea bears interesting implications. How do we think about Japanese media industry's "friendly" recognition of "*jun'ai*" films made in China and South Korea? By categorizing them as works of *jun'ai*, does Japan manage to mitigate the military threats initiated by North Korea and China? It appears that these intricate political dynamics will supplement the study of *jun'ai* today in terms of how Japanese society looks at its external threats. Moreover, this shows how popular cultural productions have come to be used as not just an escape, but also as an active release of ambivalent emotions borne by the society.

With the *soshitsukan* discourse permeating Japan's Lost Decade, *jun'ai* films function as a release of the society's inner vulnerability. By reiterating a national ideology through the *jun'ai* heroines' love, an urban myth is created to hold together a stable cultural identification with Japan. My reading and analysis have shown that the "purity" it clings to is already an unstable reference to an unmixed Japanese identity. The boom of *jun'ai* in the beginning of the 21st century can be seen as a result of inter-culturation formulated in the present postcolonial world where nationalism still operates in many aspects of everyday life. While *jun'ai* began as a domestic genre in Japan, it bears transnational potentials that can be used to examine

international ties between Japan and its foreign neighbors. As a genre that expresses a sentiment originating from Japan's cultural psyche, *jun'ai* is continuously shaped by the foreign, both inside and outside of Japan.

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