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The Answer was Cooperative:

How Anthropologists in Peru Redefined the "National Problem," 1948-1975

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Abstract of the Dissertation

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The scholarly literature has often depicted the agricultural cooperative model implemented during the Peruvian Agrarian Reform in 1969 as an imposed policy. This dissertation challenges the state-centric view by exploring intellectual and policy debates, which were strongly influenced by grassroots developments, between 1948 and 1975. It shows how the cooperative model evolved from a radical project of the left into a well-accepted strategy of rural development and flourished in Peru during the post-World War II era.

This study highlights the critical role played by a new generation of anthropologists and other social scientists, who mediated between the government, international aid and development agencies, and groups of peasants. They experimented with the peasant cooperative in an applied fieldwork setting, conducted ethnographic observation, description, and reflection in peasant communities, and eventually earned their academic credentials and political influence to redefine and solve Peru's so-called "national problem."

In sum, this dissertation seeks to enrich our historical understanding of the evolution of the cooperative model of rural development and peasant/state relations in Peru, as well as to throw light on the role that social science knowledge played in the larger arena of Latin American politics and policies of rural development during the tumultuous decades of the post-World War II era.

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Acknowledgments

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Besides archival sources, this dissertation also benefits greatly from the interviews with Peruvian and Peruvianist scholars. I thank Professor Karen Spalding for inviting me to her cozy apartment at Lima and brewing me a cup of tea. An afternoon talk with her brought me right back to the Peru in the 1970s. A special gratitude is to Professor Jürgen Golte, who warmly welcomed me to his office at the IEP *casona* and spent a morning drawing a picture of the earlier IEP with me. I am greatly indebted to Professor Enrique Mayer, who agreed to have Skype interviews and wrote detailed responses to my interview questions and suggestions to my project.

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Introduction

> In 1956, I was in my house finishing my doctoral thesis about Taquile.[1] Dr. Valcárcel showed up with his driver and told me, 'José, come out with me.' 'To where, Dr.?' I asked him. 'Just come, don't ask; follow me to the car. I want to show you something really important, the future of Peru.' Thus Valcárcel made me get into the car at six o'clock in the afternoon and took me to the City of Gods (*Ciudad de Dios*).[2] The City of Gods had been invaded in previous days and a huge neighborhood had been created in the epoch of Prado[3] in 1956. Valcárcel told me, 'Look, Matos, you have to involve yourself in this problem. This is the future problem of this country.' I said to him, 'But Dr. Valcárcel, why did you bring me here? This is a very complicated world, and I am involved in Taquile now. How can I just jump into Lima?' After that, I went to the City of Gods, stayed there for three months, and didn't go home at all. From there came out my book about neighborhoods, and the topic of urbanization and neighborhoods was launched.[4]

This anecdote recounts a conversation in 1956 between two generations of Peruvian ethnologists, Luis E. Valcárcel and José Matos Mar. While Valcárcel had already been an established *indigenista* intellectual since the 1920s, Matos Mar was still a doctoral student finishing his anthropological thesis on Taquile Island, Lake Titicaca. *Indigenista* refers to intellectuals who support the idea of *indigenismo*, a diverse current of thought, literature, and art that emerged in Latin America in the late nineteenth century, flourished in the early twentieth

[1] Taquile is an indigenous community located at Lake Titicaca, Peru.

[2] *Ciudad de Dios* is shantytown formed at the edge of Lima, the capital of Peru, in the 1950s by indigenous immigrants from the Peruvian highlands. The internal migration was seen as a problem since Lima had used to be a city belonging to the Creole elites. The migration was partly caused by decreased agricultural productivity and population pressure in the highland, and partly by the connivance of the government of President Manuel Odría (1948-1956) in exchange for political support. See David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

[3] Manuel Prado was the Peruvian president between 1956 and 1962.

[4] This anecdote, narrated by José Matos Mar in a conference in 1996, is transcribed by Pablo Sandoval in "Los Rostros cambiantes de la ciudad: cultura urbana y antropología en el Perú," in *No hay país más diverso: compendio de antropología peruana,* ed., Carlos Iván Degregori (Lima: IEP, 2009[2000]), 278-9.

century, and gradually declined after the 1950s. Its basic idea is to celebrate the glorious past of the indigenous ancient civilization, and at the same time to lament the degeneration of contemporary indigenous populations. On this particular afternoon during Matos Mar's journey to become one of the important institution builders of the Peruvian social sciences, the young scholar was entrusted with "the future problem of this country" by his own professor. This act not only handed over to Peruvian anthropologists the mission of anticipating and studying Peru's problems between two generations of Peruvian anthropologists, but it also epitomized the shift in the framework for defining key questions about the country's indigenous population.

Indigenous people constituted forty-five percent of the Peruvian national population in the 1940 census. From the central government and *limeño*[5] elites' point of view, the large percentage of indigenous people created a problem for nation formation and economic development, because most of them had been involved in the hacienda mode of production, which was perceived in the 1950s as quasi-feudalistic, isolated, and unproductive, resulting in the mass migration to Lima. The conversation between Valcárcel and Matos Mar highlights two significant aspects of contemporary politics of knowledge in Peru. First, it illustrates the anthropologists' self-awareness in reshaping their role—compared to their *indigenista* predecessors, they viewed themselves as the social scientific researchers of contemporary social changes and its resulting problems. Second, it touches upon the issue of agricultural productivity, a previously unfamiliar but now inescapable topic especially for anthropologists who were in charge of the mission to study the indigenous people.

More specifically, this dissertation examines how the Peruvian anthropologists brokered their ideal picture of rural development—the agricultural cooperative—between Peruvian governments, international aid and development agencies, and the peasants, especially from 1948

[5] *Limeño* is an adjective meaning "of Lima."

to 1975. This study does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of Peruvian anthropology but focuses specifically on numerous interrelated scholars, research projects, and academic institutions concerned with agrarian production and rural social changes. Most protagonists in this dissertation were trained as anthropologists, while some were sociologists, political scientists, historians, and even philosophers and linguists. Despite their diversified disciplinary backgrounds, they constituted interrelated intellectual circles through their common social concerns, shared institutional networks, and frequent exchanges of ideas. Appearing on the academic stage at one moment or another, they could be undergraduate or graduate students, university professors, researchers from private institutes, civilian councilors of government, and officials, sometimes simultaneously and in other cases continually. What delineates them collectively is the self-endowed mission to redefine the key problem of rural development in Peru and, if possible, to propose a solution. All of these participants were dissatisfied with the *indigenista* intellectual traditions they had inherited, so they searched for inspiration from development theory, peasant studies, and worldwide agrarian reforms, and proposed what they thought was the most practicable plan for rural development, namely, the cooperative.

As the section on organization will show, examples of scholars, projects, and institutes used in this dissertation are typically presented as distinct stages in the chronological development of Peruvian social sciences. Nevertheless, I will explore how their connections, rather than distinctions, contribute to our historical understandings of the pervasiveness of the cooperativism in Peru between 1948 and 1975. I chose 1948 as the starting point since that was the year the democratic government of José Bustamante, for which there were high expectations, was overthrown by a coup d'état that led to a rather conservative decade. During this period the issue of agrarian reform went underground. As the old oligarchy started to crumble in the late 1950s,

the increasing demands for radical changes permeated the whole 1960s. The accumulated energy climaxed during the military regime of Juan Velasco between 1968 and 1975. Researchers generally agreed that the *Velaquista* agrarian reform adopted a crude version of the cooperative model and imposed it onto ex-haciendas and communities that varied widely in degree of modernization and the crops they produced, resulting in failed reform. However, I further question how the cooperative model came into being in Peru after World War II. How was it transformed from a radical idea in the 1950s to a commonly accepted proposal, and even an established policy, in the late 1960s? I argue that the Peruvian anthropologists' mediation of this specific discourse of rural development played an important role in this historical process.

Bibliographical Review

Through this research, I wish to contribute to the body of literature focusing on the role of intellectuals in Latin America, especially regarding their creation of ideological orders that mediate the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. While the field of intellectuals' cultural mediation has been well-explored, my research will focus on their mediation of development discourse. Furthermore, I will show that it was an anthropological version of development discourse that will enrich our historical understanding toward development theory.

The history of Peruvian social sciences has been an oft-revisited topic among Peruvian and Peruvianist scholars.[6] Despite their different focuses on anthropology, sociology, and new history,

[6] For example, Jorge P. Osterling and Héctor Martínez, "Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology, 1940-80," *Current Anthropology* 24, no. 3 (1983): 343-60. Frank Salomon, "The Historical Development of Andean Ethnology," *Mountain Research and Development* 5, no. 1 (1985): 79-98. Fred Bronner, "Peruvian Historians Today: Historical Setting," *The Americas* 43, no. 3 (1987): 245-77. Degregori, ed., *No Hay País Más Diverso*. Paulo Drinot, "After the Nueva Historia: Recent Trends in Peruvian Historiography," *European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 68 (2000): 65-76. Manuel Burga, *La historia y los historiadores en el Perú* (Lima: Fondo Editorial Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, 2005). Nicolás Lynch, "The Twists and Turns of Peruvian Sociology," *Global Dialogue* 2, no. 1 (2011): 13-5. Carlos Iván Degregori, Pablo F. Sendón, and Pablo Sandoval, eds., *No Hay País Más Diverso: Compendio de Antropología Peruana II* (Lima: IEP, 2012).

the works they reviewed and the scholars they cited often overlapped. This is partly because the *indigenista* tradition had constituted the main body of research questions to be addressed by the later generations.[7] Moreover, the impact of dependency theory during the 1960s and 1970s precipitated interdisciplinary cooperation and multidisciplinary approaches. Relying mostly on published sources and their own insiders' knowledge, these reviewers-in-common depicted three important aspects for understanding the development of Peruvian anthropology: anthropologists' close relationships with foreign—especially U.S. and French—institutions and funding; their concern for political upheaval and social change; and their efforts at institution building. Echoing the call to historicize the development of Peruvian anthropology,[8] a few researchers have begun to integrate archival sources to reconstruct some specific scenes of Peruvian social scientific academia.[9] However, research dealing with the long-term transition based on primary sources is still rare. More importantly, the perspective to see the anthropologists as social actors rather than simply objective observers has not been fully explored. The anthropologists in this dissertation will be approached not only as intellectual professionals who were devoted to human advances of knowledge, but also as social actors motivated by their social surroundings while at the same

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[7] Ernesto Yepes, ed., *Estudios de historia de la ciencia en el Perú, Vol. II: Ciencias Sociales* (Lima: CONCYTEC y SOPHICYT, 1986).

[8] For example, Benjamin Orlove's comment on Jorge P. Osterling and Héctor Martínez, "Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology, 1940-80" *Current Anthropology* 24, no. 3 (1983): 343-60. See also, Juan Martín Sánchez, "Indigenismo bifronte en el gobierno peruano de Velasco Alvarado," in *La ambivalente historia del indigenismo: campo interamericano y trayectorias nacionales, 1940-1970,* eds. Laura Giraudo and Juan Martín Sánchez (Lima: IEP, 2011), 191-250.

[9] For example, Eric Ross's and Jason Pribilisky's pieces in Tom Greaves, Ralph Bolton, and Florencia Zapata, eds., *Vicos and Beyond: A Half Century of Applying Anthropology in Peru* (Lenham: AltaMira, 2011). Also, there have been many Peruvian scholars re-examining the recording of the 1964 Roundtable on anthropologist José María Arguedas's novel *Todas las sangres*. See Carmen María Pinilla, ed., *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología* (Lima: IEP, 2003) and Guillermo Rochabrún, ed., *¿He vivido en vano? La mesa redonda sobre Todas las sangres* (Lima: IEP, 2011).

time consolidating their own footholds in the society.

Pierre Bourdieu's sociological analysis of academia[10] provides a useful methodological starting point. For him, academia operates as a small society, and *homo academicus* pursues their own authoritative status in the scientific circle in order to accumulate their social capital, which can be transferred to other forms of capital. Bourdieu's approach to take scientific pursuit as power struggles boldly de-sanctifies the claimed detachment and respectability of science. It not only justified the legitimacy to sociologically study the academic circle, but also pointed out that there is no absolutely objective history of science; any representation of scientific activity has its own political stance.

This Bourdieusian perspective has been influential to Latin American studies. Nicola Miller delineates Spanish American national intellectual leaders as "cultural caudillos"[11] equipped with abilities of "creative writing,[12] prophetic genius, and a claim to universalism."[13] Miller argues that Spanish American intellectuals have been caught in an awkward situation: their societies have only been peripherally modernized when compared to Europe, even though they nominate themselves as the pioneering modernizers. For example, as Miller points out, their various efforts to create a discourse of popular nationalism actually reveal their self-created

[10] His most-cited works on this topic are *Homo Academicus* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988[1984]) and "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason," *Social Science Information* 14, no. 6 (1975): 19-47.

[11] She uses examples such as Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, Octavio Paz, and Mario Vargas Llosa.

[12] She does add that since the 1950s, some social scientists have also been included in the circle. See Nicola Miller, *In the Shadow of the State: Intellectuals and the Quest for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Spanish America* (London: Verso, 1999), 5.

[13] Miller, *In the Shadow of the State*, 26.

legitimacy to explain and mediate the national identity.[14] However, due to a lack of states with a strong middle class and civil society, Spanish America did not allow much space for political participation of intellectuals—they were usually co-opted or repressed. In other words, the mediation was ineffective, but was maintained because it could be translated into status for intellectuals, a fundamental element in peripherally-modernized Spanish American societies. Miller's research successfully applies the Bourdieusian approach to Spanish America by dissecting the basic requirements for intellectual excellence, revealing intellectuals' dilemma under the peripheral modernity, and thus demystifying the aura surrounding the intellectual leaders.

However, Miller's focus on the nationalist discourses also shows another characteristic of the existing literature, that is, an emphasis on intellectuals' role in the mediation of inter-ethic relationships. This has always been an important research field that attracts much academic attention. Ángel Rama's canonical work, *The Lettered City*,[15] elucidates how the Spanish colonial cities were designed as the center of civilization, in which the lettered produced ideological and cultural models to legitimize the cultural dominance of the Spaniards over the indigenous people, and created a sacred aura around writing. In more recent studies, the cultural orders recreated by the lettered have been more contested. Kathryn Burn depicts how low-level functionaries—specifically the notaries—and their illiterate clients, could possibly manipulate the operation of the colonial lettered city.[16]

[14] Miller, *In the Shadow of the State*, 163-73.

[15] Ángel Rama, *The Lettered City* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996[1984]).

[16] Kathryn Burns, *Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

Indigenismo has been another topic where many excellent works about the intellectual mediation of cultural orders converged. Earlier studies often criticized *indigenismo* as Orientalist and analyzed how its racialist contents supported the hidden social hierarchy while its culturalist vocabulary at the same time offered a discourse to redeem the indigenous group. Alexander Dawson revises this simplified reading of *indigenismo* and elaborates on how the *indigenista* vocabulary that emerged during the Mexican Revolution was later adopted later by young, bilingual, male community leaders to demand resources from the state.[17] Marisol de la Cadena depicts how the *cuzqueño* grassroots intellectuals, namely the indigenous Mestizos, used the *indigenista* theory of *mestizaje* to defy the racial discrimination and stigmatization from mainstream society while reproducing the social hierarchy through their cultural racism.[18]

Dominic Boyer and Claudio Lomnitz's review article[19] lists more ways in which researchers have approached intellectual mediation of a higher ideological order. Intellectuals may facilitate the invention of tradition,[20] the creation of social categories in service of domination,[21] the construction of otherness,[22] the formation of developmental discourse,[23] and

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[17] Alexander Dawson, *Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004).

[18] Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

[19] Dominic Boyer and Claudio Lomnitz, "Intellectuals and Nationalism: Anthropological Engagements," in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (2005): 105-20.

[20] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[21] Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[22] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

the articulation of fragmented national space.[24] Intellectuals may play the role of incarnation of the national spirit,[25] the architect of national planning,[26] or the representation of civilization itself.[27] This dissertation touches upon a turning period at which the Peruvian anthropologists consciously rejected their traditional task of creating national cultural orders and urged a proposal of rural development. Moreover, it was an anthropological proposal derived from their fieldwork experiences and closely bound with their faith in the resilience of local people.

In the so-called post-development period, when the myth of development has been deconstructed[28] and globalization has taken its place as the leading the popular discourse, historians begin to adopt "development" as a research topic. Development once influenced what people aspired to in the 1950s,[29] and in spite of the fact that its roles as a scientific theory and

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[23] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[24] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (London: Zed Books, 1986), also see Claudio Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

[25] Dominic Boyer, *Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals and the Dialectic in Modern German Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), also see Michael Herzfeld, *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

[26] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Escobar, *Encountering Development*, and Ron Eyerman, *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).

[27] Rama, *The Lettered City*, also see Peter Schweizer, *Shepherds, Workers, Intellectuals: Culture and Centre-Periphery Relationships in a Sardinian Village* (Stockholm: Dept. of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, 1988).

[28] Escobar, *Encountering Development*.

[29] Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, introduction to *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1-41.

ideology serving the Cold War geopolitics have expired, it still stands, though full of loopholes, as a source for goals and ideals today.[30] Gilbert Rist's *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* presents a ground-breaking historical perspective out of the post-development school. He conceives development as a concept emerging from specific cultural and historical contexts—namely ancient, Christian, and Enlightenment Europe, spread later through colonialism, Cold War geopolitics, the New International Economic Order, and globalization, in different historical periods.[31] Focusing on the discourse of development, Rist seems to suggest that discourse itself can summon reality. This touches upon the complexity of development as a set of theories, as a policy, and also as lived experiences of people, at the same time.[32] Nils Gilman criticizes the "intellectualist" hypothesis that presupposes a hierarchical relationship between theory, policy, and practices, and encourages researchers to adopt a more "reflexive" hypothesis that allows a two-way direction of causality between each level.[33] His case study clearly elucidates how the modernization theory was transformed from an abstraction to actual policy recommendations.[34]

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[30] Michael Latham, introduction to *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War,* eds. David Engerman et al. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 1-22.

[31] Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London: Zed Books, 2002 [1997]), 2.

[32] Nils Gilman, "Review on Special Forum: Modernization as a Global Project, *Diplomatic History* 23:3 (June 2009)," *H-Diplo Article Reviews*, 238 (B), July 29, 2009. Accessed February 13, 2013. http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR238-A.pdf

[33] Ibid., 6.

[34] Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2003).

The current of historicization also influences the study of the dependency school. Earlier studies often viewed the dependency school as a counterargument to the modernization theory and explored how it created a third-worldist counterculture to the U.S. policies of intervention, in spite of its failure to inspire concrete policy and to question the possibility of development.[35] In other words, it was suggested that dependency theory might be popular for a while due to the specific historical context, but its theoretical contribution did not lead social sciences too far away from the modernization theory, either. However, a revisionist perspective appears recently to question whether the fade-out of dependency theory was a result of neutral scientific progress or an imposition of new theoretical trends by the international academic system.[36]

Fernanda Beigel holds a Bourdieusian perspective that there is no absolutely neutral scientific progress since the pursuit of pure science, similar to political engagement, can be translated into academic prestige.[37] Now that the presupposed superiority of "pure science" at the center has been deconstructed, she urges a re-examination of the contribution of "science in the periphery," specifically the dependency school located in Santiago, Chile between 1964 and 1974.[38] She analyzes how Chile became a peripheral center of international social scientific academia due to the maturity of Latin American academic institutionalization, the worldwide

[35] Rist, *The History of Development,* 109-21.

[36] See Fernanda Beigel, "Dependency Analysis: The Creation of New Social Theory in Latin America," in *The ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions*, ed. Sujata Patel (London: Sage, 2010), 189-200, and also her "The Internationalization and Institutionalization of Research and Higher Education in Latin America: The Emergence of Peripheral Centers," in *The Politics of Academic Autonomy in Latin America*, ed. Fernanda Beigel (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 31-45.

[37] Fernanda Beigel, introduction to *The Politics of Academic Autonomy in Latin America*, ed. Fernanda Beigel (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 1-28.

[38] Ibid.

atmosphere favorable for critical research, and the Chilean quest for experimental changes under the democratic socialist regimes.[39] Academic excellence was defined in this specific context as the ability to study the "national reality," analyzed through a dependentist framework and responding to the issues of agrarian reform and underdevelopment. In the end, this active and autonomous intellectual circle did not stand long in Santiago due to the military coup in 1973; scholars were exiled, and dependency analysis was discredited and marginalized in the Anglo-Saxon world.[40] If Rist presents the fade-out of dependency analysis as a natural process of scientific progress, Beigel suggests it was closely related to the deinstitutionalization of Chilean academia after the 1973 military coup, and to the asymmetrical relationship between the center and periphery of knowledge production.

Beigel's study, on one hand, provides a broader historical and intellectual background for my understanding of contemporary Peruvian anthropologists' insistence on studying the "social reality." On the other hand, it reveals the central role we have attributed to economists, sociologists, and political scientists when we think of development theory. Historically speaking, how did anthropologists, especially from the Third World, relate to the development theory? What was special about an anthropological perspective for the development of theory, policy, and practice?

Anthropologists could be pro-development. Analyzing Clifford Geertz's earlier works on Java, Gilman depicts the anthropologist's job as explaining economic stagnation, targeting potential groups for change, and assessing "the potential utility of existing indigenous

[39] Beigel, "The Internationalization and Institutionalization."

[40] Ibid., 42.

institutions as instruments for introducing industrialization."[41] Anthropologists could be critical to development, too. Sydel Silverman discusses how Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf in the Puerto Rico Project, criticized Julian Steward's ecological determinist perspective and emphasized the long history of Puerto Rican economic dependency.[42]

Anthropologists could be critical of rural development but at the same time in support of it. In the anthropological field in the Third World, a synthetic research question emerged that combined a practical concern for agricultural productivity and the critical perspective inspired by dependency analysis.[43] On one hand, it was a research question, critical of the situation of underdevelopment in the Third World, and on the other hand, it attempted to find a genuine answer from the local society itself regarding rural development. This was especially the case in Latin American countries with a large portion of indigenous people, among which Peru serves as an excellent example.

The discipline of anthropology provides an interesting breakthrough point to historically analyze development theory, due to its emphasis on the method of fieldwork and the value of local sociocultural resilience. Since anthropologists relied heavily on what they learned from local people to create their knowledge, we will be able to see how the ideology, policy, and practice of the cooperative were bound in a reflexive relationship through this study of the

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[41] Nils Gilman, "Involution and Modernization: The Case of Clifford Geertz," in *Economic Development: An Anthropological Approach*, eds. Jeffrey H. Cohen and Norbert Dannhaeuser (Walnut Creek: Rowman Altamira, 2002), 3-22. To clarify, in this article Gilman does continue to introduce the critiques toward the concept of involution within U.S. anthropology, such as Eric Wolf's and James Scott's works on peasant politics in the late 1960s.

[42] Sydel Silverman, "The United States," in *One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology*, Fredrik Barth et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 257-347.

[43] Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). In a broader context, María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo's work, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (Durham: Duke University Press 2003), also indicates the coexistence between revolution and development in post-World War II Americas.

Peruvian case. This study hopes not only to alter our usual way of interpreting the chronology of Peruvian anthropology, but also to enrich our historical understanding toward intellectual mediation of an ideological order in Latin America.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in roughly chronological order. Except for chapter one, which provides a larger context of cooperativism, each chapter is based on my historical studies of specific anthropologists, research projects, research institutions or intellectual debates. This section will explain my reasons for choosing these specific cases, briefly provide a historical context for each time period, and lay out the significance of each chapter.

Before we dive into the details of the Peruvian cases, chapter one supplies a broader background of the cooperative, especially between post-World War II and the 1970s. The cooperative is introduced as a social movement, a proposal of agricultural policies, and a topic of intellectual inquiry, at the same time. It was pervasive worldwide among policymakers, international development and aid agencies, and intellectuals during this period, and this chapter slightly sketches this large picture with mostly secondary sources. The chapter first situates the cooperative in relation to the intellectual current of peasant studies and to the worldwide waves of agrarian reform. Then, it traces the origin of the cooperative and delineates how its initial principles have been picked up and emphasized by different ideological camps. It gradually narrows down to Latin America, explores how the cooperative model was utilized in agrarian reform, and reviews how contemporary scholars examined the cooperative experiences in Latin America and the Third World in general. The last section refocuses on the Peruvian intellectual tradition of combining socialism, Andean sociocultural operational mechanisms, and the

cooperative, and provides a prelude to our protagonist anthropologists in the following chapters.

Chapter two stretches the time period between 1948 and 1962, characterized by the modest social reforms during the dictatorship of Manuel Odría (1948-1956) and the conservative presidency of Manuel Prado (1956-1962). During the earlier stage of this period, Peru enjoyed an economic boom brought by the Korean War,[44] and industrialization seemed to be an irreversible tendency. Under this relatively prosperous period, higher education expanded in Peru as in many other places in the world. Internationally, Cold War geopolitics largely dictated research orientation and funding; a concern for Third World development was combined with the modernization theory and promoted through research foundations such as Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller.[45] The United States' increasing political, commercial, and scientific interests in Latin America encouraged bilateral interactions on many levels, including higher education. The U.S. model of social scientific institutionalization greatly influenced Peru, as did incoming U.S. academic resources, including theories, funding, researchers, and collaborative projects. In Peru's case, French institutions and scholars also had a significant impact.[46]

The time period between 1948 and 1962 also coincided with the Cornell-Peru Project (CPP) at Vicos; while 1948 was marked with the anthropologists' preliminary field trips for the Project, 1962 was the year when the local peasants bought the hacienda and became the landowners. In chapter two, I will portray the CPP as a cooperative in the experimental stage. I emphasize the anthropologist Mario Vásquez, a Peruvian graduate student who basically worked

[44] Burga, *La historia y los historiadores en el Perú.*

[45] Ricardo Salvatore, "The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire," in *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, eds. Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand, and Ricardo Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 69-104.

[46] Ramón Pajuelo, "Imágenes de le comunidad. Indígenas, campesinos y antropólogos en el Perú," in *No Hay País Más Diverso,* ed. Degregori, 123-79.

as the field director since both the Cornell and Peruvian project directors rarely stayed at Vicos, and the U.S. students did not speak Quechua fluently. The CPP has been a well-known case in applied anthropology, and scholars today prefer to contextualize it in the wave of the cooperative in the Andes at the time, rather than emphasize its uniqueness.[47] My selection of the CPP and Mario Vásquez is based on three factors. First, the CPP is an excellent case that bridges Peruvian official *indigenista* politics, U.S. applied anthropology, and the later twist to cooperativism. It exemplifies how anthropological studies modified their perspectives and languages with the sociopolitical changes. Second, Mario Vásquez's fieldwork experiences, so far a rarely-explored aspect of the CPP, perfectly present how the model of "the cooperative" had not been decided in the beginning but gradually formed during the process of his interactions with the Vicosinos. Third, Mario Vásquez himself later would serve as the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Agriculture during the Juan Velasco regime (1968-1975) and play a significant role in Peruvian Agrarian Reform. Whether there is a direct relationship between his CPP experiences and his interventions in the Agrarian Reform awaits more research, but the implied prerequisite of anthropologists' supervision in the consolidation process of the cooperative had been established through the CPP ever since.

Chapter three covers the time period between 1962 and 1969, featuring the sociopolitical atmosphere that demanded radical changes. Internationally, the Cuban Revolution in the late 1950s led to a revolutionary decade of student movements, the civil rights movement, and feminist movements, which strongly questioned existing authorities. Within Peru, the peasant guerilla movement led by Hugo Blanco intensified the conflict between peasants and

[47] See Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, eds., *Vicos and Beyond*.

landowners.[48] The governments of *Junta Militar* (1962-1963) and Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) sought reforms, though they repressed the grassroots movements, too. Marxism, structuralism, and dependency theory permeated the intellectual circles in Peru.[49] On one hand, the sociopolitical atmosphere radicalized student mobilizations in the public universities. Collaborations with U.S. institutions became a sensitive issue, and private research institutes were created to replace the role of the public university. On the other hand, the new critical current of ideas led scholars to question the modernization theory, U.S. culturalist anthropological perspective, and Peruvian *indigenista* tradition.

I will especially use the case study of the Chancay Valley Project in chapter three to illustrate how the model of the cooperative was confirmed not only by anthropologists' ethnographic observations but also by their achievement of academic excellence.[50] I set the starting point at 1962 when anthropological students of *Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos* (UNMSM) were first brought by their professor to the Chancay Valley. The end point was 1969, when the research results of this Project were formally published. Based on these results, some researchers of *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP) proposed the model of the

[48] Manuel Burga writes that the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and Peruvian peasant guerilla in 1965 had shaped their identity as a generation. See his *La historia y los historiadores en el Perú,* 109.

[49] Pajuelo, "Imágenes de la comunidad."

[50] I use "academic excellence" here in recognition of Marcos Cueto's work, *Excelencia Científica en la Periferia: Actividades Científicas e Investigación Biomédica en el Perú 1890-1950* (Lima: CONCYTEC, 1989). The blooming of Peruvian social sciences since the 1960s can be supported by the comparison between Ralph Beals's SSRC report in 1956 and Frank Salomon's review article in 1985. In 1956, Beals observed that social sciences in Peru were still in the burgeoning stage. See Ralph Beals, "Social Science in Latin America: A Survey," Accession 1, Series 1, Subseries 14, Box 98, Folder 521, Social Science Research Council Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center. In 1985, Salomon's "The Historical Development of Andean Ethnology," includes nearly one-third of the references (65 out of 213) by Peruvian ethnologists while scholars from other Andean countries have only single figures of works cited. Today, the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) is the hub for idea exchange and a very active publisher for all Peruvianists, regardless of nationality.

cooperative to the Agrarian Reform of the Velasco regime. The Chancay Valley Project was not the only important research project of this period, and neither were UNMSM and IEP the sole significant research institutions at the time. I choose to study the Project because it spanned Peruvian scholars' careers in two types of academic institutions, namely, the public university and the private research institute, and thus shows perfectly how the institutional transition occurred in face of the pressure of the student movement. Furthermore, this Project representatively displays the inclination of regional study and the achievement of re-conceptualizing community during this period of "great transformation" of Peruvian anthropology.[51] Scholars' reconceptualization of community not only accomplished a paradigm shift that consolidated their intellectual and social status at the same time, but also established the applicability of the cooperative to the indigenous community. The application of their research results was not merely a verbal statement; many foundational scholars of IEP were the key members of *Movimiento Social Progresista* (MSP), a political party having a close relationship with both of the governments of Belaúnde and Velasco.

Chapter four rewinds time back to 1946 when José María Arguedas, a renowned Peruvian novelist and anthropologist, entered the discipline of anthropology, and it ends in 1969 when Arguedas committed suicide. This chapter is closely connected to the previous chapter by pointing out a temporarily abandoned intellectual path to represent the social reality and solve the national problem in Peru, other than the model of the cooperative. Arguedas' culturalist response to the questions of contemporary rapid social changes was labeled as outdated by his colleagues. The strong tendency to look for the organizational principles for rural development overwhelmed Arguedas' proposal to trust the cultural resilience of the Andeans. In chapter four, I use both his anthropological works and the Roundtable on his novel, *Todas las sangres*, to

[51] Ramón Pajuelo, "Imágenes de le comunidad."

discuss how his observations on contemporary sociocultural changes were similar to those of his colleagues, and to reveal their fundamental differences.

Chapter five covers the period between 1968 and 1975, when Juan Alvarado Velasco ruled Peru and launched the long-promised Agrarian Reform on a large scale for the first time. Economically, the early phase of the Velasco regime benefited from the worldwide rise of commodity prices and tax reform to maintain its autonomy in economic management.[52] Politically, the Velasco government was composed of the military with a wide spectrum of ideology, while the progressives predominated the early phase of the regime[53] and incorporated many passionate scholars within the circle of policymaking. This military regime embraced "new professionalism" and believed reform was necessary for the maintenance of internal security. It claimed to find a third way beyond capitalism and communism to develop Peru. Rhetorically, it propagated popular participation, while practically it relied much on the technocrats to plan and carry out the reforms, and at the same time held a paternalistic pose toward people. Some scholars criticized it as a corporatist regime that controlled people through organizations of popular mobilization.[54] Many others chose to involve in the official reforms either through lecturing at *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* (CAEM) or serving as the civilian councilors in *Comité de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia* (COAP).

In chapter five, I use three important governmental institutions in *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform, namely, the Ministry of Agriculture, *Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social*

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[52] Rosemary Thorp, "The Evolution of Peru's Economy," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, eds. Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 39-64.

[53] In the Latin American context, "progressive" usually refers to the radical left in the spectrum of political ideology. See Liisa L. North, "Ideological Orientations of Peru's Military Rulers," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, 245-74.

[54] Julio Cotler, "Democracy and National Integration in Peru," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, 3-38.

(SINAMOS), and *Centro Nacional de Capacitación e Investigación para la Reforma Agraria* (CENCIRA), to depict the anthropologists' role in normalizing the cooperative. The Ministry of Agriculture and SINAMOS stand as two functionally overlapping, but ideologically divergent organizations that created confusion at the local levels. While the Ministry of Agriculture, led by Mario Vásquez, looked for efficiency and productivity in the cooperative, SINAMOS—composed of more progressive scholars—emphasized the significance of popular participation and mobilization. Their differences and conflicts show how embracive the proposal of the cooperative was; the cooperative was loaded with expectations of many Peruvian scholars, but it was also because of the divergence of these expectations that the Reform fragmented from the inside out. In this chapter, CENCIRA represents the pragmatic stance that believed the smooth operation of the cooperative would require more time and better-trained practitioners at the local level. On the contrary, the gap between the Lima-based prestigious anthropologists and the local practitioners of agrarian reform constituted a discontinuous picture of the anthropological mediation of cooperativism.

Methods and Sources

As a historical study on a group of anthropologists, this dissertation relies equally upon archival sources and published sources, complemented by my interviews and correspondence with the scholars. This section will describe my sources and explain my methods of collecting and using them. I will focus on the specific types of sources that have helped me build my main argument.

With respect to the archival sources, the key archives that have constituted the backbone of this dissertation and have been cited frequently include (1) *Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel* (ALEV),

Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura, Perú, (2) *Archivo Histórico Domingo Angulo* (AHDA)*, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos* (UNMSM)*, Perú*, and (3) Paper of John Victor Murra, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution (PJVM-NAA). As a key person who introduced U.S. anthropology and created numerous anthropology-related museums in Peru, Luis E. Valcárcel kept correspondences with several students who later became the central figures in this dissertation, especially José Matos Mar and José María Arguedas. The young scholars' correspondences with him reveal their ambitions and passions in the early stage of their anthropological careers. ALEV also contains sources that show the earlier period of Institute of Ethnology, UNMSM, such as syllabi and plans for university reform. Besides Valcárcel's involvement in university education, ALEV also includes a folder on *Instituto Indigenista Peruano* (IIP), whose paper trace has been rarely seen, and records the political influences of the CPP at Vicos.

AHDA provides abundant sources about the infrastructural aspect of the Institute of Ethnology, UNMSM. It contains the anthropologists' correspondences with the university administration, statistics and financial balances, faculty regulations, official documents, and course reports. AHDA allows me to depict the public university as a stage for the anthropologists to make best use of the resources and political connections provided. This archive also collects documents recording the activities and discourses of student unions and student movements in UNMSM, which further my understanding of the institutional transition from public university to private research center. PJVM-NAA contains bountiful correspondences between Murra and the Peruvian anthropologists, especially during the 1960s, the period of great transformation of the discipline in Peru. It records not only their quests of international funding and academic collaborations, but also their personal reflections on their self-endowed mission of studying

social reality and on the environment of Peruvian academia in general.

Besides these three above-mentioned archives, this dissertation also benefits greatly from *Colección Mario Vásquez* (CMV)*, Colecciones Especiales, Biblioteca de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú* (PUCP). During my archival research there in December, 2012, this specific Collection was still under the process of cataloguing and organization, so the readers will find my citations to this collection without specified box and folder numbers. This collection provides great sources like Vásquez's typed field notes about Vicos that allow me to reconstruct the formation of his ideas and practices regarding the cooperative. It also contains paper traces concerning Vásquez's involvement in the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform.

Except for the archival sources, my research is enriched by the rare books and pamphlets collected in (1) *Biblioteca María Rostworowski, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos,* (2) *Biblioteca Nacional del Perú* (BNP), and (3) Land Tenure Files (LTF), Steenbock Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries. *Biblioteca María Rostworowski* keeps many published but rarely seen sources about IEP, especially in regard to its institutionalization and consolidation at the earlier stage. BNP and LTF both contain abundant propaganda, pamphlets, and manuals printed and spread during the Velasco regime.

Published sources that constitute the significant primary source of this study also include the collections of correspondences, interviews, and autobiographies of the anthropologists. The collections of correspondences are especially important for the chapter on José María Arguedas, who often expressed his passions and frustrations through the letter exchanges. The published retrospections of the anthropologists themselves, such as interviews and autobiographies, not only fill in the gaps left by the archives and documents, but also reveal how they want to be remembered and interpreted.

Besides the retrospections of the scholars, I also conducted a few individual interviews with Karen Spalding, Jürgen Golte, and Enrique Mayer. The earliest interview with Spalding was the least structured that developed from consulting with her about suggestions to my project and sources. I did not tape record the interview, but jotted down notes, and transcribed the text right after the talk. She provides this study with various key anecdotes from the Juan Velasco period. The interview with Jürgen Golte was structured around the questions I had emailed him in advance and was enriched by the details and fruitful detours he provided. Notes were recorded by hand in notebooks and transcribed on the same day. This interview greatly influenced my understanding and interpretation of the Chancay Valley Project. The interviews with Enrique Mayer were conducted via email correspondence and Skype, both of which left traceable records. I emailed my interview questions ahead, and Mayer reorganized them in a manner convenient for him to answer. Mayer identifies himself as rather distant from the *limeño* intellectual circle, and thus gives me a chance to step out and look at this study from another perspective. An interview with him furthers my understanding of the three "Cornell giants" in the history of Peruvian anthropology, namely Allan Holmberg, John Murra, and William Whyte, and the larger picture of intellectual life during the Juan Velasco period.

This introduction has defined the research question and situated it among the existing studies. It has outlined the scope of this dissertation, including the time frame and the scholars, projects, and institutions involved. It also reveals the archival sources, published sources, and interviews utilized by this research. The next chapter will bring my readers a broader political, economic, and intellectual context of cooperativism.

Chapter One
Peasant Studies, Agrarian Reform, and Latin America: The Cooperative in a Larger Context

This chapter depicts a larger picture of the cooperative as a topic of intellectual inquiry, an agrarian policy, and a social movement, especially in Latin America between post-World War II and the 1970s. I intend to provide a broader context, on one hand to clarify that Peru was not the only case predominated by cooperativism, and on the other hand to manifest the characteristics of the Peruvian case. The cooperative was widely embraced by the First World international aid agencies, communist or socialist governments, and Third World countries. Also, as a long-lived social movement and ideology, cooperativism often transforms with time and adjusts itself according to the currents. Post-World War II to the 1970s, the targeted time of this dissertation, was a period when the cooperative was specifically aligned with peasant studies and agrarian reform. It was a complex of questions tackling land ownership and labor organization of a group of small farmers long attached to their land and reconsidering their economic and political agency in relation to capitalism and the state. The cooperative was not the one and only proposed solution to this complex of questions, but it was definitely a popular one.

This chapter will begin with the larger framework, namely the relationship between peasant studies and agrarian reform, and explore how it shaped contemporary viewpoints toward rural land, population, and production. This section touches upon how Latin American cases played an important role in the emergence of peasant studies and traces how this framework had attracted intellectual devotion and absorbed institutional resources. The next section will explore how cooperativism fit into the larger picture of peasant studies and agrarian reform. It begins

with introducing the Utopianist origin of cooperativism and its reformist and Marxist descendants, and discusses how these fundamental ideas were picked up and reworked by scholars, policymakers, and their consultants during the post-World War II period to respond to the agrarian question. The third part of this chapter will narrow down to Latin America and examine how agrarian reforms in different countries, such as Mexico, Cuba, and Chile, unfolded at different historical conjunctures. These cases served not only as reference points for the Peruvian agrarian reform coming later, but also shaped the debates centering on Latin American experiences of cooperative organization. One hotly debated issue was whether the cooperative or communalistic traditions would facilitate the operation of the cooperative. The same question was also deliberated by generations of Peruvian thinkers, who commonly traced their inspirations to Hilderbrando Castro Pozo, a socialist cooperativist scholar and politician seeking the confluence between the indigenous *ayllu* and the socialist cooperatives. The last section will come back to Peru with the aforementioned larger context and bridge it with the case studies in the following chapters.

Peasant Studies and Agrarian Reform

"Peasant" was not a newly-created category during the post-World War II period, but "peasant studies" as one branch of anthropology, was born in the 1960s, boomed in the 1970s, and underwent its downfall since the second half of the 1980s.[1] The category "peasant" had appeared sporadically in the works of European and Russian leftist thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Aleksandr Chayanov, Karl

[1] There is a revival of so-called new peasant studies in the twenty-first century marked by Marc Edelman's *Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin.[2] Nevertheless, anthropologists had not systematically adopted it until peasant studies emerged.[3] The rise of peasant studies came directly from an anthropological questioning of the modernization theory and orthodox Marxism, and many important works were based on Latin American case studies.[4] It asked if the process of modernization had not been as sweeping as it had claimed, and how we should perceive the groups of people still leading a seemingly enclosed rural life but at the same time socio-economically and politically connected to a larger world. In Marxist terms, if the lower class did not all become alienated laborers in an industrialized world, how much possibility was left for a genuine revolution in the hands of peasants? Debates within peasant studies thus were centered on issues such as the definition of peasant, the pattern of peasant behavior, and the degree of their political and economic autonomy in relation to the state and capitalism.

Peasant studies were thus mainly about the nature of peasants' agricultural production and how this mode of production led to their political awareness and actions. Both were themes echoing with the calls and waves of agrarian reform, which sought to reorganize rural land and labor and to integrate both of them further into the modern state, either capitalist or communist.[5] To illustrate, agrarian reform was first seen by the First World as the breeding ground of

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[2] Linda Seligmann, "Agrarian Reform and Peasant Studies: The Peruvian Case," in *A Companion to Latin American Anthropology*, ed. Deborah Poole (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 325-51.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 330. The most representative work would be Eric Wolf's founding classic for peasant studies, *Peasant* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Pioneers of peasant studies who based their research on Latin American fieldwork also include George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist* 67 (1965): 293-315.

[5] Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico* (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1984).

communism and thus a dangerous idea during the earlier Cold War period. Nevertheless, the Cuban Revolution gradually untied the United States' uncompromisable stance on this issue, while the government of John F. Kennedy pushed the Alliance for Progress to encourage Latin American countries to reform peacefully.[6] Agrarian reform, in the emergent stage of peasant studies in the 1960s, seemed to constitute an agreeable common ground between the First World international aid agencies, the Third World governments and political parties, left-leaning intellectuals,[7] and land-longing peasants.[8] It potentially served as a peaceful process of structural change that hopefully would unleash productivity out of the quasi-feudalistic system and thus supported the import substitution industrialization (ISI) promoted by many contemporary Latin American governments. Agrarian reform was also the primary policy among communist and socialist countries after the revolution, such as the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cuba. Thus, for left-leaning intellectuals, it could realize a just redistribution of means and profits of production that peasants themselves had longed for.[9]

Peasant studies thus attracted many passionate scholars concerned with the contemporary radical transformations in rural areas impacted by the wave of modernization. The resources utilized to study the blossoming experiences of agrarian reforms all over the world increased,

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[6] L. Harlan Davis, *United States Assistance in Agriculture in Latin America through the Agency for International Development* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1970).

[7] Besides the U.S. and European scholars of peasant studies known for their leftist perspective, such as Eric Wolf and Eric Hobsbawm, Dependentists in Latin America also embraced the concept of peasantry against the context of a world capitalist system, and perceived agrarian reform either as a support for ISI or a structural change aiming at internal colonialism. See Hewitt de Alcantara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*.

[8] Seligmann, "Agrarian Reform and Peasant Studies: The Peruvian Case."

[9] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Evanston, 1969).

and the institutions established to study and promote principles of good reforms burgeoned.[10] One representative institution established during this period to combine international aid, Third World governments, and intellectual efforts was the Land Tenure Center (LTC) at University of Wisconsin-Madison.[11]

The birth of the Land Tenure Center in 1962 was closely related to the U.S. response to the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress established in 1961. The first contract that the Land Tenure Center relied on was with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); it had been a three-year contract but later was extended for several more years.[12] It was part of the Alliance for Progress's concern for agricultural development in Latin America, especially in regard to raising productivity and encouraging agrarian reform.[13] Distinct from all other sorts of technological inputs into Latin American agriculture, the Land Tenure Center was commissioned to support interdisciplinary studies on the relationships between land tenure forms and their social, economic, and political consequences.[14] The research results would be provided not only to the agrarian reform agencies but also to researchers and students in both the United States and Latin America, though it admitted the circulation of information was not sufficient to meet its

[10] Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara mentions how the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (ICAD) sponsored large scale and interdisciplinary research projects on these topics in rural Mexico. See her *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*.

[11] Seligmann, "Agrarian Reform and Peasant Studies: The Peruvian Case."

[12] Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, *A Progress Report: December 31, 1964, pt. 1*. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNRAA821.pdf

[13] Davis, *United States Assistance in Agriculture*.

[14] Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, *A Progress Report*.

goals.[15]

Although principally led by agricultural economists such as Peter Doner and William Thiesenhusen, the Land Tenure Center was characterized by a social scientific perspective that viewed agricultural problems in Latin America not only an economic and technical but also socio-political.[16] The LTC focused on the issue of land tenure forms, a decision based on the researchers' observation of the surging waves of agrarian reform in Latin America. "The need for land reform grows out of recognition of the need in developing areas of the world for a more productive agriculture and a new basis for participation in government. . . . No magic formula for Latin America's economic ills is so widely accepted—and none is so little understood. . . . To the *campesino*, ownership of land is more than a source of wealth; it is the source of prestige and political power and social justice."[17] The authors recognized that agrarian reform in Latin America was prevailingly summoned as "a magic formula" not only to economic development but also to peasants' radicalized demands of social justice and political participation. Furthermore, they argued that these growing demands should be contextualized against the background of the Latin American power structure that was closely bound with the land tenure system.

> Latin American agriculture is characterized by concentration of productive resources in the hands of people who have not generally demonstrated a desire to maximize agricultural production. Rural

[15] Ibid.

[16] See Peter Doner and William C. Thiesenhusen, "Relevant Research Programs to be Conducted in Developing Countries," and compare it to D. Wood Thomas, "Discussion: Relevant Research Programs to be Conducted in Developing Countries," both in *Journal of Farm Economics* 46, no. 5 (1964): 1095-108.

[17] Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, *The Land Tenure Center, its first three years*, adapted from Proposal of the same date, *A Land Tenure Research and Training Program for Latin America: A Report and Proposal for Continued Funding, May 12th, 1965*, p.1. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNRAA820.odf

> economic and social institutions have been shaped by these resource owners themselves through governments in which they have traditionally had a controlling voice. The existing system has not generated necessary increase in production for urban and export markets, nor has it bettered the living standards of the farm work force.[18]

The existing system that concentrated economic and political power in few people's hands had caused the stagnation of production and the dissatisfaction of peasants. The LTC researchers appealed for Latin American and U.S. policymakers' attention to these "nontechnical, sociopolitical, and institutional issues that are complex, hard to analyze, difficult to deal with, and consequently, easy to ignore."[19] From these quotes, we can see clearly how the Land Tenure Center was influenced by the contemporary intellectual current of peasant studies. The authors depicted peasants as a group evolving from their long-term relationship with the broader economic and political orders, previously a quasi-feudalistic one and now in need of a more direct connection with the capitalist market and the state. The Land Tenure Center exemplified how the perspective provided by peasant studies was combined with the pursuit of the policy of agrarian reform. It funded scholars and students to study land tenure systems and the experiences of agrarian reform in Latin America,[20] later expanding to other Third World countries, and expected these studies would provide lessons for future planners of agrarian reform.

Opposing one single model of agrarian reform to be imposed on different situations, the LTC advocated flexible agrarian policies, through which the efficient large commercial farms

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[18] William C. Thiesenhusen and Marion R. Brown, "Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Problems of Agriculture," in *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Compilation of Studies and Hearings of the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senator, April 29, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 171. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pcaaa242.pdf

[19] Ibid., 173.

[20] The countries and areas that the LTC studied during its first three years were Bolivia, Brazil, Central America, Chile, and Colombia. See Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, *The Land Tenure Center, its first three years.* Accessed December 30, 2015. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNRAA820.odf

should be maintained while the small farms could be directed to commercial agriculture with suitable technological inputs. The main purpose was to sustain economic security and political stability and "buy time for urban and industrial development to catch up with population growth."[21] As for the issue of peasant political participation, LTC scholars such as Marion Brown ever boldly proposed the idea of encouraging Latin American agricultural labor unions, though the idea did not receive any approving response from policymakers.[22]

Although the LTC had a close relationship with USAID, the center did not remain silent toward the U.S. government's inconsistent stance toward Latin American agrarian reforms that resulted from the government's anti-communist orientation, protective attitude toward U.S. private investors abroad,[23] and opposition from Latin American power blocs.[24] However, the LTC did not see the shift it had hoped for regarding U.S. policies toward Latin America. First of all, since the Alliance for Progress aimed to improve "total country development," the money was primarily used for designing an overall plan and stabilization rather than specific, individual, localized projects.[25] Thus, it was USAID's policy that Latin American governments should not use its funds to purchase and expropriate land, the largest expense in agrarian reform. Secondly,

[21] Thiesenhusen and Brown, "Survey of the Alliance for Progress," 184-6.

[22] See the conversation between Marion Brown and Senator Wayne Morse in "Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Hearings before the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, Problems of Agriculture, Tuesday, February 27, 1968," in *Survey of the Alliance for Progress,* 241-98.

[23] Peter Doner and William C. Thiesenhusen, "Relevant Research Programs to be conducted in Developing Countries," *Journal of Farm Economics* 46, no. 5 (1964): 1095-105.

[24] Davis, *United States Assistance in Agriculture.*

[25] Ibid.

the discourse supporting land reform was replaced by a pursuit of increasing productivity after 1965,[26] and third, the presidency of Richard Nixon after 1969 largely reoriented U.S. foreign policy.

The LTC's efforts to insert the perspective of peasant studies into U.S. international aid policies on agrarian reform might not be decisive, but it would continuously involve itself in this affair well into the 1970s and played a role in Peruvian agrarian reform.[27] Broadly speaking, the LTC epitomized a wider network of intellectuals and institutions involved in the linkage between peasant studies and agrarian reform. In the next section, we will explore how cooperativism evolved in the historical process and situate it in the abovementioned context.

The Ideological Source of Cooperativism

The modern cooperative has been defined gradually through time. Contemporary advocates of the cooperative usually refer to the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, established in 1844 in England, as their most renowned forerunner. But the earliest modern cooperatives, greatly influenced by utopian socialists such as Henri de Saint-Simons, Robert Owen, and Charles Fourier, can actually be traced back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[28] Most grew out of donations from wealthy individuals to mitigate the immediate food shortages of workers, and thus they lacked long-term economic planning.[29] Later

[26] Ibid.

[27] For example, the Peruvianist Douglas Horton was first contracted with the Land Tenure Center to study Peruvian Agrarian Reform for the reference of the World Bank and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
[28] Jesús Cruz Reyes and Camila Piñero Harnecker, "An Introduction to Cooperatives," in *Cooperatives and Socialism: A View from Cuba*, ed. Camila Piñero Harnecker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 25-45.

[29] Ibid.

developments would further distinguish between the reformist model and the Marxist model of the cooperative, with these two approaches often creating debates within socialist circles.

The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers is usually praised as the first successful modern consumer cooperative established against the harsh working conditions, meager salaries, and expensive but poor-quality provisions during the early stage of the capitalist Industrial Revolution. The Rochdale case corrected the shortsightedness of earlier Utopianist cooperatives and managed to survive economically. Instead of depending on unstable donations, each member contributed to the cooperative common fund, which would be used to rent a warehouse and to buy wholesale products sold to the members, with only slight profits. Its seven principles were later adopted and modified by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) in the late nineteenth century, and became the predominant characteristics of the cooperative we know today. Rochdale's principles included: (1) open membership, (2) political neutrality, (3) one member, one vote, (4) limited interest in capital, (5) cash sales, (6) earnings that return to the members, and (7) education and training.[30] The original emphasis on political neutrality without a total rejection of the interest in capital allowed space for the growth of reformist cooperativism, which viewed the cooperative as an alternative to revolution, a space of interclass alliance,[31] and even an organization of capitalist profit-making.[32]

The apolitical inclination of the earlier Utopianist cooperatives and the reformist model

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Humberto Miranada Lorenzo, "Cooperativism and Self-Management in Marx, Engels, and Lenin," in *Cooperatives and Socialism,* ed. Piñero Harnecker, 63-89.

[32] June Nash and Nicolas S. Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management," in *Popular Participation in Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives, and Nationalized Industry*, eds. June Nash, Jorge Dandler, and Nicolas S. Hopkins (Chicago: Aldine, 1976), 3-32.

was criticized by Karl Marx and his followers who were looking for the revolutionary potential and significance of the cooperative. The leftist cooperativists prioritized the production cooperative over the consumer one, since they ascribed the source of economic inequality, caused by exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value, to the production process. Thus, on one hand, Marx recognized the potential of the cooperative to provide a production process not necessarily predominated by capitalist logic, but rather by values for a more just society—therefore playing a role in the revolutionary transformation.[33] On the other hand, Marx thought the cooperative did not rule out private property ownership, could not eradicate capitalism, and thus must be directed by a national plan.[34]

Marx's analysis happened to reveal the elasticity of the cooperative, which can be adopted and reinterpreted by either the reformists or the Marxists, or more generally speaking, by groups with extremely different political orientations and ideological beliefs. Before we see in the following chapters how this occurred in Peru, we should understand that even within the socialists' circle, the reformist and the radicalization approaches of the cooperatives were often debated.[35] Some socialists adopted the term "collective," and looked for inspiration from the Paris communes, the Kronstadt communes of the Russian Revolution, and agrarian communes in the Spanish Civil War, and spread this model to Eastern Europe under the sway of the Soviet

[33] See Gabriela Roffinelli, "Building Alternatives beyond Capital," in *Cooperatives and Socialism,* ed. Piñero Harnecker, 46-62, and Miranada Lorenzo, "Cooperativism and Self-Management in Marx, Engels, and Lenin," in the same volume.

[34] Miranada Lorenzo, "Cooperativism and Self-Management in Marx, Engels, and Lenin."

[35] For instance, in the 1864 Congress of International Workingmen's Association (IWA) at Lausanne, 1866 Congress of IWA at Geneva, and the 1910 International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen. See Miranada Lorenzo, "Cooperativism and Self-Management in Marx, Engels, and Lenin."

Union.[36] There were still other socialists, such as Che Guevara, who argued against the cooperative as a socialist form of ownership and did not think the existing socialism had ever confronted the issue of social property.[37]

In conclusion, the genealogy of cooperativism has often been traced back to Europe and then spread to Third World countries after World War II, in parallel to the collective model in the Second World. In both currents, the central concern of production, land ownership, and political autonomy rightly echoed the themes of contemporary peasant studies and the issues of agrarian reform. The next section will discuss how the cooperative stepped up onto the historical stage of Latin America as a topic of intellectual inquiry and an agrarian policy within this broader context.

The Cooperatives in Latin America

The earliest modern production cooperatives in Latin America can be traced back to those created by the European immigrant refugee communities in the beginning of the twentieth century,[38] but their popularization did not occur until the post-World War II period. Researchers generally agree that the growth of production cooperatives in Latin America between post-World War II and the 1970s were mostly imposed rather than spontaneous.[39] While scholars in the

[36] Nash and Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management."

[37] According to Helen Yaffe, this part of Guevara's writings was kept unpublished during his lifetime. See her "Che Guevara: Cooperatives and the Political Economy of Socialist Transition," in *Cooperatives and Socialism,* ed. Piñero Harnecker, 115-42.

[38] Marcela Vásquez-León, "Introduction: Walking the Tightrope: Latin American Agricultural Cooperatives and Small-Farmer Participation in Global Market," *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 6 (2010): 3-11.

[39] Vásquez-León, "Introduction: Walking the Tightrope." Also see Nash and Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management."

1960s and 1970s examined how different these cooperatives were from the Rochdale predecessors and how they adapted to local situations, more recent scholars historicized them against the transition to capitalist agriculture, import substitution industrialization, and populist politics.[40] This section will also distinguish between these two levels: the previous social scientific discourse on Latin American cooperatives and the historical conjuncture that propelled it to be a popular political proposal.

Previously, we have seen how agrarian reform was generally accepted as a way to advance agricultural production, whose great leap was expected to support import substitution industrialization, and integrate peasants into the future modern nation-state. The cooperative was a popular choice for policymakers among various forms of land and labor reorganization, mainly because it avoided land fragmentation, a condition incompatible with contemporary agro-economic ideas of productivity and efficiency.[41] At the same time, its feature of political autonomy should supposedly satisfy Latin American peasants longing for political voice. On the other hand, it could also be turned into a tool of political co-optation for the political parties or channels of policy transmission for the state.[42] The cooperative contained significant elements that many post-World War II Latin American policymakers and their councilors—no matter capitalist, socialist, or communist—wanted: economy of scale, productivity, popular mobilization, and integration.

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[40] Tanya Korovkin, *Politics of Agricultural Co-operativism: Peru, 1969-1983* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990).

[41] Peter Worsley, introduction to *Two Blades of Grass: Rural Cooperatives in Agriculture Modernization*, ed. Peter Worsley (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 1-40. Also see Nash and Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management."

[42] Vásquez-León, "Introduction: Walking the Tightrope."

Besides traditional politicians, the so-called policymakers during this period also involved many anthropologists and sociologists concerned about peasant groups and rural transformations. While some of them worked for international aid agencies or participated in the planning and operation of the quasi-cooperative projects, others maintained their positions as observers, expecting that their studies of the Third World cooperative experiences would contribute to their improvement. Their discussions embodied both the influence of peasant studies on their academic training and the social consensus on agrarian reform.

Because these anthropologists and sociologists perceived the cooperative as a movement and organizational structure originating in Europe and spreading to the Third World, they were mainly concerned about the cooperative's relationship with local cultural customs and social structures. Some scholars reinterpreted the disciplinary characteristics of anthropology, such as holistic analysis and cross-cultural comparison, as the best approaches to engineering successful cooperatives.[43] Local understanding of economic growth, currency and credit devices, and corruption and efficiency, which might be culturally different from northwestern European, were essential for the success or failure of the cooperative.[44]

Others paid attention to whether the social structures and social processes were advantageous or disadvantageous for the development of the cooperative.[45] The "open

[43] Henry Dobyn, "Sociological and Anthropological Approaches to Engineering Successful Economic Organizations," in *Agricultural Cooperatives and Markets in Developing Countries*, eds. Kurt R Anschel, Russell H. Brannon, and Eldon D. Smith (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 163-88. This collection contains papers for a seminar on agricultural cooperatives in underdeveloped countries held in 1967 at the University of Kentucky.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Nash and Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management," in *Popular Participation in Social Change,* a collection which contains papers for the 9th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in Chicago, 1973.

community" seemed to accept the innovative concept of the cooperative more readily than "close-corporate community" as conceptualized by Eric Wolf,[46] but researchers were also eager to know the potential of modernizing the traditional forms of cooperation.[47] Before we focus on the Peruvian case in the next section to illustrate this perspective, it is also worth mentioning that there was no easy agreement among scholars on this issue. Some thought cooperativism based on the Rochdale case was totally different from, and incomparable with, other forms of human cooperation they were familiar with.[48] They criticized the "assumptions about natural communalism of peasant or tribal society, notably by populists and socialists"[49] and rightly argued that traditional communities were not necessarily solidary, egalitarian, and compatible with the formal institutions of the modern cooperative.[50] Furthermore, some researchers observed the contemporary disintegration of the traditional institutions of cooperation.[51] Nevertheless, both optimists and pessimists seemed to agree that no Third World cases looked exactly like Rochdale; the more successful cases of the quasi-cooperative, linking customary cooperation institutions and modern cooperative principles, were those with a lesser degree of

[46] Wolf, *Peasant.*

[47] See Thomas Carroll, "Peasant Cooperation in Latin America," in *Two Blades of Grass,* ed. Worsley, 199-249. This collection contains papers for a sociological conference on the cooperative held in 1969 at the University of Sussex.

[48] Worsley, introduction to *Two Blades of Grass*.

[49] Ibid., 24.

[50] Ronald F. Dore, "Modern Cooperatives in Traditional Communities," in *Two Blades of Grass,* ed. Worsely, 43-60.

[51] See Carroll, "Peasant Cooperation in Latin America."

social disintegration[52] and more psychological or ideological readiness.[53]

The issue of psychological or ideological readiness for the cooperative institution introduced the other important issue in peasant studies, that is, George Foster's "the image of limited good."[54] From a scholar's point of view, while traditional institutions of reciprocity guaranteed immediate benefits for individual peasant families, the image held by peasants of limited good, would hinder them from understanding the future gains of organizing the modern cooperative.[55] In the case of Latin America, they hardly witnessed an ideological commitment to the cooperative movement except for the Cardenas period in Mexico and the left wing of the Chilean Christian Democrats.[56] This relatively pessimistic perspective on the political consciousness of peasants was later modified by those researchers with more conceptual tools to deal with cultural changes. The marginal, or say, intermediate group of peasants, "who may function adequately in the traditional, close-network society but who do so restlessly and with expectation of change and alternative institutions"[57] would play a key role in the success of the modern cooperative.

Overall, these anthropological and sociological works showed a zealous group who

[52] Carroll, "Peasant Cooperation in Latin America."

[53] Ibid. Also see John W. Bennet, "Agricultural Cooperatives in the Development Process: Perspectives from Social Science," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 18, no.1/2 (1983): 3-68.

[54] George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist* 67, no. 2 (1965): 293-315.

[55] Dobyn, "Sociological and Anthropological Approaches to Engineering Successful Economic Organizations."

[56] Carroll, "Peasant Cooperation in Latin America."

[57] Bennet, "Agricultural Cooperatives in the Development Process," 25.

placed a great hope on the cooperative as "the social forms into which we may be about to move."[58] Both the optimists and pessimists spent much time and energy on the Latin American experiences of the cooperative; their thoughts were occupied by the most apparent and urgent question: how effective were they as the cooperative? Recently, researchers have pointed out these studies held either a modernist or a corporatist perspective.[59] While the modernist approach examined the Third World experiences against the cooperative principles developed in Europe, and deliberated about their compatibilities, the corporatist approach criticized how the movement was manipulated by Latin American politicians and political parties.[60] Both stances presupposed an ideal type of cooperative that few cases in Latin America could achieve since they understood peasants and their relationships to the capitalist market and the state in the specific way determined by peasant studies.

Their research, however, indeed allows us to see the diversified picture of the quasi-cooperatives and the cooperatives at the time. Here, I will bring in the most cited cases of Mexican *ejidos*, Cuban cooperatives, and Chilean *asentamientos*, to show how the cooperative and the quasi-cooperative had historically unfolded on the stage of Latin America. Both their success and failure might influence their neighboring countries looking on and planning for their own agrarian reforms, including Peru.

Mexico, the first Latin American country carrying out agrarian reform in the 1930s, adopted the institution of the *ejido*—a unit of land property owned collectively by communities but

[58] Nash and Hopkins, "Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Cooperatives, Collectives, and Self-Management," 4.

[59] Korovkin, *Politics of Agricultural Co-operativism*.

[60] Vásquez-León, "Introduction: Walking the Tightrope."

operated through individual families, within which members could inherit land but they could not divide, rent, sell or mortgage it.[61] Any member who failed to cultivate his part for two consecutive years would be deprived of the usufruct, and the land would be reassigned to others. In terms of land title, an *ejido* was a compromised version of the cooperative, which conceded to the customary family division of agricultural labor and inheritance of land. Nevertheless, the *ejido* also featured the organizational framework of the modern cooperative, namely, the general assembly, the executive committee, and the oversight committee.[62] The deficiency of the actual operation of an *ejido* has been an important research topic, but it was the first realized agrarian reform in Latin America with significant improvement in agricultural productivity and income distribution[63] and thus stood as a reference point.

In the next wave of Latin American agrarian reforms in the 1950s, Cuba was one famous case that adopted the cooperative. Before the Cuban Revolution, most of the fertile land had belonged to large tobacco and sugar estates, which utilized wage laborers rather than peasants traditionally attached to the land. The revolutionary government thus had more space than many other Latin American states, such as Mexico and the Andean countries, to plan the economy of scale that conformed to its communist creed. In response to the foreign banks leaving after the Revolution, cooperatives were established in the previous tobacco and sugarcane estates to offer accounting services and credit for production.[64] Following Marxist theories, these earliest

[61] Thiesenhusen and Brown, "Survey of the Alliance for Progress."

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Armando Nova González, "Agricultural Cooperatives in Cuba: 1959-present," in *Cooperatives and Socialism,* ed. Piñero Harnecker, 279-91.

cooperatives were perceived as a transition to state farms, and the cooperative should be guided by the state during this transitional period. The National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) could designate administrators until the cooperatives accumulated sufficient experience.[65] For the first five years, only twenty percent of the cooperative income could be distributed among the members.[66] These cooperatives with limited autonomy were soon nationalized, though after 1975 Cuba would promote another wave of the cooperative movement.[67] In short, the cooperative in the early period of Cuban agrarian reform was part of a larger plan, and the existing land-people relationship in Cuba had saved the Castro regime from negotiating with traditionally land-attached peasants.

The third wave of agrarian reform in Latin America between the late 1960s and early 1970s was closely related to the Alliance for Progress. Besides Peru, the most well-known case would be Chile under the rules of Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende. The Frei government adopted the system of *asentamiento,* a form of cooperative first experimented by a Catholic philanthropic organization, INPROA, whose staff was also integrated into the agrarian reform.[68] The guiding ideology of *asentamiento* was communitarian socialism, characterized less by state control[69]

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[65] Emilio Rodríguez Membrado and Alcides López Labrada, "The UBPC: A Way of Redesigning State Property with Cooperative Management," in *Cooperatives and Socialism,* ed. Piñero Harnecker, 292-316.

[66] Rodríguez Membrado and López Labrada, "The UBPC."

[67] Nova González, "Agricultural Cooperatives in Cuba."

[68] Joseph R. Thome, "Expropriation in Chile under the Frei Agrarian Reform," *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 19, no. 3 (1971): 489-513.

[69] Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende's Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 6, no. 1 (1974): 135-59.

compared to the Cuban case. The *Asentamiento* was a transitional organization lasting from three to five years, during which time land ownership was temporarily retained by the agrarian reform agency. It was supposed to be a learning period for *asentamiento* members, organizing general assemblies and administrative committees and distributing the profits through the assistance and training of the agrarian reform agency.[70] The idea was that *asentamiento* members could learn how to manage the cooperative and eventually choose this form of land and labor organization, rather than split up after this transitional period, though in most cases people adopted a mixed form.[71] The experimental nature of *asentamiento* had been well received by contemporary international observers,[72] and it improved productivity, wages, and employment of the members, namely, the permanent resident labor force on the old estates.[73]

The Allende reform inherited much from Frei but attempted to improve the problem of limited membership and further push the elements of socialist morality of the cooperative.[74] The new unit of agrarian reform was CERA (Center of Agrarian Reform), which opened membership to those previously excluded, such as non-resident workers, and young men and women helping their fathers and husbands (also known as permanent resident workers). To lessen the paternalistic intervention from the state, CERA established committees for production, welfare,

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[70] Thome, "Expropriation in Chile under the Frei Agrarian Reform."

[71] Ibid.

[72] Thiesenhusen and Brown, "Survey of the Alliance for Progress."

[73] Winn and Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende's Chile."

[74] Ibid.

and control, through elections held in the general assembly. Moreover, CERA was expected to contribute part of its profits to the regional community development fund to balance the capitalist tone of the cooperative. The supposedly highly autonomous and socially democratic design of CERA, nevertheless, encountered peasant distrust and resistance, in addition to the problem of the shortage of machinery and technicians, causing slow progress.[75]

Cases of Mexico, Cuba, and Chile may show just some small pieces of the whole picture of Latin American cooperatives, but they also reveal how the cooperative could blend with governments and intellectuals with different ideologies and problems. In 1930s' Mexico, the cooperative was combined with *indigenismo* and negotiated with the local customs of land-holding and labor organization. In the waves of revolutions in the 1950s, the Cuban cooperative exemplified how orthodox Marxism would place the cooperative in its ultimate plan of the communist mode of production. Chile, at the crossroad of the Alliance for Progress and Allende's socialist democratic reform, experimented with the cooperative as a learning institution for a broader range of participants in rural political and economic decisions. In the next section, we will refocus on Peru and discuss how the cooperative had been picked up by the Peruvian socialist *indigenistas* in the early twentieth century and how this intellectual tradition would unfold in the following decades, as the dissertation chapters will show.

Peru: Socialist Cooperativism with an Andean Twist

Among the abovementioned cases of Latin American agrarian reform, Peru had a background more similar to Mexico than to Cuba; Peru had a large portion of indigenous people, at the time conceptualized as peasants, strongly claiming their ancestral land, too. In fact, it was

[75] Ibid.

also against the background of the Mexican and Russian Revolutions that Peru developed its second-stage *indigenismo* featuring socialist and anti-imperialist elements in the 1920s.[76] Facing increasingly radicalized mobilizations and land invasions since the late 1950s, leftist Peruvian policymakers and their advisors sought their intellectual tradition, fusing socialism and *indigenismo* through cooperativism. This section will discuss how cooperativism had emerged in Peru in the early twentieth century as a socialist-*indigenista* political project and became an influential intellectual tradition for later generations.

Mariátegui, a representative socialist-*indigenista* during the 1920s, is an important source of inspiration for Peruvian scholars in the 1960s, especially those immersed in neo-Marxism and dependency theories.[77] His appeal for Peruvians to scientifically study and interpret their own reality[78] reflected the anthropologists' self-endowed mission. As a pioneer who brought the issue of indigenous life and culture into Marxist discussions, he argued that indigenous people, more than simply a racial or cultural group, were also an exploited class since the Spanish Conquest. Thus, he called for the inclusion of agrarian problems into the Peruvian political agenda that dealt with the "Indian problem."

Mariátegui was not alone; he belonged to an *indigenista* circle called *Grupo Resurgimiento* centered at Cuzco, and contributed his newly-learned and developed ideas after coming back

[76] Alejandro D. Marroquín, *Balance del indigenismo: informe sobre la política indigenista en américa* (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1972). In this book, the author depicted *indigenimso* in Peru until the 1970s with four stages: romantic, socialist, integrationist, and revolutionary. Here, I will specifically focus on the second stage since it constituted a significant intellectual inspiration for the anthropologists in this dissertation.

[77] Harry Vanden and Marc Becker, "Introduction. Amauta: An Introduction to the Life and Works of Jose Carlos Mariátegui," in *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology*, eds. Harry Vanden and Marc Becker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011) 11-61.

[78] José Carlos Mariátegui, "Toward a Study of Peruvian Problems," in *José Carlos Mariátegui*, eds., Vanden and Becker, 65-8.

from Italy. He worked closely with Luis E. Valcárcel, whose abundant folklore fieldwork experiences and knowledge of the indigenous communities complemented his Marxist analytical framework.[79] Agreeing with Hilderbrando Castro Pozo and Cesar Ugarte, Mariátegui argued the primary characteristic that Peruvians had to face when dealing with the agrarian problem was "the survival of community and elements of practical socialism in indigenous agriculture and life."[80] He cited Castro Pozo[81] to show that the community was not simply a residue of primitiveness or colonialism but "a living organism" that evolved with time.[82]

Cooperativism in Peru has often been traced back to Hilderbrando Castro Pozo, a socialist politician and a sociologist in early twentieth-century Peru. His classical work, *Del ayllu al cooperativismo socialista*, testifies how he pushed for legislation of the cooperativization of the indigenous *ayllu* in the National Congress in the 1930s.[83] The idea was influential not only to his contemporaries, such as José Carlos Mariátegui,[84] but also to the later generations of Peruvian leftists. The book was reprinted in 1973 during the Velasco regime, in a series for which Carlos Delgado served as the consultant, together with Carlos Delgado's *Testimonio de*

[79] Luis E. Valcárcel, *Memorias* (Lima: IEP, 1981), in which Valcárcel also recognized Mariátegui's influence on his own ideas and works during the 1920s.

[80] Cesar Ugarte, *Bosquejo de la historia económica del Perú* (Lima: Cabieses, 1926).

[81] Hilderbrando Castro Pozo, *Nuestra comunidad indígena* (Lima: El Lucero, 1924).

[82] José Carlos Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1968[1928]).

[83] Hilderbrando Castro Pozo, *Del ayllu al cooperativismo socialista* (Lima: PEISA, 1973[1936]).

[84] See José Carlos Mariátegui, "cooperativas," *Amauta III*, no. 13 (1928): 38-9. Accessed December 18, 2015. https://www.marxists.org/espanol/mariateg/oc/ideologia_y_politica/paginas/las%20cooperativas.htm
Also see his *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*.

lucha and José María Arguedas's *Todas las sangres*.

Castro Pozo analyzed Peru with a scientific Marxist perspective and traced the emergence of the exploitative capitalist mode of production back to the Spanish colonial period. Except for serving as an analytical tool, scientific Marxism for him also provided the proletariat a set of scientific standards to struggle against capitalism, and this analytical tool must modify the general principles according to the local idiosyncrasies.[85] In Peru, Castro Pozo thought the special issues they had to consider were the collective ownership of land and organization of works. Therefore, if Peru wanted a change, he proposed a communitarian blueprint, in which the conservation of *ayllu* lands could run parallel with the modernization and rationalization of agricultural production.[86] Moreover, Peru would thus initiate a whole new stage of culture, in which people could benefit from the "economic-moral unity" of the organization form of *ayllu*, characterized by "collective usufruct of land, cooperation of manpower and goal, and volition in socialized production."[87]

Castro Pozo was very positive about the interchangeability between the socialist cooperative and Andean *ayllu*, and he was not alone. Andean forms of labor organization, such as *minga* and *ayni*, were continually debated by generations of scholars with regard to whether they would facilitate the development of the modern cooperative or not.[88] In the Peruvian case, this intellectual tradition of "a consistent desire to form a national brand of socialism around the

[85] Castro Pozo, *Del ayllu al cooperativismo socialista*.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., 210.

[88] Carroll, "Peasant Cooperation in Latin America."

principles of the Indian community"[89] could also be traced in the works of Manuel Gonzales Prada, José Carlos Mariátegui, and Luis E. Valcárcel. This Peruvian intellectual tradition would eventually influence the social scientific circle involving itself in the experiment, observation, and promotion of the agricultural cooperative in Peru, between post-World War II and the 1970s, as the case studies in the following chapters will reveal.

Conclusion

This chapter contextualizes the Peruvian cooperativism in a larger political, socio-economic, and intellectual framework. It explores how and why the cooperative became a popular idea for international aid agencies, governments, and intellectuals with extremely different political ideologies. It elucidates how the contemporary understanding of "peasant" and consensus of agrarian reform were connected to this zeal. Many critics have already pointed out that this was a wishful imposition onto Latin American rural society[90] and this is exactly why most agrarian reforms failed.[91] In the following chapters, I wish to further historicize this specific group of Peruvian intellectuals, involving and adopting different stances in relation to cooperativism. Through this analysis, we will be able to see the flesh and blood of a generation that endowed themselves with the mission to reflect social reality and to tackle a national problem.

[89] Gavin Alderson-Smith, "Peasant Response to Cooperativization under Agrarian Reform in the Communities of the Peruvian Sierra," *Popular Participation in Social Change,* eds. Nash, Dandler, and Hopkins, 116.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Seligmann, "Agrarian Reform and Peasant Studies."

Chapter Two
An Agricultural Cooperative in Experiment:
Mario Vásquez, the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos, and its Ripple Effect, 1948-1962

This chapter deals with a case of applied anthropology: the Cornell-Peru Project (CPP) at Vicos Hacienda, Ancash, Peru, in which the ideas and practices of the agricultural cooperative met with Peruvian anthropology in an obscure way. Although the Cornell-Peru Project is one of the most well-known cases of applied anthropology during the post-WWII period, most Peruvian scholars preferred to keep a distance from it and hardly credited it with any significant contribution to Peruvian academia. My curiosity toward this well-documented case begins with this paradox, and I will further investigate how the CPP could have possibly helped form an intellectual consensus regarding the agricultural cooperative proposal.

The Cornell-Peru Project, funded mainly by the Carnegie Corporation of New York through the channel of Cornell University, rented Vicos Hacienda to experiment with controlled reforms in respect to agricultural productivity, elementary and vocational education, health and sanitation, and local political autonomy. In 1962, as Cornell University gradually retreated from Vicos, the peasants of Vicos bought out the Hacienda with the profits accumulated by their agricultural cooperative, and became the landowners themselves. This has aroused debates about how to evaluate the Project. For the scholars participating in the Project themselves, they

celebrate its liberating characteristics.[1] In contrast, some critics have questioned its uniqueness, its presupposition of destined modernization and acculturation of indigenous peasants, and its paternalistic rhetoric.[2] More recently, there has been a third approach to historically examine the Project.[3]

By using the word "experiment," I follow the third approach and contextualize the Cornell-Peru Project in respect to Peruvian development of anthropological science and its land and agrarian policy between 1948 and 1962. As chapter one shows, this period was a historical conjuncture; during this time, the mode of the agricultural cooperative gradually became the most applicable solution to the agrarian problems defined by contemporary Peruvian anthropologists. It was also the period during which the modern division of social scientific disciplines was imported from the United States and established itself in the existing intellectual circle of Peru. In other words, instead of proving or disproving the significance of the Cornell-Peru Project to the local peasants, I perceive it as an excellent case that unfolds the entangled relationship between the initial stage of institutionalization Peruvian anthropology and the

[1] The most well-read and cited analysis is Henry Dobyns, Paul Doughty, and Harold Lasswell, eds., *Peasants, Power, and Applied Social Change: Vicos As a Model* (London: Sage, 1971[1964]). See also Paul Doughty, "Vicos: Success, Rejection, and Rediscovery of a Classic Program," in *Applied Anthropology in America,* eds. Elizabeth Eddy and William Patridge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 433-59. Paul Doughty, "Against the Odds: Collaboration and Development at Vicos," in *Collaborative Research and Social Change: Applied Anthropology in Action,* eds. Donald Stull and Jean Schensul (Boulder: Westview, 1981), 129-57. For more recent works, see Paul Doughty, "Anthropological Journeys: Vicos and the Callejón de Huaylas, 1948-2006," in *Vicos and Beyond,* eds. Tom Greaves, Ralph Bolton, and Florencia Zapata (New York: AltaMira, 2011), 51-78. An exceptional work would be William Mangin, "Thoughts on Twenty-Four Years of Work in Perú: The Vicos Project and Me," in *Long-Term Field Research in Social Anthropology,* eds. George Forster et al. (New York: Academic, 1979), 65-84.

[2] See William Mitchell, "Anthropological Hope and Social Reality: Cornell's Vicos Project Reexamined," in *Vicos and Beyond*, eds. Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, 81-101. Eric Ross, "Reflections on Vicos: Anthropology, the Cold War, and the Idea of Peasant Conservatism," in *Vicos and Beyond*, eds. Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, 129-61.

[3] See Enrique Mayer, "Vicos as a Model: A Retrospective," in *Vicos and Beyond*, eds. Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, 163-92. Jason Pribilsky, "Modernizing Peru: Negotiating *Indigenismo*, Science, and the "Indian Problem" in the Cornell-Peru Project," in *Vicos and Beyond,* eds. Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, 103-27. However, the earliest attempt would be from James Himes, "The Impact in Peru of the Vicos Project," in *Research in Economic Anthropology: A Research Annual* 4 (1981): 141-213.

sprouting attempts to put the agricultural cooperative into practice. More specifically, I will explore how the experimental ideas and practices actually influenced the Peruvian anthropologist, Mario Vásquez, who later in 1969 became an official of Agrarian Reform, to perceive the agricultural cooperative as the most realistic answer to Peru's rural problem.

This chapter begins with the historical context in both Peru and the United States, where funding of the Cornell-Peru Project came from. A brief summary of the Project will follow, giving readers a larger picture of the Project. The following section will focus on the process of institution building by Peruvian anthropologists in order to show where Mario Vásquez came from. Their efforts will be presented in relation to the politics of knowledge in both Peruvian and international contexts, and examined together with their academic writings, especially related to the idea and practice of the agricultural cooperative.

The major sources of this chapter come from (1) Allan R. Holmberg Collection on Peru, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, (2) *Colección Mario Vásquez, Colecciones Especiales, Biblioteca de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú*, and (3) *Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura, Perú*. All contain published and unpublished sources, including proposals, reports, field notes, questionnaires, census records, conference papers, journal papers, news clips, and personal correspondences. A less-examined archival material, Mario Vásquez's field notes, will be used in this chapter to study how this young Peruvian scholar-in-training was forging his own ideas on rural development through his experimental practices.

Historical Background

In a 1962 documentary by CBS, the reporter Charles Kuralt gave his opening remarks as follows:

> As far as you can see, back there to where the snow begins, is Vicos, a former hacienda 200 miles from Lima, Peru. Two and quarter miles up in the Andes and **just ten years out the sixteenth century**. . . . Not far from this hacienda are many others where the Indians with the same [Incan] heritage are serfs willing to bow their heads in submission to the man who owns or rents them. If they are unwilling to submit, they may starve slowly or they may move to Lima and live in slum shacks on the edge of the city and starve slowly there. Here at Vicos, the Indians neither submit nor starve. They hold their heads high, stay and prosper because they have learned something, **something which in ten years has carried them from sixteenth century serfdom to freedom in the twentieth**. What they learned is a simple thing, that **all men are equal**, including Indians. This is our story, ***So That Men Are Free.***[4]

Following the storyline, audiences would see how the *Vicosinos*[5] were given the chance to improve their agricultural productivity, construct their own primary school and health care center, and collectively discuss and decide their own future. They became free from hunger, poverty, illiteracy, disease, and serfdom. The acceleration of history was said to begin with the Cornell-Peru Project, an applied anthropological project carried out at Vicos Hacienda between 1952 and 1964.

Today's audience may feel uneasy about the confident tone of this documentary, praising the achievement of a U.S.-initiated project in a Third World country. As part of the representational machines of empire,[6] the documentary targeted the typical U.S. audience in the early 1960s, and therefore tells us much about the U.S. in the Cold War context. Viewers were told that the spread of a U.S.-styled modernization project would eventually benefit Andean peasants, and Vicos was the best example. Moreover, it was a peaceful and successful reform in

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[4] Emphases mine. "So that Men are Free," reported by Charles Kuralt, directed by Willard van Dyke, produced by Isaac Kleinerman. Columbia Broadcasting System. Distributed by McGraw-Hill Films. Accessed March 20, 2011. http://courses.cit.cornell.edu/vicosperu/vicos-site/cornellperu_page_1.htm

[5] *Vicosinos* means the local population at Vicos.

[6] See Ricardo Donato Salvatore, "The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire," in *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand and Ricardo Donato Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 69-104.

the context of increasingly radicalized peasant mobilization throughout Peru at this period of time, not to mention the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 and Agrarian Reform from then onward. After the Cornell-Peru Project, Vicos would serve as a model for other underdeveloped places. Spanning ten years from 1952[7] to 1962, the CPP embodies U.S. confidence to export the model of modernization after World War II, and its anxiety over the burgeoning revolutions in Latin American countries, especially the influential Cuban Revolution.

The United States' interests in Latin America rose during World War II and grew with the advance of the Cold War. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy in 1933 set the tone for U.S.-Latin American relations for the following decades. In 1949, Harry S. Truman delivered his Inaugural Speech, in which he mentioned the famous Point Four:

> Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. . . . The old imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing. . . . Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technological knowledge.[8]

The plan proposed an international relationship based on the distinction between development and underdevelopment;[9] the developed countries were obliged to help the underdeveloped ones with their scientific knowledge and technological advances.

The CBS documentary left out both the social changes and historical dynamics that Peru

[7] The official project contract between Cornell University and Peruvian government was signed in 1952 while the participating anthropologists had visited Vicos several times since 1948 to prepare for the project.

[8] Harry Truman, "Truman's Inaugural Address," January 20, 1949, delivered in person at the Capitol. Accessed March 11, 2016. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm

[9] Rist, *The History of Development* (see intro. n. 32).

and the Vicosinos were facing. In reality, the Vicosinos hardly lived as if they were "just ten years out of the sixteenth century." Prior to the CPP, the Peruvian government was trying to modernize and industrialize the haciendas in the north-central highlands of Peru. A hydroelectric plant was newly built in the valley where Vicos was located.[10] The CPP, however, was not the only factor contributing to the Vicosinos' awareness of autonomy and self-government. Earlier attempts to form indigenous delegations to demand the appropriation of hacienda land occurred continually between the 1920s and 1940s.[11] Nevertheless, the dictatorship of Manuel Odría (1948-1956) and the conservative presidency of Manuel Prado (1956-1962) hindered more radical changes beyond modest reforms.

Vicos was in the tide of social and economic changes in the 1950s in Peru. Modern agricultural and breeding techniques entered into rural areas of coastal Peru, and more extensive use of land, capital, and modern norms thus followed. While coastal Peru was experiencing advances in production, highland Peru faced the problem of decreasing productivity and emigration to urban areas. Rural Peru, between the late 1940s and the early 1960s, was experiencing an accelerated breakdown of traditional society built upon the hacienda mode of production.[12] More frequent peasant mobilizations were asking for land redistribution; unionization was their newly learned strategy and the current of urban migration was timely in providing new networks. It was in this context that Peru's problem was defined: the decrease of rural agricultural productivity in traditional haciendas influenced the agricultural sector to

[10] Peter Klarén, *Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[11] Mitchell, "Anthropological Hope and Social Reality," in *Vicos and Beyond*, eds. Greaves, Bolton, and Zapata, 81-101.

[12] Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).

change. They could either introduce modern techniques and management norms, as in many coastal haciendas, or suffer population emigration or intensified mobilization. At the same time, urban Peru was witnessing the fast growth of migrant squatters as well as the enormous expansion of urban areas.[13]

Cornell-Peru Project in Brief

Vicos Hacienda lay in the Department of Ancash, 270 miles northeast of Lima, the capital city of Peru. It was a hacienda of 43,750 acres located at *Callejón de Huaylas*, on the west side of *Cordillera Blanca*. In 1952, the population was 1,703, from 363 families. The hacienda belonged to the Public Charity Society of Huaraz, which leased out its use for a five-year period. The patron had the right to decide the type of cash crop that *Vicosinos* should grow and *Vicosinos'* obligations to work for him. In general, the male heads of the peon households had to work on the patron's land three days a week in exchange for their right to cultivate on their own plots. Every Wednesday, the peons were gathered to a meeting called a *mando* to hear the orders from the overseers.

Allan Holmberg, then a young anthropology professor from Cornell University, visited Vicos for the first time in 1948. It was a field trip with students of the National University of San Marcos (*Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos,* UNMSM) in Lima. The field trip had originally been designed to study the impact of the hydroelectric plant on the nearby peasant communities and the cultural changes resulting from industrialization. This visit should be considered against the background of the relationship between Cornell University and the Point Four Program. Around the same time, the newly established Department of Anthropology and

[13] David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976).

Sociology at Cornell University was planning a cross-cultural research project. They planned to study the influence of technological innovations in traditional communities, which covered places in India, Thailand, the American Southwest, and Latin America. Allan Holmberg was sought to be in charge of the Latin American study.

However, the coup led by Manuel Odría in 1948 stopped the industrialization projects, and Holmberg was made to change his plan. Later in a seminar on their recommendations for a modernization program in Peru, Cornell students involved in the CPP clearly documented this twist:

> The present basis of available information makes it very difficult to offer any specific recommendations with regard to a proposed Point Four program in Peru. First, we must stress that we can recommend no program under existing politico-cultural conditions. The situation in Peru gives no assurance that the desirable cooperation on the part of the Peruvians would be forthcoming. . . . One of the greatest difficulties is found in the unstable nature of Peruvian politics. . . . The landowning class of Peru, whose existence depends upon the slightly more than bare subsistence activities of large numbers of peons, would perhaps tend to discourage the release of the peons into industrial and large scale agricultural enterprise. . . . Agricultural programs seem more feasible in the light of Peruvian culture. They would be more closely aligned with previous patterns.[14]

Limited by the conservativeness of national and local politics, the original plan to recommend and study Peruvian industrialization at *Callejón de Huaylas* became unrealistic. Holmberg was told by a Peruvian photographer, Abraham Guillen, to visit the "traditional and isolated" indigenous community around Vicos Hacienda. After a brief visit to the community, Holmberg talked to Mario Vásquez, a Peruvian graduate student coming from the region near Vicos, and learned of the poor maintenance of Vicos Hacienda. Holmberg and Vásquez brewed the idea to lease the hacienda, experiment with the introduction of technological and social innovations, and

[14] William Stein et al., "Seminar 677: Recommendations for A Modernization Program in Peru," March 14, 1950, Box 9, Folder 58, Allan R. Holmberg Collection on Peru, #14-25-1529, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library (hereafter cited as Allan Holmberg Collection).

help Vicosinos improve their life. Starting from 1949, Mario Vásquez spent two years at Vicos conducting a basic census survey.[15]

The Carnegie Corporation of New York was the main funder of the two stages of this Project from 1951-1956, and 1959-1964. The Project staff consisted mainly of U.S. graduate students from Cornell University and Peruvian students from UNMSM. Major developmental projects included the improvement of agricultural production (e.g., the introduction of new seed potato, guano fertilizer, and insecticides), education (e.g., construction of a new primary school and recruiting teachers), health (e.g., a community clinic, a doctor and nurses, a parasitological survey, DDT lice control), and leadership (e.g., regular meetings between Project staff and *mayorales*, a universal suffrage of council representatives). In 1962, the land title of the hacienda was formally transferred to the Vicosinos, and the CPP was considered to have accomplished its initial goal and thus gradually decreased its activities at Vicos.

Local Institutional History

While we have already seen the institutional context of the CPP on the U.S. side in the 1950s, this section will mainly focus on the institution where Mario Vásquez came from, the Institute of Ethnology, National University of San Marcos (UNMSM), Lima, Peru. UNMSM is one of the oldest universities in Latin America, established in 1555. As social sciences had not yet been established, the School of Arts was dominated by Literature and History.[16] In 1946, the

[15] Mario Vásquez later used these data to write his bachelor thesis from the Institute of Ethnology at National University of San Marcos. Between 1950 and 1951, he was enrolled in the MA program of anthropology at Cornell University, which granted him the degree in 1955. See Allan Holmberg, *Vicos: Método y Práctica de Antropología Aplicada* (Lima: Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1966).

[16] Facultad de Letras, "Formulario Estadístico, 1947-1949" Sala 2, Caja 289, Código de Referencia 277, Numero de Ítem 219, Archivo Histórico Domingo Angulo, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (hereafter cited as Archico Domingo Angulo).

Institute of Ethnology was first established by the prestigious *indigenista* Luis E. Valcárcel as the nursery of modern anthropology in Peru, with the mission to scientifically solve the problem of rural development in Peru. The establishment of the Institute of Ethnology in the National University of San Marcos was only one of the numerous achievements of Luis E. Valcárcel with respect to ethnological institution building. Between 1931 and the mid-1960s, Valcárcel also served as the Minister of Education, led the National Museum, National Museum of History, Museum of Peruvian Culture, and others.[17]

Inserting ethnology into higher education was not a revelation that suddenly came to Valcárcel; he was interested in how other countries did it and how their experiences and resources could help Peru to start off.[18] In 1937 and 1941, he had visited the United States, especially university anthropology departments, and found anthropology's core similar to *indigenismo*.[19] For him, they were both against racism, while anthropology was "a solid scientific alternative to understand Peru" for further planning and legislation.[20] The so-called "further planning and legislation" based on "a solid scientific" understanding actually referred to solutions for the inefficiency of the hacienda system in rural Peru.[21] This also echoed Valcárcel's

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[17] Osterling and Martinez, "Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology," (see intro. n. 7).

[18] Luis E. Valcárcel, *Memorias*, eds., José Matos Mar, José Deustua C., and José Luis Rénique. (Lima: IEP, 1981), 285-6.

[19] Ibid., 313-7.

[20] Ibid., 319.

[21] Ibid., 326.

idea about rural education, which should function to train a group of productive agricultural laborers.[22] In other words, the indigenous peasants' role was to work and produce, while the anthropologists' job was to help the country figure out how to achieve this goal more effectively. In the beginning, few resources flowed into ethnology, and help from foreign scholars, theories, and funding was common. In the early years of the Institute of Ethnology, teaching materials were highly influenced by American anthropology.[23] In the syllabus of 1950, the first-year courses of Introduction to Ethnology used books by Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Margaret Mead, Melville Herskovits, Clyde Kluckhon, and Ralph Linton. Among them, Kroeber, Lowie, and Herskovits were the first generation of Boas' students, while Benedict, Mead, and Kluckhon were the second generation.[24] The methodology course taught by a Peruvian faculty member was in collaboration with the Smithsonian Institution, represented by Ozzie Gordon Simmons, who at that time conducted a research project on alcoholism at Lunahuana with *sanmarquino*[25] students, and also taught North American Ethnology in the Institute.[26]

Allan Holmberg also came to Peru due to similar opportunities to do research and teach at

[22] Luis E. Valcárcel, "Educación Pública," MN/ALEV-M. Ed. 008, Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura, Perú (hereafter cited as Archivo Luis Valcárcel).

[23] Classical works of Peruvian or Latin American traditions were also used in other courses, especially about Peruvian History, for example, Jorge Basadre, Julio Tello, José de la Riva Agüero, Luis E. Valcárcel, José Carlos Mariátegui, Pedro Cieza de León, Garcilaso de la Vega, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa. The European continental impact was also significant. Jehan Vellard taught the course South American Ethnology, and brought in works by German, French, and Italian scholars. See "Syllabus, Instituto de Etnología, Universidad Nacional Mayor San Marcos, 1950," MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0001, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[24] Silverman, "The United States," (See intro. n. 43).

[25] *Sanmarquino* is a term meaning "of San Marcos."

[26] "Syllabus, Instituto de Etnología, Universidad Nacional Mayor San Marcos, 1950," MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0001, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

UNMSM at the same time. Under this situation, the Cornell-Peru Project also became an important field site for Peruvian anthropological students. UNMSM trained fifteen professional anthropologists between 1946 and 1963; eight among them had their initial field experiences at Vicos, and the additional four had their first field training either at other parts of the Cornell-Peru Project or under the guidance of Holmberg.[27] Ironically, a general impression among Peruvian scholars was that the CPP did not influence Peruvian anthropology in any significant way, and neither did the CPP have many paper traces in Peru.[28]

Politics of Knowledge in National and International Perspectives

Tracing the institutional history of UNMSM, it is not hard for us to find this irony was caused partly by the radicalization of anti-Americanism among university students, especially since the second half of the 1950s. Meanwhile, most San Marcos professors preferred to keep a distance from the applied anthropological project in general, to avoid the label of the mediator of U.S. cultural imperialism.[29] At the same time, some of them were busy fetching resources and training students in order to build anthropology as a discipline with a strong empirical base and powerful conceptual tools to study the so-called "social reality," an influential intellectual project centered at Santiago, Chile and spread among Latin American countries between 1950s and 1970s.[30] Applied anthropology, for them, was both counter-revolutionary and unscientific since it

[27] Holmberg, *Vicos: Método y Práctica,* 129.

[28] Himes, "The Impact in Peru of the Vicos Project."

[29] Ibid.

[30] This will be the main topic of the next chapter.

did not develop sufficient conceptual tools.

Despite left-leaning Peruvian scholars' critiques, the CPP progressed on its own track according to the plans of the funding and coordinating institutions from both countries. I'll start from an early proposal dating back to April 1951, *A Proposal for a Program of Experimental Field Research in Technological Change*. This proposal included similar projects in India, Peru, American Southwest, and Thailand. Generally, this program as a whole sought to introduce new technologies,[31] which would help these countries modernize and at the same time study the process of social and cultural change resulting from the introduction of new technologies. Allan Holmberg, the Cornell coordinator of the Vicos Project, was the author of the part on Peru. More specifically, Holmberg followed the over-arching tone throughout this proposal that the introduction of technology and the promotion of modernization were not jobs monopolized by the natural sciences; social sciences were equally important in facilitating and observing these changes. He specified that Peru had always had the so-called "Indian problem,"[32] meaning Indian peasants were isolated in the enclosed and paternalistic environment of haciendas and not able to effectively contribute to the nation in an economic sense. Moreover, this was not just Peru's internal problem but a pan-Andean issue that might determine whether or not the Andean countries could avoid violent revolution. Holmberg wrote, ". . . unless these are soon given opportunities and assistance in changing and improving their lot considerably, present conditions of unrest and dissatisfaction are apt to lead to more bloodier revolutions within the next few

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[31] These technologies included increasing food production, developing marketing facilities, and improving the health and nutrition of the local population.

[32] Allan Holmberg, *Participant Experimentation in Peru: A Proposal for a Program of Experimental Field Research in Technological Change*, April 1951, p.17. Box 1, Folder 4, Allan Holmberg Collection.

years . . . ."[33] We can see, from how Holmberg defined the significance of the Cornell-Peru Project in this proposal, the concerns of both U.S. and Peruvian scholars and funding institutions. On the U.S. side, the concern was for promoting modernization to prevent violent revolution in Third World countries. Holmberg proposed that Vico peasants should change their way of production and life, but the direction of change should not be a communist or revolutionary one.

The idea of modernization was related to a general trend among contemporary U.S. social scientists of modernization theory, responding to the Cold War context and rise of the Third World after decolonization. This trend conceptualized "modernization" as a necessary and pragmatic transitional process for traditional societies to evolve into modernized national states. The content of modernization involved an economic transition from subsistence economies or feudal modes of production to technology-intensive and industrialized economies; a political transition from making passive subjects to educating modern citizens; and social change from "closed ascriptive status systems to open, achievement-oriented systems."[34] In every aspect of individual and national life, modernization theory offered one clear direction accordingly. Holmberg was also aware of the Peruvian way to define the "Indian Problem." In the initial stage of the Cornell-Peru Project, he had sought the support of *Instituto Indigenista Peruano*, a governmental institute established in the mid-1940s to take charge of indigenous affairs concerning integration and economic improvement. A transition from a pluralist to assimilationist perspective took place regarding the *indigenista* current of thought in this period

[33] Ibid., 18-9.

[34] Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 no. 2 (1973): 199-226.

of time.[35] The wave of socialist *indigenismo* in the 1920s, represented by José Carlos Mariátegui, was replaced by the integrationist currency. Holmberg's idea of bringing technological changes into a static indigenous community coincided with the Institute's motivation to accomplish political achievements.

Intellectual Development: Putting the Cooperative into Practice in Peru

The cooperative is usually related to Utopian or left-leaning ideas toward production and consumption, since its central motivation is for non-commercial profit.[36] Naturally, in the context of Cold War geopolitics and the height of modernization theory, the term "cooperative" was not used directly by the Project participants in the beginning to describe their plans. Rather, the scholars employed terms such as "technological innovations," referring to the introduction of new seed potato, fertilizers, and insecticides, and "democratic process of decision-making" especially in the proposals for the U.S. funding institutions. However, in front of the peasants of Vicos, the Project claimed it was different from previous patrons in the sense that its ultimate purpose was not for earning profit for itself, but to reinvest the profit to improve the peons' lives,[37] clearly coinciding with the principle of the cooperative. Later, between 1960 and 1963, in their position papers for the Peruvian government, they explicitly adopted the phrase "cooperative" and clearly distinguished it from the communist collective farm.[38] Basically, they

[35] Pribilsky, "Modernizing Peru."

[36] Korovkin, *Politics of Agricultural Co-Operativism* (see chap. 1, n. 40).

[37] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on November 28, 1951, p. 3614, Colección Mario C. Vásquez, Biblioteca de Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (hereafter cited as Colección Mario C. Vásquez).

[38] The position papers were expanded and translated into Mario C. Vásquez and Henry Dobyns, "The

perceived the cooperative as a transitional stage to a capitalist mode of production.

In a 1959 article published in *Human Organization*, the journal of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Allan Holmberg's interpretation of the CPP at Vicos also shows this combination of modernization theory and idea of the cooperative:

> . . . on first entering this scene, although it was felt that ultimately the most rational solution to the economic and social problems of Vicos was to return the land and the responsibility for its cultivation to the peons, immediately and sharply to increase the socioeconomic growth and independence of Vicos was simply not a realistic possibility. **For political reasons, a land reform program could not be immediately initiated; for economic reasons, capital was lacking for developmental purposes** . . . . **Thus it was decided that, in the beginning at least, it would be advisable to vary only slightly and simply a few of the variables involved, but in an integrated way**. . . .
>
> Obviously, the notable rise in production which took place after the termination of the hacienda system was due to a combination of factors, not the least of which was earlier experimentation in agriculture and the improved technology introduced by the Project. But it is also important to note that, as a result of the changed system of land tenure and of work, important attitudes and values were altered or brought into play which deeply affected the productive process. **Once the Vicosinos assumed direct control of the hacienda, a new perspective on the future, a new lease on life, was possible. They now had a stake in their own destiny which led to new incentives for action and for work**. . . .
>
> . . . .**They tend to confirm a hypothesis long ago expressed by Marx, namely, that the alienation of people from control over the means of production retards social and economic development**.[39]

In this passage, we see Holmberg arguing that the return of land to the Vicosinos motivated them to pursue agricultural productivity, implying an individualized motivation of economic pursuit in regard to agricultural production in contrast to the socialists or communists' concern for redistribution and equality. Despite this fundamental difference, he cited Marx's idea of alienation and thus added a left-leaning flavor to his discourse. Ultimately, however, despite the cooperative's utopian and left-leaning tone, it was proposed as a strategy in the face of political

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Transformation of Manors into Producers' Cooperatives," report for AID/csd-296. Box 9, Folder 72, Allan Holmberg Collection.

[39] Emphases mine. Allan Holmberg, "Land Tenure and Planned Social Change: A Case from Vicos, Peru," *Human Organization* 18, no. 1 (1959): 7-10.

conservatism and capital shortage, and thus was viewed as a feasible transition from hacienda to capitalist agriculture in the Latin American context.[40]

Under such a socio-politically conservative atmosphere, how did cooperativism become a visible issue and discussible topic, both in public and in intellectual circles? I will tackle this question with Mario Vásquez's field notes, policy advice, and position papers, which overall show how his experiences of interacting with peasants during the CPP constituted an important point of reference in his later career as a planner of Agrarian Reform in 1969. I will begin with his field notes between 1952 and 1956, the first stage of the CPP, to show the process of his introducing new agricultural technical skills and receiving feedback from the Vicosinos.

In his field notes from 1951, right before the formal launch of the CPP, it was recorded that Vicosinos were dubious about the claim that the CPP's ultimate goal was to return the profit back to the producers and improve their life quality.[41] It is not that Vicosinos were unfamiliar with ideas of the cooperatives; in fact, in 1946, they had once tried to collect money among themselves to rent the hacienda between 1947 and 1951, but had failed. They attributed the failure to the cunning of the mestizo landowner during the bidding process, just as they had experienced in their daily lives. In the beginning, Mario Vásquez was also seen as a mestizo, who, according their experiences, would not keep his promises and would treat Indians well only if he could take advantage of them. However, Vásquez's conduct as an anthropologist, including living, eating, and working with them,[42] and bringing small gifts for them in exchange only for

[40] Korovkin, *Politics of Agricultural Co-Operativism*.

[41] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on October 29 and 30, 1951, p. 3607, 3608, 3611, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[42] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in April 1949, Colección Mario Vásquez.

friendship,[43] began to slightly shake *Vicosinos'* stereotypical image of mestizo. After realizing their new patron would be *gringos*[44] from the United States, they began to wonder whether they would be better than the mestizo or not.[45] It was this wait-and-see attitude that Vásquez encountered in the beginning.

In order to begin to replace the customary practices and power relationship between patrons and peons, it took the CPP some effort to build a more rational relationship with the *Vicosinos*. At the same time, the CPP also had to discipline them with the authority customarily endowed to patrons. Free labor services of peons for the hacienda were abolished, and all jobs and services were to be justly remunerated.[46] It was also announced that CPP employees, namely the new "patrons," should not receive any gifts,[47] a customary and reinforced reciprocal practice between patron and peon in haciendas. Vicosinos were happy to see these changes, which would surely alleviate their burdens, but at the moment, they had not realized their relationship with the patrons was not a reciprocal patronage anymore.

Previously, absentee ownership and intermediated supervision had implicitly granted Vicosinos the customary privilege to steal or glean the hacienda crops as long as they did not

[43] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in January 1950, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[44] *Gringo* is a term widely used in Latin America referring to white-skinned outsiders, either from foreign countries or urban areas of Latin America.

[45] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on October 29 and 30, 1951, p. 3609 and November 28, 1951, p. 3614, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[46] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 27, 1951, p. 3631, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[47] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on January 16, 1952, p. 3653, Colección Mario Vásquez.

step over the delicate line.[48] Under the CPP, those peasants who were still making use of this "weapon of the weak"[49] would soon encounter difficulty. On one occasion, a young peon was found stealing the hacienda's potatoes and his godfather stepped in to intercede by suggesting he kneel down and kiss Vásquez's hand to ask for a pardon—a customary practice between patron and peon, which embodied the patronized relationship. Vásquez refused to accept this code and told them a verbal promise was sufficient.[50] The implied message is that the asymmetrically reciprocal relationship should be changed, and the CPP was building a more rationalized relationship with the local people.

Asymmetrical exchange under the table was discouraged while an official award system was built. One family once invited Vásquez for an extravagant lunch, during which they alluded to being granted more land for the next year but did not get any such promise.[51] This was not a single case, and Vásquez emphasized in his notes that the redistribution of cultivation rights to land should be discussed and decided publicly without the influence of bribery.[52] Nevertheless, at the end of each year, the CPP awarded tools and potatoes for those with perfect attendance for hacienda work, in the presence of all peons.[53] Vásquez observed that Vicosinos were not quite

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[48] Barbara D. Lynch, *The Vicos Experiment: A Study of the Impacts of the Cornell-Peru Project in a Highland Community*, Agency for International Development Evaluation Special Study, no. 7. April, 1982. Accessed April 8, 2016. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAJ616.pdf

[49] See James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

[50] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on January 23, 1952, p. 3664, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[51] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on March 22, 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[52] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in July, 1952-1953, p. 2932, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[53] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 31, 1952, p. 20-23, Colección Mario Vásquez.

used to the public system of award. Many were ashamed to pick up the awards in the beginning because they did not want to be envied and talked about behind their backs.

Nevertheless, the CPP's role as the hacienda patron and its self-endowed mission to lead Vicosinos step by step still made it convenient to utilize the customary authority of a patron when necessary. Facing another "weapon of the weak"—an absenteeism from assigned work—the CPP announced that those peons who had been often absent should improve their behavior, otherwise their right to use land inside the hacienda would be expropriated. Moreover, CPP administrators, especially Mario Vásquez, continued to play the role of "patron" with respect to solving Vicosinos' conflicts. The CPP actually tried to avoid this situation by putting the conflict in front of the local leaders' (*mayorales*) meetings, but Vásquez's personal charisma and often useful suggestions gradually won him a significant position at Vicos. The case of an absent peon, named as C here,[54] came up during an investigation. Through information offered by the local leaders, Vásquez realized the problem also involved a conflict of land-use between C's separated wife, his brother, and his nephew.[55] C had been sick for a period of time and thus could not perform the agricultural tasks and hacienda duties. His land was currently planted for his brother, A, with the help of his nephew, S. A small part of the land was planted for his separated wife—who could not be counted as a hacienda peon since she was a female—to support their two young children. In a typical case, a peon who could not perform his duties anymore should pass their position to his adult son or return his house and land so that the hacienda could grant them to another newly-enrolled peon. But C's case was complicated since he and his wife had already

[54] I am not sure whether Vásquez used real names or pseudonyms in his field notes. But for the purpose of protecting the privacy of *Vicosino* informants and their descendants today, I will use abbreviations instead of the full names appearing in the field notes. This principle also applies to my citations of Vásquez's notes of interviewing *Vicosinos*.

[55] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in March 1952, p. 3688-90, Colección Mario Vásquez.

separated, their children were too young to register as peons, and he, with his illness, still needed to support himself; his brother had his own land and should not enjoy the rights to both lots. In the end, it was Vásquez who suggested the thoughtful solution that the house and maize field would continue to be C's until he died. But the major land rights and the future rights to the house and maize field should belong to his elder son, who would be tutored by the separated wife until he came of age as an adult.

It was through these everyday interactions, rather than discourse, between Mario Vásquez and Vicosinos, that the Vicosinos grasped the kind of relationship they should build with the new "patron." For his part, Vásquez realized how an intermediating outsider like him could play a key role in touching off changes from deep-rooted practices. A similar experience also applied to the promotion of a central agricultural experiment in the CPP, the New Seed Potato (NSP). When the CPP first arrived at Vicos, local people were experiencing a famine due to the potato blight so they had to eat the seed potatoes kept for the next season. Mario Vásquez's informal action to consult the regional office of SCIPA (*Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Producción Alimentos,* Inter-American Cooperative Service of Food Production) for advice on improving potato production created a decade-long potato bonanza.[56] The information SCIPA provided Vásquez was a package of agricultural knowledge based on the idea of the Green Revolution, including row spacing, the introduction of seeds from new species, fertilizers, and insecticides. Vásquez promoted this approach for three potato seasons—1952-1953, 1953-1954, and 1954-1955—and in addition to the hacienda itself, seventy-two percent of the total households participated in it.[57]

[56] Lynch, *The Vicos Experiment*.

[57] Ibid., 32.

At first, there were only 17 out of 363 peons willing to be involved in the experiment of new seed potato and methods of cultivation, and not all of them followed the instructions through every step. Besides the simple fact that Vicosinos were short on cash to purchase seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides from the hacienda, learning the agricultural technique was an experiential process, and most Vicosinos would rather look on in the beginning. The first obstacle was solved by the CPP through proposing the system of *mediania*—peons willing to participate in the experiment would be offered seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides at the cost of fifty percent of their harvest. Besides a public announcement of the *mediania* program, Vásquez began to talk the wealthier or influential peons into participating in NSP through small talks, in which he could further assuage their doubts in front of their friends or relatives.[58] Communication between friends, neighbors, and relatives actually played an important role in the beginning of NSP.[59] Vásquez's interviews reveal that those who were at the bottom and suffered most from the potato blight and famine were also the ones willing to try NSP first.[60]

Overcoming the second factor took the persuasion and time of Vásquez. One good example illustrating this process of persuasion and acceptance concerns whether to space the potatoes in rows or not. The NSP experiment proposed to space them in rows to facilitate drainage and thus prevent the tuber from rotting and the soil from eroding.[61] Moreover, a

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[58] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1952, NSP: I, 21, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[59] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of N. P., interview of J. R., interview of V. V., and interview of H. C., 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[60] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of P. C., interview of D. H., interview of V. V., 1953, Colección MarioVásquez.

[61] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of D. H., interview of N. P., 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

regularly arranged field would also facilitate the application of fertilizers and insecticides. But Vicosinos were wondering about this new approach. Some protested that the rows made it easier for thieves to locate their seed potatoes;[62] some complained that they did not have enough helpers to prepare the land;[63] while others argued the new method prevented potatoes from obtaining sufficient moisture from the soil.[64] A similar situation happened regarding the application of insecticides. Some said they did not use it because they had observed that others' potato plants got sick after fumigating;[65] some applied it incorrectly so they ran out of the provided portion quickly and could not see the positive results;[66] while some actually planted both experimental and control groups in their fields.[67] Vásquez visited the participants' fields often, and when he saw that they did not follow the instructed way of irrigation,[68] fumigation,[69]

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[62] Mario C. Vásquez investigated further into this case of potato theft, and based on the testimony of the protesting neighbor and traces left at the scene, he concluded it could have been damage caused by the protestor's own pigs. See his field notes on October 8, 1952, NSP: I, 18, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[63] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: II, 7, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[64] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of V. V., 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[65] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 30, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[66] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[67] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 2, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[68] Cases in his field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 25, and his general observations in NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[69] Cases in his field notes on September 17, 1952, NSP: I, 1; 1953, NSP: II, 19; NSP: III, 33, Colección Mario Vásquez.

and fertilization,[70] or found them dishonest about the tasks, he would first inquire why, and in most situations push them to carry out the planting correctly. There was a rumor that best described *Vicosinos'* fear and respect for their new, well-informed "patron": Vásquez must have a radio that could tell him everything that was happening at Vicos.[71]

Despite the ongoing process of persuasion and acceptance regarding the technical details, the success of the first harvest in early 1953 attracted more Vicosinos to come forward to participate in the next round of the experiment. Later in 1954, many new participants admitted their main reason to join was because everybody was doing it and having good harvests.[72] Some of them even began to feel the pressure from their families or peers. M was pushed by his wife to demand to be included in NSP,[73] and L said he did not want to be ridiculed by others saying he was not man enough to take the heavier work load of NSP.[74] In the field notes of 1954, even the newly joined Vicosinos were careful to follow the instructions for preparing the land and seedlings, and Vásquez was at the same time decreasing his time inspecting the work. Vicosinos were ultimately persuaded by the SCIPA package of Green Revolution information.

The NSP did not stop at the improvement of agricultural technology and productivity; its ultimate goal was to create an agricultural cooperative with a fair credit system to help the commercialization of Vicosinos' products and the accumulation of capital. Mario Vásquez started

[70] Cases in his field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 23, and his general observations in NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[71] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[72] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1954, NSP: IV, 3; NSP: IV, 4; NSP: IV, 46c, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[73] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1954, NSP: IV, 4c, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[74] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1954, NSP: IV, 9, Colección Mario Vásquez.

NSP slowly and meanwhile observed and thought about the differences between customary reciprocity and the cooperative. He noticed that customarily, Vicosinos gave away a large portion of their harvest in several reciprocal forms. The most important one was *minka*, a labor exchange system through which potatoes would be gifted to those who came to help with the harvest or had ever helped or lent their tools during the process. On harvest day, the hosts would often prepare a good meal for the *minkas*, who were usually their own relatives. If the hosts had ever borrowed potatoes from others, the lenders would show up to pick up their portion, too. Many of them would also allow the poorer Vicosinos to disproportionally barter potatoes or even glean after the harvests (*kallapar*). Though there were some cases in which people did not like their harvests to be gleaned, they generally thought it was a good sign that others were asking something from them;[75] it meant they now had the ability, and someday they might be able to ask for reciprocal returns, too.[76] In other words, these reciprocal practices actually constituted a network of mutual help, food security, wealth redistribution, and prestige accumulation. Thus, Vásquez observed that Vicosinos were still somewhat uneasy about commercializing their potatoes, especially when facing their *minkas* and lenders stepped forward to claim their portion.[77]

Indeed, some Vicosinos began to commercialize their potatoes, either through the mediation of the hacienda or by themselves. Vásquez realized Vicosinos clearly distinguished between reciprocal practices inside their community and commercialization toward mestizo

[75] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 33, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[76] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[77] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: II, 7, Colección Mario Vásquez.

outsiders.[78] The commercial exchange would be proportional and market price would be considered. In some cases, they wanted to sell the potatoes because they needed cash to buy some commodities that could not be bartered, such as wool.[79] In other cases, the cash was planned to be reinvested into agricultural production, either for purchasing tools, fertilizers, and insecticides, or for hiring day labor.[80] But it was just a beginning, and most people who had intended to sell often changed their minds at the last minute or sold less than they had planned; they were considering the social consequences of commercializing their products.

To promote the idea of commercialization and capital accumulation, Vásquez also improved the credit system. At first, it was a *mediania* system, in which the loan would be repaid with half of the total harvest, namely, potatoes, which would then sold to the outside market. Most of the participants were satisfied with this system since they thought it was fairer than any deceiving system that mestizos had ever provided them. Some of them understood this system because of their customary practices to equally divide cigarettes and coca leaves during night watch or irrigation.[81] Others criticized it as unfair since the hacienda only had to provide seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, while the peons had to carry out each step from preparing the field, spacing, seeding, weeding, and fumigating, to irrigating, fencing, and harvesting.[82] In 1954, Vásquez designed a new percentage credit system, in which the hacienda would provide

[78] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[79] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: II, 19, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[80] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 2, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[81] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of D. H., 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[82] Mario C. Vásquez, interview of A. C., 1953, Colección Mario Vásquez.

participants with seeds and fertilizer at low interest rates. After they sold their harvest, they could repay in cash or crops. In the first year, most participants chose to look on, but in 1955, there were seventy-two borrowers.[83] The number dropped to thirty-five in 1956, largely due to cash being available to the Vicosinos at this time.[84] The increasing productivity and gradual acceptance of credit and commercialization together created a short-term potato bonanza at Vicos.[85]

Besides productivity and a credit system, the cooperative is also involved with the issue of land tenure. Nominally, all hacienda land belonged to the patron, who had the right to grant it or take it back. In practical situations, the peons enjoyed secure use rights of their land as long as they fulfilled their hacienda tasks, and they could even manage to acquire more land from the hacienda. Vásquez noticed this division between the wealthy and the poor when he first entered Vicos.[86] In the process of promoting NSP, he also observed how rivalry and competition between individual households caused everyday conflicts that he had to conciliate. Most conflicts resulted from potato damage caused by neighbors' animals[87] and from competition over irrigation water,[88] and Vásquez also observed how Vicosinos took advantage of these conflicts through

[83] Lynch, *The Vicos Experiment*.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Barbara Lynch evaluated this bonanza as only short-term since Vicosinos' potatoes soon would face competition from other places with potato production, the attack of new pathogens, and the loss of soil quality. The overemphasis of potatoes prevented the CPP and Vicos from trying other cash and subsistence crops. See Ibid.

[86] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in July 1949, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[87] Cases in Mario Vásquez field notes in 1953, NSP: II, 11; NSP: II, 20, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[88] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: II, 32, Colección Mario Vásquez.

their relationship with the CCP. Some Vicosinos would pry into other participants' cultivation by trying to get information from them, gossip about others' dishonesty in their use of seeds and fertilizers, claim priority for irrigation compared to the non-participants, and even purposefully seeded potatoes at specific places where animal-caused damage would likely occur, in order to exact revenge for long-term grievances.[89] Realizing this, Vásquez decreased his direct intervention to conciliate, but he did not show his position toward these problems. On one hand, this phenomenon indeed attracted more Vicosinos to voluntarily participate in NSP since they thought their crops would be better protected. On the other hand, Vásquez was probably considering how to balance this individualistic rivalry with the cooperative ideal originally planned in the CPP. In other words, Vicosinos should be encouraged to compete for agricultural productivity but not in a fragmented way, especially in regard to land tenure.

To encourage Vicosinos to work in an integrated way, the CPP had paid attention to developing local leadership. In the official discourse of the CPP, the Project brought Vicosinos out of serfdom to self-decision, but the real process was far more complicated. Before the CPP, besides hacienda patrons, political power in Vicos was shared by two interconnected systems of authority: *mayorales* and *varayoc*. *Mayorales* were patron-assigned overseers for maintaining the operation of the hacienda with the absenteeism of the hacienda patron. *Varayoc* was a civil-religious hierarchy, in which the married male members would take turns serving on positions of communal matters and gradually accumulate their prestige, wealth, and influence as they grew older. Unsurprisingly, *mayorales* assigned by patrons were usually the significant members in the

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[89] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in 1953, NSP: III, 41-50, Colección Mario Vásquez.

varayoc system.[90]

The CPP was good at beginning with the existing institutions of Vicos: it maintained *mayorales* as intermediaries with the Vicosinos, but minimized their power little by little; it kept the command meetings (*mandos*), but turned it into an occasion more like a forum. Every week, the CPP would hold three consecutive meetings from Monday to Wednesday. The first meeting would be among the Project personnel, the second was between Project personnel and the *mayorales* to consult regarding their opinions toward the innovative programs,[91] while the third one was the *mando* to announce policies and decisions and receive the peons' feedback. Vicosinos during the *mandos*, in Vásquez's description, would either keep silent or make sounds of satisfaction or protest, and these were all signs for CPP personnel to either adjust or further clarify their policies. In short, the *mando* was turned into a space of negotiation and persuasion. Besides allowing Vicosinos to negotiate their assigned duty and thus gradually open the space of consensus formation, the CPP also paid much attention to developing an autonomous leadership at Vicos. It began with the election of two leaders among the *mayorales* by themselves, an apparently confusing order for the *mayorales* since they had always understood their role as mediator of patrons' power regarding hacienda affairs. Thus, the power to assign their leaders should belong to the patron. Vásquez recorded that and after further clarification, the *mayorales* exchanged ideas among themselves and nominated the two eldest and most experienced as their own leaders.[92] CPP personnel would in the future gradually encourage younger Vicosinos to

[90] Lynch, *The Vicos Experiment*.

[91] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 27, 1951, p. 3627, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[92] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 27, 1951, p. 3629-30, Colección Mario Vásquez.

compete for the leadership, but at the moment, they did not interfere with the *mayorales'* decision.

The *mayorales'* preconceived idea that they were solely the intermediaries of the patrons' power, rather than leaders directly responsible for their community and people, had created some barriers for the CPP in promoting innovations. For instance, the CPP tried to stop children working through *mayorales'* supervision, to which the *mayorales* did not express their own opinions but only asked the Project personnel to announce it in the *mando* so that people could know it was the patron's order.[93] Their supervision would not be effective unless the peons knew the order came directly from the patrons, the source of ultimate power in the hacienda. In other words, the system of *mayorales* was actually in conflict with the CPP's ideal to build an autonomous community after the Project ended.

At the same time, the CPP's consultative and tolerant attitude toward the peons had gradually shaken the absolute authority of patrons, and thus the *mayorales*. Some *mayoral* complained that people did not listen to them since they were not afraid of the new patrons.[94] The CPP obviously did not want to change its stance because in Mario Vásquez's field notes later in the same year,[95] when the *mayorales* were questioned why they did not push the peons to finish their assigned tasks, they answered it was not due to their delinquency. They themselves were willing to cooperate with the Project, but they had no sufficient authority passed down from the patrons. In other words, the traditional structure of power and control was breaking down, and the CPP must find a new one that suited its goal.

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[93] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 27, 1951, p. 3634, Colección MarioVásquez.

[94] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in March 1952, p. 35, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[95] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on October 15, 1952, p. 7, and November 28, 1952, p. 10, Colección Mario Vásquez.

The CPP's ideal was to develop a younger group of bilingual leaders who could continue to modernize Vicos even after the CPP ended. To achieve this goal, the CPP encouraged Vicosinos to finish their obligatory military service, through which they could learn Spanish and get to know the outside world at almost no cost. Not wanting to lose their laborers, previous patrons would usually help Vicosinos to evade the obligatory military service by hiding them on conscription days or bribing lower-ranking officers. Mario Vásquez again played a role to persuade young male Vicosinos and their families, one by one, to see this obligation in a positive way. In the beginning, while most boys sadly accepted it as their fate, their parents or parents-in-law were very upset and even scolded Vásquez for intervening, especially if they had already planned to bribe their way out of conscription.[96] However, most of the draft age young men still showed up for the medical examination and followed his suggestion. The first groups of veterans would become the backbone of future leadership at Vicos.

In 1956, the first stage of the CPP would come to an end. At that time the Hacienda's fate for the next five years was still unknown, but very possibly it would be rented by some mestizo owner, which would mean a probable retrogression of CPP innovations at Vicos. Allan Holmberg was having problems finding financial support for the Project. Without knowing whether the Peruvian government would permit Vicos to become a cooperative, a process of consensus-making regarding political autonomy and land rights took place at Vicos, and Mario Vásquez made an effort to make it happen.

Vásquez interacted closely with the Vicosinos in planning to collect money and lease Hacienda Vicos by themselves. He knew he personally could play an important role in face of the burgeoning stage of Vicosino democracy. He announced on May 2, 1956, that he would pay

[96] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes in December 1952, p. 6-9, Colección Mario Vásquez.

home visits to the heads of households. When the *mayorales* questioned why he would not directly discuss this issue in the *mando*, Vásquez answered it was because people preferred not to express their real opinions in larger meetings.[97] Between May 3 and 9, he paid home visits to Vicosinos and held small meetings among household heads to discuss the plan. Vásquez usually began by asking them who the real owner of Vicos was, and why the mestizos would want to rent Vicos. He noticed many had realized it was for appropriating Vicosinos' labor force, and then he would bring up the plan to gather all Vicosinos's money to rent the hacienda. In some visits, he would ask people to compare the administrations of the CPP and previous patrons, and suggested that they imagine the economic future of Vicos.

People had different reactions and Vásquez found many had already discussed this plan among themselves before his home visits. Some agreed with it quickly while others said they did not have the money or questioned why everyone should pay the same amount (300 soles) if they did not have an equal size of land or were not equally rich. In some cases, the peons who opposed the plan would be called and persuaded by the supporters.[98] In the end, when asked by Vásquez whether they would approve or disapprove the plan, some said yes while others said they had to talk to their families, or they would try to gather the money; a few worried that their fellow Vicosinos might abuse the collected money. However, most people did not oppose it. Many expressed their trust in Mario Vásquez rather than in their fellow peons since they had done this once before in 1946 but had failed to have their money returned.

On May 9, 1956, Vásquez finally felt that it was time to announce the plan publicly in the *mando*. We cannot say that the whole process of consensus formation was mobilized and

[97] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on May 2, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[98] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on May 9, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

controlled by Vásquez alone. The Vicosinos obviously remember clearly about the failed bidding in 1946, and their small economic success at the moment, due to NSP, certainly gave them hope to try again. Vásquez noticed many of them had already talked about it privately before his visits, but he was not sure about letting them do it alone. His worries came from three interrelated factors: (1) the failed experience in 1946 might cause people's distrust in the traditional leadership in dealing with the collected money; (2) the poverty gap among the Vicosinos would hinder the transition from a hacienda to a cooperative, and they might split up; (3) the Vicosinos' competition to lead the bidding affairs should be channeled into a democratic election.[99] He thought an elected and generally agreed upon group of leaders would be the key to resolving these problems, and thus planned a general election soon afterwards.

The election occurred on October 16, 1956, and each zone of Vicos voted for their respective representatives. There was a total of ten zones in Vicos, and each would elect two representatives to form the new governing body, replacing hacienda patrons and *mayorales*.[100] Vásquez noticed that the traditional structure of power was breaking down; the wealthy and elder group of leaders did not necessarily win more votes than the younger generation.[101] During the meeting among the newly-elected representatives on October 17, an elder representative even expressed his inappropriateness to serve as one of the delegates to Lima for stating their purpose before the Minister of Works and Indigenous Affairs, since he did not understand Spanish,[102] a

[99] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on May 3, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[100] Lynch, *The Vicos Experiment*.

[101] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on the election in Wiash, October 16, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[102] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on the meeting of the representatives, October 17, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

necessity for dealing with the outside world. In both cases, the younger representatives still showed their respects toward the older generation, but the composition of the Vicosino leadership was undergoing change, as the CPP had planned. On December 11, 1956, Vicosinos received the news about the enactment of the Supreme Resolution to the Expropriation of Vicos.[103] Although the expropriation was not realized until 1962, it had already made people widely notice the CPP and wonder about indigenous peasants' ability to manage a cooperative themselves.

Ripple Effects of the CPP and the Proposed Role of Anthropologists

After the first stage of the CPP between 1952 and 1956, Vicos seemed to be on its way to becoming a more productive and autonomous cooperative. Thus, despite the marginal positions of the CPP in Peruvian academia and the impotency of Peruvian Indigenist Institute (*Instituto Indigenista Peruano*, IIP) in Peruvian politics,[104] the transformation of Vicos still created some ripple effects among Peruvian haciendas. Hacienda peasants who had longed for land expropriation and autonomy petitioned the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs and the Peruvian Indigenist Institute, which organized a Technical Committee to study these petitions and provide policy advice.[105] The Peruvian Indigenist Institute had long hoped that Vicos would become a model of agrarian reform for highland haciendas and communities. Thus, as central personnel of the CPP, Mario Vásquez was a certain member of the Committee.

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[103] Mario C. Vásquez, field notes on December 11, 1956, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[104] Himes, "The Impact in Peru of the Vicos Project."

[105] Richard Patch, "Emergencia India: Un Caso," November 14, 1958, MN/ALEV IIP 019, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

In a trip to investigate the petition of Hacienda Lauramarca at Cuzco, Vásquez expressed his ambivalent attitude toward the hope that the CPP had aroused among the Lauramarca peons. He recorded that the Committee members had to explain to the peons that their presence did not promise expropriation, but was to investigate the situation. Ultimately, their report suggested governmental expropriation of Lauramarca and funding its operation as a cooperative.[106] Nevertheless, he emphasized the fundamental solution should not stop at granting them land and providing them financial resources, but to organize a group of technical assistants that could walk the peasants through the process of expropriation and self-government.[107]

It was through his interactions with Vicosinos that Mario Vásquez realized anthropologists could play a significant role as catalyst with respect to promoting the successful agricultural cooperatives. He wrote: "

> If the purchase of the farm is realized without the intervention of some special agency, it runs the risk of the current group of the tenants, based on a common front against the landlords, disorganizing and creating some kind of anarchy. If this occurs, the invested capital to establish the current livestock organization featuring the most advanced technologies for raising sheep will be lost, causing serious damage to the economic and industrial development of the region and the country.[108]

Economic productivity, which definitely would be diminished by the disintegration into smallholdings, was Vásquez's primary concern here. To maintain or even to advance it on the hacienda's basis, he proposed that some proper intervention by specialists was necessary, just as he had walked the Vicosinos through the process of NSP, expropriation, and the general election.

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[106] Anonymous, "Adquisición del Fundo Lauramarca por el Estado, para Organizar Granjas Cooperativas," February 28, 1959, MN/ALEV IIP 027, Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel.

[107] Mario Vásquez and J. Hugo Contreras, "Informe Lauramarca," December 1958, MN/ALEV IIP 021, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[108] Ibid.

Another CPP scholar in the Committee, Richard Patch, also expressed sympathy towards the Lauramarca peasants, but at the same time distrusted their ability to govern themselves immediately after the expropriation.[109] He suggested that expropriation was just a starting point for many problems to follow, which Vicos had spent five years to overcome, such as land division, formation of the entrepreneurial cooperatives, school infrastructure, sanitation facilities, and technological improvement. Vicos was fortunate to have so many resources and people to achieve all this, but Patch questioned how many "Vicos" the Peruvian Indigenist Institute could afford with its meager resources. He wrote:

> In the Peruvian Indigenist Institute, on the fourth floor of the Ministry of Labor, I have had the chance to see an impressive pile of letters from indigenous communities. Some were written by indigenous individuals who had difficulty with Spanish, and some by a lawyer who was paid with hard-earned money. The writers requested that the Institute to provide them security, freedom from unpaid work obligations, and the opportunity to cultivate their own land without interference. So far, the Institute's resources only allows it to reply to these letters.[110]

Both the Peruvian Indigenist Institute and the indigenous communities used the Vicos case to further their respective interests. While the Institute attempted to build its reputation, which hopefully could be translated into administrative resources and political power endowed by the government, the petitioning indigenous communities tried to rephrase their long-term demands so that they looked like ex-Vicos and would win similar attention. As an anthropologist who stood by the side of indigenous peasants, Patch must have felt hopeful and disappointed at the same time to see the pile of unanswered letters at the Peruvian Indigenist Institute. He, and very probably Vásquez, thought if only the government could grant more power and resources to the Institute, and the Institute and the communities could be bridged by more enthusiastic specialists

[109] Patch, "Emergencia India."

[110] Ibid.

trained in anthropology and sociology, Peru could have a more productive indigenous sector and fewer conflicts.

Vásquez's ideas and experiences with the agricultural cooperative were developed into a more sophisticated discourse between 1960 and 1964, during which time Vicos finally obtained its land title, and the cooperative stood out as an acceptable and even desirable project among Peruvian academics and politicians. In their report for AID/ csd-296,[111] titled "The Transformation of Manors into Producers' Cooperatives," Mario Vásquez and Henry Dobyns depicted the CPP as a successful case proving that violent revolution was not an unavoidable step to overthrowing latifundium and improving peasants' lives.[112]

Their report also clearly lays out what they consider to be the ideal cooperative, which could be divided into five aspects. First, the cooperative means the coexistence of communally and individually owned land, previously structured by the hacienda system in order to prevent further land fragmentation through redistribution.[113] Second, it is a modern organization characterized by a rationalized administration and management, and distinguished from the "indigenous community" featuring organized reciprocity and civil-religious hierarchy.[114] Third, the cooperative is the basic unit within which to spread innovative agricultural technologies and

[111] The report is translated and expanded from their two Spanish position papers presented to the officials of the Peruvian government between 1960 and 1963.

[112] Mario C. Vásquez and Henry Dobyns, "The Transformation of Manors into Producers' Cooperatives," report for AID/csd-296, January, 1964, Box 9, Folder 72, Allan R. Holmberg Collection.

[113] Ibid., 16-7.

[114] Ibid., 6-9.

improve productivity.[115] Fourth, it must be supported by a strong source of capital or a credit system, which in the beginning would possibly be from the government, in order to introduce new technologies.[116] Fifth, the cooperative also plays an educative function by training ex-serfs to become modern shareholders.[117] Social scientists are the "participant interveners . . . who know how to channel the initiative and the frequently very small scale and limited objectives and social aspirations"[118] of the peasants.

The authors' blueprint of the cooperative was very much influenced by Mario Vásquez's fieldwork experience between 1948 and 1956. The CPP had maintained the co-existence of communally and individually held land, and it proved to be a workable strategy. On one hand, the commercially profitable land belonging to the hacienda before 1962, was kept intact and thus facilitated the experimentation, demonstration, and spread of new technologies. On the other hand, the Vicosinos did not feel as though they were being deprived since they still had their original land in use. For Vásquez, therefore, the CPP had not imposed any dramatic restructuring of land tenure, and neither did it instigate serious resistance.[119]

Vásquez was especially concerned with the rationalization of the cooperative administration and management, and the authors repeatedly clarified how it was different from the operation of a traditional indigenous community. The targets to change consisted of three

[115] Ibid., 2-5.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid., 7.

[118] Ibid., 25.

[119] Ibid., 14-5.

levels: patron-client relationship, civil-religious hierarchy, and communal reciprocity. During his fieldwork, Vásquez had attempted to end the patron-client relationship that the Vicosinos had endowed to him, and he tried to make it clear that patronage and bribery would not work anymore under this new "patron." Rules were rules, and the peasants gradually needed to learn to make decisions on their own and be responsible for them. Though starting with the limited autonomy of the *mayorales* to elect their own leaders, the CPP ultimately weakened the power of the *mayorales*; they were partially based on the patrons' authority and partially on the civil-religious hierarchy, and they constituted an obstacle for change.[120] The CPP intended to develop a younger generation of leadership at Vicos, men who would presumably accept new ideas of the cooperative management more quickly, since they spoke Spanish (mostly learned during military service); the CPP needed new resources to help these men climb the hierarchy faster.

Furthermore, based on Vásquez's observation of the Vicosinos' reciprocal practices and at the same time competitive relationships, the authors inferred there was no way the traditional Andean spirit of cooperation could be directly translated into the cooperative movement.[121] Reciprocal relationships were based mainly on real and artificial kinship ties, and their focus was the welfare and reputation of the respective households. Vásquez was impressed by how Vicosinos gossiped or complained about their neighbors in front of him in order to win favors from the patron. What he gradually realized during the fieldwork was that Vicosinos were competitive and individualistic, a good motivating force for pursuing innovation and progress. Nevertheless, this quality needed to be channeled into something more farsighted. Vásquez and

[120] Ibid., 6.

[121] Ibid., 9.

Dobyns wrote: ". . . the modern cooperative movement operates through capitalistic institutions with a philosophy, principles, objectives and goals that require formal administration organization, written rules, compliance with nation laws, an ample monetary base, and modern methods of production, distribution, and accounting."[122] They envisioned a modern and rational mode of organization and production for Vicosinos and for all other peasants in Peru, Latin America, and potentially the whole world. The above-listed requirements could by no means be directly transferred from traditional communal reciprocity. Besides, based on Vásquez's observation, Vicosinos themselves clearly distinguished reciprocal exchanges from commercialization. It would be unreasonable to suggest they were the same thing.

Most significantly, it was also Vásquez's experience at Vicos that specialists such as anthropologists could play a significant role in promoting the cooperative movement. With social scientific sensitivities, they could more easily win the trust of local people through participating in their life and production. Nevertheless, they stood at a more objective and farsighted position than the locals, so they could channel competition of local people into a more productive and integrated direction, as Vásquez did during NSP and the purchase of Hacienda Vicos.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I focused on how the experience of the Cornell-Peru Project influenced the Peruvian anthropologist, Mario Vásquez, to develop his design of a modern agricultural cooperative. Across the spectrum of ideas and practices related to the cooperative, his was a model of applied anthropology and modernization. From 1948 to 1962, at the national level, the idea of the cooperative evolved from a dangerous and forbidden topic to a well-accepted and applicable solution to problems of the hacienda system. The CPP at Vicos was not the sole

[122] Ibid.

contributor to this transition, but it constituted a basis for Vásquez to frame his ideas about Peru's agrarian reform prospects for the future. Also, the publicity of the CPP made it an iconic case for mass media when they discussed the issue of rural development and agrarian reform.[123] Labeled as a mediator of Yankee imperialism by the left and a communist guerilla instigator by conservatives, Mario Vásquez's academic career did not unfold well in Peru before 1969.[124] Nor did the mainstream social scientific community pay much attention to the CPP. Before analyzing how his ideas and career were integrated into Juan Velasco's government, in the next chapter we will discuss the mainstream social scientific thoughts about the cooperative proposed by the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP), and how they were different from Vásquez's version.

[123] For example, the widely-circulated magazine among upper-class limeño readers, *Careta*, always posed the CPP at Vicos as a model for land appropriation in Peru. See E. Zileri Gibson, "Los Quieren Traicionar," *Careta* 223 (1961): 12-4. Box 10, Folder 31, Allan Holmberg Collection.

[124] Mario Vásquez to John Roberts, January 31, 1967, Box 1, Folder 6, Allan Holmberg Collection.

Chapter Three
Tackling the "National Problem," Proposing the Cooperative: UNMSM, *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*, and the Chancay Valley Project, 1962-1968

This chapter deals with the Peruvian anthropologists who voluntarily took responsibility for empirically studying the country's social reality and redefining the "national problem." Their contributions were significant not only for establishing academic excellence in Peruvian anthropology, but also for their achievements in building institutions and creating social prestige for social scientists in Peru. Eventually, they earned the opportunity to influence the official political discourse on rural Peru and the resulting reformative projects, especially during the regimes of Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968) and Juan Velasco (1968-1975).

This chapter elucidates how they achieved this status within two decades of the introduction of modern anthropology in Peru, through a case study of the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP) and its initial large-scale research project at the Valley of Chancay. Although IEP was only one example of the noted private research institutes to serve as a think tank in contemporary Peru,[1] it was representative of how the problematique was reoriented in the currency of dependency theories through scholars' intellectual and institutional works. IEP's case also illustrates well how the political agenda of the cooperative could be based on empirical social scientific studies.

This chapter will begin with a broader historical context of the 1960s, and explore how this context shaped the scholars' common outlook, echoing the universal demand for

[1] Another famous case would be DESCO (*Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo*) established in 1965, one year after IEP. See Fred Bronner, "Peruvian Historians Today: Historical Setting," *The Americas* 43, no. 3 (1987): 245-77.

fundamental change from their positions as social scientists. Within this context, the chapter continues to illustrate the scholars' efforts at institution building, from the public university of San Marcos to the private research center, IEP. Their endeavors to tap financial resources, distinguish themselves from old-school Latin American intellectuals, and compete with other newly established social scientific disciplines, are the topics of this section. Furthermore, these efforts at institution building should be understood against the contemporary politics of knowledge, including the caution toward Yankee imperialism among Latin American countries, and the internal strife between Peruvian political parties that has permeated academia. The Chancay Valley Project witnessed not only how IEP survived its early years under these attacks and suspicions, but also served as the first reputable large-scale project that set the tone of IEP until 1985. The section on the Chancay Valley Project will gradually focus on how the Huayopampa case study would ultimately become IEP's proposed prototype of the agricultural cooperative for the Velasco government.

The primary sources in this chapter include correspondences, administrative documents, university journals, and newspaper clippings stored in (1) *Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura, Perú*, (2) *Archivo Histórico Domingo Angulo, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Perú*, and (3) Papers of John Victor Murra, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution. Additionally, a long interview with Jürgen Golte complements the picture of the Chancay Valley Project with his personal fieldwork experiences. The secondary sources that were especially inspiring for this chapter include William F. Whyte's autobiography *Participant Observer*,[2] Juan Javier Rivera Andía's "*Bibliografía etnológica sobre el valle del*

[2] William F. Whyte, *Participant Observer: An Autobiography* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

Chancay,"[3] and the IEP publications and *Memorias* collected at its *Biblioteca María Rostworowski*.

Historical Context

If we say the 1950s in Peru, as in most parts of the world, had been a politically conservative period featuring an optimistic faith in modernization and technology, then the 1960s was a time filled with distrust in authority and calls for revolution. Internationally, the success of the Cuban Revolution in the late 1950s crumbled the old order and set the tone for the following decade. The civil rights movement, feminist movement, anti-war movement, and student movement spread all over the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, and Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico. In Peru, the peasant guerilla movement led by Hugo Blanco in the early 1960s was well received by the left-leaning youth and constituted part of their identity as a generation under the universal current of radical politics.[4]

Nevertheless, if we examine Peru in the 1960s more closely, we will see that student movements, peasant mobilizations, and left-leaning intellectuals were actually in a process of fragmentation rather than unification.[5] The politicization of student movements in Peru liquidated the public universities as an ideal field to promote the study of social reality. Thus, in

[3] Juan Javier Rivera Andía's "*Bibliografía etnológica sobre el valle del Chancay,*" *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, February 1, 2006. Accessed December, 17, 2013. http://nuevomundo.revues.org/1609

[4] Burga, *La historia y los historiadores en el Perú* (see intro. n.7).

[5] See how Jürgen Golte distinguishes between IEP founders and students in "50 años de reorientación de los trabajos del IEP: las sociedades campesinas y la migración a las ciudades," in *50 años pensando el Perú: una reflexión crítica. El Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1964-2014,* ed. Martín Tanaka (Lima: IEP, 2014), 35-62.

the 1960s, Peru, as in many other Latin American countries,[6] witnessed a growth of non-governmental, private research organizations replacing public universities as the centers for intellectual debate and the national think tanks, including IEP.[7] Many left-leaning scholars actually expected to cooperate with the reform-friendly regimes of the military junta (1962-1963) and Belaúnde (1963-1968), even though the governments' repression of student and labor movements aroused their anger and criticism.[8]

The cleavages between the established scholars and the student movements will be further developed in the section on institution building. Here, for the purpose of providing a general context, it is sufficient to emphasize that anthropologists, under a universal current of radical politics, perceived their mission in a specific way—to study the social reality and solve the national problem. It was a mission implying academic excellence, social prestige, and political influence, and it was fundamentally different from union organizing and armed revolution. Their "national problem" was differentiated from that of the *indigenista* posed by their predecessors, and was strongly influenced by the dependency-theorist inquiries made by the intellectual circle in Santiago, Chile.[9] Here in Peru, the anthropologists' concern began by observing excessive urban migration in Lima, a phenomenon resulting from rural

[6] Daniel Levy, "Latin America's Think Tanks: The Roots of Nonprofit Privatization," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 30, no. 2 (1995): 3-25.

[7] Burga, *La historia y los historiadores en el Perú*.

[8] Martin Quintana Ch., Rodolfo Guevara T., Julio Llanos C., et al. "Moción de Orden del Día," January 31, 1963, Sala 2, Caja 302, Código de Referencia 319, Numero de Ítem. 259, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[9] Beigel, "The Internationalization and Institutionalization of Research and Higher Education in Latin America (see intro. n. 37).

underdevelopment.[10] In contrast to the modernization perspective to the "isolated Indians" in the 1950s, scholars in the 1960s were equipped with the theoretical framework of dependency theories to explore the relationships between "peasants" and the larger economic and political order. In the section on intellectual development, I discuss their arguments more closely. Here, I simply state that these scholars agreed that agrarian reform was necessary to change the existing unproductive and paternalistic system of production; this was the radical change they foresaw and were devoted to.

Institution Building: From San Marcos to IEP

Previously, we have seen how Luis Valcárcel built the Institute of Ethnology in the *Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM),* whose initial stage had relied much on U.S. curricula and teaching materials. Throughout the 1950s, young scholars who had recently graduated from the Institute came back to try to solidify it; one key figure in this effort was José Matos Mar (1921-2015). Ever since Matos Mar was a young scholar, his ambition was to carry on Valcárcel's proposal that anthropologists should redefine the national problem. In 1953, while studying in Paris, he wrote to Valcárcel with a passionate tone:

> I continue to be more convinced that what we have proposed, besides being very logical, has a scientific direction. Here, once again, I note a little background about the organization of ethnological studies. They are in total dysfunction. There are so many famous people, including the best specialists and scientists from all fields, but they are so dispersed or specialized, making the Institute of Ethnology of the Museum of Man nothing compared to [our Institute], neither in terms of fieldwork nor a comprehensive program. When I look more deeply, I see only disorientation. The Museum of Man has a wonderful appearance and rich collections, in addition to a strong and solid spirit among the young ethnologists . . . but there is no guiding body in this environment. . . . The group of sociologists and economists is strong. Their work is amazing; they have enthusiasm, they create organizations, have big plans, and they do work. But they do

[10] "Entrevista a José Matos Mar: Lima, diciembre 2001," in *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología del 26 de mayo de 1965*, ed. Carmen María Pinilla (Lima: IEP, 2003), 57-70.

not crystalize a single bit of information or a supporting argument.[11]

Matos Mar was fascinated by the talented scholars and abundant resources in Paris. However, he could not understand why the research directions were so dispersed compared to Peru. As for the direction Peruvians should pursue, he proposed that the *Realidad Peruana* was definitely the right way to go.[12]

Retrospectively, Matos Mar traced his concern about the national problem and social reality back to his participation in an intellectual group called *Espacio*, which began in the late 1940s.[13] *Espacio* was composed of artists, architects, urban planners, writers, novelists, art critics, and musicians, who were concerned about Lima's population explosion. After Matos Mar came back from Paris in 1954, old friends from the *Espacio* encouraged him to gather a group together to discuss how Peru could become a nation and society in which all people participated. They met once a week; underdevelopment theorists, such as Gregorio Garayar, Emilio Gastanon Pasqual, and Jorge Bravo Bresani, were the guests. These meetings became the basis for the *Movimiento Social Progresista* (MSP) in the 1950s.[14]

MSP's understanding of the urban population explosion problem was connected to the issue of rural underdevelopment. Fragmentation of cultivatable land, population pressure, and the inefficiency of the hacienda system constituted a drive for emigration. A social scientific understanding of rural society, upon which agrarian reform could be planned, was necessary to

[11] José Matos Mar to Luis E. Valcárcel, December 9, 1953, ALEV C M 164-192, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[12] José Matos Mar to Luis E. Valcárcel, May 26, 1954, ALEV C M 164-192, Matos Mar 8, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[13] "Entrevista a José Matos Mar."

[14] Ibid.

slow the inflow of rural immigrants. With an institutional position at San Marcos University, Matos Mar worked from the Institute of Ethnology.

In 1958, the Institute of Ethnology was renamed the Institute of Ethnology and Archaeology with a reorientation of its courses and research. The course design was adjusted from an emphasis on Incan history and U.S. anthropology to a concern of social reality and development. By 1959, Matos Mar was a professor and Chief of Ethnological Research at the Institute. The syllabus between 1959 and 1961 showed more attention for cultural change and applied research.[15] The reformative actions initiated by young Matos Mar, then 38 years old, aroused the attention and displeasure of the Dean of the School of Arts.[16] José María Arguedas, who stated, "The old University defends itself with claws and teeth, and no doubt it arranges to strengthen those who will represent the University in the future."[17]

While the Institute of Ethnology was differentiating from its literary and historical roots and aligning more with social sciences, it faced the discontentment of the archaeologists inside the Institute[18] and the threat of annexation by the new Department of Sociology.[19] In the end it

[15] "Syllabus, Año académico de 1959," MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0002, and "Syllabus, Año académico de 1961," MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0004, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[16] José Matos Mar to John Murra, March 13, 1959, Series I. Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Victor Murra, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution (hereafter cited as Papers of John Murra).

[17] José María Arguedas to Luis E. Valcárcel, April 27, 1959, ALEV C A 181-185, Arguedas 36, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[18] José Matos Mar to John Murra, August 3, 1961, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

[19] José Matos Mar to Luis E. Valcárcel, June 2, 1960, and August 23, 1960, ALEV C M 164-192, Matos Mar 8, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

was agreed to maintain ethnology and archaeology together under the name of anthropology,[20] and the Institute of Ethnology and Archaeology was renamed in 1962 as the Department of Anthropology. Despite the hostile environment for the nascent anthropology in Peru in the 1950s, it was an undeniable fact that due to Matos Mar's efforts, anthropology was getting students, opportunities for fieldwork, and potential plans for further research.[21] Between 1961 and 1965, Departments of Sociology and Anthropology steadily recruited more and more students while the more traditional departments of the School of Arts, such as History and Literature, were losing students.[22]



Figure 1. Student Numbers in the School of Arts, UNMSM, 1961-1965 (source: self-made)

Student movements were radicalized as Matos Mar was about to enact the blueprint for an anthropological approach to studying social reality by arranging student fieldwork at the

[20] José María Arguedas to Luis E. Valcárcel, March 6, 1962, ALEV C A 186 190-231 233, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[21] John Murra to José Matos Mar, August 12, 1961, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

[22] "Número de Alumnos Matriculados en la Doctoral de Letras en los Años 1961-1965," Sala 2, Caja 304, Código de Referencia 331, Archivo Domingo Angulo. Figure 1 was made according to this document. I show only four departments although the document also includes the departments of Art, Linguistics, Geography, Philosophy, and Psychology. The Department of Sociology was established in 1962 and thus did not include 1961 data.

Chancay Valley since 1962. At first the scholars interpreted the student movement as a symptom of the public universities' structural problems, and tried to propose reformative changes. In 1953, the philosopher Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias concluded in "Synthesis of the University Problem" that the main issue was insufficient economic resources to insure that instructors and students' could fully dedicate themselves to quality education.[23] The University did make some effort to stop this vicious circle. For example, in 1962, the Rector of UNMSM signed "Regulations for the Full-Time Professors" to manage full-time professors' responsibilities of teaching, research, and technical advising to the university authorities or organizations.[24] Full-time professors should spend at least five hours a day on campus for the above-mentioned obligations and teach no more than three related lectures. Neither could they serve in any public or private position outside the University.

While proposing the reforms and regulations, these scholars were also observing students' class performance. Especially in the case of anthropology, student attendance was low partly due to students' disinterest in cultural issues. José María Arguedas once wrote to the Dean of the School of Arts to explain why fourteen percent of his students in the course, "Introduction of Anthropology," failed to pass: "The average attendance of students was never higher than fifty, even though the total number of registered students was nearly three hundred. . . . The written exam showed that these students do not read the recommended bibliography. Without reading the recommended books as a foundation, and without attending the classes, this majority of students

[23] Francisco Miró Quesada, "Síntesis del Problema Universitario," March 11, 1953. Folder MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0021, Archivo Luis Valcárcel. Miró Quesada became the Minister of Education between 1963 and 1964 and also competed for the position of Rector of National University of San Marcos in 1966.

[24] "Reglamento para los profesores a tiempo completo, Resolución No. 19560, Aprobado el Reglamento del profesorado a tiempo completo y dedicación exclusiva," Sala 2, Caja 299, Código de Referencia 310, Numero de Ítem 252, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

seem to take the exam as an adventure." [25] In this letter, Arguedas suggested that the poor attendance and participation might result from the fact that not many students really needed this course. He proposed a curriculum reform reflecting students' real needs as a possible strategy to address the problem.

What did the students really want to learn? In another report, Gabriel Escobar depicted the passion and limitations of contemporary university students.[26] His seminar titled "Cultural Change" attracted a good number of senior students attending classes regularly, except on strike days. Nevertheless, he realized that students had different expectations from his:

> Theories and cases took two-thirds of the professor's time. The remaining time was dedicated to analyzing the relationship between anthropological theories and experiences of development and change, and the consideration of applied anthropology. This emphasis was due to **the enormous interests of students to the problem of development today**, in our country and the world. . . . During the year, two written exams were taken. . . . The overall result shows that while the students have a good control of information, **they still have limitations in their perception of scientific questions, difficulties in analysis, and a strong tendency to raise questions and solutions in ideological terms.** The other limitation was the fact that, while they have some control of the theories and methods, **they do not appreciate cultural differences, patterns of culture, and ethnographic information**. In contrast, almost all show **a strong tendency for sociologizing and much interest in the solution of practical problems that a course of this nature could not offer.**[27]

While anthropologists of the younger generation were already very much aware of the need to shape the newly consolidated discipline of anthropology to address the urgency of reform, anthropology's emphasis on cultural differences, pluralism, and tenacity could offer only indirect

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[25] José María Arguedas, "Informe sobre el Curso de Introducción a la Antropología," February 13, 1963, Sala 2, Caja 301, Código de Referencia 315, Numero de Ítem 257, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[26] Gabriel Escobar, "Informe del Catedrático de Etología (Cambio Cultural) del Departamento de Antropología de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de Dan Marcos sobre sus Actividades Académicas del Año 1965," December 29, 1965, Sala 2, Caja 307, Código de Referencia 335, Numero de Ítem 274, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[27] Ibid. Emphases mine.

answers to the young passionate students' questions and expectations. In contrast, Maoist pamphlets provided radical ideas and vocabularies that were easily applied to the students' organizing efforts.[28]

What students mobilized against was the university administration and student unions infiltrated by Aprism. APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) had once been the progressive political party and was influential among student and labor unions between 1945 and 1948. However, after the military coup in 1948 and the prohibition of union organizations, unions waned while APRA lost its radical characteristic and began to be abhorred by the radical sectors.[29] While university administrations kept a close relationship with APRA for resources, student movements viewed Apristas as their class enemies.[30] In the case of UNMSM, Aprista Rector Luis Alberto Sánchez won the rector election for the third time in 1966, an easy target of student movements between 1966 and 1969. The University adopted a repressive attitude toward the student strikes and sought help from the police.[31] In 1969, Luis Alberto Sánchez was forced to resign under the new University Law, D. L. 17437, but student political activities and student co-governance were also cancelled. Student movements lost their immediate goal of expelling Sánchez, while encountering repression from the government. Still lacking an alternative to university problems, the only reason for students to organize was democratization, which was

[28] Nicolás Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos: El radicalismo universitario de los años setenta* (1990: El Zorro de Abajo, Lima), 64.

[29] Julio Cotler, "Democracy and National Integration in Peru," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, eds., Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 3-38.

[30] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos,* 279.

[31] Centro Federado de Letras, "Informe a los Estudiantes de San Marcos," Sala 2, Caja 308, Código de Referencia 340, Numero de Ítem 279, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

interpreted as the elevation of students' status, resulting in a wave of expulsions of professors,[32] including Matos Mar in 1969.

Many intellectuals of Matos Mar's generation expressed their general disappointment with the student movement. Alberto Escobar criticized the movement and politics as having nothing to do with Peru's real problems; they were characterized by an ideological poverty. The university they were trying to shape was not for the society, but at the expense of it.[33] The Project of General Study, one reformative project promoted by Augusto Salazar Bondy to restructure freshman courses and improve academic production, was rejected by the student unions as a Yankee scheme.[34] During this reform process, the scholars figured out they would eventually need another academic stage to continue their ideal, and IEP was clearly the best possibility. Retrospectively, in the memoir of IEP spanning twenty-five years, Alberto Escobar elaborated:

> The founders of IEP were certain that a university education at the time would not allow for the development of suitable researchers or discussion about training them with a new approach that reflected reality.Therefore, they proceeded to diverge from the kind of widespread training typical of the country's universities. By undertaking interdisciplinary research, they lay the foundation for their future work, which became a framework for preparing new researchers in Lima and other regions of the country, as well. [35]

The creation of IEP was clearly under the currency of social reality study, posed as the basis for

[32] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos*, 23-5, 47-67.

[33] Alberto Escobar, "El problema universitario o el vacío ideológico," in *Perú: hoy*, José Matos Mar et al. eds., (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1971) 260-304.

[34] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos,* 22-3.

[35] Alberto Escobar, *IEP Memoria 25 Años*, (Lima: IEP, 1989), 13-4.

any reformative actions. Drafting the fundamental document of IEP,[36] Matos Mar and Jorge Bravo Bresani[37] wrote:

> It is obvious that planning for development and institutional and structural reforms, cannot occur without sufficient knowledge about social reality as a dynamic process requiring the contribution of all social disciplines, including history, to achieve a complete interpretation of this complex reality. This approach eliminates static visions and purely economic or sociological schematizations, as well as culturalist visions that do not adequately integrate the historical and social context and historical-political perspective. . . . [IEP's] fundamental objective is to improve the knowledge of all social sciences for the development of Peru. Development here is understood as expansion with economic progress in terms of structural change aimed at the promotion of the whole man and all of mankind.[38]

This passage, first of all, shows IEPs interdisciplinary approach to studying Peruvian development with the collaboration of economists, sociologists, historians, and anthropologists. Secondly, it attempts to dilute the influence of the previously dominant *indigenista* and culturalist perspectives among Peruvian intellectuals. *Indigenismo* had once been a progressive intellectual movement between late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, which sought to elevate the status of indigenous cultures, especially in the glorious past, and improve the quality of life for contemporary indigenous people. Culturalism came into Peru through the introduction of U.S. anthropology and the Boasian approach, which for Luis E. Valcárcel coincided with the essence of *indigenismo* against racism. For Bravo Bresani, they were revolutionary but also utopian; for the indigenous people, changes and contacts were always occurring, and an overemphasis on cultural uniqueness would easily lead to the trap of

[36] José Matos Mar and Jorge Bravo Bresani, "Instituto de Estudios Peruanos," January, 1964. Folder MN/ALEV IEP 002, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[37] Bravo Bresani was an economist and the first Director of the IEP between 1964 and 1965. He was one of the important scholars who introduced the theory of development and underdevelopment into Peru. His representative publication is *Desarrollo y subdesarrollo, de una economía del hambre a una economía del hombre* (Lima: Francisco Moncloa, 1967).

[38] José Matos Mar and Jorge Bravo Bresani, "Instituto de Estudios Peruanos."

stereotypes and ethnocentrism.[39] Social scientific understanding of development issues turned out to be the core of IEP at its inception.

Fundamentally, IEP hypothesized that Peruvian reality was a circuit of external domination, internal domination, and underdevelopment. Based on this hypothesis, two large research projects marked IEP's early days—"Large Company (*Gran Empresa*)" and "Rural Changes (*Cambios Rurales*)"—which constituted the two ends of the internal structure of domination.[40] It was inferred that since the 1950s, the traditional internal structure of domination saw its own collapse. Different transformation processes occurred in different areas and groups. Some rural areas were facing problems of land fragmentation and scarcity, as well as competition for land resources with neighboring haciendas, thus witnessing waves of migration, unionization, and land invasions. Others grasped at opportunities provided by technological innovation, especially in agriculture, to improve productivity and be further involved in the market system. This approach dominated IEP's perspective in explaining Peru's reality and problems for its first five years, from 1964 to 1969,[41] which is best exemplified through the Chancay Valley Project.

Politics of knowledge: Funding, Yankee Imperialism, and APRA-MSP Opposition

The Chancay Valley Project emerged from a few short field trips for Matos Mar's *sanmarquino* students in the course, "Ethnological Research in Peru: Field and Cabinet Works"

[39] Carmen María Pinilla, ed., *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología del 26 de mayo de 1965*. (Lima: IEP, 2003).

[40] Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, *El Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: la institución y sus actividades (1964-1968)*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1968. Accessed April 13, 2016. http://repositorio.iep.org.pe/handle/IEP/150

[41] Escobar, *IEP Memoria 25 Años*, 14-5.

during the school vacation in 1962.[42] It marked the transformation of the Department of Anthropology's focus from community-based research and education using North American methodology, to development-centered and social scientific research.[43] Matos Mar had brewed the idea to find more resources and expand the project for several years; short field trips limited by the university budget and class schedule could not satisfy Matos Mar's ambition.

After the first field trip in early 1962, Matos Mar wrote to John Murra to ask if he knew anything about a Ford Foundation mission that would support research projects on indigenous communities.[44] At first, Murra was not sure about the mission Matos Mar had referred to, so he recommended Matos Mar look for William Foote Whyte: "Now, I do know there will be some mission to recognize the necessities of various university institutions, since I am almost named as its member. . . . The one who will really be the advisor of this mission is William Whyte, who is now in Peru, and it will be very useful to maintain contact with him since this segment of the Ford Foundation is ready to spend money with an open mind."[45] After talking with Sidney Mintz about the funding orientation of the Ford Foundation, Murra added on March 16 that: ". . . they now do not get involved in research abroad. It is true that they give money to reinforce the local institutions, which may or may not do research. But the Foundation does not sponsor research anymore. It is possible that the Foundation supports one or another young researcher in terms of

[42] Jehan Vellard to Jorge Puccinelli, November 23, 1962, Sala 2, Caja 300, Código de Referencia 312, Numero de Ítem 255, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[43] "Syllabus, Año académico de 1967," Folder MN/ALEV-UNMSM-0005, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[44] John Murra to José Matos Mar, March 11, 1962, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

[45] Ibid.

training, and in many cases the funding is really limited."[46] The shift from funding research projects abroad to research and scholar training at local institutions, played an important role in the establishment of the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*. During this time, Matos Mar was introduced to William F. Whyte by Allan Holmberg, the director of the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos.

Whyte had joined the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University in 1948. During his sabbatical year between 1961 and 1962, Whyte conducted a research project, "Human Problems of Industrial Development," surveying values and attitudes relevant to entrepreneurial achievement among high school students of different social classes.[47] Although he was not directly involved in the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos,[48] Whyte visited Vicos during the year, and his research began smoothly thanks to the contacts made through Allan Holmberg.[49] In the beginning, however, Matos Mar was probably more conscious of how their networking would bring future cooperation than Whyte, since Murra had reminded him of that. Whyte originally had thought about working with Holmberg in order to show a larger picture of Peruvian social and economic development—Holmberg would work on the rural research and he would work on the industrial sector. However, Holmberg's health was declining

[46] Ibid.

[47] See Hilda Berger, "Dr. William F. Whyte: Un año de investigación social en el Perú," August 27, 1962, *Expreso*, p.11, and Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 207-20.

[48] Whyte did write to Rose Goldstein to ask for the questionnaire on attitudes and values that she designed for Vicos and he revised to suit his own project. Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 220.

[49] More specifically, the IIP director, Carlos Monge, had helped the Whyte family settle down in Lima, and two of Whyte's assistants, Hernan Castillo and Mario Vallejos were introduced through Holmberg. Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 216.

due to leukemia, and Fernando Belaúnde Terry's emphasis on rural development during his presidential campaign intrigued Whyte to become involved in rural research himself.[50] While Whyte needed Matos Mar to bring him into the field of rural Peru, Matos Mar needed Whyte to bring in more financial resources. They agreed on cooperation shortly after the general election on June 9, 1963.[51] In early 1964, after the establishment of IEP, they decided to make it the headquarters of the project on rural change. The New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations and the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* signed a contract in late 1964.[52]

Research projects on rural changes defined IEP's intellectual orientation to a large degree, but also financially nurtured its initial stage. Retrospectively, Whyte recalled how the funding for this project maintained IEP at that time:

> Larry Williams and I had nothing to do with the creation of IEP, but, in its early months, we accepted an invitation from Matos to develop our research program in Peru in collaboration with IEP. For twelve years Larry Williams and I made IEP the physical and intellectual center of our work in Peru. We brought in substantial grant money that may have been essential to keep IEP alive in the early years, as grant money from the Peruvian government and other Peruvian sources was drying up. I take special satisfaction from the fact that IEP was able to continue a very dynamic and productive existence in the years after Cornell financial support had terminated.[53]

The "grant money from the Peruvian government" refers to funding from the Ministry of Public Education. Between June 1964 and May 1965, IEP was subsidized by the project on rural

[50] Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 223.

[51] Ibid., 224.

[52] "Convenio entre Universidad de Cornell e Instituto de Estudios Peruanos," Series I, Box 18, Folder Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Papers of John Murra.

[53] William F. Whyte to Davydd Greenwood and Tom Holloway, April 16, 1985, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

changes, namely Cornell University, with S/.53, 811.50.[54] But the biggest funder the first year was the Ministry of Public Education of Peru, where Valcárcel had served as Minister between 1945 and 1947, and Francisco Miró Quesada served between 1963 and 1964. Between 1964 and 1965, IEP's total income was S/.858, 624.00, among which S/.800, 000.00 (ninety-three percent) came from the monthly subsidy of the Ministry. It would be safe to say the Ministry of Public Education gave birth to IEP.[55] However, U.S. funding channeled through Cornell became more and more important.[56]

Whyte and Matos Mar kept looking for more funding while expanding the project to include more universities, students, and field sites. In the November 1964 AAA (American Anthropological Association) meeting, Whyte presented a report on the Chancay Valley, which interested the director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Lee Huff, and brought a chance of funding. ARPA was part of the U.S. Department of Defense. Although Huff promised Whyte that ARPA did not require any secrecy, and there would be no intervention regarding research and publications, Matos Mar was still worried about the sensitiveness of receiving Pentagon funding. Ultimately, they expediently agreed to use ARPA's money to pay Cornell researchers while IEP would use only National Science Foundation funding. Their proposal was approved in the end of March, 1965.[57]

In the summer of 1965, the Camelot scandal broke in Chile and the news spread all over

[54] "Balance de Ingresos y Egresos: 1 de junio de 1964 a 31 de mayo de 1965," Folder MN/ALEV IEP 003, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[55] Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 227.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., 233.

Latin America. Matos Mar was getting worried since he had told only Luis Valcárcel about the ARPA money; none of the others on the IEP board of directors had heard about it. Whyte and Matos Mar decided to call a meeting and tell the truth—the members showed their concerns and unwillingness to be directly involved. This meeting did not immediately stop ARPA funding; it simply suggested that ARPA money would only pay the Cornell side, not the IEP side.[58]

The situation became strained in January 1966, when information about ARPA funding leaked out. It ultimately became the front-page story in *La Tribuna*, the official organ of the APRA party, on February 11, and appeared in the press continuously on February 12, 13, 18 and 19.[59] The reports suggested that IEP scholars, who used to label themselves as anti-imperialists and sympathizers with the left, were taking money from the Pentagon through some wirepuller called "Mr. White," to study the social reality of Peru—a project similar to Camelot in Chile.[60] On February 19, the honorary president of IEP, Luis Valcárcel, wrote a letter of proclamation to the director of *La Tribuna* to clarify the project contents, the members and institutions involved, and the funding for rural change projects.

Valcárcel asseverated that IEP did not receive any money from the Pentagon. Although North American universities and private foundations were important funding sources, this was a general and acceptable situation among Peruvian organizations. He had also hoped IEP could raise more money from Peruvian sources, but in 1966, for example, the funding from the

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[58] Ibid., 234.

[59] Ibid., 235.

[60] "La política y los políticos: Con la verdad no ofendo ni temo," February 12, 1966, *La Tribuna*, p. 4. "Furibundos antiyanquis: Sabios Encabezados por Miro Quesada Estudiarían al Perú con Dinero de EE. UU.," February 13, 1966, *La Tribuna*, p. 1. "Pentágono Subvenciona Comunistas y Comparsa: Paco Miroquesada, Matos Mar y Salazar Bondy juegan a comunistas y cobran dólares yanquis," February 18, 1966, *La Tribuna*, p. 1.

Ministry of Public Education accounted only for one-third of IEP's income. The project on rural changes was not a Peruvian version of Camelot, either; it was designed to understand social and cultural changes happening to indigenous peasants and communities. Valcárcel also rectified the participants involved: William Whyte, not White, was not some deceased wirepuller working for the Pentagon but a prestigious sociologist at Cornell University. He also clarified that not all IEP leading members were involved, as the reports had stated. Even with this clarification, the rumors about IEP as a congregation of anti-imperialist communists taking Yankee imperialists' money did not vanish immediately,[61] and this greatly shook Whyte and Matos Mar's original plan to pay the Cornell side of this project with ARPA money. They returned the unused money to ARPA, whose funding ended on February 15, 1966. According to Whyte, the remaining grant could support the project only until September, 1966.[62]

Matos Mar and Whyte soon turned to other less politically sensitive funding institutions, including the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). While waiting for the peer review results of both institutions, Whyte also realized the political sensitiveness of a research project like this was not limited to the Peruvian side; it was also on the U.S. side. An inquiry about USAID funding revealed that collaborative scholars in Peru, namely Matos Mar and Cotler, would need to go through U.S. security clearance—a remnant of McCarthyism. Whyte's remark on this interlude shows perfectly how the bilateral relationships delicately influenced the funding policy: "I did not even ask Matos and Cotler to consider going through security checks. Being certified as not constituting a danger to U.S.

[61] For example, see Manuel Ángel Marinero, "Disfraces que Encubren al Protegido Comunismo en el Perú," September 25, 1966, Series I, Box 18, Folder Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Papers of John Murra.

[62] Whyte, *Participant Observer,* 235.

security would have forever branded them as lackeys of the Yankees."[63]

The Peruvian side of the story also revealed the long existing opposition between APRA and MSP, embodied in academic politics. MSP, in which several members of the IEP board were active, had long been one of the strong critics of APRA. During the Belaúnde regime, MSP allied with Belaúnde's party, *Acción Popular*, while APRA allied with UNO (*Unión Nacional Odriísta*, Manuel Odría's party) and won the majority of seats in the legislature. Retelling Matos Mar's interpretation of the *La Tribuna* event, Whyte related the attacks on IEP and the project on rural change with the Rector election of San Marcos University in 1966. The Aprista candidate was its Senator Luis Alberto Sánchez, who had been the Rector twice during 1946-1948 and 1961-1963. Sánchez was able to run for Rector while simultaneously being a senator, due to a legislative modification of University Law. His rivals in 1966 were Augusto Salazar Bondy and Francisco Miró Quesada, both core members of MSP and the IEP board. Matos Mar's speculation was corroborated by another event during the campaign: Salazar Bondy and Miró Quesada were proposing curriculum reform to establish a program of general studies. Sánchez's camp attacked that proposal, arguing that the project was a plot related to Yankee imperialism since it was supported by the Ford Foundation and the consultant was from the University of Kansas. The campaign was successful; Sánchez won the election and the rumors about IEP and Yankee imperialism died out afterward.[64]

Although the rumors faded away, so did the funding. Preparing for the worst, in November 1966 both Whyte and Matos Mar seemed to foresee the end of the project and

[63] Ibid., 236.

[64] Ibid., 237-8.

probably the end of IEP. The Belaúnde government was in a financial crisis and it severely squeezed the funding from the Ministry of Public Education, whose financial support to IEP was expected to stop completely in 1967.[65] Fortunately, both the project and IEP survived due NSF and NIMH funding from 1967 to 1969. It may be hard for us to imagine today that IEP had gone through such a shaky period. The simplicity of its publications before 1966 clearly demonstrates its nascent stage.

At an earlier stage, IEP research reports were usually published in mimeograph form, which was cheaper, faster, and thus easier to circulate among scholars.[66] Some reports would eventually be developed into monographs years later, but no one could predict that IEP would become one of the largest publishing houses in Peru, especially for human and social sciences.[67] Matos Mar was just beginning to feel a steady growth of publications in Peru as he wrote to Murra in October 1966, amid the *La Tribuna* crisis:

> Looking at the past three years in Peru, I think we are close to a profound change in anthropology here. I don't know which form it will take, or whether it will be something better. But I think something new is emerging, and it would be good to advance prepared. Thus, I think the existence and the quality of the publications are more important than ever: if there is an assault against the existent organization of anthropology or an effort to dilute it, the publications will ensure to maintain a certain quality of work and teaching. The three publications we talk about in the IEP have their importance, but only partially.[68]

Matos Mar had a reason to say IEP publications had only partial importance in 1966. Major

[65] Ibid., 236.

[66] John Murra to José Matos Mar, July 24, 1960, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

[67] Víctor Urquiaga, Carlos Fernández, and Jesús Astorga, "La Gran Aventura," in *Caretas, Separata Institucional, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 25 Años, 1964-1989*, September 25, 1989, p. 2-4.

[68] José Matos Mar to John Murra, October 2, 1966, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra.

initial collections of IEP publications, such as *Peru Problema*, *America Problema*, and the two series about the Chancay Valley project (including *Estudios de la sociedad rural* and *Estudios etnológicos del valle de Chancay*) did not begin to be published until 1967, and flourished between 1967 and 1984. Up until 2001, *Peru Problema* had twenty-seven volumes, among which twenty-one were published between 1968 and 1984. *America Problema* had eleven out of sixteen volumes published between 1968 and 1980. Two series about Chancay had sixteen out of twenty-five published between 1967 and 1983.[69] In the following section, I continue to discuss how the Chancay Valley Project unfolded the first golden decade of IEP.

Chancay Valley Project: Questionnaire, Fieldwork, and the Economically Successful Communities

The Chancay Valley Project started out humbly from the Department of Anthropology at UNMSM. Originally, it was designed for the *sanmarquino* students in Matos Mar's course, "Ethnological Researches in Peru: Field and Cabinet Works" and simply funded by the Department.[70] The location was chosen for its acceptable distance from Lima, 112 miles, and its plural styles of social relationships, modes of production, and processes of social change, which more closely reflected Peruvian society.[71] Even though the project had meager resources and a short duration, the burgeoning stage had already aimed for a larger scale.

[69] Juan Martín Sánchez, "El Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: de la ambición teórica de los años sesenta al estupor fáctico ante el fujimorismo," Documento de Trabajo 123. Serie Sociología y Política 33 (Lima: IEP, 2002), p. 10.

[70] Jehan Vellard to Jorge Puccinelli, November 23, 1962, Sala 2, Caja 300, Código de Referencia 312, Numero de Ítem 255, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[71] José Matos Mar to Jehan Vellard, December 26, 1962, Sala 2, Caja 301, Código de Referencia 314, Numero de Ítem 256, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

This was also the starting point through which Matos Mar began to realize his ideal of concentrating intellectual efforts on the study of social reality. The first visit in January 1962 was planned systematically, focusing on the coastal part of the valley.[72] Matos Mar assigned students to different types of human settlements such as haciendas, indigenous communities, irrigated land, urban towns, seaports, to study the diachronic changes and synchronic structure of land tenancy, production, and social relations and organization. A basic sketch of the coastal area of the Chancay Valley was presented through students' preliminary reports, journal articles,[73] and thesis.[74] But the picture would not be complete without a study of the highland area of the valley. In mid-1962, coinciding with the winter break of San Marcos, Matos Mar led another group of students to visit the upper valley of Chancay, which was composed mainly of indigenous communities, to prepare for a forthcoming community survey expected in early 1973.[75]

At this stage, students' writings showed their awareness of the anthropological mission to present social problems and solutions, while revealing traces of the *indigenista* perspective that had not completely vanished. Here I use Hugo Neira's series of columns published in the newspaper *Expreso,* where he also served on the editorial board, to show this bizarre combination of perspectives. First of all, Neira distinguished their field trip from the often-seen

[72] José Matos Mar to Jehan Vellard, November 23, 1962, Sala 2, Caja 300, Código de Referencia 312, Numero de Ítem 255, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[73] Cesar Fonseca, "El proceso de sindicalización de los braceros de las haciendas algodoneras del valle de Chancay," *Cuaderno de Antropología* 2 (1964): 54-60. *Cuaderno de Antropología* was a *sanmarquino* journal and the same volume also included Arcenio Revilla's and Walter Qunitero's works adapted from their preliminary reports.

[74] Heraclio Bonilla, *Las comunidades campesinas tradicionales del valle de Chancay* (Lima: Museo Nacional de la Cultural Peruana, 1965).

[75] José Matos Mar to Jehan Vellard, November 23, 1962.

archaeological and historical research on indigenous communities focusing on extinct cultures and great names. Their anthropological fieldwork was to study a group of contemporary common people, who were not only racially and culturally descended from the Incas, but also constituted modern Peruvians. They are the real and deep Peru, *el Perú verdadero y profundo*. However, they were encountering some problems; these people were exploited, and a study of their problems and solutions would influence the orientation of Peru's future.[76] While Neira's readers only gradually grasped the modern anthropological view, his depiction of the community, Pacaraos, soon brought them back to the stereotypical image of an Andean community and then opened up the topic of cultural changes:

> What is the visible difference in peoples' lives and conception of the world between the blatant, dynamic, and extroverted cities, such as Huaral or Chancay, and **the peaceful, hierarchical, and traditional life, somewhat subdued and reserved**, of the villages of the upper zone? . . . . Pacaraos is one of these Andean cities, **high and unobtrusive, difficult to find**, but its secret lies in the fresh highland **hospitality** and the peace of its **bucolic** places, hidden as the tender cactus fruit among the thorny and rocky ridges. Anthropology may reduce its complex historical aggregates, which can be separated like living tissue, into traces of the Incan, Spanish, and the Republican periods, to some hidden classification like this: A community of the marginal area of the northern highland, composed by emerging mestizos, in the process of change and integration into the nation.[77]

The stereotypical image of an Andean community was utilized by Neira, on one hand, to depict Pacaraos, and on the other hand, to contrast with the anthropological perspective that could pierce this appearance and analyze the marks left by different historical periods.

Neira specifically focused on the infrastructural changes brought by communal efforts, such as the construction of the school, road, electricity plant, and the communal house. But at the

[76] Hugo Neira, "La vida cotidiana en una comunidad indígena, I Parte, Comprensión en una aldea peruana: Pacaraos," August 26, 1962, *Expreso*, p.10.

[77] Hugo Neira, "La vida cotidiana en una comunidad indígena, II Parte, La silenciosa revolución de los pueblos andinos," August 28, 1962, *Expreso*, p.10.

same time, there were also changes that seemed to forecast the crumbling of communal traditions, such as the privatization of land and livestock, which worried Neira. "The changes have been felt in people's minds, and there are various tendencies struggling in the community. The old Traditional Order is in crisis. The Community should convert itself into a Social Cooperative, or it will disappear amid chaos and greed. But so far the authorities remain and are legally recognized, as they have been since 1939."[78] Neira indicated the survival of communal land ownership would be the key to define community in the future.[79] "Indigenous community" was a legally defined unit of autonomy, and the so-called *comuneros* had corresponding obligations to their land usufruct, conceptualized by researchers as the civil-religious hierarchy. This system seemed to operate well in maintaining communal life. However, it allowed narrower access to political power for the younger generation, who was fighting against the system. Further division and fragmentation of land would result in poverty and lower productivity, and thus a rationalization of communal political structure was necessary. This was the reason why Neira, like many other contemporary intellectuals, thought the "cooperative" would be the answer to Peru's rural problem.

The preliminary viewpoints of these earlier research results of the *sanmarquinos* would be more fully developed after Matos Mar established a contract of cooperation based on IEP, with William F. Whyte in 1964, and secured funds in late 1966. The project was broadened to include six geographical areas[80] and six regional universities,[81] and renamed "The Project of a

[78] Ibid.

[79] Hugo Neira, "La vida cotidiana en una comunidad indígena, III Parte, Las comunidades: Entre la cooperativa o la disolución," August 29, 1962, *Expreso*, p.10.

[80] To present the pluralist picture of Peru, the project covered six areas: (1) Valleys of Virú y Moche, (2) Valley of Chancay, (3) Valley of Mantaro, (4) Valley of Urubamba, (5) Province of Huamanga, (6) Province of Arequipa.

Study on Rural Changes in Peru." In the project proposal, Matos Mar and Whyte characterized Peruvian society as underdeveloped and unequal in terms of resource distribution, which needed to be understood and solved through a study of changes. On one hand, the differentiated processes and mechanisms of changes created a plurality of social and cultural situations, which could serve as diverse models of integration, productivity, communications, and relations.[82] On the other hand, the plurality constituted a picture of an archipelago, in which the isolated islands did not communicate with each other but depended on one single urban center.[83] Underdevelopment and inequality resulted in the marginalization of rural society in national life, rural dependency on the elite group, and thus the "impossibility to organize a rational order at the level of the whole society."[84] The elite had never seriously looked at rural society, and neither would their decisions benefit the Peruvian nation as a whole. The project proposal rejected the dualistic picture traditionally presented by the *indigenistas*; it proposed pluralism as the solution to the *Peru Problema*, with the precondition that the connections between the rural "isles" could be built.[85] More concretely, data collected from the six areas would be used to build a typology

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[81] National University of Trujillo, National University of San Marcos at Lima, National University of Central Peru at Huancayo, National University of Abbot San Antonio of Cuzco, National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga, and National University of San Agustin at Arequipa.

[82] See Julio Cotler "Actuales pautas de cambio en la sociedad rural del Perú," in *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural: la micro-región del valle de Chancay*, José Matos Mar et al. (Lima: IEP, 1969), 60-79 for more detailed discussion.

[83] José Matos Mar, "El pluralismo y la dominación en la sociedad peruana: Una perspectiva configuracional," in *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural,* José Matos Mar et al., 23-59.

[84] José Matos Mar and William F. Whyte, *Proyecto de Estudio de Cambios en Pueblos Peruanos: Cambios en la Sociedad Rural, Objetivos, Propósitos, Primeros Resultados* (Lima: IEP, 1966).

[85] Ibid.

of human organizations (e.g., hacienda, indigenous community, and mestizo town) and the stages of rural social changes. Once the typology and stages are established, researchers could better situate the location of trade unionism, politicization, participation, marginality, migration, education, administration, and the complexity of powers, in relation to human organizations.[86]

Methodology was a significant area where the negotiation between Cornell and Peruvian scholars occurred. The original proposal stated that the project would combine sociological questionnaires and anthropological fieldwork. Whyte's made a particular effort to promote the standardization of data through questionnaires, in order to balance the diverse anthropological materials arising from fieldworkers' personalities, experiences, impulse to conduct salvage anthropology, and emphasis on diversity rather than unity.[87] The questionnaire was a revision of what Rose Goldsen had designed for the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos, to see how values, personality, and outside contact would determine *Vicosinos'* acceptance to the modern ways of production and life.[88] In 1964, the first round of questionnaires were used in six research areas, with a total of 3,569 retrieved.[89] A re-survey was planned in 1969 to understand the changes of values and attitudes, specifically in those villages with deeper anthropological fieldwork.[90]

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Whyte, *Participant Observer.*

[89] Matos Mar and Whyte, *Proyecto de Estudio de Cambios en Pueblos Peruanos.*

[90] The planned 1969 study included four villages in the Chancay Valley, three in the Mantrao Valley, four in the Cuzco area, and Virú. See Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 241.

Failing to persuade Peruvian scholars of the advantages of quantitative research, Whyte himself utilized the data and invited Giorgio Alberti to co-author *Power, Politics, and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru* (1976).

Although the Cornell scholars attempted to integrate the quantitative perspective into the project, the Peruvian scholars were eager to shed concepts such as personality or values, which could easily lead to a dualistic interpretation of Peru. Dualism was a discourse separating Peru into two worlds—the mestizo and elite's coast and the indigenous highland—that were very different and alienated from each other. While the coastal area was modernizing fast, the highland stagnated due to indigenous peasants' psychological configuration and personality, namely, fatalism, passivity, lack of projection into the future, distrust, and conservatism.[91] Peruvian scholars, greatly influenced by dependency and world-system theory, criticized dualism because it ignored the asymmetrical relationship of production in the long historical process which kept peasants traditional.[92] In other words, peasants' conservative values were a result of long-term dependency rather than a cause of rural underdevelopment.[93]

Whyte was impressed with how Peruvian students were so obsessed by historical methods that "they are inclined to trace the development of any area back to the Spanish conquest. I made what I thought was a big concession by suggesting they trace the history of the villages back fifty years. Fortunately, they did not accept that limitation."[94] Whyte's concession

[91] Giorgio Alberti and Fernando Fuenzalida, "Pluralismo, dominación y personalidad," in *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural*, José Matos Mar et al., 285-325.

[92] Ibid., 288.

[93] Ibid., 311-3.

[94] Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 224.

of fifty years was based on the supposition that the contemporary structure of domination, namely the liberalist economy and expansion of haciendas, could be traced back to the 1890s.[95] Retrospectively, Whyte also recognized the advantage of historical methodology to help the project build the typology and developmental stages of human organizations.

The study of Chancay Valley, headquartered in Lima, was the most productive branch of the whole project on rural changes. Between 1964 and 1969, this branch alone produced at least thirty-six reports, seven theses, four mimeographs, nine IEP series volumes, three conference presentation papers, and six journal articles.[96] The formal publications of the IEP series concentrated on the period between 1967 and 1969, when funding was more stabilized. The most representative work of this stage of the project was *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural: la micro-región del valle de Chancay* (1969). Matos Mar considered it to be one of the best IEP syntheses on Peruvian rural society before the Agrarian Reform of 1969.[97] Not only did it fully elaborate theoretically on the historical process of Peruvian underdevelopment, dependency, and plurality, but it also comparatively analyzed the social changes of haciendas and communities of the Chancay Valley.

The central concern that strung the comparative pieces together was how the two entities differed in the ways they faced the factors that would lead to structural changes, so that they were in the process of either collapsing or thriving. William Whyte utilized fieldwork data

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[95] Matos Mar and Whyte, *Proyecto de Estudio de Cambios en Pueblos Peruanos*, 19.

[96] The numbers come from my calculation of Rivera Andía, "Bibliografía etnológica sobre el valle del Chancay."

[97] José Matos Mar, presentación to *Hacienda, comunidad y campesinado en el Perú,* ed. José Matos Mar (Lima: IEP 1976 [1970]), 9-12.

collected by Peruvian students to compare two highland communities, Huayopampa and Pacaraos,[98] pointing out that their key difference lay in the land tenure systems. While Huayopampa maintained communal ownership and used the land rent collected from community members as the income for the communal government, Pacaraos divided its land, and the community had gradually lost its reason to remain a united entity.[99] Julio Cotler compares two cotton haciendas, Caqui and Esquivel, and shows how land tenancy and rationalization of production and management played significant roles in the haciendas' developmental process. After the 1964 Agrarian Reform, Esquivel was divided up quickly while Caqui remained unified and continued to benefit from the preexisting systems of administration and shareholding, professional technical staff, and transferable economic and technological resources.[100] In both cases, it was implied that unified ownership of land, whether common or private, plus the rationalization and technification of agricultural production, would lead to the progress of rural Peru.

In sum, research manpower and publication infrastructure, supported by more financial resources, allowed the Chancay Valley Project at this stage to have more sophisticated theoretical discussions and more revealing case studies that echoed scholars' concerns about agrarian issues. A rationalized, modern organization of production that could bind producers, land, and other productive resources together, was the best option. But how this modern organization of production could go along with existing communal structures in the Andes, was the next question.

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[98] Whyte indicated that his source was from Fernando Fuenzalida, José Luis Villarán, Jürgen Golte, and Teresa Valiente. See William F. Whyte, "Integración y desintegración en dos comunidades serranas," in *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural*, José Matos Mar et al., 162-222.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Julio Cotler, "Alternativas de cambio en dos haciendas algodoneras," in *Dominación y cambios en el Perú rural*, José Matos Mar et al., 223-41.

This question paralleled the younger generation's emphasis on long-term anthropological fieldwork at the next stage of the project, and jointly these two orientations would create a more nuanced understanding of the Andean highland communities. I refer to the younger generation as Fernando Fuenzalida, José Luis Villarán, and Teresa Valiente at Huayopampa, and Carlos Iván Degregori, Jürgen Golte,[101] Modesto Gálvez, and Jaime Urrutia at Pacaraos. They carried out their fieldwork between September and December in 1966 and March in 1967. During this time they were able to refute the static and homogenous picture of indigenous communities and reorient the later publications of the project to center on Pacaraos and Huayopampa.

In our interview, Jürgen Golte still remembers how they were equipped with questionnaires and workshop training before the field trip, and how they completely changed their direction later in the field. Sitting in his office on the second floor of the white *casona* of IEP, Golte still visualizes how the questionnaires collected in 1964 had been stacked up in the hallway when he first joined the project. Since the questions were first designed by U.S. scholars and literally translated into Quechua, Golte was not sure how well they would fit rural Peru. While Whyte thought it was a way to standardize data and make anthropology more scientific, Golte thought of it as a means to provide general impressions rather than precise pictures, and wondered if the questionnaires were ever processed and computed. Regarding the workshop held at IEP in 1965, Golte recalls that it was still largely *indigenista*, despite the senior Peruvian scholars' awareness of carrying the national problem on their shoulders, and their newest tool of dependency theory.

Golte's doubts about the methods and training were further justified by his fieldwork

[101] Golte was also involved in the fieldwork at Huayopampa and the report writing process.

experiences. The fieldwork at Huayopampa and Pacaraos was teamwork.[102] He still remembers how he and other colleagues got off the truck at Huayopampa and were shocked by what they saw: the *huayopampinos* in the 1960s were real businessmen, one characteristic they had never learned in the classroom about the indigenous population. The *huayopampinos* owned their own trucks; they might be divided into poor and rich individuals, but they were actively looking for a better future. The consideration to adjust the fieldwork was reinforced by the information revealed by the historical records that the local municipality allowed them to access. These records accounted the *huayopampinos'* efforts to construct their own school, to establish communications with the outside world, and introduce new crops.

They decided to study this dynamic process of change, and Whyte quickly realized its potential for the whole project and immediately agreed. Matos Mar and Whyte also pushed to expedite the writing of the Huayopampa case, although Whyte's suggestion for the young scholars to use the questionnaire results was not taken.[103] Their case study of Huayopampa, titled *Estructuras tradicionales y economía de Mercado* (1968),[104] was published promptly under a new IEP series, Ethnological Studies of Chancay Valley.[105]

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[102] Golte explains that the groups would introduce themselves together in front of the community members. However, when it came to fieldwork, each student would establish different degrees of relationships with local people according to their own personalities. Each student would keep close contact with each other and also with the Project Directors. However, the relationships among students were more egalitarian in the case of Huayopampa than in Pacaraos, since people there trusted students less, and Matos Mar arranged some mechanism of supervision.

[103] Whyte, *Participant Observer*, 246.

[104] The book was authored by Fernando Fuenzalida, Jürgen Golte, Teresa Valiente, and José Villarán. It was enlarged and republished in 1982 with the title *El desafío de Huayopampa: Comuneros y empresarios.*

[105] This series has seven numbers. One of which was published before 1970, four were published between 1972 and 1975, and the remaining two were published in the early 1980s.

In terms of theoretical argument, the younger generation precisely pinned down their issue—the reconceptualization of a peasant community. The image of immobility and isolation developed by Peruvian *indigenistas* were by no means based on any empirical studies of real communities.[106] U.S. anthropological works, such as Eric Wolf's "close corporate community," featuring "defensive ignorance" and "culture of poverty," did not coincide with the dynamics witnessed by the students in Huayopampa, either. Most importantly, they argued that communities should be presented "not as collections of free features but **as institutional systems**, not as isolated entities but **as units in regional and sub-regional contexts**."[107]

They examined Huayopampa in its regional and sub-regional contexts. Huayopampa was nestled among the four communities[108] in the District of Atavillos Bajo,[109] Province of Canta. It achieved its dominant status among the neighboring communities through its economic success brought by fruit cultivation. Fruit was first introduced in the 1910s, but the *huayopampinos'* real interest in it had not emerged until the 1940s, which coincided with great improvement in transportation in this region. Since the early 1950s, fruit cultivation had continued to bring in profits and channels of outside contact, which both promised the ability to provide more communal services, and thus consolidated the *huayopampinos'* place on the community board.[110]

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[106] Fernando Fuenzalida et al., *El desafío de Huayopampa: comuneros y empresarios*, (Lima: IEP, 1982), 20.

[107] Ibid., 21. Emphases mine.

[108] Besides San Miguel de Huayopampa, there were also San Pedro de Pallac, San Luis de Chaupis, and San Salvador de Pampas. Ibid., 48.

[109] The Province of Canta included seven districts: Pacaraos, Veintisiete de Noviembre, Lampían, Atavillos Alto, Acos, Atavillos Bajos, and Sumblica. Ibid.

[110] Ibid., 94-6.

Perceiving community as an institutional system, they focused on how the economic success had influenced the communal institutional operations. Previously, in Whyte's comparison, Huayopampa was characterized by communal land tenancy, communal income, and solidarity, in contrast to Pacaraos. Here, the authors provided a more nuanced picture. The suitable area for fruit cultivation was just 0.8 percent of the whole of Huayopampa; this land actually belonged to private owners and was still in a process of fragmentation during the 1960s.[111] Although the privatized land accounted only for a small proportion, it significantly catalyzed changes in the local system of labor exchange. The biggest landowning peasants, about sixteen percent of *huayopampinos*, contracted peons because they needed more labor force than they could personally reciprocate. The *huayopampinos* used to organize fraternities to establish quasi-kindred relationships and make sure they had sufficient labor during the harvest. The change began with some fraternity members' sale of partial rights and obligations they did not need. Some fraternities utilized this operation to raise funds, and the number of peons increased, especially between 1960 and 1965.[112] The biggest landowning peasants were also the ones more likely to adopt new agricultural technologies—from guano to chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and sprayers—than the small landowners.[113]

The authors predicted that the current of land privatization, the increase of recompensed peons, and the influence of modern agricultural technology would advance with the growth of fruit cultivation. The next question was how a community that was increasingly differentiated

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[111] Ibid., 140-6.

[112] Ibid., 155-8.

[113] Ibid., 165-6.

internally, like Huayopampa, could still maintain some degree of communal solidarity. The key lay in mechanisms such as the communal control of pasturage and the revival of festivals. Communal land accounted for forty-eight percent of the whole of Huayopampa and was mainly used for pasture. Although raising cattle played only a secondary role in Huayopampa's subsistence, the authors noticed that the recent price hike of meat made the communal control of pastureland an effective instrument to maintain cohesiveness.[114] In addition, the authors also pointed out the contribution of religious institutions, including fraternities and festivals, toward communal solidarity. These practices did not die out with economic individualization; to the contrary, the economic boom actually revived the religious institutions in Huayopampa.[115]

In sum, the research presented a dynamic community with changes in all aspects of its institutional life, including land ownership, labor exchanges, social networks, communal service, and religious institutions, and yet it still remained integrated. The researchers successfully overthrew the static image of the Andean community created by the Latin American *indigenistas* and North American culturalists.[116] More importantly, this academic excellence was achieved by emphasizing the significance of anthropological fieldwork, through which the researchers avoided presuppositions of the indigenous community and actually studied the "social reality" they had witnessed.

Nevertheless, they continued to reflect on the fieldwork experiences to modify how they should theoretically perceive Huayopampa's economic success. As Golte's retrospection reveals, during the fieldwork these young scholars were very impressed by the *huayopampinos'*

[114] Ibid., 117-21.

[115] Ibid., 287-94.

[116] Carlos Iván Degregori and Jürgen Golte "Los límites del milagro: apuntes críticos al estudio de la comunidad de Huayopampa," in *El desafío de Huayopampa,* Fernando Fuenzalida et al., 359-69.

entrepreneurship because they had never been conceptually trained to look at an indigenous peasant community in such a dynamic way. They felt the urge to represent this energetic aspect of it in order to break down the unscientific and stereotypical images that had long dominated the racial discourse, cultural representations, and rural policymaking in Peru. They asserted the peasant community actually could have their own "innovative collective momentum."[117] Later, they reconsidered this explanation of the *huayopampinos'* distinctiveness as too psychological[118] and re-emphasized the aspects of institutional renovations, which made the community a quasi-cooperative and protected small landowners against the market.[119] As the next section will show, the case of Huayopampa and its implication would become a model upon which the IEP would base its proposal to the official Agrarian Reform.

Engaging in Policymaking: IEP Statement to the Agrarian Reform

The initial stage of IEP coincided with a great political transition in Peru, namely, the combination of the military regime, reformative stance, and "new professionalism." New professionalism had emerged among the Peruvian military since the late 1950s, especially those trained in the *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* (CAEM), to correlate internal security with national development and often seek advice from civil consultants.[120] The military junta that

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Carlos Iván Degregori and Juvenal Casaverde, "Huayopampa quince años después: la profunda transformación de la comunidad y de sus relaciones con la sociedad nacional," in *El desafío de Huayopampa,* Fernando Fuenzalida et al., 373-426.

[120] Klarén, *Peru*. (see chap. 2, n. 10).

governed Peru between 1962 and 1963 was the first regime of this new professionalism, and San Marcos anthropologists and sociologists also moved forward to contribute their research skills to the reformative projects.[121] The following regime of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, especially in the beginning, was perceived as "sympathetic and conciliatory"[122] toward peasants and agrarian reform. José Matos Mar was one of the civil advisors to the Belaúnde government concerning rural development.[123] UNMSM also cooperated with the Inter-ministerial Executive Committee of Popular Participation to promote communal development.[124]

IEP gradually solidified institutionally and intellectually after the *La Tribuna* crisis in 1966 and managed to distinguish itself in this current of new professionalism, though not all IEP scholars were willing to be too close to the government. Its renowned series, *Peru Problema* and *America Problema*, was becoming textbooks and references in both national and foreign universities. IEP ascended to become one of the prestigious private research institutes, nationally and internationally, and researchers' salaries reflected this achievement. A reporter from *La Prensa* wrote, "What is interesting about this is that all of them can live and wholeheartedly dedicate themselves to the research with the salaries that the Institute pays them. And this is, per

[121] For example, Matos Mar proposed an applied anthropological project to the Ministry of Public Health and Social Care, see José Matos Mar and Juan Comas "Proyecto de Antropología Aplicada en Salud Publica," December 20, 1962, Sala 2, Caja 301, Código de Referencia 314, Numero de Ítem 256, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[122] Klarén, *Peru*.

[123] Whyte, *Participant Observer,* 224.

[124] Comisión Ejecutiva Inter-Ministerial de Cooperación Popular, "Decreto Supremo No. 37-F, Programa de Participación del Universitario en el Desarrollo Comunal pro Cooperación Popular," October 1963, Sala 2, Caja 302, Código de Referencia 319, Numero de Ítem 259, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

se, one of the most evocative achievements for the future of social sciences of Peru."[125]

Achieving academic excellence and social prestige, IEP scholars strived to have their painstaking research results and implications heard by the government. Significant works on rural social change were published timely between 1968 and 1970,[126] when the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform was just kicking off and was highly anticipated. In fact, the regime and the transformations caused by its reformative policies constituted the central concern of IEP research and publications between 1969 and 1979.[127] In the appendix of *Hacienda, comunidad y campesinado*, José Matos Mar, Fernando Fuenzalida, Jorge Bravo Bresani, Julio Cotler, Luis Soberón, José Portugal Mendoza made a statement together to the Agrarian Reform.[128] Interestingly, their suggestions about the reform were similar to the Huayopampa case. Their main proposal was to structurally transform peasant communities into an entity that assumed the characteristics of a company and self-government at the same time. To achieve this, the myth of the passive and conservative peasant community must be abolished; their recent studies had shown how Andean peasants were willing to adopt technical innovations, while to some degree maintain their corporative characteristics and communal institutions. They argued that this structural transformation would help peasant communities face the wave of modernization in a

[125] The "them" here refers to the researcher and assistant. F. T. H., "Estudiosos de lo Peruano: iep, rigor en la investigación," January 18, 1970, *Siete Días – La Prensa*. Series I, Box 18, Folder Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Papers of John Murra.

[126] Besides the above-mentioned volumes on the Chancay Valley, there was also Matos Mar, ed., *Hacienda, comunidad y campesinado en el Perú* and Fernando Fuenzalida, ed., *El indio y el poder en el Perú* (Lima: IEP, 1970).

[127] Escobar, *IEP Memoria 25 Años*, 14-5.

[128] Matos Mar, ed., *Hacienda, comunidad y campesinado en el Perú,* 371-7.

more vigorous manner. Under the best situation, the government should equip the community with credit support and financial services, mechanization, improved seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, and a convenient chain of cargo transportation, storage, and marketing.[129]

Chapter five will further discuss the degree to which the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform was influenced by this intellectual proposal and how scholars established different relationships with the Velasco government. To conclude, this chapter presents the process of institutional building and intellectual development initiated by the San Marcos-IEP group, exemplified by José Matos Mar, Julio Cotler, Jorge Bravo Bresani, at the senior level, and Fernando Fuenzalida, Jürgen Golte, Carlos Iván Degregori, at the junior level. Within two decades of the establishment of modern anthropology in Peru, these scholars managed to create a new perspective toward indigenous communities based on their fieldwork, and ultimately redefine Peru's problem. The problem was no longer a racial and cultural one as the *indigenistas* had suggested; it was one of dependency and underdevelopment that could be solved through the principles discovered through their fieldwork. Peasant communities were dynamic and pluralistic, and peasants had the potential to accept innovations while at the same time maintaining communal ties. All evidence seemed to suggest that the cooperative would be the best answer.

The researchers' achievement of re-conceptualizing the *Peru Problema* and policymaking also opened a new page of social scientists' prestige in Peruvian society. Internally, they might have divergent political affiliations and theoretical perspectives, but as a whole, they stood out as a new group of Peruvian intellectuals who spoke to the nation and society based on their scientific studies. They commonly defended their project of studying the "social reality" and redefining the "national problem." In the next chapter, we will use the case of José María Arguedas to show how grand and heavy this burden was, and how it smothered the possibility of

[129] Ibid.

a different intellectual path.

Chapter Four
The Right Way to Ask *Perú Problema*: José María Arguedas and the Roundtable on *Todas las sangres*

> Today, I think my life has completely ceased to have reason for being.
>
> . . . it was nearly demonstrated today by two wise sociologists and an economist that my book "Every Blood" is negative to the country. I have nothing to do now in this world. My strength has declined irremediably.
>
> I ask forgiveness to those who believe I may have done wrong against anyone, although I do not remember doing so. I have tried to live for serving others. I am going, or I will go, to the land where I was born, and I shall seek to die there immediately. My wish is that they sing to me in Quechua from time to time, at the place wherever I would be buried in Andahuaylas. Though the sociologists might take this request as a joke—and with reason—I think the song will reach me in some way that I do not know.[1]

This dramatic and sentimental paragraph was left by José María Arguedas right after the Roundtable on his novel, *Todas las sangres,* held on June 23, 1965, at *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP). As the previous chapters show, this was a time when anthropologists in Peru strived to depart from their *indigenista* roots and embrace a more "social scientific" approach to understanding social reality and problems. Therefore, in this supposed dialogue between literary and social scientific fields, Arguedas's novel was examined and criticized in terms of its ability/inability to reflect on contemporary Peru. Arguedas grew up among the indigenous population in highland Peru and wrote this novel to express what he had lived through. Strongly questioned by his colleagues, Arguedas thus lamented, "Have I lived in vain?"

The Roundtable stands as a mythical moment for many Peruvian and Peruvianist scholars, especially those interested in the relationship between literature and social sciences. While some

[1] "De José María Arguedas," in *《¿He vivido en vano?》La Mesa Redonda sobre Todas las Sangres del 23 de junio de 1965*, ed. Guillermo Rochabrún (Lima: IEP, 2011) 77-8.

perceive it as the starting point of Peruvian social sciences,[2] others view it as the foundational moment of Andeanism as a project of *interculturalidad*.[3] Arguedas's lamentation has also aroused much curiosity, speculation, and interpretation regarding the relationship between the Roundtable and his suicide in 1969. While some consider the Roundtable to be the last straw that knocked Arguedas down,[4] most scholars today prefer not to overemphasize the connection; instead, they see how it had inspired Arguedas's last intellectual project before his psychological problem overwhelmed him.[5] Since the 1980s, there has been a lot of re-reading, re-interpretation, and value-redeeming of Arguedas's works.[6] His ideas were excavated again and exalted, not only because they seemed to foretell the resurgence of the indigenous movement since the 1980s,[7] but

[2] Guillermo Rochabrún, "Las trampas del pensamiento: una lectura de la mesa redonda sobre Todas las Sangres," in *《¿He vivido en vano?》*, ed. Guillermo Rochabrún, 89-114.

[3] Marisol de la Cadena, "The Production of Other Knowledge and its Tensions: From Andeanist Anthropology to *Interculturalidad*?" in *World Anthropologies: Disciplinary Transformations within Systems of Power*, eds. Gustavo L. Ribeiro and Arturo Escobar (New York: Berg, 2006) 201-24.

[4] "Entrevista a Mario Vargas Llosa," in *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología del 26 de mayo de 1965*, ed. Pinilla, 71-87 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

[5] See Antonio Melis, foreword to *José María Arguedas: Reconisderations for Latin American Cultural Studies*, eds. Ciro A. Sandoval and Sandra M. Boschetto-Sandoval (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998), ix-xvii. Also, Antonio Zapata, "Arguedas y la mesa redonda," in *《¿He vivido en vano?》*, ed. Guillermo Rochabrún, 115-7.

[6] Among Arguedas's contemporaries, Alberto Escobar and John Murra were probably his earliest defenders inside the Peruvianist circle, while Ángel Rama elevated the significance of Arguedas's works to the level of all of Latin America.

[7] See de la Cadena, "The Production of Other Knowledge and its Tensions" and Rodrigo Montoya, *100 Años del Perú y de José María Arguedas (1911-2011)* (Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma, 2011).

also because they gave scholars intellectual inspiration.[8] This body of Arguedistas' studies has been complemented by a re-contextualization of the Roundtable. The attack that Arguedas and *Todas las sangres* encountered at the Roundtable is understood now as a result of the fashionable theories and the institution building of Peruvian social sciences at the time.[9]

This short dissertation chapter does not pretend to be an Arguedistas' study, attempting to unearth a new angle of Arguedas's contributions through a systematic re-examination of his works. Rather, it explores Arguedas as a novelist and anthropologist at the same time[10] and contextualizes his intellectual career between 1946[11] and 1969 in the academic circle in Lima,[12] as the previous chapters have shown. This chapter discusses José María Arguedas's alternative but marginalized approach beyond cooperativism, to answer the *Peru Problema*. Through a comparative reading of IEP's group efforts on the Chancay Valley and Arguedas's anthropological research on Puquio and the Mantaro Valley, I will show that Arguedas's

[8] The most famous examples are Ángel Rama's "narrative transculturation" and Antonio Cornejo Polar's "heterogeneity." See Ángel Rama, *Writing across Cultures: Narrative Transculturation in Latin America,* trans. David Frye (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982) and Antonio Cornejo Polar, *Escribir en el aire. Ensayo sobre la heterogeneidad socio-cultural en las literaturas andinas* (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1994). For a more recent example, see Irina Alexandra Feldman, *Rethinking Community from Peru: The Political Philosophy of José María Arguedas* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014).

[9] Priscilla Archibald, "Andean Anthropology in the Era of Development Theory: The Work of José María Arguedas," in *José María Arguedas,* eds. Sandoval and Boschetto-Sandoval, 3-34. Melisa Moore, "Encuentros y desencuentros de la novela y las ciencias sociales en el Perú: repensando Todas las Sangres de José María Arguedas," in *José María Arguedas: hacia una poética migrante*, ed. Sergio R. Franco (Pittsburgh: Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana, Universidad de Pittsburgh, 2006), 267-284. Fermín del Pino, "Arguedas como escritor y antropólogo," in *Arguedas y el Perú de hoy*, ed. Carmen María Pinilla (Lima: Sur, 2005), 377-403.

[10] See Rama, *Writing across Cultures* and Alberto Flores Galindo, *Dos ensayos sobre José María Arguedas* (Lima: Sur, 1992) for the pioneering works on this approach.

[11] This is the year when Arguedas entered the newly established Institute of Ethnology at Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.

[12] The references cited in n. 8 have already opened up this research perspective, to which I wish to bring in primary sources for a cross examination and a more nuanced picture.

observations on contemporary rural socioeconomic changes in Peru actually did not differ much from IEP's results. Nevertheless, a review of the Roundtable on *Todas las sangres* will enable us to see more clearly that Arguedas's divergence from mainstream modernization and dependentist theorists lies in his cultural interpretation of the social reality and solution to the national problem.

Arguedas spoke and wrote in a way that made the institution builders of Peruvian social sciences eager to draw a clear line and distinguish themselves from his views. The marginalization was thus not only about intellectual contentions, but also about institution building, resource competition, achieving dominance, and ultimately the development of a problematique reorientation, the central topic of this dissertation. This perspective will enable us to understand the Roundtable participants' retrospections during these years. They were eager to show their political or intellectual alliance and cooperation with Arguedas before and after the Roundtable.[13] For me, the intention of these retrospections lies not only in clarifying, but also in reappraising the project to which these participants had devoted their whole careers and in which they had tried to persuade and recruit Arguedas.

To situate Arguedas in the context of "making *Peru Problema*," primary sources such as university papers, formal and private correspondences, writings and speeches, roundtable records, published testimony, will be included. Sources used in this chapter mainly come from (1) the abundant published testimonies, correspondence, and roundtable transcriptions concerning Arguedas and the 1965 Roundtable, (2) published collections of Arguedas's anthropological writings and essays, (3) *Archivo Luis E. Valcárcel, Biblioteca del Ministerio de Cultura, Perú*, (4)

[13] See, for example, Aníbal Quijano, "El nudo arguediano," and José Matos Mar, "Significado y aportes de la obra de José María Arguedas a la construcción de la nación peruana en el siglo XXI," in *Centenario de José María Arguedas: Sociedad, Nación y Literatura,* ed. Virginia Quintana Ávila (Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma, 2011), 13-23, 43-8.

Archivo Histórico Domingo Angulo, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, and (5) Papers of John Victor Murra, National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution.

This chapter will first follow José María Arguedas's steps into anthropology, or more specifically, the Institute of Ethnology at San Marcos, and reconstruct Arguedas's close but at the same time detached relationship with the mainstream social scientific circles in Lima. His singularity, which was supported only by a couple of scholars and followed by few students at the time, will be contextualized in the intersection between literature and sociological sciences, and between applied, dependentist, and Andeanist anthropologies. The second section of this chapter will turn to Arguedas's anthropological works on Puquio and the Mantaro Valley, discussing his observations about rural changes in highland Peru, including the socioeconomic cooperativeness among indigenous peasants. The next section will reexamine the well-known 1965 Roundtable on *Todas las sangres*, and the follow-up comments by the participants, showing how Arguedas proposed a culturalist yet marginalized perspective and solution to *Peru Problema*. The last section will depict Arguedas's continuous efforts after the Roundtable—juxtaposed by the torment of his psychological problems—to advocate his ideas and entrust his hopes in the coming Agrarian Reform, which he never really had a chance to witness.

José María Arguedas at San Marcos and IEP

After his childhood in the Peruvian highlands, Arguedas first came to Lima in 1931 to study literature at the National University of San Marcos. His university years were not smooth; San Marcos was closed down between 1932 and 1935 due to student movements, and in 1937, the year he completed his literary studies, he was arrested for participating in an antifascist student protest and spent eleven months in prison. This traumatic experience not only led to his

writing the novel "*El Sexto*," but also pushed him to seek for peace outside of Lima. In Cuzco, he met many major Peruvian folklorists, such as Efrain Morote Best, Jorge A. Lira, Victor Navarro del Aguila, Josafat Roel, Demetrio Roca, and Emilio Mendizabal,[14] an influential consequence of his decision to enter the newly established Institute of Ethnology at San Marcos in 1946.[15]

Entering university again as a thirty-five-year-old student, Arguedas was somewhat different from his young and ambitious colleague, José Matos Mar, though Luis E. Valcárcel remembered them both as the students closest to him. In the previous chapter, we saw how Matos Mar wrote to Valcárcel from Paris to express his ideal about organizing Peruvian anthropologists to investigate *realidad peruana* in the near future. About the same time, Arguedas sent a correspondence to Valcárcel about his fieldwork at the Mantaro Valley, through which he planned to study the causes of cultural change and record the disappearing indigenous traditions he had grown up with and was fond of.[16] While young Matos Mar was zealous about institution building and networking, Arguedas gained vitality through fieldwork.

In the late 1950s, they both became professors at the Institute, where students sensed their differences and distance. Alejandro Ortiz remembers Matos Mar as a diligent but cold leader of the institute, eager to look for opportunities for funding, projects, and cooperation with foreign scholars, while Arguedas was an emotional and affective person.[17] Ortiz does not recall Arguedas

[14] Emilio Mendizabal entered the Department of Anthropology at San Marcos after Arguedas, and became one of Arguedas's students. A more detailed discussion of their relationship will come later.

[15] Rodrigo Montoya, "Antropología y política," in *100 Años del Perú y de José María Arguedas (1911-2011)*, 229-43.

[16] José María Arguedas to Luis E. Valcárcel, July 20, 1954, and February 11, 1955, ALEV C A 175-180, Arguedas 35, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[17] Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere, ed., *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad* (Lima: PUCP, 1996), 186-93.

ever saying anything judgmental against other scholars in front of the students, but we have already seen in the previous chapter Arguedas's worry about Matos Mar's overactive style of leadership. Arguedas's correspondence with Ortiz also shows how, as an anthropologist, he was very different from Matos Mar. Matos Mar was opportunistic and would look for every possible useful resource to achieve his ideals,[18] while Arguedas thought anthropology should be closer to art than to science, a perspective he knew Matos Mar would never agree with.[19] Though caring about the survival of the newborn Institute of Ethnology, Arguedas often expressed that he was too old for the mission of institution building of anthropology at San Marcos, and he would like to spend more time writing a novel about Peru.[20]

Ortiz also noticed that their divergent personalities attracted support from different students, and they both had their favorite students. He sensed that Matos Mar favored enthusiastic and studious students like Rodrigo Montoya, while he himself worked closely with Arguedas due to their long-term family friendship.[21] Ortiz entered the Institute at the early stage of the Chancay Valley Project, during which time students' began short field trips during vacations. He observed that Arguedas's relationship with Matos Mar cooled down even more

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[18] José María Arguedas to Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere, March 3, 1969, in *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad*, ed. Ortiz Rescaniere, 222-4.

[19] José María Arguedas to Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere, February 20, 1967, in *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad*, ed. Ortiz Rescaniere, 280-2.

[20] See José María Arguedas to Luis E. Valcárcel, April 27, 1959, ALEV C A 181-185, Arguedas 36, Archivo Luis Valcárcel. José María Arguedas to John Murra, April 10, 1960, Series I, Box 4, Folder Arguedas, J-M, 1959-69, Papers of John Murra.

[21] Ortiz Rescaniere, ed., *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad*, 186-93.

quickly after the trip to Pacaraos in 1962.[22] As the previous chapter shows, this was the time when Matos Mar began to assume the status of resource distributor and thus was able to push forward the research questions he had proposed. Those students, who were closer to Arguedas personally or professionally, were often out of the project's limelight, especially at the publication stage.

Alejandro Vivanco Guerra and Emilio Mendizabal Losack, two older colleagues as Ortiz remembered,[23] were similar to Arguedas in terms of age, experience, and research interests. The three of them together belonged to the generation when folklorists were highly active in Lima and Cuzco during the 1930s, and they entered the Institute of Ethnology at San Marcos with the same motivation to continue this interest. Alejandro Vivanco was born in 1910 at Huamanga and had learned Quechua in childhood. In 1935, he traveled to Lima with his parents' expectation that he would study law, but ended up starting a new press and forming his own folklorist group. That was how Vivanco met Arguedas, who later became his partner in collecting folklore and his professor at San Marcos.[24] Thus, when Vivanco first came to Pacaraos in 1962, he seemed more comfortable than his young and urban-grown colleagues—he immediately undertook a systematic collection of arts, dances, music, oral literature, rituals, and magic.[25] During January-March 1963, Vivanco came back and surveyed the Chancay Valley on his own, keeping well-organized field notes about arts, magical/religious realms, Quechua toponym, and rituals. In

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Juan Javier Rivera Andia, "Apuntes para una historia de la antropología en el Perú: la etnografía inédita de Alejandro Vivanco y los estudios etnológicos en el valle de Chancay," *Antropológica* 19 (2001): 9-51.

[25] Ibid.

recent years, the excavation and reevaluation of Vivanco's unedited field notes suggests that though he never got the same strong institutional support as other Chancay Valley participants, his notes show nuanced details that could not be explained by dependency theories.[26]

Emilio Mendizabal Losack met Arguedas in the 1930s in the folklorist circle at Cuzco. Luckily, Mendizabal was able to publish his works on Pacaraos through the Department of Anthropology at San Marcos and in the *Revista del Museo Nacional*, an important publication channel created by Luis E. Valcárcel and carried on by Arguedas.[27] Mendizabal's works on Pacaraos were different from the ones we read about in the previous chapter.[28] Overwhelmingly rich in detail in all aspects of Pacarao's life, it flowed freely from history, geographical background, transportation and construction, to villagers' physical characteristics, clothing, and intermarriage, and then to cultural changes, political life, annual agricultural cycle, and even potato varieties. It ended with a section on conflict, which included land conflict, radical schoolteacher-church conflict, and traditional ritual-Catholicism conflict. Mendizabal did not seem to try to make a strong argument with this article, but one of the identifiable concerns was cultural change, which also troubled Arguedas.

Reading Mendizabal's one-hundred-and fifteen-page and barely trimmed article, we might easily associate it with Matos and William Whyte's comment that anthropologists tended to write down everything, a practice they strived to discipline. As the previous chapter shows,

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[26] Ibid. For a more comprehensive and updated work, see Alejandro Vivanco Guerra and Juan Javier Rivera Andia, *Una etnografía olvidad en los Andes: El Valle del Chancay (Perú) en 1963* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 2012).

[27] John Murra, "Semblanza de Arguedas," in *Las cartas de Arguedas*, eds., John Murra and Mercedes López-Baralt (Lima: PUCP, 1996), 283-98.

[28] Emilio Mendizabal Losack, "Pacaraos: Una comunidad en la parte alta del valle de Chancay," *Revista del Museo Nacional* 33 (1964): 12-127.

they encouraged some students to publish promptly, to go back to the field, and to rewrite preliminary reports that were later published by IEP, while other students would stop after one or two publication attempts, mostly through the Department of Anthropology. As Ortiz recalled, Arguedas was not a Matos-kind of professor who would offer students abundant resources and employment opportunities;[29] he would love to share his fervency toward indigenous culture with students who understood its beauty and encourage them with inspiring advice and talks.

Arguedas believed the Department of Anthropology needed real ethnologists like Vivanco, Mendizabal, and Ortiz, although by the time these students got their degrees, he himself had already faded from San Marcos. Arguedas began to teach part-time at the Agrarian University at La Molina from 1962, and became a full-time professor there in 1966. In his correspondence with John Murra and Alejandro Ortiz between 1968 and 1969—the time when Matos Mar was also edged out of San Marcos—Arguedas lamented that the Department had no single real anthropologist now.[30] But nor was he in a condition of good health to step forward and fight for the best institutional position for the kind of anthropology he had always dreamed about.

Arguedas's early intervention in the birth process of the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* was also mitigated. In November 1963, Arguedas and María Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, Alberto Escobar, José Matos Mar, John Murra, Aníbal Quijano, and Luis E. Valcárcel had gathered at Huampani and discussed constructing IEP's antecedent, *Centro de Estudios Andinos*.

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[29] Despite this characteristic, Mendizabal still became a faculty of anthropology at San Marcos University between 1966 and 1976. See Osterling and Martinez, "Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology," (see intro. n. 7). Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere also came back to Lima as an established anthropologist.

[30] See José María Arguedas to Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere, 1968, in *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad*, ed. Ortiz Rescaniere, 265-266. José María Arguedas to John Murra, January 6, 1969, Series I, Box 4, Folder Arguedas, J-M, 1959-69, Papers of John Murra.

The document they created during the gathering clearly shows a negotiation between the social scientific, dependentist orientation and the ethnological, Andeanist one:

> We consider it a responsibility, as researchers in social science, to warn of the danger of the currently projected reforms if they disregard a profound understanding of the social reality of this country. We offer our contribution to the construction and organization of the Center of Andean Studies. We aim to understand Andean studies fully, in particular the area occupied first by the Tahuantinsuyu Empire, and later by the Viceroyalty of Lima. Since Independence, this area has been integrated into the Republics of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, while the latter maintains its nuclear status.[31]

On one hand, this message used the dependentists' rhetoric that it was social scientists' responsibility to provide their understanding of social reality to the coming reformative projects. On the other hand, it expanded the center's research scope from Peru in the narrow sense to the Pan-Andean region, traced back to the pre-colonial period. In a later version, the purpose to expand to diachronic pan-Andean studies was elaborated more clearly: "The studies to date reveal a continuity in the techniques and general concepts that enabled the ancient Peruvians to achieve a high level of domination and exploitation in a difficult but fertile environment. We propose the urgent task of undertaking integral research of these continuities, which has been particularly recognized by the current President of the Republic, as the most valuable resource to the cultural and technical development of this country."[32] This is a picture equal to John Murra's Andeanist perspective, in which the most valuable knowledge originating from the Andean region is how the inhabitants have continuously lived with, and made use of, the harsh but fertile environment. More than once, Murra expressed in his correspondence with students that

[31] José María Arguedas et al., "Centro de Estudios Andinos: Documento elaborado en Huampani," November 1963, Folder MN/ALEV IEP 010, Archivo Luis Valcárcel.

[32] Centro de Estudios Andinos, "Acuerdos logrados en la reunión de 6 de junio de 1964," June 6, 1964, Series I, Box 7, Folder Centro de Estudios Andinos, Huampani 1963, Papers of John Murra.

Arguedas's works were closest to his idea: to look for Andean solutions to Andean problems.[33] Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the founding declaration of IEP (later composed by José Matos Mar and Jorge Bravo Bresani), dimmed this perspective and reframed the understanding of social reality with a history of Peruvian dependency. Although the Center of Andean Studies still existed for a while, it did not prosper as IEP.[34]

Arguedas's anthropological career between 1946 and 1969 coincided with the switch from an orientation of development and modernization after WWII, to the critical stance toward the international structure of economic dependency in Latin American social scientific fields. This switch compellingly summoned social scientists from every field, including anthropology.[35]Although the late 1960s also featured the beginning of Andean studies as a subfield, its complete flowering was in the 1970s, making it powerful enough to reframe the issue of class and ethnicity in the Andes in the beginning of the 1980s,[36]—a success Arguedas could not see anymore.

Inspiration from the Field: Cultural Changes at Puquio and the Mantaro Valley

In this section, I will trace back to the first half of the 1950s, when Arguedas was still an anthropological student immersed in fieldwork and anthropological writings, especially at

[33] See John Murra to Carlos Ivan Degregori, March 13, 1968, Series I, Box 10, Folder Degregroi, Carlos Ivan, 1967-1972, 1992, Papers of John Murra. Also, John Murra to Fernando Fuenzalida, April 29, 1970, Series I, Box 13, Folder Fuenzalida, Fernando, Papers of John Murra.

[34] John Murra to Aníbal Quijano, January 16, 1965, Series I, Box 31, Folder Quijano, Aníbal, Papers of John Murra.

[35] Salomon, "The Historical Development of Andean Ethnology," (see intro. n. 7).

[36] Ibid. See also, Frank Salomon, "Andean Ethnology in the 1970s: A Retrospective," *Latin American Research Review* 17, no. 2 (1982): 75-128.

Puquio and the Mantaro Valley—believed to be influential experiences for his writing of *Todas las sangres*. I will pay special attention to how Arguedas perceived and dealt with rural cultural changes, as conveyed in correspondences and published works, and compare the degree to which the pictures presented by Arguedas and the Huayopamapa group were similar and/or different.

Arguedas's fieldwork at Puquio, which could be counted as his hometown, occurred during August 1952 and September to October 1956. After years of academic training, he now went back as an anthropologist. His student Alejandro Ortiz later described him as an anthropologist who knew the Quechua culture inside out, since Arguedas grew up with Quechuas and then was trained as a researcher.[37] Unlike other anthropologists, Arguedas was an insider and outsider at the same time. As with his contemporaries, Arguedas witnessed, and was concerned about, sociocultural changes—no concept that he had learned from university could precisely define these changes. In Puquio, he observed that the younger generation was skeptical about myths and legends and would rather be onlookers at the ceremonies, which they saw as useless except for enriching the priest and liquor sellers.[38] Though lamenting the loss of traditions, Arguedas did not lose sight of the complementary relationship between mestizos and *indios* especially in the dynamic economic life of Puquio:

> Another very important factor is that the economy of the most successful mestizos was not in conflict with the *indios*, but rather was complementary to them. The mestizos live through commerce, and the rise of the value of agricultural and pasturage products has increased the purchasing power of the *indios*. This required an association in the administration of the official community, namely, the association between *indios*, mestizos, and even the representatives of the oldest families, creating a brand new situation that so

[37] Alejandro Ortiz Rescaniere to José María Arguedas, December 8, 1967, in *José María Arguedas, recuerdos de una amistad*, ed. Ortiz Rescaniere, 245-7.

[38] José María Arguedas, "Puquio, una cultura en proceso de cambio," in José María Arguedas, *Formación de una cultura nacional indoamericana*, Selection and Prologue by Ángel Rama (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1998 [1975]), 34-79. Originally published in *Revista del Museo Nacional*, xxv (1956), 184-323.

> far has not been defined in a stable way. Nevertheless, as we already mentioned, in at least in one community, Chaupi, this required association has provided great energy to the community, which has realized several important public works projects that has reshaped the urban setting of the neighborhood. It has been demonstrated that the association is necessary. A leader of Pichqachuri told us, very seriously, that his community does not progress much because there are few *mistis* and mestizos, and therefore, they, the elders, are determined that their children should become mestizos.[39]

While the mestizo businessmen needed the *indios* to provide agricultural and pasturage products, the *indios* also relied on mestizos to bring in new consumer goods. Their economic and political association together gave impetus to the community and thus made the neighboring communities look upon cultural changes for the younger generation as unavoidable, and even desirable. Nevertheless, mestizos did not take complete control of the community; the economic prosperity enabled *indios* to maintain a rather strong communal structure of authority.

In his fieldwork at the Mantaro Valley, Arguedas intermittently observed a parallel situation between 1953 and 1956. Examined historically, Arguedas characterized the differences between *indios*, mestizos, and whites in the Mantaro Valley as cultural and lingual, rather than socioeconomic, which had led to serfdom and stigma attached to the title of "*indio*" in other parts of Peru.[40] Therefore, the incorporation of the Mantaro Valley into the modern economy and the following cultural fusions were described by Arguedas as "an organic process,"[41] in which people did not have to go through a chaotic destruction of their cultural traditions. Instead, traditional ceremonies and festivals gained vitality after fusing with new elements.

In this sense, Arguedas's depiction of Puquio and the Mantaro Valley was in some degree

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[39] Ibid., 37-8.

[40] José María Arguedas, "Evolución de las comunidades indígenas, El Valle del Mantaro y la ciudad de Huancayo: un caso de fusión de culturas no comprometida por la acción de las instituciones de origen colonial," in Arguedas, *Formación de una cultura nacional indoamericana*, 80-147. Originally published as "Evolución de las comunidades indígenas en el valle del Mantaro," *Revista del Museo Nacional*, xxvi (1957), 78-151.

[41] Ibid.

similar to, and at the same time distinct from, the one of Huayopampa shown by Fernando Fuenzalida, Teresa Valiente, José Luis Villarán, and Jürgen Golte in 1968. The Huayopampa case study also described an economically thriving community in the waves of changes and seemed to point out a solution or alternative. Both bodies of work noticed that rituals and festivals played a role in these economically strong communities. While Fuenzalida and others suggested that these events reinforced communal solidarity and temporarily blocked rapid land fragmentation at Huayopampa—a functionalist interpretation that Golte later self-criticized[42]—Arguedas saw them as a creative space that demonstrated dialogue between cultures. As for the determining factor for economic success, the Huayopampa case emphasized the "innovative collective momentum" held by the *huayopampino* entrepreneurs, which they later recalled as a psychological explanation.[43] Arguedas maintained an Andeanist perspective on this issue; people in the Andes had long been creative and adaptive in the face of change. While Fuenzalida and others paid much attention to land tenancy, political structure, and economic innovations—namely, the aspects of communal life that could possibly point out a practical reformative plan for other communities—Arguedas believed the adaptability was in their culture and need not be outsourced.

Arguedas's fieldwork at Puquio and the Mantaro Valley constituted an important foundation for his dialogue with contemporary scholars and students at San Marcos. In a Roundtable of Anthropological Sciences organized by the Institute of Ethnology and Archaeology at San Marcos in January 1958, Arguedas presented a paper titled "Cultural Change

[42] Degregori and Golte, "Los límites del milagro," (see chap. 3, n. 116).

[43] Ibid.

in the Economically Strong Indigenous Communities."[44] He summed up the examples of Puquio and the Mataro Valley: "The situation of prosperity and active production has made possible the strong economy of the *indios*, which reaffirmed their independence and a solid sense of the values in regard to their own human individuality and culture."[45] In his teaching plan for a seminar on the comparison of Peruvian regional cultures at San Marcos, Puquio and the Mantaro Valley were two of the four cases used to exemplify how diversified the historical process of cultural fusion between Andean communities and modern world could be.[46]

To this point, it is clear that although Arguedas paid attention to the waves of sociocultural changes as much as his contemporaries did, he did not perceive them as a problem to be solved. Cases like Puquio and the Mantaro Valley showed that communities able to integrate with the modern economy and culture could thrive without completely losing their own cultures. If his contemporary scholars saw problems, Arguedas was saying that the answer lay in the people themselves. Interestingly, Arguedas did lightly touch on the issue of the cooperative in the Mantaro Valley by writing that festivals were then funded through the cooperative rather than through the system of civil-religious hierarchy.[47] Nevertheless, he did not put as much emphasis on the cooperative as a form of organization and production as his contemporaries did. His concern was for how people would culturally react to the changes, rather than what people

[44] José María Arguedas, "Cambio de cultura en las comunidades indígenas económicamente fuertes," in Arguedas, *Formación de una cultura nacional indoamericana*, 28-33. Originally published in *Cuadernos de Antropología* 2, no.1 (1959): 33-8.

[45] Ibid., 31.

[46] José María Arguedas to the Dean of the Art School, December 16, 1965, Sala 2, Caja 308, Código de Referencia 329, Numero de Ítem 277, Archivo Domingo Angulo.

[47] Arguedas, "Evolución de las comunidades indígenas."

should organize to successfully survive the changes. With this comparison in mind, it would be easier for us to understand Arguedas's entanglement in the Roundtable with regard to whether his *Todas las sangres* correctly reflected Peruvian reality.

Roundtable on *Todas las sangres*, June 23, 1965

The Roundtable on *Todas las sangres* was one among a series of dialogues between Peruvian literature and sociology, which ended up with only two sessions. The idea originated from an intellectual exchange between economist Jorge Bravo Bresani and literary critic Sebastian Salazar Bondy regarding Bravo Bresani's draft of a book prologue.[48] The exchange was mainly about literature's power to offer cultural critique, especially against the phenomenon of underdevelopment. This proposal was not random if we consider the *indigenista* tradition, or baggage, of Latin American anthropology, which had blended literary representation, physiological description, legal discussion, and folkloric, ethnological and archeological studies. Being one among the *indigenistas*, Luis E. Valcárcel built the modern discipline of anthropology in order to study the Peruvian problem and reality with better tools, and José Matos Mar strengthened the discipline through institution building at San Marcos and IEP. Literature became the nearest competitor of the newly established anthropology and sociology; these modern disciplines were born so closely to literature, and they now had to declare their independence from it. This was also a period of a Latin American literary boom, coinciding with a wave of literary critique concerning the relationship between verbal reality and life-art

[48] Pinilla, ed., *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología del 26 de mayo de 1965* (see chap. 3, n. 39).

correspondence.[49] In other words, there had been a long tradition in Peru of representing reality and problems in a literary form, which the sociological sciences were trying to closely question, while literary critique would distinguish between different levels of representation.

The first roundtable was held on May 26, 1965, with the participation of Jorge Bravo Bresani and José Matos Mar on the side of social sciences and Enrique Solari Swayne, Sebastian Salazar Bondy, Mario Vargas Llosa, Alberto Escobar, and José Miguel Oviedo in the literary circle. Nevertheless, the participants were not divided into two camps simply by their professions; Salazar Bondy and Escobar had long been in the MSP and IEP circle. Thus, while Miguel Oviedo and Vargas Llosa, who were more like guests of the Roundtable rather than hosts, were still questioning the comparability between literature and sociology, Salazar Bondy and Escobar were ready to defend it.[50] Miguel Oviedo considered literary works as an interpretation, rather than reflection, of reality, and thus they must go through the writer's personal mediation, which would be incongruent with sociological objectiveness.[51] Vargas Llosa thought literary works' main purpose was to transcend time, although they would be unavoidably influenced by their time. He insisted that literary works would be intuitive or even irrational and thus very different from what sociologists were looking for.[52] While the guests were wondering about the possibility of connecting writers and sociologists, the hosts explained why they thought the dialogue was meaningful. Salazar Bondy argued that literary works could be so influential that they went

[49] Melis, foreword to *José María Arguedas,* eds. Sandoval and Boschetto-Sandoval.

[50] See Victor Vich, "Pensando el Perú desde la literatura: el aporte del Instituto de Estudios Peruanos," in 5*0 años pensando el Perú*, ed. Tanaka, 23-31 (see chap. 3, n. 5).

[51] Pinilla, ed., *Primera mesa redonda sobre literatura peruana y sociología del 26 de mayo de 1965*.

[52] Ibid.

beyond the writers' original plans; in other words, the writers' personal mediation, intuitive or irrational, did not hinder their explanatory power at all. Moreover, Salazar Bondy thought anthropology and literary works were similar in the sense that their interpretations of social reality were based on anthropologists' or writers' direct contact with the society.[53] Facing Salazar Bondy's suggestion that anthropology did not seem to require rigid and completely objective methods, Matos Mar intervened and returned to the division between objective social sciences and intuitive literary works. He reasserted that the significance of this dialogue lay in the inspirations that literary works could offer social sciences, since writers carried less baggage of objectivity than did the social scientists, and dialogue was possible since both fields were concerned about Peru under rapid changes.[54]

When they talked about works concerning changes, they had in mind Vargas Llosa's novel *La ciudad y los perros* (1963), Arguedas's novel *Todas las sangres* (1964), Salazar Bondy's essay *Lima la horrible* (1964), and Anibal Quijano's article "La emergencia del grupo cholo y sus implicaciones en la sociedad peruana*"* (1964). But the first Roundtable did not seem to accomplish what the IEP hosts had wished. Anthropology was still entangled with literary representation, and the guest writers and literary critics did not carry the same burden on their shoulders as the IEP scholars, namely, to show social reality. This sense of incompleteness would be reacted to more anxiously and addressed in the second Roundtable on Arguedas's novel, *Todas las sangres*, held a month later on June 23, 1965.

Arguedas was himself both a writer and anthropologist, positions that perfectly fit the purpose of the series—a dialogue between literature and social sciences. He was undoubtedly

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

under the same current as his colleagues of concerning rapid social changes in Peru, and expected that both his anthropological and literary works could contribute to it. In the second Roundtable, the literary circle was still represented by Alberto Escobar, José Miguel Oviedo, and Sebastian Salazar Bondy, while the social scientific group was joined by Henri Favre and Aníbal Quijano, together with Jorge Bravo Bresani and José Matos Mar. Perhaps except for Bravo Bresani and Favre, all the participants had a personal friendship with Arguedas.[55] Arguedas was one person among the IEP circle, though he may have been marginal.

Todas las sangres tells a story about two brothers from one landowner family in the Andes, who held totally different values regarding their inherited assets. Bruno is a traditional paternalist *hacendado* while Fermín represents the modern capitalist perspective. Fermín decided to venture in silver extraction, which absorbed much of Bruno's labor and attracted envy from foreign investors. Fermín's silver mine was eventually sold and the land of neighboring communities was also nibbled away by the foreign investor. At this moment, Rendón Willka, an educated communal member with coastal experience, came back to organize an indigenous movement, characterized by a combination of modernization and indigenous traditions. In general, Bruno was often read as a representation of paternalistic feudalism, while Fermín was seen as a symbol of modern capitalism. Rendón Willka was a rather ambiguous and controversial character, a point I will come back to later. Nevertheless, he was generally seen as the answer to the question of social change in this novel.

The Roundtable was structured into two parts: the first part focused on the conversation between Arguedas and the three literary critics, and the second revolved around the exchange between the social scientists and Arguedas. Nevertheless, both sections were centered on the same question as to whether *Todas las sangres* successfully represented Peruvian society and

[55] "Al árbol, el injerto, el nudo: Entrevista a Guillermo," in《*¿He vivido en vano?*》, ed. Rochabrún, 77-8.

why. In the opening, to prevent discussions that were as stagnant as in the first Roundtable, Alberto Escobar cleared the way by saying this novel should be treated as a metalanguage to describe Peruvian society. He thought Arguedas perfectly showed how contemporary Peru was stuck in a series of conflicts brought by the transformations. Besides socioeconomic conflicts, there were conflicts between modern capitalist and indigenous worldviews, intermingling with each other and creating mentally confused characters that Escobar regarded as an embodiment of contemporary Peru.[56] Salazar Bondy held an opposite view toward this issue. He thought Arguedas's novel showed an indigenous, magical, and pantheistic perspective together with a modernized, rational, and scientific one, and these two were discrepant and contradictory to each other.[57] It seemed to Salazar Bondy that a sociological understanding of Peru should present a more unified and clear picture. In other words, he took the contradictions to be a result of Arguedas's indecision or say, schizophrenia, about Peru's present and future, while Escobar viewed these contradictions as correct sketches of contemporary Peru.

Arguedas appreciated Escobar's positive feedback and further clarification about the novel, but he himself did not consider the two worldviews as conflictive or even contradictory. Instead, what he had attempted to show was that they could be complementary and fraternal just like Fermín and Rendón Willka in the novel. This was the reality he had witnessed and lived at Puquio and the Mantaro Valley, and it was also his proposal to the problem of current social transformation.[58] José Miguel Oviedo and Salazar Bondy did not think Arguedas presented this

[56] Rochabrún, ed.,《*¿He vivido en vano?*》.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

solution successfully; their reading was that Rendón Willka, who embodied the integration of an indigenous worldview and modernized perspective, eventually came back to Bruno, representing the feudalistic order.[59] Arguedas responded that Rendón Willka actually manipulated all others in the novel.

With the discussions and clarifications in the first round, the second part of the Roundtable went one step further to ask about the proposal brought up by the novel. Favre opened the second round with two questions that framed the following exchanges. First, in what sense did *Todas las sangres* reflect society? It is worth mentioning that social scientists with recent fieldwork experience, such as Favre and Quijano, would pose this query in a rather positivist sense in contrast to the literary critics.[60] Second, what proposal of action did the novel provide? Favre himself thought Arguedas presented a society featured by the caste structure that had long disappeared in Peru, according to his own fieldwork experience.[61] He suspected that Arguedas mixed up different historical periods in *Todas las sangres*, a point Bravo Bresani and Quijano concurred, and thus it did not constitute a successful social novel for him. Neither was he quite persuaded by Arguedas's action proposal, interpreted as *indigenista* by Favre, for both scientific and political reasons.[62] "Indian" for most scholars of the time, was a stigmatized label utilized by the colonizers to press and exploit another group of people, while a more politically and scientifically correct term would be "peasants." Jorge Bravo Bresani's reading of the novel

[59] Ibid. Also see Rochabrún, "Las trampas del pensamiento."

[60] See Moore, "Encuentros y desencuentros de la novela y las ciencias sociales en el Perú."

[61] Rochabrún, ed., *《¿He vivido en vano?》*.

[62] Ibid.

was slightly different from Favre's; he thought Arguedas showed Peru as an Indianized *gamonal* family, in which the anesthetic elements correctly survived because "Indian" was stigmatized and marginalized. This specific picture of Peruvian reality, at the same time a proposal, was too idealistic and pre-rational for Arguedas. Politically, he would prefer to ally with the socialist proposal of cooperation through rationalization.[63]

Responding to Favre's critique that the novel mixed up different historical periods by presenting Peru as a caste society, Arguedas thought it was a matter of diversity and generalization. Each region in Peru had different degrees of development; while Huancavelica, as Favre observed, might be freed from caste structure, it did not mean that other places were in the same situation. Arguedas did not pretend the scenes in his novel would look like every single community in Peru, and he would say the label of "peasant" was an overgeneralization. He disagreed that his solution was an *indigenista* one; by utilizing the term "Indian," he was trying to convey groups of people who were culturally so different from each other that could not be contained by the concept of peasant.[64] As for Bravo Bresani's critique that his proposal was pre-rational, Arguedas clarified again that Rendón Willka was a totally rationalized character that manipulated all others. Through this controversial figure, he meant to say that the indigenous values, such as collective actions, combined with modern culture, would be a solution rather than a problem for Peru.[65]

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[63] Ibid. Here, Favre and Bravo Bresani's reactions to Arguedas's proposal echo Fermín del Pino's comment that the issue was actually ideological and political rather than intellectual. See del Pino, "Arguedas como escritor y antropólogo."

[64] Ibid.

[65] Rochabrún, "Las trampas del pensamiento."

Aníbal Quijano gave his long and uninterrupted intervention at the very end of the Roundtable. This was the time when Quijano just finished his study on "cholification," on which he based most of his arguments. The category of "cholo" had existed since the colonial period to label the initially acculturated indigenous people who had racial characteristics still close to "indios." In other words, it had been one category in the caste system until nineteenth century. In his study, Quijano distinguished this type of cholo from the cholo he observed in the twentieth century.[66] He argued that the contemporary cholification was a completely new phenomenon, catalyzed by the industrialization and the further integration into the market economy and international dependency of Peru, which he thought was best exemplified by Arguedas's Mantaro study. In this context, cholification was more voluntary than imposed when compared to the colonial and early Republic periods. It was a strategy chosen by the indigenous people to restructure their relationships with the dominant culture.

Since cholification was a completely new, still developing, and undefined phenomenon, Quijano thought it was natural that its criteria and differences from the upper-level groups were not stabilized yet.[67] Thus, for researchers, cholo could seem like a caste and social class at the same time. In response to Favre's critique of *Todas las sangres*, Quijano saw the possibility that some elements of the caste system might still remain despite the fact that it had been officially abolished a long time ago. Agreeing with Arguedas that social class was not the only factor here, Quijano accepted there were groups of people culturally different from each other and also from

[66] Aníbal Quijano, "Lo cholo y el conflicto cultural en el Perú," in Aníbal Quijano, *Dominación y cultura: lo cholo y el conflicto cultural en el Perú* (Lima: Mozca Azul, 1980), 47-116. Originally published as "La emergencia del grupo cholo y sus implicaciones en la sociedad peruana," in *Memoria del VII Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología*.1964. Bogotá, Colombia.

[67] Ibid.

the simple category of "peasant." Nevertheless, Quijano criticized the lack of an attempt to reconsider the concept of "Indian" from a cultural perspective, in both the social scientific realm in general and in *Todas las sangres*. He expected to see in the novel how the indigenous culture evolved without losing its vitality in the face of modern influences. This was his interest as well as a promise Arguedas had made but did not keep.[68]

Quijano was not sure about labeling Arguedas's proposal as *indigenista*, but he agreed with Favre and Bravo Bresani that it was not a viable solution based on his observation of contemporary peasant organizations and movements.[69] He never met any real person like Rendón Willka in his fieldwork. Quijano's criticism here brought us back to the ambiguity and controversy surrounding the character Rendón Willka. Was he an *indio*, a cholo, or a mestizo in the eyes of Arguedas and the other participants? In the Roundtable, Arguedas and the others never explicitly labelled this character as a cholo[70] or mestizo;[71] rather, they hesitated about how to name a character with both an indigenous background and urban experiences—on one hand revealing the advantages of modernization while on the other hand keeping close relationships with indigenous traditions and the feudalistic order. While most participants read conflicts, contradictions, and incoherence in this character, Arguedas saw a possibility of modernization without losing indigenous culture, while infiltrating dominant culture, though he wasn't sure how

[68] Rochabrún, ed., 《*¿He vivido en vano?*》.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Melisa Moore contextualizes Quijano's critique during the Roundtable against his recent study on cholification and points out that Rendón Willka can acutally be read as a cholo, who could adjust himself according to the specific geo-cultural situation. See her "Encuentros y desencuentros de la novela y las ciencias sociales en el Perú."

[71] Ángel Rama read Rendón Willka as a mestizo. See his *Writing across Cultures*.

to conceptualize this figure yet.

In fact, among all the Roundtable participants, Quijano's work was probably the closest to Arguedas's ambition to represent Peruvian society as a cultural collage and to point out an outlet for it through a culturally heterogeneous character. Quijano had been positive that Arguedas's anthropological work on the Mantaro Valley was the best case study to manifest cholification against the context of industrialization and integration into market economy.[72] He also had been in contact with Arguedas[73] and John Murra before the Roundtable. In January 1965, Quijano had mailed Murra his article on cholo, to which Murra commented positively as "a clarification of process" and "an ideological formulation for the future of this country."[74] Murra had lamented that except for Arguedas and Alberto Escobar, there were not many scholars interested in culture instead of social structures.[75] After reading Quijano's article, he was gratified that someone had clarified the differences between acculturation and cholification, seeing the category of "cholo" as a refugee but not necessarily a product of acculturation.[76]
It was probably a simplification to say that Quijano's concept of cholification implied an evolutionist or irreversible process and thus was incongruous with Arguedas's proposal embodied by Rendón Willka. Quijano was actually aware of the vitality of the indigenous culture in Peru: "The indigenous culture had not only survived all these intentions [to eliminate it], but

[72] Quijano, "Lo cholo y el conflicto cultural en el Perú."

[73] Rochabrún, ed., 《*¿He vivido en vano?*》.

[74] John Murra to Aníbal Quijano, January 30, 1965, Series I, Box 31, Folder Quijano, Aníbal, Papers of John Murra.

[75] John Murra to Aníbal Quijano, January 16, 1965, Series I, Box 31, Folder Quijano, Aníbal, Papers of John Murra.

[76] Murra to Quijano, January 30, 1965.

also had constantly developed to the point that one could say there has been a process of cultural revitalization in recent years, proving the strength and vitality of this culture and the profound adhesion of its carriers to it."[77] Nevertheless, this awareness was not shown in Quijano's interventions at the Roundtable. Quijano's pessimistic attitude toward Arguedas's proposal might come from a more political reason than an intellectual one. In a letter to Pierre Duviols, Arguedas once rephrased Quijano's confession to him: "He told me, more or less like this, 'my generation is the failure of APRA, the apparent bankruptcy of Peru, the betrayed Peru; that is why we are bitter; but it is a bitterness for our ignorance of the people."[78] In addition, neither did Arguedas understand Quijano's "cholo" as being anywhere close to his own Rendón Willka. In a 1966 essay on indigenous children, he mentioned the category of cholo in a more remote and detached way compared to his passionate attitude about the ambiguous character, Rendón Willka:[79]

> But the tradition is also changing in this aspect of the contemporary community life. The cloister of caste has begun falling, especially in the communities with sufficient land. In them, the young *indios* convert themselves into a new type of mestizos, to which anthropology denominates as *cholos*. . . . They are prepared to adapt to an environment in which the conflict between the native and the modern will become increasingly more acute. . . . We think this will be for the good of the country to enrich its human capital. The *indio* children are those who suffer most from the conflict; and the conflicting forces now swaying will probably give a place to the formation of a human being carrying tremendous energy for creation and renovation.[80]

[77] Quijano, "Lo cholo y el conflicto cultural en el Perú," 113.

[78] This correspondence is quoted in Carmen María Pinilla, "Arguedas: describir la vida y golpear como un rio la conciencia del lector," in *Centenario de José María Arguedas,* ed. Quintana Ávila, 35-41. Originally published in Carmen María Pinilla, ed., *Itinerarios epistolares: la amistad de José María Arguedas y Pierre Duviols en dieciséis cartas* (Lima: PUCP, 2007).

[79] Melissa Moore has pointed out that it was exactly Rendón Willka's ambiguity that mattered to Arguedas. See her "Encuentros y desencuentros de la novela y las ciencias sociales en el Perú."

[80] José María Arguedas, "Algunas observaciones sobre el niño indio actual y los factores que modelan su conduta," in *Qepa Wiñaq… Siempre literatura y antropología*, critical edition of Dora Sales, (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2009), 178. Originally published in *El niño en el Perú*, vol. 3 (Lima: Consejo Nacional de Menores, 1966).

In this instance, *cholos*, for Arguedas, were the same as mestizos—important figures in the contemporary economic and cultural life of communities, but still distinct from *indios* who could absorb and integrate into new cultural elements without losing their essence.

The Roundtable thus ended in a discouraging atmosphere especially for Arguedas, causing him to write the pessimistic paragraph we saw in the beginning of the chapter. Other participants also sensed Arguedas's frustration and had an urge to comment further or explain it. José Miguel Oviedo declared that the participating social scientists, especially Quijano, were adding too much unnecessary sociological requirements to a literary creation.[81] Quijano responded that it was supposed to be a dialogue between literary and sociological fields, and his interventions were just trying to achieve this goal. Besides, it was also Arguedas's self-expectation to reflect social reality and point out a way for Peru's future; thus, he did not think their critiques were unreasonable. Instead, he wondered why the literary critics like Miguel Oviedo did not think they could learn something from the sociological perspective when the sociologists were eager to talk to them.[82]

After the Roundtable, Quijano was one among the participants who continued to communicate with Arguedas about the issues brought up in the Roundtable. Arguedas's planning of his last novel, *El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo*, was very much based on his determination to write about the process of cultural change in the coastal town of Chimbote, a

[81] José Miguel Oviedo, "Las peras del olmo," in *《¿He vivido en vano?》*, ed. Rochabrún, 79-80. Originally published on *El Comercio Grafico*, June 28, 1965.

[82] Aníbal Quijano, "De Aníbal Quijano a José M. Oviedo: En torno a un dialogo," in *《¿He vivido en vano?》*, ed. Rochabrún, 81-86. Originally published in *Boletín de sociología* 1, no. 2 (1965): 18-20.

project that he had discussed with Quijano.[83] Nevertheless, similar intellectual concerns and continuous exchanges could not unilaterally save Arguedas from his emotional problems. Arguedas sometimes wrote excitedly about how he made Quijano further understand his novels,[84] while at other times he was deeply bothered by the inability to communicate with him.[85] Quijano also recalled how they might talk excitedly about Arguedas's new project all night long, and Arguedas would come back to him pessimistically hours later.[86] In his letter to Murra in 1966, Quijano wrote, "I am glad that José María has left the hospital. . . . I still think now, perhaps more than before, that he should live alone for a while. The knot enclosing him today will continue adjusting itself if he does not untie it. In the end, I think he should leave Peru for some time and work freely."[87] Quijano realized that the intellectual network between them would not help Arguedas more than to let him live and work alone. The knot, namely the historical and cultural problems of Peru,[88] which their whole generation tried to untie collaboratively, was probably fastened too tightly for Arguedas's health situation at the time. In the end, a potential cultural approach to *Peru Problema,* which might have come out from their intellectual exchanges, was also not able to be placed on the table.

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[83] Quijano, "El nudo arguediano."

[84] Carmen María Pinilla, "Arguedas: describir la vida y golpear como un rio la conciencia del lector," in *Centenario de José María Arguedas,* ed. Quintana Ávila, 35-41.

[85] José María Arguedas to John Murra, September 2, 1969, Series I, Box 4, Folder Arguedas, J-M, 1959-1969, Papers of John Murra.

[86] Quijano, "El nudo arguediano."

[87] Aníbal Quijano to John Murra, 1966, Series I, Box 31, Folder Quijano, Aníbal, Papers of John Murra.

[88] Quijano, "El nudo arguediano."

The year of 1966 was also when Arguedas left San Marcos completely and became a full-time professor at the Agrarian University to focus on his folkloric project. For twenty years (1946-1966) in the *limeño* anthropological circle, Arguedas had carried out the same mission as his colleagues to correctly represent social reality and to propose a blueprint for Peru. They all noticed changes and continuities; while most of his colleagues were busy finding social organizational principles of economically adaptive and successful communities, such as Huayopampa, Arguedas urged for showing the beauty of indigenous cultural vitality. In the Roundtable, his colleagues were more explicit about their theoretical and political inclination for a socialist and rationalized project of the cooperative, about which Arguedas was dubious. This doubt was reflected in Arguedas's attitude toward the Velasco regime.

Ambivalence to the Agrarian Reform

After leaving San Marcos, Arguedas went back and forth between Lima and Santiago, Chile, while he struggled to clarify and deepen his misunderstood and misinterpreted ideas in *Todas las sangres* through all kinds of channels. In the XXXVII Congress of Americanists, in La Plata, Argentina, 1966, Arguedas's approach was questioned by a North American scholar, again implying that it was *indigenista*. Reflecting on the Congress, Arguedas reasserted:

> The Latin American countries nourished by an ancient "indigenous" tradition, such as Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, or Guatemala, and Ecuador, have nurtured their creators with the totality of their traditions, which is not only Indian but also contains an extremely original confluence of pre-Hispanic and western elements. Those who have achieved the feat of making work that is now part of the universal heritage of human art . . . worked with all these materials, living and handling them with maximum wisdom and inspiration.[89]

[89] José María Arguedas, "La cultura: un patrimonio difícil de colonizar," in *Qepa Wiñaq,* ed. Dora Sales, 167. Originally published in Francisco Miró Quesada, Fernando Szyslo y José María Arguedas, *Notas sobre la cultura latinoamericana y su destino* (Lima: Industrial Gráfica, 1966), 549-55.

He saw the intermingling of indigenous and modern cultural elements not only as the treasured inheritance for Latin American countries with indigenous roots, but also as a universal heritage for all of humanity. In the award ceremony for *Inca Garcilaso de la Vega* in October 1968, Arguedas further illustrated his self-endowed mission to promote this idea throughout his literary and anthropological career in the famous speech "*No soy aculturado"*:

> Always infected with the songs and myths, carried to the University of San Marcos by fortune, I spoke Quechua all my life and was well incorporated into the surrounding world. As a happy visitor to big foreign cities, I intended to convert who I was as an individual into written language. It is a lively and strong linkage that can universalize itself to the great nearby [non-indigenous] nation and to the generous, human part of the oppressors. This linkage could universalize and extend itself; it demonstrated a concrete working example. The siege could and should be destroyed; the flow between the two nations could and should unite [them]. . . . I am not acculturated; I am a Peruvian proudly, like a happy demon who spoke in Christian and indigenous, in Spanish and in Quechua.[90]

Condensing his own biography in this short passage, Arguedas spoke proudly about his growth among Quechua people who nourished him with their culture, which he never tossed aside, whether in the University or abroad. He was so proud of being an intermingled product of, and a linkage between Quechua and Spanish cultures, and the fact that he was not predominantly acculturated by the latter. Moreover, he thought it was his destined mission to use written language to make this linkage known.

October 1968 was also a month of political upheaval for Peru; the coup d'état led by Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew the Belaúnde regime for its dereliction of promised reforms. Peru was at the peak of an atmosphere to demand effective reforms in its relationships with foreign investment, agrarian policy, and the education system. Arguedas also touched upon the relationship between his beloved culture and his political inclination in this speech: "How did I

[90] José María Arguedas, "No soy aculturado…," in *Qepa Wiñaq,* ed. Sales, 182. Words of José María Arguedas in the ceremony of Award Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Lima. October, 1968.

come to understand socialism? I do not know it well, but it does not kill the magical in me. . . . [I] always consider Peru as an infinite spring for creation. . . . No, there is no other country more diverse, more varied in terrain and human diversity, with all the grades of temperature and color, of love and hate, of warps and subtleties, of utilized symbols and inspirers."[91] Unlike most of his contemporaries, Arguedas did not see a contradiction between the socialist inclination, featuring rationalization, and the indigenous perspective, characterized by mythical beliefs and worldview. None was supposed to be replaced by the other, nor did there exist a lineal process of cultural evolution; they together constituted what Peru was, a forever spring of creativity because of its diversity. Although both Arguedas and his colleagues inherited the ideas of José Carlos Mariátegui, Arguedas enhanced the part of cultural resilience, while his colleagues focused on the aspect of social dynamics. Socialist and indigenous perspectives connected in a way that Arguedas himself could not define precisely yet, just as he could not clearly conceptualize Rendón Willka in the novel. Arguedas was optimistic about Peru, at least on the cultural level.

In contrast, Arguedas showed more hesitation and concern with respect to real policy-making and the approaching reformative projects than his colleagues. On July 7, 1969, two weeks after the Decree Law N. 17716 of New Agrarian Reform was announced, Arguedas mailed the editor of *Oiga* an article titled "El ejercito peruano," in which he appealed to President Velasco for a real concern for the people: "General: we are listening; we are following your steps with anxiety and hope. If you and the officials of the army neither fear nor despise the young people, neither dread nor disdain the people in their true "inner sky," but were afraid of and loathed Belaunde and Haya, you, the army, can have Peru launch a great flight; perhaps we

[91] Ibid., 182-3.

will be able to see this arrow shot into the infinite before we die."[92] This passage reveals Arguedas's cautiousness and at the same time high expectation toward the military government. He sensed he might not be able to witness the radical changes of Peru due to his own increasing thought of committing suicide. Nevertheless, he wished the changes could launch in a way that accorded with the ideal picture of Peru in his mind, supposedly, the culturally diverse but fraternal society.

Arguedas's correspondence in November 1969 with Hugo Blanco—an ex-peasant guerilla leader imprisoned at El Fronton—right after the announcement of Supreme Decree N. 240-69 AP[93] and weeks before his suicide,[94] further expressed his uncertainty about the coming changes. The two did not know each other personally; Blanco wrote Arguedas simply out of his admiration for the writer. In return, Arguedas mailed him a copy of *Todas las sangres*, which he thought was highly related to what they were exchanging through letters. They wrote to each other in Quechua, the language they both believed to be more powerful and beautiful than Spanish,[95] and the contents were actually about their passionate love for Quechua culture and expectations, and about the culture's self-respect and self-pride. Blanco described the scenes of his guerilla movement occupying Cuzco, while Arguedas echoed him with similar scenes in the

[92] Cited in Rodrigo Montoya, "Cien años del Perú y de José María Arguedas (1911-2011)," in Montoya, *100 años del Perú y de José María Arguedas (1911-2011)*, 32.

[93] The Supreme Decree was a regulation of the cooperatives announced on November 4. Hugo Blanco's first letter to Arguedas was dated as November 11, 1969.

[94] The exact date was November 28, 1969.

[95] These letters were translated into Spanish by Arguedas, who also mailed them to the editor of *Punto Final*, a left-leaning magazine in Santiago, Chile, to seek publication. See Carlos Vidales, ed., "El escritor y el revolucionario," *Punto Final* 95, January 6, 1970. Accessed October 25, 2015. http://www.pfmemoriahistorica.org/PDFs/1970/PF_095_doc.pdf

novel.[96] At the end of their letters, they both expected more fundamental changes would happen. Blanco encouraged Arguedas, "But this day will surely come back, *taytay*,[97] and not only as what I tell you, but something bigger. Bigger days will arrive, and you have to see them by yourself. They have been announced clearly."[98]Arguedas seemed to be able to foresee the beautiful picture they depicted, but he was also afraid of its accomplishment via violent revolutions: "I am not well, not at all; my strength is declining like a setting sun. But if I die now, I will die more peacefully. This beautiful day that you said will come, that our people will be born again, comes, I feel it, and I feel their aurora in the apple of my eyes. In this light, your burning pain is falling drop by drop, drop by drop, and never ends. I fear this dawn costs blood, so much blood. You know it well and that is why you emphasize and cry out from the jail. . . ."[99] Arguedas did not seem to affirm that the most recently proposed reforms, namely organizing the cooperatives, would achieve a fundamental change in Peruvian society in the most smooth and peaceful way. He never openly questioned the idea that had absorbed most of the intellectual and political energies of his colleagues. He was just not as optimistic and passionate about it compared to his own cultural proposal—an alternative approach to ask and answer *Peru Problema*—that was not put on the table until the late 1970s. On November 28, 1969, Arguedas shot himself in his office at the Agrarian University, passed away on December 2, and left many unresolved questions about his life and works to the later generations of Peruvian scholars.

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[96] Ibid.

[97] A Quechua word for father.

[98] Ibid., 4.

[99] Ibid., 5.

Conclusion

Arguedas, especially after the 1980s, has often been seen as a misunderstood and undervalued scholar during his lifetime. This chapter reconstructs his career since he stepped into anthropology and thus joined the *limeño* intellectual circle, emphasizing the urgent need to study social reality and thus solve "*Peru Problema"* through anthropological and sociological sciences. We have seen how Arguedas was summoned by the same call as his colleagues, but could not forget the cultural vitality of the indigenous people he had lived with since childhood. With his unique life experience, Arguedas made an effort to persuade his colleagues that they could actually entrust Peru's future to the indigenous cultural resilience and flexibility, a proposal apparently too naïve and anti-rational for other colleagues to accept at that time.

Facing the increasing demands of agrarian reform and cases of land invasion, most scholars were inclined to see these as a complex of issues that included land title and distribution, productivity and technological innovation, and political autonomy with modern rationalized organization. Culture seemed to be an aspect of life destined to change in this historical torrent, and they were rather pessimistic about how much they could do with it. Arguedas's academic interaction and intellectual exchanges with his colleagues in this chapter present us with an alternative but temporarily abandoned path to study and perceive Peru until the 1980s. The cooperativism that went through previous experimental stages (at Vicos) and participant observation (at Huayopampa), now achieved an unquestionable position, at least among the *limeño* intellectual circle—the basis for a think tank for the early Velasco government.

Chapter Five
The Cooperative in Practice:
Debates and Battles between the Ministry of Agriculture and SINAMOS, 1968-1975

This chapter concerns how the experimental and homogenized idea of the agricultural cooperative was put into practice during the Juan Velasco regime between 1968 and 1975. Compared to the previous chapters focusing on specific research projects and academic institutions, this chapter is composed of ideological debates and political battles between the three major governmental branches in charge of Agrarian Reform: the Ministry of Agriculture; National Support System of Social Mobilization (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, SINAMOS); and Centre for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform (*Centro Nacional de Capacitación y Investigación para la Reforma Agraria*, CENCIRA).

Juan Velasco's regime is characterized by the encounter between the military and prestigious intellectual consultants. Its early phase features enthusiastic debates regarding the correct approach to a wide array of reforms. Established scholars and students trained in the recently institutionalized disciplines of anthropology and sociology since the late 1940s, were deeply involved in these debates and practices. Famous international and Peruvian scholars were invited to serve as the government's consultants, while their newly graduating students were hired as local practitioners of the reforms.

To be more specific, Mario Vásquez, the main figure discussed in chapter two, became the Vice Minister of Agriculture, an office that approached Agrarian Reform with a perspective of efficiency and productivity. On the other hand, Carlos Delgado, a member of the IEP circle, served as the civil head of SINAMOS, and he emphasized the importance of peasant

participation in the Agrarian Reform.[1] The cooperative, an idea that had gained currency since the late 1950s, achieved its unquestionable status as the "best solution" to the problem of rural development during this time. Nevertheless, it was also because of the various expectations, approaches, and emphasis toward the cooperative that *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform was viewed as chaotic and confusing by Peruvian peasants. While most research on Peruvian Agrarian Reform is concerned with what it achieved or how it failed, this chapter approaches the Reform as a long-awaited chance for Peruvian and international intellectuals to put their ideal—the agricultural cooperative—into practice. Readers will be able to see how the unresolved intellectual and political tensions between scholars in the previous chapters emerge as policy incongruities between SINAMOS and the Ministry of Agriculture, the two primary governmental institutions enlisting civilian consultants.

In this chapter, I will draw on sources from (1) *Colección Mario Vásquez, Centro de Documentación, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú*, (2) Land Tenure Files, Steenbock Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, (3) published pamphlets and propaganda by SINAMOS archived at *Bilioteca Nacional del Perú*, (4) interviews with Peruvian and Peruvianist anthropologists, including Karen Spalding, Jürgen Golte, and Enrique Mayer, and (5) reports, observations, and evaluations from international scholars conducting fieldwork in Peru between 1968 and 1975, such as Douglas Horton, Peter Cleaves, Martin Scurrah, and Cynthia McClintock.

I will begin with a brief introduction of *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform, especially its plans and policies with respect to agricultural cooperatives. Then, I will show a broader picture of how Peruvian and international intellectuals joined this exciting historical moment, either to help,

[1] IEP was not directly involved in Agrarian Reform as an organization, but it participated in the Education Reform while Augusto Salazar Bondy, one of its founders, was the civil consultant for the Ministry of Education. José Matos Mar was said to have a good relationship with the Ministry, too. See Carlos Iván Degregori to John Murra, April 29, 1970, Series I. Box 10, Folder Degregori, Carlos Iván, 1967-1972, Papers of John Murra.

witness, or simply observe the supposedly radical change, especially against the context of Latin American agrarian reform. What follows will be the ideal image of the cooperative proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Mario Vásquez's role in it. In contrast to the Ministry's focus on economic achievement, SINAMOS's enthusiasm was directed at promoting participation and solidarity, the topic of the next section. Readers will be able see how different emphases on the cooperative created conflictive instructions for peasants. Lastly, CENCIRA will be depicted as a pragmatic institution, whose position that the cooperative just needed more time and better-trained practitioners to succeed, reveals that there were insufficient numbers of trained anthropologists for mediation between the government and the peasants. In sum, this chapter intends to show how anthropologists and sociologists involved themselves in this long-anticipated reform, which in the beginning temporarily united their diverse backgrounds and expectations but ultimately drove them apart.

Agrarian Reform under Juan A. Velasco: the Cooperative as the Dominant Theme

I have shown in previous chapters how contemporary Peruvian intellectuals had either experimented with principles of the cooperative (e.g., Vicos) or witnessed the vitality of quasi-cooperative communities (e.g., Huayopampa). Both camps of scholars, either modernization supporters or dependency theorists, agreed that cooperation in terms of land and people was the right way to go for rural Peru. Scholars who sided with modernization theory thought the cooperative would liberate indigenous peasants from backward isolation and mitigate the impact that they would suffer from their unavoidable involvement with the capitalist market. From the viewpoint of anthropologists strongly influenced by dependency theories, the indigenous peasants had long been involved in global capitalist markets and survived with their cultural

resilience and communal vitality, which for them was comparable to the cooperative institution. With the unquestionable arrival of modernization in the agricultural sector, an economy of scale, namely, cooperation, was indispensable.[2]

Against this ideological background, Juan Alvarado Velasco (in office from 1968-1975) launched the long-promised Agrarian Reform on a large scale for the first time in Peru. Economically, the early phase of the Velasco regime benefited from the worldwide rise of commodity prices and tax reform, enabling it to maintain autonomy in economic management.[3] Politically, the Velasco government was constituted by the military with a wide ideological spectrum, with the progressives predominating the early phase of the regime.[4] Velasco himself was especially attracted to the political agendas of *Partido Democratica Cristiano* (PDC) and *Movimiento Social Progresista* (MSP),[5] both deeply influenced by the "social reality" currency of understanding that I have discussed. This military regime embraced "new professionalism" and believed reform was necessary for the maintenance of internal security. Its center of decision-making was *Comité de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia* (COAP), in which the civilian members offered their advice while military members had the final say; the most influential

[2] Ibid. Also, see Douglas E. Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report, Land Reform and Reform Enterprise in Peru, Appendix A, Appendix B* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1974), III-11.

[3] Thorp, "The Evolution of Peru's Economy," (see intro. n. 53).

[4] In Latin American context, progressive usually refers to the radical left in the spectrum of political ideology. See Liisa L. North, "Ideological Orientations of Peru's Military Rulers," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, eds. McClintock and Lowenthal, 245-74.

[5] Klarén, *Peru* (see chap. 2, n. 10).

COAPs were all closely related to the Agrarian Reform.[6] Velasco claimed to find a third way beyond capitalism and communism to develop Peru, and cooperativism, thanks to its ideological elasticity, chimed in readily.

An exposition held at the Peruvian Center of Advanced Military Studies (*Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*, CAEM), a nursery of the "new professionalist" generals, perfectly revealed the marriage between the Velasco government and cooperativism.[7] Similar to the way in which IEP's series of *Peru Problema* dissected the land problem, the exposition categorized contemporary haciendas in Peru into three types—modern commercial, transitional, and traditional—and analyzed their respective problems. Despite their productivity, the modern commercial haciendas were usually enclaves of foreign interests, while the traditional ones were laggard and could not feed the increasing rural population.[8] The cooperative was thus envisioned as an organization of property and autonomy that would eradicate both sets of problems. It was the "third path," distinctive from capitalist and communist approaches, through which those who worked on the land would become the actual beneficiaries of the production.[9]

The General Law of Cooperatives in 1964 had opened up a political space for the cooperatives' blueprints,[10] while the Organic Law of Agricultural Sector (No. 19608) in 1969

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[6] Peter S. Cleaves and Henry Pease Garcia, "State Autonomy and Military Policy Making," in *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, eds. McClintock and Lowenthal, 209-44.

[7] CENCIRA, *El sector agrario: planteamientos y acción del gobierno revolucionario de la fuerza armada. Exposición en el CAEM, 26 de mayo de 1972* (Lima: CENCIRA, 1972).

[8] Ibid., 11.

[9] Ibid., 15-7.

[10] Peter S. Cleaves and Martin J. Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 221-2.

practically enforced the organization of the cooperative. Under the Organic Law, the cooperatives could be distinguished as two types: Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (*Cooperativa Agraria de Producción*, CAP) and Agricultural Societies for Social Interest (*Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social*, SAIS). CAP was a cooperative transformed from one single hacienda, whose workers now became the absolute members of this specific CAP. SAIS was composed of at least one hacienda and its neighboring indigenous communities. Given its complex formation, either the hacienda or each community was respectively counted as only one member when it came to voting and profit sharing. Nevertheless, the hacienda was actually the only profit producer in SAIS, and complaints and conflicts were thus often heard in SAIS.[11] Whether in the form of CAP or SAIS, Peruvian peasants now were the collective workers, managers, and shareholders of the agricultural estates. Despite the slogan "land for those who work on it," peasants under Agrarian Reform were not owners in the traditional sense that could trade and inherit land in their own interest.[12]

The cooperative was designed to be a politically autonomous unit under the intermediate supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture until it paid the agrarian debt as compensation to previous estate owners. Each member could participate in the General Assembly to elect the Administrative Council and Vigilance Council from cooperatives' members. The Administrative Council would name three candidates for the position of Director, who would be responsible for arranging the cooperative's daily work schedule, and the Ministry of Agriculture would select

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[11] Cynthia McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 35-6.

[12] Ibid., 33.

one among the three.[13] Ideally, the candidates should have their educational backgrounds as agronomists or veterinary technicians, presumably with university degrees, and even be authorities in either field, i.e., professionals. The combination of the General Assembly, Administrative Council and professional Director was very much like the experiment at Vicos. Mario Vásquez was the initiator of New Seed Potato and the final purchase of the haciendas, while the Vicosinos were eventually encouraged to vote for their administrative board. In later sections, I will come back to how the Director became a source of conflict between the cooperatives and the Ministry of Agriculture.

The Velasco government made rules with respect to the cooperatives' pricing and marketing, similar to IEP's proposal and advice toward Agrarian Reform as shown in chapter three. The government also served as the credit source for cooperatives. These functions were planned to be channeled through *La Central de Cooperativas* (The Central Cooperatives). Every year, forty to seventy-five percent of the cooperative's net surplus, after deducting taxes and agrarian debt, went to the Central Cooperatives supposedly to help the cooperative sell their products, purchase agricultural inputs, and improve education, social welfare, and infrastructure.[14] In practice, the establishment of the first Central Cooperative at Santa Valley, Ancash, in the 1970 earthquake disaster area, was outsourced to and incompetently managed by the Center of Research and Promotion of Development (*Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo*, DESCO) in 1972.[15]

This brief introduction to the cooperative in *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform not only elucidates how it was ideally based on the models proposed in previous chapters, but also

[13] Ibid., 34. Also see Cleaves and Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru*, 222-3.

[14] José Matos Mar and José Manuel Mejía, *La Reforma Agraria en el Perú* (Lima: IEP, 1980), 135-50.

[15] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* III-1—III-19.

touches upon many potential problems that would surface when the state tried to put it into practice. Nevertheless, before discussing problems of the cooperative operation, especially with respect to the intellectual promoters' diversity and incongruity, the next section will step back a little and provide a broader picture of social scientific circles during this period.

Intellectual Life under Velasco Regime: A Sketch

The opening of the Velasco period (1968-1975) was a rather exciting and attractive moment for both Peruvian and foreign scholars concerning agrarian reform, peasant movements, and cooperatives in Latin America. Post-World War II was a period of agrarian reform in many Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Cuba. Peru was an interesting case for them in the sense that the reform was carried out by a military government, which claimed it would adopt neither the capitalist nor the communist way of change.

This section depicts a larger picture of Peruvian intellectual circles at this moment, which surely went beyond the scope of the Ministry of Agriculture, SINAMOS, and CENCIRA, which are the topics of the remaining sections in this chapter. It will also temporarily go beyond the debate over the cooperative, in order to show the groups of zealous and clamorous intellectuals with diversified political, ideological, and institutional affiliations, disciplinary trainings, and approaches toward participation in, or criticism of, the official reforms. This section provides not only background, but also a collage through which we can more closely represent the Velasco period.

As a military regime, the Velasco government at the beginning was relatively friendly to its intellectual critics, seemingly making Peru a refuge for international scholars fleeing from

dictatorship and repression in their home countries.[16] José María Caballero ran away from Franco regime in Spain, arriving in Lima in late 1969 or early 1970, and staying until 1980. He was invited by the Velasco government to join CENCIRA to lecture on the significance of Agrarian Reform and cooperativism.[17] At the same time, he was associated with the Department of Economy, *Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú*, which held seminars on theoretical model building of the cooperative.[18] Later in 1978, Caballero joined IEP to lead the Project titled Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (*Reforma Agraria y Desarrollo Rural*) and published several influential research studies through IEP.[19] Besides these open academic activities, Caballero was also invited to join an underground leftist party, *Círculo de Estudios Atusparia, Vanguardia Revolucionaria*, close to the radical peasant organization, Peruvian Peasant Confederation (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*, CCP). The study circle did not seem to survive long for it published only one volume of its journal, *Cuaderno agrarios*, in which Caballero used the pseudonym, Javier Gastón, to criticize the government.[20]

Caballero's case clearly illustrates every possible way through which an established exiled

[16] Besides Caballero, Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro is another often-cited example. Ribeiro had been in exile since 1964 and was invited by the Velasco government after the fall of the Allende government in Chile, his third country of exile. See Luciana Quillet Heymann, "The Utopian Darcy Ribeiro Archive," *História Ciências, Saúde—Manguinhos*, 19, no. 1 (2012):261-82. Accessed March 31, 2013. http://scielo.br/hcsm

[17] Fernando Eguren, "Homenaje a José María Caballero," *Economía* 33, no. 66 (2010): 161-6. Accessed March 30, 2013. http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/economia/article/view/889/850

[18] Raúl Hopkins, "José María Caballero: Una vida a favor del desarrollo rural latinoamericano," *Revista Argumentos* 4, no. 2 (2010). Accessed March 11, 2015. http://web.revistargumentos.org.pe/index.php?fp_cont=959 Also see José María Caballero, "Los eventuales en las cooperativas costeñas peruanas: un modelo analítico," *Revista Economía* 1, no. 2 (1979): 57-80.

[19] José María Caballero and Elena Álvarez, *Aspectos cuantitativos de la reforma agraria, 1969-1979* (Lima: IEP, 1980); José María Caballero, *Agricultura, reforma agraria y pobreza campesina* (Lima: IEP, 1980); José María Caballero, *Economía agraria de la sierra peruana: Antes de la reforma agraria de 1969* (Lima: IEP, 1981).

[20] Eguren, "Homenaje a José María Caballero."

scholar could become involved with Peruvian intellectual circles at this moment. With their international reputations, they could be invited by the government to assist in the reform projects. They lectured at local prestigious universities, and with the network they built in Peru through intellectual and social exchanges, they could go further to collaborate with private research centers for larger projects. Their non-native status also made it convenient for them to flow from one institutional position to another without the burden of academic partisanship. They might also, as Caballero did, react quickly to the shortcomings of official reforms and criticize what they had once participated in, themselves.

Besides exiled scholars, Peru in the Velasco period also attracted many foreign scholars coming and going all the time to witness and evaluate the reforms. Eric Hobsbawm was first attracted to the peasant movement at La Convención, Cuzco, led by Hugo Blanco, and had followed events in Peru since this first short visit in 1962.[21] He came back to Latin America often, but the longest period was a six-month stay in 1971 in Peru and Mexico.[22] In my interview, Karen Spalding still remembers how Hobsbawm took a pick-up truck, accompanied by government officials, to visit expropriated haciendas and collect documents in order to build the Center of Agrarian Documentation (*Centro de Documentación Agraria*). Hobsbawm did not publish any academic writing on the Velasco reform, but he did write an article on it.[23]

Many foreign scholars who did leave academic writings on the Velasco reforms were doing

[21] For his first trip to Peru, see Eric Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times: My Twentieth-Century Life* (London: Penguin, 2002). For his publication on La Convención, see Eric Hobsbawm, "A Case of Neo-Feudalism: La Convención, Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1, no. 1 (1969): 31-50.

[22] Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times*.

[23] Eric Hobsbawm, "Peru: The Peculiar Revolution," *New York Review of Books* 17, no. 10 (1971): 29-36. Accessed April 4, 2016. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1971/dec/16/peru-the-peculiar-revolution/

their PhD theses at the time. David Scott Palmer got his PhD in political science from Cornell University in 1973 with the thesis, *Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-1972*. Although Palmer did his PhD at Cornell, he connects to Peru in a different way from Vicos or the Chancy Project. In 1962, he came to Peru as a Peace Corp volunteer at Ayacucho and stayed until 1964. He started his PhD program in 1968 and stayed in Peru again between 1971 and 1972 for his thesis research, while teaching at PUCP at the same time.[24]

The other Cornell student doing thesis research on Velasco Peru was Douglas Horton.[25] Horton was from the Department of Economics but worked with William Foote Whyte, the co-director of the Chancay Valley Project. He got his PhD in 1976 with the thesis, *Haciendas and cooperatives: a study of estate organization, land reform and new reform enterprises in Peru*. The major fieldwork was carried out between 1970 and 1972.[26] While writing his thesis, between 1973 and 1975, he also held a job at the Rural Development and Employment Division of the World Bank, researching a project titled "Comparative Experiences of Land Reform in Latin America." He based this research on the Peruvian case and compared it with experiences of Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. Cynthia McClintock from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also conducted her dissertation research in Peru during this period. She graduated in 1976 and published her dissertation in 1981 with the title *Peasant Cooperatives and Political*

[24] David Scott Palmer, "Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-1972," (doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1973), iii-iv.

[25] My correspondence with Enrique Mayer shows both Palmer and Horton had been in the Quechua class established by John Murra.

[26] Douglas Horton, "Haciendas and Cooperatives: A Preliminary Study of Latifunidist Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Northern Peru," Land Tenure Center Research Papers, 53 (1973). Accessed January 21, 2012. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/57047

Change in Peru.

Palmer, Horton, and McClintock were three among the multitude of young researchers attracted by "the Peruvian experiment."[27] David Collier from the University of Chicago conducted his dissertation fieldwork in the squatter settlement of Lima between 1968 and 1969; Susan Bourque from Cornell University studied peasant organization and social change continually between 1965 and 1970; and Jane Jaquette from Cornell researched the politics of development between 1967 and 1969. There were three contributors to *The Peruvian Experiment* (1975) who had recently received doctoral degrees working for the Ford Foundation's office at Lima—Abraham Lowenthal (Harvard PhD 1971), Robert Drysdale (Harvard EdD 1971), and Peter Knight (Stanford PhD 1970).

Compared to foreign scholars, who came and went frequently and contributed to the already-flourishing intellectual circle of Peru, many of the Peruvian scholars were more deeply involved in the wave of radical politics. While some of them discontinued their academic life—either temporarily or forever—by directly jumping into official positions with the hope of putting their ideals into practice, others stayed in the field of research and served as civil consultants to the government. Some were also deciding to keep a critical distance from the government and the reform so they could oversee both with unbiased eyes. At the same time, there were others who did not wish to combine their research with contemporary radical politics; they believed there were more equally important topics.

Mario Vásquez and Carlos Delgado were two central figures during this period, not only because of their direct involvement in official appointments (which will be more fully developed in later sections), but also due to their calls and invitations to their colleagues. Together they

[27] I have borrowed the title of Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) and eds. McClintock and Lowenthal, *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*.

invited Stéfano Varese, an anthropologist focusing on the Ashaninka in Amazonia, to join the Ministry of Agriculture and to establish the Division of Forest Native Communities (*División de Comunidades Nativas de la Selva*), which would be in charge of land issues in Amazonian Peru.[28] In retrospect, Varese defined one of the Division's main tasks to educate the military about how land issues in Amazonia were different from those in the Andean region, which dominantly framed the discourse of Agrarian Reform.[29]

Scholars perceived their role not only as educators to the military government, but also as messengers spreading the good news of Agrarian Reform to the peasants. The Velasco government was very concerned about its public relations, and it used many types of media to propagandize itself, such as posters,[30] movies,[31] theaters,[32] and broadcast. In a local empowerment workshop manual for Lurinchincha peasants, the manual editor wrote: "Peasant Friend: Listen to the radio program "Man and Land" (*El Hombre la Tierra*), prepared for you by the Office of Technical Information of the Ministry of Agriculture, at the following times: 5:30

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[28] Himes, "The Impact in Peru of the Vicos Project." (see chap. 2, n. 3). Also see Charles Hales, "Introduction of Recipient: Stefano Varese," 2013 LASA/OXFAM America Martin Diskin Lecture, *LASA Forum* 144, no. 3(2013): 6-7. Accessed November 1, 2013. https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol44-issue3/MartinDiskinLecture-1.pdf

[29] Rodrigo Montoya, Hernando Burgos and Martín Paredes, "En la Selva Sí hay Estrellas: Una entrevista con el doctor Stéfano Varese," *Quehacer* 128 (2001): 98-105. Accessed March 3, 2013. http://www.desco.org.pe/sites/default/files/quehacer_articulos/files/qh128sv.doc

[30] Anna Cant, "'Land for Those Who Work It': A Visual Analysis of Agrarian Reform Posters in Velasco's Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 44, no. 1 (2012): 1-37.

[31] For example, Federico García Hurtado was invited by SINAMOS to make documentaries about Agrarian Reform though he ends up using the subsidy to make his first film Kunturwachana (1977). See Enrique Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

[32] Interview with Jürgen Golte on December 13, 2012.

and 8:30 in the morning and 6:30 in the afternoon, through National Radio 1080 (*Radio Nacional 1080*)."[33] On one hand, scholars were positive that media, such as TV programs, radio broadcast, photos, tapes, and documentaries, would facilitate peasants' understanding of the reform and that peasants should be able to utilize them to express local voices. On the other hand, they were cautious about the close relationship between mass media and capitalism, through which counterrevolutionary messages might be plugged in.[34] Thus, major national newspapers were nationalized, and experienced media practitioners were recruited into SINAMOS to be in charge of governmental public relations. Hugo Neira, who had been *Expreso's* reporter and participated in the Chancay Valley Project as a *sanmarquino* student, was invited to join SINAMOS[35] while the said newspaper was expropriated to spread ideas about educational reform.[36]

José Matos Mar and Augusto Salazar Bondy were examples of influential consultants staying active in the intellectual circle. They were particularly involved in the *Velaquista* educational reform. Matos Mar continued to be the resource fetcher for IEP; he had a good relationship with the Ministry of Education and due to his string-pulling, IEP was funded for

[33] José Vargas Córdova, ed., *La Voz de Lurinchincha: Informativo de los alumnos del curso de capacitación para adjudicatarios del asentamiento de Lurichincha*, May 18-22, 1970, p. 23, Peru, 20.1, V69, Land Tenure Center Files, Steenbock Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries (hereafter cited as Land Tenure Center Files).

[34] See Hugo Neira, *El Poder de Informar*, Serie VI. Capacitación y Difusión, No. 3, 1973, Files Pe 18.1 N24, Steenbock Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries (hereafter cited as Steenbock). Also see SINAMOS, *Participación y comunicación*, Serie VI: Capacitación-difusión, No. 1, Files Pe 18 S47, Steenbock.

[35] Juan Martín Sánchez, *La revolución peruana: ideología y práctica política de un gobierno militar, 1968-1975*, (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2002), 113-20.

[36] Joel Rojas Huaynates, "Augusto Salazar Bondy: ideólogo y editorialista de la reforma educativa," in *Actas del congreso sobre Augusto Salazar Bondy*, ed. Rubén Quiroz Avila (Lima: Instituto de Investigación del Pensamiento Peruano y Latinoamericano, 2014), 87-99.

field research for making the new Law of Education.[37] Augusto Salazar Bondy, who had been deeply involved in educational reform since the 1950s, was one of the three key drafters of the new Law of Education in 1972.[38] It was a pioneering project emphasizing structural change and cultural diversity, though was unfinished due partly to Salazar Bondy's untimely death in 1974, and strong opposition to the dogmatic student movement in public universities.[39]

While some perceived the *Velaquista* reform as a long-awaited chance to put their ideas into practice, others preferred to keep some distance from it. Sociologist Julio Cotler adopted a critical stance toward the authoritarian and dictatorial nature of the Velasco regime.[40] The other sociologist who worked closely with him was Aníbal Quijano; they were two among the group editors of the magazine *Sociedad y Política*, in which Cotler published several articles criticizing the Velasco government. In December 1973, after publishing a document to express support for Chile against the military coup of Augusto Pinochet, which was interpreted as an insinuation of the Velasco regime, Cotler and Quijano were captured and expatriated to Argentina and later to Mexico until 1976.[41]

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[37] See Carlos Iván Degregori to John Murra, April 29, 1970. Series I, Box 10, Folder Degregori, Carlos Iván, 1967-1972, Papers of John Murra.

[38] Manuel Burga, "Las reformas educativas en el Perú," *El Peruano*, Aproximación, August 29, 2013. Accessed July 16, 2015. http://www.elperuano.com.pe/edicion/noticia-las-reformas-educativas-el-peru-9548.aspx#.VadfFvm83m4

[39] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marco* (see chap. 3, n. 28).

[40] Julio Cotler, "El itinerario del Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Algunos hitos fundamentales," in *50 años pensando el Perú*, ed. Tanaka, 15-22 (see chap. 3, n. 5). Also see Antonio Zapata, "Julio Cotler: A los judíos nos insultaban, había que soportar la incertidumbre," Entrevista, *La República*, April 29, 2012. Accessed July 16, 2015. http://archivo.larepublica.pe/29-04-2012/julio-cotler-los-judios-nos-insultaban-habia-que-soportar-la-incertidumbre

[41] Aníbal Quijano, "Expatriación de dos intelectuales peruanos editores de la revista *Sociedad y Política*," *Problemas del Desarrollo* 4, no. 16 (1973): 201-4.

There were also scholars choosing to keep some distance from the reforms in order to focus on other equally important research topics. In a letter to John Murra in 1970, Degregori wrote, "Well, I did recognize the importance of studying the Agrarian Reform, but I had the idea to go to the south, to walk for a couple of months, and to find a good place to study something more 'traditional.'"[42] In our interview, Enrique Mayer also mentioned how he consciously stayed away from researching the reform at the time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they shunned social and political upheavals completely or ignored their historical significance. As early as the late 1970s, Degregori had already begun to question the influential framework of the national problem that had been constructed by Augusto Salazar Bondy's generation to diagnose Peru.[43] In later works, Degregori traced the development of the Shining Path back to 1969,[44] the same year of *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform, while Mayer came back to revisit the "ugly stories of the Peruvian agrarian reform."[45]

It was also a time of increasingly militant student movements, especially in the public universities. While the established scholars thought the students were limited by political struggles and dogmatic Marxism,[46] the students thought of their professors as rather bourgeoisie

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[42] Carlos Iván Degregori to John Murra, April 29, 1970. Series I, Box 10, Folder Degregori, Carlos Iván, 1967-1972, Papers of John Murra.

[43] Carlos Iván Degregori, "Indigenism, Peasant Culture and National Problem," (paper, Ayacucho, Peru, December 4-9, 1977), AL 1, Caja 02, Documentos de la Confederación Campesina del Perú 83, Archivo Laboral Centro de la Documentación, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (hereafter cited as Archivo Laboral).

[44] *El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho 1969-1979* (Lima: IEP, 1990).

[45] Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*.

[46] Escobar, "El problema universitario o el vacío ideológico." (see chap. 3, n. 33).

and thus their class enemies. Most public university student leaders were from squatter immigrant families or the impoverished countryside and made it all the way up to the higher level of education in the hope of improving their class position, but were ultimately disillusioned.[47] They had grown up in the 1950s and 1960s with the iconic images of Che Guevara and Hugo Blanco, leaders of armed struggles. They rejected the official reforms, including the university reform, and chose to stand by the side of peasant movements against the government, mainly the Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*, CCP).[48] The failure of *Velaquista* reforms and the growing militancy among public university students seemed to foreshadow the later emergence of the Shining Path, a topic this dissertation cannot deal with directly but will discuss its implications in the conclusion.

Based on this complex picture of intellectual activities in the Velasco period, the next section will bring the focus back to the issue of the agricultural cooperative and dissect how it involved scholars with diverse ideological, political, and institutional backgrounds. Cooperativism in the Juan Velasco regime brought together enthusiasts with conflictive and incoherent perspectives of the cooperative, which ultimately led to their loss of hegemonic control over the Agrarian Reform.

Productivity and Efficiency: Mario Vásquez and the Ministry of Agriculture

This section will delineate the Ministry of Agriculture and how it put the cooperative into practice through the professionals' mediation. Readers will see not only Mario Vásquez's role in

[47] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos*.

[48] Comité de solidaridad con las tomas de tierras en Andahuylas, "Comité de solidaridad con las tomas de tierras en Andahuylas, Comunicado," AL 1, Caja 02, Documentos de la Confederación Campesina del Perú 81, Archivo Laboral.

the Ministry and his expectations for university-trained professionals in this process, but also his ideal picture of the cooperative. Equipped with the experiences from Vicos, Mario Vásquez stepped up as Deputy Director of the Ministry of Agriculture during Velasco period. In this military regime, generals served as ministers, who generally agreed Agrarian Reform was necessary for national security but had little training with regard to carrying it out. Thus, they relied heavily upon the civilian intellectuals to plan workable reformative projects and to mediate between them, the peasants, and the international funding institutions. This very much describes Vásquez's job as Deputy Director. He proofread the internal evaluation reports before their final presentation to the Directorate of the Ministry.[49] He summarized the international funding institutions' evaluations for the Minister and made sure they would be revised and contextualized so that the specific case studies wouldn't be used against the revolutionary government and the reform.[50]

In a retrospective article published in 1977, two years after the coup that overthrew Velasco, Vásquez still defended the cooperative as the basic organizational unit of the Agrarian Reform.[51] Out of the five benefits he listed, four concerned the issue of economy of scale. In Vasquez's official position, which was slightly different from his role in the Vicos Project, he concentrated his argument on how the cooperative would facilitate productivity and efficiency.

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[49] Luis Bortesi Longhi to Mario Vásquez, September 28, 1973, M. No 248 OP/RA, Colección Mario Vásquez. Also see Oficina de Programación, Dirección General de Reforma Agraria, *Evaluación del proceso de reforma agraria al 30 de junio de 1973*, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[50] Mario Vásquez to Enrique Valdez Angulo, Minister of Agriculture, July 17, 1974, Of. No. 129 DA-RA/AR, Colección Mario Vásquez. Also see Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Agricultural Sector Survey, Peru*, Report No. 549a-PE, March 14, 1975, Colección Mario Vásquez.

[51] Mario Vásquez, "Significado y logros de la Reforma Agraria Peruana," *Socialismo y Participación* 1 (1977): 91-107.

He reasoned that the cooperative would allow for a more efficient use of common physical resources, such as irrigation water and infrastructure; a rational use of the labor force and equipment; a larger agricultural yield that would bring better income and technical, administrative, and accounting services; and an ideal division of labor and distribution of benefits. He did bring up the significance of the cooperative to promote solidarity and participation, but only specifically in the sense that peasants could no longer stay isolated in face of the modernization of agricultural production.

Besides serving as an intermediary for the military minister and as a policy defender, Vásquez also strived to incorporate more anthropological and sociological perspectives into the Ministry. In the revised internal report that Vásquez proofread, the Ministry reflected on its work:

> . . . we perceive it to be highly recommended at this stage of the process to conduct a "Qualitative Evaluation." The Evaluation at present . . . suggests that undertaking these studies would contribute to our understanding of **how efficient and effective the actions of Agrarian Reform are in achieving the objectives**, as mentioned in the First Article of the Law of Agrarian Reform. **The statistical and purely quantitative point of view left very little to analyze** . . . more doubts are revealed each time regarding the degree to which peasants in each area or sector feel they are being integrated into a new life in the political, social, and economic spheres.[52]

This was an academic, and especially anthropological, way to deal with doubts and suspicions toward the effects of policies—to understand more deeply, namely qualitatively, in order to be persuasive. This was not an easy task since Vásquez faced a shortage of personnel and resources at hand. Who would be responsible for executing the Reform, and who would study and evaluate the process? In the case of an applied anthropological project, the small scale allows anthropologists to balance these two tasks. Nevertheless, the large scale of a national Agrarian Reform would need more trained anthropological and sociological hands and minds than

[52] Oficina de Programación, Dirección General de Reforma Agraria, *Evaluación del proceso de reforma agraria al 30 de junio de 1973*, revised in April 1974, p. 2-3. Colección Mario Vásquez. Emphases mine.

prestigious consultants who were mostly Lima-based.

In the 1975 evaluation by the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it was suggested that

> **The Ministry should increase the number of its employees who have regular direct contact with peasants.** Out of 15,000 staff in total, less than 1,000 are *sectoristas*. . . . It has been suggested that the *sectoristas* have too many duties in addition to their main task as extension workers, such as collecting statistics, appraising loan applications, and executing the land reform. It is recommended, however, that no change will be made in this situation to avoid confusing the peasants by confronting him with several different representatives of the Ministry, conceivably giving contradictory instructions. **Increasing the number of *sectoristas* and spending more money to improve their quality and mobility would probably be a better solution**. . . . It would also be desirable that the plan **provides pay differentials for field job as a means to attract and retain staff of desired ability for such a position**. In addition, the Ministry might consider introducing, as a prerequisite for promotion, the requirement of prior service in the field.[53]

This evaluation revealed the inadequacy of the Ministry staff at the scene of Agrarian Reform. It suggested the possible causes for this problem were the heavy workload for complicated tasks, the lack of economic and promotional motivation, and the subsequent loss of qualified staff. In terms of qualified personnel, the Ministry was looking for people with both university education backgrounds and work experience. For instance, in the Sub-Directorate of Research, Directorate of Remuneration and Working Conditions, Ministry of Agriculture, the Specialists in Social Promotion were required to have a degree related to social sciences or agronomic engineering and two to five years of related work experience.[54] While social scientists' job description seemed to be more like a Lima-based consultant for the government, agronomic engineers tended to be on-site advisors for peasants.

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[53] Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, IBRD, *Agricultural Sector Survey,* 22-3. Emphases mine.

[54] Oficina de Programación, Dirección General de Apoyo a las Empresas Campesinas, Ministerio de Agricultura, *Manual de Organización y Funciones 1977*, Colección Mario Vásquez.

The other position served by agronomists and closely connected to the Ministry of Agriculture was cooperative director.[55] As to how many resources the Ministry offered to keep these professionals, McClintock recorded that in 1974 the average salary for a cooperative director was "15,000 soles a month, or under $4,000 a year, rather meager remuneration for a technician with at least some university education working in a remote area."[56] As a result, the low pay eventually led to the loss of qualified personnel. McClintock noticed that by 1977, a large percentage of directors in the Virú Valley did not even complete their university education, and thus hardly had the power to persuade peasants about their professional abilities.[57]

The issue of the Director's salary also reflected the ambivalence of professionals' role in an ideally bottom-up and autonomous organization, namely, the cooperative. This ambivalence resulted from the design of the position of the cooperative director that was similar to Mario Vásquez's role in Vicos. He had been an outsider for Vicosinos, but in the end they trusted him more than any other leaders with the mission of collecting money to purchase the hacienda. His management of agricultural works and dealing with conflicts among Vicosinos won him that status. Thus, the design of an outside and professional director for the cooperative was supposed to decrease corruption and facilitate technical innovation.[58] However, the ascribed nature of director instead resulted in more complicated situations.

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[55] Although the director was theoretically elected by cooperative members, before the cooperative paid off compensation debt for original landowners, the Ministry reserved the power to select the final one among the three candidates nominated by the Administrative Council of the cooperative.

[56] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 137.

[57] Ibid., 302.

[58] Ibid., 136.

Although the Ministry reserved the right to assign the director among three candidates, it also gave the cooperative the power to fire the director or cut his salary.[59] From the cooperative's perspective, this power could be used as a means against the potentially power-abusing director[60] or the Ministry's excessive intervention.[61] Douglas Horton's report vividly presented the tension between peasants and technician directors. He noticed there were widespread "crises of confidence" among the directors he had visited. They were bothered by the multitasking and insecurity of their job. One director said, "It is very difficult to work in the CAPs. **One has to be a technician, a sociologist, and a politician at the same time**. . . . There is never any agreement in the Assembly, and at any point they could throw you away."[62] The other felt himself as "performing much the same functions as in any other business, but now **having one hundred and sixty-five bosses instead of one**."[63]

Complications went beyond the issue of self-government, which for peasants were tied to land ownership. Directors shared their observation in a conversation held by the Ministry of Agriculture, SINAMOS, and CENCIRA: ". . . maybe it is a mistake to insist on saying they are the "owners of the land" and the Directors and Administrators are simply "employees." This designation of "landowner" created a negative attitude on the part of peasants, making them no longer wanting to work and reducing the quality of their work, compared to when the land was

[59] Ibid., 136.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 302.

[62] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* p. IV-6. Colección Mario Vásquez. Emphasis mine.

[63] Ibid., p. IV-15. Emphasis mine.

owned by patrons. Now, they all prefer to be 'foremen or stewards' who control the work of other salaried peasants. . . ."[64] The directors' feedback reveals not only the difficulty of promoting cooperativism on the ground—the gap between the official plan and local expectations—but also the ambiguous role of professionals in the Agrarian Reform. They were trained and equipped with the pioneering idea of cooperativism and portrayed themselves as "peasant empowerment workers," assigned to spread the idea that "peasants are the landowners now, while directors are only employees." Paradoxically, their intellectual self-effacement encountered more aggressive reactions than they had expected. Retrospectively, in the controlled experiment of the Vicos Project, the slow-paced purchase of the hacienda land had allowed Mario Vásquez to operate in the gray area between the hacienda and the peasant cooperative. Many Vicosinos had still perceived him as the new patron so Vicos could still go on in a relatively integrated way before the final purchase. Now, the premise of Agrarian Reform, understood by peasants through the slogan "land for those who worked on it," abruptly put the role of professionals and the purpose of governmental interventions into question. These technicians were perceived as officials sent by the Ministry of Agriculture, rather than people who could work with them, not to mention the fact that some directors used to work for haciendas before Agrarian Reform.[65]

Moreover, as I have shown earlier, the local practitioners the Ministry sought were usually professionals in the fields of agronomy, veterinary medicine, plant genetics, and marketing.[66]

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[64] CENCIRA, *Informe del primer conversatorio de dirigentes campesinos de Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social, Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción, Comités Provisionales de Administración y Comisiones de Adjudicación Provisional*, p. 40. Files Pe 86.2 P27, Steenbock Library.

[65] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 55-6.

[66] Cleaves and Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru*, 246-9.

Conceivably, their professional training, if they ever completed the university, focused on how to improve productivity rather than dealing with complex interpersonal relationships, something that Mario Vásquez had grappled with for more than a decade at Vicos. Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture was generally perceived as a centralist institution, especially after its reorganization into the Ministry of Food in 1974.[67] It prioritized economic stability of the newly-established cooperatives more than any other aspect, and intervened in peasant work habits, director candidates,[68] and redistribution of financial profits.[69] It was also observed that Ministry officials held a rather paternalistic attitude toward peasants and felt that "they know what is best for the peasantry and. . . consider the rejection of their ideas as the result of ignorance . . . or political agitation. . . ."[70] The anthropological spirit to understand more qualitatively in order to persuade those who did not support the Reform barely went beyond the wall of the Ministry.

The ideal picture of the cooperative projected by the Ministry of Agriculture was that of an efficient unit of productivity, facilitated by a professional leadership of well-trusted technicians. It was not only in conflict with peasants' expectations, but also incongruent with the governmental discourse of mass participation, mainly drafted by SINAMOS. It is an intra-governmental conflict over the purpose and methods of rural development. In the following section, we will be able to see how the picture of the cooperative planned by SINAMOS was

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[67] Ibid.

[68] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* p. III-16.

[69] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 298-302.

[70] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* p. III-14.

different from that of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Revolution from Below: the "Steamrollers" and SINAMOS

In contrast to the Ministry's reformist approach to the cooperative, the National Support System of Social Mobilization (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, SINAMOS) stood on the left-leaning side. Its composition reflected the predominance of the progressives in the early phase of the Velasco regime. During its heyday between 1972 and 1973, SINAMOS was led by the socialist-leaning general, Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa[71] and the ex-*Aprista* anthropologist, Carlos Delgado Olivera.[72] Besides the socialist and Aprist elements, the influence of the *Partido Democracia Cristiana* (PDC)—a political party born by the university student movement in the 1950s—was also seen in SINAMOS. One of its leaders, political scientist Francisco Guerra García, also passionately joined SINAMOS.[73] SINAMOS also enlisted sociologist Héctor Béjar, the recently amnestied leader of *Ejército de Liberación Nacional,* an active guerilla movement between 1961 and 1965. Social psychologist Carlos Franco, an active communist since university, was also in the rank. Together, Francisco Guerra Garcia, Héctor Béjar, and Carlos Franco were called the "steamroller of SINAMOS." Their retrospection revealed excitement rather than confusion in working with people with diverse political and

[71] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 50-1.

[72] Delgado is also believed to be the major writer of Juan Velasco's speeches and one among the three most important civil consultants for the President. See Ricardo Uceda, "Qué Hacer: Carlos Delgado 1970 – 1980," *Nosotr@s Ñuqanchik,* March 18, 2014. Accessed August 18, 2015. http://nosotrosperu.com/index.php/articulos/ver-todos-2/39-numero-18/789-

[73] Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*.

ideological affiliations.[74]

SINAMOS officially characterized itself as an organization containing members with a wide spectrum of creeds,[75] specifically pinpointing humanism, socialism, libertarianism, and Christianity as the ideological basis of the Peruvian Revolution.[76] The convergence of these ideologies highlighted a common goal of the diversified members and the purpose of SINAMOS, that is, to encourage social mobilization of the previously marginalized, such as shantytown-dwellers, peasant communities, the cooperatives, laborers, and youth.[77] The official discourse of the Velasco government argued for an economically participatory state in which those exploited could benefit from what they produced, and from a politically autonomous society where power and decision arose from below. But at the same time, it expected people's political and economic participation to be in accordance with solidarity and common benefit.[78] Under this concept, SINAMOS was tasked with propaganda and defending policies, which would ensure popular participation in control, and the empowerment of marginalized groups to confront their new role that was politically and economically autonomous.[79]

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[74] See Héctor Béjar, *La revolución en la trampa* (Lima: Ediciones Socialismo y Participación, 1976) and Francisco Guerra García, "Carlos Franco," in *Carlos Franco*, ed. Emma Zevallos Aguilar (Lima: CEDEP, 2012), 51-6.

[75] SINAMOS, *¿Por qué se ataca al SINAMOS?* (Lima: SINAMOS, n. d.) Files Pe 86.2 P67, Steenbock Library.

[76] Dirección de Investigación, Oficina de Planificación, SINAMOS-ONAM, *Transferencia del poder económico, participación y transformación de la estructura ideología, Tomo I, Volumen 1: Marco de referencia y metodología*. May, 1976. Colección Mario Vásquez. Although this source is published in 1976, the whole project was approved in 1974, and the writing of the conceptual and methodological model of the Peruvian Revolution was accomplished in March 1975, before the fall of the Velasco government.

[77] Carlos Delgado, *Testimonio de lucha* (Lima: Biblioteca Peruana, 1973).

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

To transform the previously marginalized into being politically and economically autonomous, Agrarian Reform and the promotion of the cooperative became an important field of SINAMOS operations. Douglas Horton's observation of the National Office of Cooperative Development (*Oficina Nacional de Desarollo Cooperativo*, ONDECOOP), the predecessor of SINAMOS before its creation in 1971, indicated that: "[Its] employees seemed to operate under the assumption that liquidation of the latifundia system and its replacement with the cooperative system would be accompanied by a radical transformation of the behavior patterns of rural people. Personal egoism was expected (actually assumed) to disappear, being replaced by a solidary cooperative spirit."[80] For many of the renowned SINAMOS members, this was the long-awaited chance to accomplish their ideals. In an interview by Enrique Mayer, Francisco Guerra García recalls, "A radical agrarian reform had been what a whole generation of politicized leftist like me had long been dreaming about. I remember vividly the image on television of the armed forces rolling with tanks into the sugar refineries. That action persuaded me to join the regime."[81] Cynthia McClintock depicts those who were attracted to SINAMOS like Guerra as "bureaucratic guerillas" who thought they could "push the military to the left and . . . use the agency as a base for advancing their own radical ideas among citizens."[82] They were conscious that joining SINAMOS made them the center of political power, with which they should build a system of popular participation—a tradition among highland peasant communities but washed away by the

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[80] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report*, p. III-16.

[81] Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*, 35.

[82] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 55.

waves of capitalism.[83]

In this sense, SINAMOS's blueprint was somewhat similar to the proposal offered by IEP scholars, which we have seen in chapter three. They both recognized the existence of elements within peasant communities that would serve as the basis of the cooperative. The key difference lay in whether they still detected these elements in today's communities. While IEP scholars believed they still thrived and were resilient, SINAMOS scholars perceived them as a disappeared tradition in needed of revival and remobilization, and this was where SINAMOS could play a role. In Mayer's interview, Guerra's testimony vividly shows the contemporary popularity of the cooperative model and explains how SINAMOS picked it up: "The idea of implementing cooperatives was current here and elsewhere in Latin America, and there were arguments dating from the 1930s by *apristas* and socialists like Hildebrando Castro Pozo **that an Andean tradition of collective organizations would meld well with cooperatives**. There were no other new ideas around . . . mind you **it was not made by SINAMOS—we came later—we had to support it**."[84] As we will see in the following discussions, the ideal picture of the cooperative promoted by SINAMOS would dogmatize the principle of popular participation and lose the anthropological ideas of local resilience.

Composed of several established and passionate scholars, SINAMOS also attracted many post-graduate young people to join its regional and local agencies. Fredy Gambetta's experience tellingly shows how young people devoted themselves to the *Velaquista* reforms. In the beginning of the *Velaquista* reforms, Gambetta had just graduated from the programs of sociology and social psychology. His first job was conducting social studies on an ex-hacienda

[83] Béjar, *La revolución en la trampa* and Guerra García, "Carlos Franco."

[84] Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*, 37. Emphases mine.

for the Ministry of Agriculture, which indeed trained him with survey techniques and the newest educational philosophy of Paulo Freire, but did not teach him how to deal with the inert provincial bureaucrats. In 1971, he left for another job in a local office of SINAMOS. Gambetta recalls the First Informative Seminar held by SINAMOS in Lima, in which the representatives from all over the country finally had the chance to personally interact with these prestigious metropolitan scholars, such as Carlos Delgado, Héctor Béjar, Mario Vásquez, Francisco Guerra García, Jaime Llosa Larraburre, and José Luis Alvarado.[85]

Despite his later disillusionment toward the SINAMOS "steamrollers" and their projects, he remembers the sincerity he and other young people held in the beginning: "Those were hard days when during the evenings we explained to the people about the Peruvian reality, goals, and objectives of the organization. We **presented charts about the national, regional, and local reality**, and we prioritized their problems **in order to create awareness among the people that they should participate in government decisions**."[86] This quote perfectly shows how SINAMOS expected its local agents to educate peasants, with the "social reality," to arouse their awareness, and thus to mobilize them to cooperate with the government. SINAMOS's emphasis on popular participation and grassroots empowerment made it recruit quite different field agents than the Ministry of Agriculture. While the Ministry looked for those who had agronomic training, SINAMOS attracted mostly left-leaning, loosely Marxist, idealistic and relatively middle-class young post-graduates with social scientific backgrounds,[87] as Gambetta was.

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[85] Fredy Gambetta, "Confesión de parte de Fredy Gambetta: SINAMOS, una amarga experiencia." Accessed August 13, 2015. http://www.peruan-ita.org.personaggi/gambetta/top-gambetta.htm

[86] Ibid. Emphases mine.

[87] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 55-58.

The SINAMOS campaign was complemented by workshops and pamphlets. The materials reveal these young social scientists' efforts to communicate the spirit of cooperativism and the analysis of Peruvian reality they had learned at university, in plainer language. Stories, dialogue, and comics were utilized to tell two simplified ideas: join the cooperative, organize, and participate. In a workshop manual from Lurinchincha in 1970, one peasant participant, Juan Chávez Donayre wrote a mock dialogue between two peasants:

> -Hi, Juan. What are you doing?
> -I am depositing my little savings so I could pay back at the end of the year what the Cooperative had loaned me for the work on my parcel.
> -You are quite right, Juan. I will do the same when I sell my maize harvest to collect money to buy cattle.
> -That is a very good idea, but last year they paid us a very low price for the maize.
> -And now? What do we do?
> -Don't worry, Mr. Anselmo. When harvesting, we will deliver the crops to the Cooperative that we are forming and sell them according to the best prices for us.
> -Thanks, Juan. I am more relieved now and will become a member of the Agrarian Cooperative of Lurinchincha Services.[88]

This short dialogue conveyed at least two messages: (1) The cooperative provided necessary loans and a beneficial channel of commercialization for peasants, and (2) savings and reinvestment into agricultural and livestock businesses were preferable and praiseworthy. Without complicated and abstract theorizing, it created an ideal image of the new small agricultural entrepreneur assisted by the cooperative that the workshop participants should pursue. Moreover, the author of the mock dialogue was one of the peasant participants, many among whom also contributed poems, letters, and funny stories to the manual. It presented "the voice of Lurinchincha," something ideal that the progressive SINAMOS attempted to achieve.[89]

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[88] Vargas Córdova, ed., *La Voz de Lurinchincha,* 10.

[89] In this example, I use "progressive" to specifically refer to SINAMOS under the leadership of Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa and Carlos Delgado during 1972-1973. See McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 50-8.

Expressing oneself through his customary or newly-learned ways should be encouraged.[90] "For people to participate, it is necessary that they become aware of their dignity. To be aware of their dignity, people have to express themselves. They have to speak their own words."[91]

While SINAMOS perceived that its emphasis on participation was based on a concern for the process rather than the results, outside observers questioned the applicability and acceptability of its ideals. Douglas Horton distinguished ONDECOOP, the predecessor of SINAMOS, and the Ministry of Agriculture, in respect to their empowerment courses:

> In 1970 and 1971 ONDECOOP's *capacitación* courses were **strong on conventional cooperative doctrine and ideology and weak on practical aspects of cooperative operation**. . . . The Ministry and higher government authorities were less concerned with doctrinaire aspects of cooperation than with practical economic and political matters. Consequently, **the election laws legislated for Peru's sugar coops differed radically from the principles taught in ONDECOOP's cooperative courses**.[92]

Despite the efforts and passions of SINAMOS and its local agents to involve peasants in the campaign, peasants and other onlookers did not see the point of repeating these efforts. One cooperative member complained during the interview by Horton, "SINAMOS has come many times, but it's always says the same thing. 'The land is yours now.' At the end, we are bored."[93]

Skeptical about the real functions of SINAMOS, all social sectors raised questions and

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[90] There were experimental projects to teach cooperatives to use photography, sound recording, and videotaping. during this period. For videotaping and documentary production, see Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform*, 44-57.

[91] SINAMOS, *Participación y comunicación*, 2. Files Pe 18 S47, Steenbock Library.

[92] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* p. III-19. Emphases mine.

[93] Ibid., IV-10.

criticisms against it. SINAMOS usually tried to clarify their function by reiterating what it was not, rather than the other way around.[94] In a self-defensive pamphlet, SINAMOS responded to the nine most frequent questions about it.[95] These questions can be grouped into three categories. The first category concerned SINAMOS's relationships to the existing political organizations, such as political parties, labor unions, and peasant organizations, critics questioned whether it had attempted to dissolve and repress them, while controlling society through the new organizations, including the cooperatives. These accusations were simply denied. The second category questioned its ideological extremism congregating anarchists, communists, Trotskyists, Maoists, guerillas, Aprists, McCarthyists, fascists, and corporatist. SINAMOS did not deny its members carried such a wide spectrum of creeds, but confirmed they had a common goal. The third type of attack on SINAMOS questioned its sincerity to the reforms. While some suggested it was manipulated by some popular organizations, others criticized that it actually delayed the real revolution, namely, the seizure of power by the proletariat. SINAMOS sneered that only the economically powerful would make the first comment, and the second remark must come from the traditional ultra-left political parties, which were afraid to lose their mediator role between the powerful and the popular.[96] In general, questions and critiques were perceived by SINAMOS as malicious attacks with political intentions, and it defended and defined itself by counterattacks. As Horton observed, its self-definition was structured in an ideological sense, rather than a practical one, in this contentious political environment.

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[94] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 58.

[95] SINAMOS, *¿Por qué se ataca al SINAMOS?*

[96] Ibid.

SINAMOS's excessive emphasis on bottom-up participation, its social scientific, left-leaning young local agents, and its ideological campaign actually created many conflicts with other institutions, and that too caused peasants' distrust. First of all, while the Ministry of Agriculture preferred to choose the cooperative directors with agronomic backgrounds and hacienda experience, SINAMOS preached that peasants should manage the cooperative on their own without directors.[97] Technological innovations, productivity, and economic achievements were not their first concern; no matter how professional an agronomist was, he had no advantage over peasants in regard to the cooperative management. On the contrary, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture thought SINAMOS's local agents knew nothing about agriculture.[98]

This disagreement over director candidates revealed two other basic problems that SINAMOS had. One, SINAMOS's functions largely overlapped with those of the Ministry of Agriculture with respect to carrying out the Agrarian Reform and helping peasants build the cooperative. Nevertheless, they not only failed to complement each other, they also gave peasants conflicting instructions. Two, the Ministry and SINAMOS's competition for credit for carrying out Agrarian Reform stopped them from supporting other public or private institutions similarly involved in local empowerment projects.[99] All of these contributed to peasants' discontent with SINAMOS.

Ironically, SINAMOS, an institution that advertised itself with supporting popular participation, in the end faced strong protests and opposition. The SINAMOS office was burned

[97] McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 298.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Horton, *IBRD-LTC Report,* p.III-5.

down during a mass protest in 1973.[100] Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa, the more progressive general director of SINAMOS, was replaced by corporatist[101] General Rudecindo Zavaleta in January 1974, a moment marking the wane of leftist and socialist power in SINAMOS and coincidentally in other Latin American countries, as well. Internationally and internally, military suspicion about popular mobilization intensified. Many SINAMOS personnel left and started all over again in other institutions. The "steamrollers" established the Center of Studies for Development and Participation (*Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación*, CEDEP)[102] and the journal *Socialismo y Participación* to analyze their experiences within SINAMOS.[103] The Support Agency for Peasant Enterprise was another organization created after 1975 to take in SINAMOS's ex-technical personnel.[104]

SINAMOS's reorganization marked the end of the more radical stage of Peruvian Agrarian Reform between 1970 and 1973. Besides internal opposition, SINAMOS's fall was also related to Peru's deteriorating economic situation after 1973, the Velasco government's increasing dependence on international aid to fulfill its reformative promises, and the United States'

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[100] Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform,* 265. Also see Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marco,* 59.

[101] I use "corporatist" here in the same sense as McClintock generalizes the critics to the Velasco regime. That is, the primary goal for the military government was to stabilize state control toward all social sectors. See McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, 41-7, 50-1.

[102] Emma Zevallos Aguilar, introducción to *Carlos Franco*, ed. Zevallos Aguilar, 7-14.

[103] Daniel Martínez, "Sobre el pensamiento político de Carlos Franco ¿De la ilusión al desencanto?" in *Carlos Franco*, ed. Zevallos Aguilar, 79-86. The representative work of their analysis of the *Velaquista* reforms is Carlos Franco ed., *El Peru de Velasco* (Lima: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación, 1983). Individually, they also published their reflections on the reforms. See Béjar, *La revolución en la trampa* and Carlos Franco, *La Revolución Participatoria* (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1975).

[104] Cleaves and Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru*, 246-9.

negative attitude toward SINAMOS. SINAMOS was generally perceived by the U.S. Embassy as a communist and Trotskyist project, which did not require forceful intervention as did the Allende government in Chile, since the Embassy predicted that power would soon come back to the moderates.[105] Furthermore, the Embassy proposed that Peru could serve as a model of peaceful reform for other developing countries, and the U.S. should assist its agrarian reform.[106] The international chill to revolution might beat SIANMOS, but it did not devastate the continuous efforts to promote the cooperative made by our third institution in this chapter, CENCIRA.

"It only takes time": The Cooperative from CENCIRA's Perspective

The establishment of the National Center for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform (*Centro Nacional de Capacitación e Investigación para la Reforma Agraria*, CENCIRA) was closely related to the need for pragmatism in Agrarian Reform, which also ensured its survival during the post-Velasco period. CENCIRA was not like the Ministry of Agriculture, an unshakable traditional government department. Neither was it like SINAMOS, a brand new and highly-anticipated constellation of prestigious scholars. It was born in 1970 after a FAO/UNDP (Food and Agriculture Organization/ United Nations Development Programme) mission received a request by the Peruvian government to "identify and define the requirements for international technical assistance."[107] This mission was led by economist Solon Barraclough, also the Project

[105] Richard Walter, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2010).

[106] Ibid.

[107] Solon Barraclough et al., *Report of FAO/UNDP Mission to Peru for Assistance to the National Center for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform, CENCIRA*, 1970, p. 1.

Manager of ICIRA, Chile (*Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria*) between 1964 and 1973, an important figure in the Frei and Allende agrarian reforms.[108] Barraclough was known for his pragmatism in dealing with agrarian issues.[109] The mission he led commented on Peru's situation in 1970 in the following way:

> Present training programmes are only **loosely coordinated** and often **carry conflicting messages** about the nature of the Agrarian Reform. Content of training courses is often **based on an inadequate superficial knowledge of the real problems at the local levels**. Training methods must be improved markedly in order to be effective, especially at the *campesino* level. The use of **radio and other mass communications media** should be studied and improved. **Training should be de-centralized** so that most of it takes place in the reform areas and a large part of it is realized on the agrarian reform projects where the *campesinos* live and work.[110]

These comments were mainly based on ICIRA's successful experiences in Chile. While the adoption of mass communication media came later,[111] the mission first suggested the Velasco government create CENCIRA, the Peruvian version of ICIRA,[112] so that FAO/UNDP could provide funding and technical assistance through it.[113]

Moreover, the mission's comment also revealed how it carefully navigated between the two

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[108] Cristóbal Kay, "Reflexiones sobre la contribución de Solon L. Barraclough a los estudios rurales: algunos impresiones personales," *Cuadernos de Desarrollo Rural* 56 (2006): 9-28.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Barraclough et al., *Report of FAO/UNDP Mission to Peru,* 12.

[111] Colin Fraser, "Video in the field: A novel approach to farmer training," *CERES- FAO Review on Agriculture and Development* 73(1980): 24-8.

[112] John Strasma, "Agrarian Reform," in *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution*, ed. David Chaplin (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1976), 291-328.

[113] Barraclough et al., *Report of FAO/UNDP Mission to Peru,* 1.

giant institutions involved in Agrarian Reform, namely, the Ministry of Agriculture and ONDECOOP, the predecessor of SINAMOS. While the Ministry preferred that professional technicians serve as cooperative director, ONDECCOP, and later SINAMOS, called for peasant self-government. The mission led by Barraclough proposed a middle ground: the training programs should be decentralized so that peasant leaders could learn locally, and the contents should be localized, too. The main focus was to help the cooperative function well on its own, and the idea was that the cooperative needed time to accomplish this goal.[114]

Besides Barraclough's pragmatism and ICIRA experience, the creation of CENCIRA also reflected the knowledge-oriented undertakings of international philanthropies that took off after WWII.[115] Following the mission's advice, CENCIRA structured itself into divisions of training and research. The training division was in charge of the drill at three levels: CENCIRA's own staff, personnel from other agencies involved in Agrarian Reform, and selected peasant beneficiaries. The training included five fields: law, organization, economics, social sciences, and technology.[116] The research division was assigned to study the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the peasantry in order to facilitate the training process, which would be a research topic itself. The organization was divided into two departments: applied research and research on agrarian reform processes.[117] The purpose and structure of the research division showed that CENCIRA's existence was based on recognizing social sciences' value in understanding and

[114] Cleaves and Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru*, 241.

[115] Daniel Levy, *To Export Progress: the Golden Age of University Assistance in the Americas* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

[116] Ibid., 13-5.

[117] Ibid.

solving problems.

FAO/UNDP's technical assistance plan for Peruvian Agrarian Reform was finalized in 1972 and maintained its effectiveness until 1976.[118] Statistically, CENCIRA offered 106 courses and seminars in 1971, which in total involved 4,239 staff and peasants.[119] The number grew in the next year, during which time there were 6,369 staff and 14,087 peasants participating in CENCIRA courses, seminars, conferences, and talks.[120] Out of the 14,087 trained peasants, only 215 were located in Lima while 13,872 were in the Agrarian Zones.[121] CENCIRA followed its original intention—to train peasants locally. CENCIRA's research division focused on evaluating the actual levels of empowerment, surveying public opinions toward the reform, and examining the effectiveness of the empowerment courses it had taught.[122] This was another original promise of CENCIRA—to know the real problems at the local level.

To make these local problems known, in 1972, together with the Advisory Board of the Ministry of Agriculture (*Comité de Asesores del Ministerio de Agricultura*, COAMA), CENCIRA pushed for a conversation between the government and cooperative leaders, including the presidents of the administration council and directors. The event was funded by SINAMOS and the Ministry of Agriculture, which also prepared the preliminary agenda and was in

[118] CENCIRA's magazine mentioned that it was proposing to FAO/UNDP to have another five-year project between 1976 and 1980. See Centro Nacional de Capacitación e Investigación para la Reforma Agraria, *Informativo CENCIRA*, Año 4, no. 15, p. 13 (1974). Documents RD998 AG8 In, Steenbock Library.

[119] CENCIRA, *CENCIRA: propósito, organización y actividades,* 1973. Files Pe 7.5 P27, Steenbock Library.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid.

attendance.[123] In the conversation, the cooperative leaders complained about the difficulties of the cooperative operation, which, according to them, were largely caused by the governmental institutions involved. The Ministry of Agriculture's control over director candidates put the directors in an awkward position, as I have mentioned.[124] Neither was SINAMOS's ideological emphasis on participation trusted by peasants, since the policy of organizing the cooperative came to them before an agreement had emerged. After the establishment of the cooperative, the leaders felt they were left without further support in terms of either professional suggestions or equipment.[125] While this could be understood as the insufficiency of financial resources and capable personnel from governmental institutions, leaders also pointed out that the lack of coordination between these governmental institutions was the main source of confusion.[126]

Although the conversation ultimately ended with shifting the responsibility of empowerment between the government representatives and the cooperative leaders, this occasion itself indeed reveals CENCIRA's institutional characteristic—to make the cooperative work and to give it more time. It managed to put together conflicting sectors in Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Agriculture, SINAMOS, and the cooperatives, on a more interactive basis, rather than the usual hierarchical training and educational activities. Since complaints and noise had arisen from the cooperatives, they needed to be channeled and communicated.

CENCIRA's pragmatic inclination also ensured its survival and even growth after

[123] CENCIRA, *Informe del primer conversatorio*.

[124] Ibid., 40.

[125] Ibid., 1-5.

[126] Ibid., 37.

SINAMOS's disintegration.[127] In Chile, ICIRA members were persecuted during the coup d'etat of Augusto Pinochet in 1973 due to ICIRA's prominent status during the Allende regime.[128] In the same year, the progressive power within SINAMOS also waned. But CENCIRA survived, and carried out the idea borrowed from ICIRA's experience of using mass media in peasant training, even after the fall of the Velasco government.[129] It might not heroically save the Agrarian Reform from crumbling down, but it did make efforts to fill in the missing puzzle in the whole project: the competent mediator of cooperativism between the prestigious scholars based in Lima and the peasants.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed how young or established, international or Peruvian, left-leaning or liberalist scholars were intrigued by the rare combination of a social agrarian reform being carved out under a populist military regime. While some scholars perceived it as a long-awaited chance to modernize Peru's rural sector and were passionately devoted to the projects, other researchers stood back and watched it unfold. The late 1960s was a historical moment at which the long-discussed and experimental idea of the peasant cooperative was finally put into practice, and Peruvian and international scholars actually had a unique opportunity—governmental support and funding resources—to promote it in their own ways. All kinds of pioneering ideas were negotiated and applied: empowerment workshops, peasant-centered media production, bottom-up mobilization, knowledge-oriented policies, and ongoing conversations

[127] Cleaves and Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru*, 252-3.

[128] Cristóbal Kay, "Reflexiones sobre la contribución de Solon L. Barraclough a los estudios rurales."

[129] Fraser, "Video in the field."

and negotiations between peasants and governmental organizations. The early years of the Velasco regime featured a rather tolerant and all-embracing attitude toward progressive intellectuals carrying out their diverse political and ideological priorities, as long as they were willing to be involved in the government's reformative process.

Under the agreement of promoting the cooperative as the best solution to the rural problem, Peruvian scholars temporarily withheld their ideological disagreements with each other. Fundamentally, they disagreed about whether the peasant community still preserved communal traditions that resembled and might sustain the principles of the modern peasant cooperatives. They also differed with each other in regard to the degree to which professional outsiders should intervene in the cooperative and whether they could trust peasants' motivations. At the level of academic publication and discussion, these divergences were simply an issue of perspectives and interpretations. Nevertheless, once they were put into practice, problems surfaced, including resource competition, credit contests, policy incongruities, and lack of coordination.

In this chapter, these problems are exemplified through the conflicts between the Ministry of Agriculture and SINAMOS, which ultimately undermined peasants' cooperation and turned them against official policies of the cooperative organization. Neither the version of the productive and efficient cooperative, promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture, nor the autonomous but vague vision promised by SINAMOS, nor the pragmatic but time-consuming model projected by CENCIRA, could convince the peasantry that the cooperative ultimately served their interest.

Conclusion

> A strong rise in the dollar is the end of a tremendous crisis that has been brewing since 1968: **the new model did not work, and its failure demonstrated once again that the *limeño* elites do not know Peru. I think neither Mariátegui nor Haya, nor many others, have complete knowledge about what it is to be an Andean society**. . . . I will continue to work hard, trying to overcome all the obstacles that would impede the fulfillment of the tasks we have proposed. **What will happen is a pull-back and moderation because we have fewer and fewer customers buying books or they simply don't have the money; in addition, the cost of printing has almost tripled**.[1]

Writing to John Murra in 1976, José Matos Mar described how the economic crisis made him aware of the limits of the economic model developed by the *limeño* elites and at the same time the powerlessness of academic research as a tool of social intervention. The strong faith in their ability to represent "social reality" and to accomplish the cooperative model crumbled. The deteriorating economy made book printing and purchasing expensive, and the dissolution of the Velasco government and its departments in charge of the reforms created a large group of young unemployed anthropologists.[2] Through this thesis, I reconstruct a history of anthropologists' deliberation of, passions for, and involvement in a specific proposal of rural development in Peru—the cooperative—between 1948 and 1975. Before the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform, anthropologists had generally agreed that the reform would be a rationalized modern institution assuming the characteristics of an autonomous company and assisted by the government with technological innovations, agricultural inputs, a system of credit support, and marketing channels. Despite their disagreement on peasant subjectivity, they collectively marginalized the culturalist proposal calling for the indigenization of the mainstream culture. Ultimately, they achieved

[1] José Matos Mar to John Murra, September 29, 1976, Series I, Box 23, Folder Matos Mar, José, Papers of John Murra. Emphases mine.

[2] Osterling and Martinez, "Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology," (see intro. n. 7).

academic and social status that transferred into political influence. During the normalization process of the cooperative during Agrarian Reform, the two most valued features of the cooperative—its economic productivity and principle of self-government—turned into doctrines, and thus was abhorred and resisted by the peasants. The situation was further aggravated by the lack of sufficient middle-level public servants competent to carry out the ideals propagated by the center.

Nevertheless, I do not intend to end the story simply as another "lost chance" of development and national integration in the history of Peru. On the contrary, I have shown how these anthropologists' involvement actually opened a political space, primarily for themselves at a specific historical moment of revolution and development. In approximately two decades of the institutionalization of anthropology in Peru, these scholars achieved the status of governmental councilor, whose nature should be distinguished from their *indigenista* predecessors and their colleagues in the hard social sciences. Their stories show that the cooperative should not be simplified as an imported and imposed idea on Peru; rather, it went through a long process of experiment, observation, and ethnographic reflection. The scholars managed to overcome the predominant *indigenista* formula based on a dualistic and "unscientific" understanding of Peru, and tailored the proposal of the cooperative according to their fieldwork experiences rather than some theoretical model alone. Studying how the cooperative was reworked in Peru, we see how this specific task congregated so many distinguished minds, resources, passions, and energies, enriching our historical understanding of how Latin American intellectuals once mediated a discourse of development.

This mediation is a cultural translation between the principles of the modern cooperative, either socialist or reformist, and the characteristics of a contemporary peasant community.

Equipped with theoretical and methodological tools of anthropology, the scholars' translation was more sophisticated than a simplified and romantic equation between the two. They translated for the policymakers: community life was not exactly the same as the modern cooperative, but the indigenous peasants showed potential for change, and the cooperative could keep them from dissolving and becoming isolated in the capitalist market. The policymakers, nevertheless, adopted a crude version of this proposal. While translating the proposal back to the indigenous peasants, the incongruities between different governmental institutions and the insufficiency of competent regional and local mediators ultimately failed the project.

Nevertheless, the anthropologists' unsuccessful mediation of cooperativism during the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform also points out a direction for future research, that is, the role of grassroots intellectuals and technicians in Agrarian Reform. On one hand, many provincial and immigrant students seeking social mobility and solutions to rural problems, enrolled in universities as a result of the expansion of higher education in Peru since the 1950s.[3] Most of them did not follow their professors' reformative approach, but radicalized instead. On the other hand, dissatisfied with the agronomists or social scientists sent by the government, peasant unions hired their own technicians and specialists,[4] some of whom were channeled through student unions.[5] Peasant unions were not anti-intellectual; instead, they were good at seeking

[3] Lynch, *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos*. (see chap. 3, n. 28).

[4] For example, see Manuel Canal Bendezú and Andrés Gonzales Tejada, "Mensaje de la Federación Provincial de Campesinos de la Convención y Lares, a sus bases sindicales y trabajadores en general, con motivo del XI aniversario de su fundación," Quillabamba, December 8, 1969. AL 1, Caja 02, Documentos de la Confederación Campesina del Perú, 153, Archivo Laboral.

[5] For example, see Comisión de Publicaciones y Archivo del Grupo de Estudios Movimientos Campesinos, UNMSM, "Entrevistas a dos dirigentes campesinados de Huanta y Ayacucho," (Lima: Edicion Ciencias Sociales U.N.M.S.M., 1972). AL 1, Caja 02, Documentos de la Confederación Campesina del Perú, Archivo Laboral.

professional resources and connections willing to cooperate with them.[6] Researchers have pointed out the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform actually opened up a political space for young provincial intellectuals, but it was soon closed again due to numerous socio-political factors, which they thought were closely related to the emergence of the Shining Path.[7] Although the Shining Path has already been a well-studied research topic, the intermediary level during the Agrarian Reform and their relationships with the central administration and peasant unions, have not yet been sufficiently explored.

Self-evaluating this thesis, I think it can be furthered in two ways. First of all, although I have discussed why I chose to focus on the specific scholars, projects, and institutions, this does not exclude the possibility that primary sources regarding other disciplines, scholars, projects, and institutions, may support this study to a greater degree. For example, *Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo* (DESCO) is a significant private research institute created in the 1960s, concerned about the issue of development. As I mentioned in chapter five, it was also involved in the *Velaquista* Agrarian Reform as an NGO through specific empowerment projects. Research on DESCO could potentially deepen our understanding of the interaction between intellectuals and peasants during the Reform process. *Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú* (PCUP) is another obvious absentee in this thesis. A historical examination of the university during the 1960s would bring together Gustavo Gutiérrez and liberation theology, José Maria Caballero and his workshop on building the model of the cooperative, and the "Taller Rural"

[6] Marcos Pillco H. and Lucio Conche M., "Comunicado de Prensa," Quillabamba, February 14, 1972. AL 1, Caja 02, Documentos de la Confederación Campesina del Perú, 153, Archivo Laboral.

[7] See Linda Seligman, *Between Reform and Revolution: Political Struggles in the Peruvian Andes, 1969-1991* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Also Enrique Mayer, "Peru in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa's "Inquest in the Andes" Reexamined," in *Rereading Cultural Anthropology*, ed. George E. Marcus (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 181-219.

held by Mariano Valderrama, into the picture.[8]

The issue of targeting specific scholars, projects, and institutions leads to another character of this thesis: it is largely Lima-centered. This research may sufficiently present a loosely connected intellectual circle close to the new power bloc featuring middle-class interests and new professionalism. However, a historical examination of anthropologists based in Cuzco, Huancayo or Huamanga, for example, may provide very different perspectives in terms of rural development. This also brings us back to the question about the provincial intellectuals and their access or exclusion to the center of Peruvian academia and politics.

The second major improvement this thesis could make is to excavate more primary sources about the Velasco period. Some researchers have footnoted in their studies the unstable situation of the archives during this period.[9] The fire that burned SINAMOS in 1973, and SINAMOS's dissolution and integration into other departments after 1975, also increased the difficulty. Other researchers rely heavily on interviews and visual sources to form a clearer picture of the Agrarian Reform.[10] During the process of archival research, I have also realized that political propaganda and evaluation reports are the two most abundant kinds of primary sources and the easiest to locate. But to study how the anthropologists put the model of the cooperative into practice requires more than propaganda and evaluation. It needs sources that can show "the process" of the formation, operation, and maybe fragmentation of the cooperative and

[8] I am in debt to Enrique Mayer for this information about PUCP.

[9] Juan Martín-Sánchez, "Indigenismo bifronte en el gobierno peruano de Velasco Alvarado: continuidad y alternativa, sierra y selva," in *La ambivalente historia del indigenismo: campo interamericano trayectorias nacionales*, *1940-1970*, eds. Laura Giraudo and Juan Martín-Sánchez (Lima: IEP, 2011), 191-250. This situation was also mentioned in my consultations with numerous Peruvian and Peruvianist historians.

[10] For interviews, see Mayer, *Ugly Stories of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform* (see chap. 5, n. 31). For visual sources, see Cant, "'Land for Those Who Work It'" (see chap. 5, n. 30).

the role of intellectuals in this process. Conducting systematic interviews, locating archival resources, and exploring the explanatory potential of the existing primary sources could all enrich this research.

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