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**The Struggle for Promoting Development
An Inter-American analysis on the making of the Alliance for Progress.
Argentina, Venezuela and the United States**

by

Cristóbal Espinoza

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Abstract of the Dissertation

**The Struggle for Promoting Development. An Inter-American analysis on the making of
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This study analyzes the making Alliance for Progress from an Inter-American perspective by exploring the relationship between United States, Argentina and Venezuela during the implementation of the program. Based upon Inter-American research, this study explains the complexity and contradictions that aroused from this Development alliance. By placing special attention to the Inter-American complexities and contradictions behind the conceptualization and implementation of the Alliance for Progress, this study shows why Argentina and Venezuela had very different relationship with the program. Moreover, this work explains the reasons behind the Alliance's inability to promote Development based on democracy and economic growth. This study also demonstrates that the Alliance for Progress, as any other foreign aid program, was structurally incapable of promoting Development. In addition, it also demonstrates that the Inter-American system functions as a regional entity where U.S. and Latin American historical processes are tightly interrelated in a cause-effect relationship. Finally, this dissertation makes a contribution by showing the use of history both for decision makers and citizens.

Dedication Page

To the future

Frontispiece



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Chapter I.
Introduction.
The Alliance for Progress Under a Transnational and International Light

By late 1950s, it was clear that the Third World was crucial in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹ Fidel Castro in Cuba, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Abdul Nasser in Egypt as well as the strength of the decolonization movement opened the eyes of both sides of the Iron Curtain. The United States and Soviet Union realized the Third World, especially Africa and Latin America, were the battleground for the Cold War. Reacting to that reality, once elected president of the United States, John F. Kennedy started developing a new paradigm for understanding, waging and winning the Cold War in the Third World. Kennedy's analysis and strategy was simple. Poverty explains communist appeal in that part of the world and if the West could offer those societies a path for Development then the Third World would become infertile to communists.

On March 13, 1961 this new approach became a reality when Kennedy gathered Latin American representatives in Washington to announce the Alliance for Progress. The new program planned to promote Development based on the economic and political transformation of Latin America. On the economic side, the program proposed a ten points program. Those ten points included issues such as tax, social and land reforms along with a \$500 million promise to finance Development programs in Latin America.¹ On the political side, the program proposed to complete unfinished revolution of the Americas and to advance toward the democratization of

¹ All references are endnotes starting page 165

the region.² As Kennedy argued on his message, “political freedom must accompany material progress.”³ By promoting Development based on economic growth and political democracy, the Kennedy Administration expected to destroy any incentive for another Castro.

By examining previous attempts to promote economic growth in Latin America, the uniqueness of the Alliance for Progress becomes clear. One of the early antecedents of Inter-American cooperation took place in the context of the Good Neighbor Policy and the creation of the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank). This bank aimed to contribute to the recovery of the U.S. economy after the 1929 collapse. To accomplish this, the Ex-Im Bank facilitated trade with foreign nations through short-term credits in connection with exportation of agricultural products, extension of long-term credit to U.S. firms desiring to export industrial manufactures and loans to U.S.-American exporters where foreign governments were unable to provide liquidity to their own nationals to pay in dollars.⁴ One of the most significant projects financed with the support of the Ex-Im Bank was the Pan American highway. Nearly two decades later, the Truman administration implemented a new program to promote Development overseas, including Latin American. The name of this program was Point Four (1950), which provide technical assistance for struggling economies. Few years later, the Eisenhower administration created the Inter-American Development Bank (1959) that focused exclusively on the Western Hemisphere to promote Development through financing social as well as economic programs.

Departing from those practices, the Kennedy Administration embraced the idea that Development was both an economic and a political problem. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was essential shaping that understanding. Before Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, he organized several initiatives to understand the region’s needs and interests. One of those initiatives was Arthur Schlesinger’s trip to Latin America in February 1961. This trip not only helped Kennedy

better understand the region, but also justified the creation of one of the program's most revolutionary elements. Departing from previous Washington practices, Schlesinger argued that the best path to prevent another Castro was through fomenting a middle-class revolution:

The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle- class revolution as speedily as possibly. The corollary is that, if the processing classes of Latin America make the middle class revolution impossible, they will make a “workers-and-peasants” revolution inevitable; that is, if they destroy a Betancourt, they will guarantee a Castro or a Peron.⁵

For first time in the history of the Inter-American system, the White House expected to empower Latin American democracies as a means to defend national interest. Even more revolutionary, according to the Alliance's blueprint, Inter-American collaboration was crucial for the prospects of the program. While Latin American governments would be in charge of designing their own Development plans, the United States will provide resources of “a scope and magnitude sufficient to make this bold development plan a success.”⁶ Not surprisingly, Schlesinger described the Alliance for Progress as Washington's first experiment in total diplomacy.⁷ Naturally, some of these elements may resemble the Marshall Plan. However, as it will be explained on the conclusion, both plans were radically different.

Fortunately for Kennedy, Latin America offered an ideal scenario for the implementation of this initiative. Long before Castro came to power, Latin American leaders and intellectuals had been working on conceptualizing a Latin American path for Development. Those leaders included Presidents Arturo Frondizi in Argentina, Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil, Adolfo Lopez Mateos in Mexico and Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela. For them, the Alliance for Progress was the continuation of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy as well as their own discussions on Development.⁸ Those leaders were essential for the prospects of the program. Since the Alliance for Progress expected to promote Development based on economic growth and democracy, it

required collaborators that shared those values and principles. Inspired by this, Juan de Onis and Jerome Levinson argued that those Latin American leaders are as relevant as a Communist Cuba for understanding Kennedy's decision to announce the Alliance for Progress.⁹

The Alliance for Progress ultimately failed to accomplish its objective and to this day Latin American societies still fail to provide a decent standard of living to large sections of their population as democracy remains a chimera. How was it that a program so thoroughly conceived, in collaboration with the Latin American forces of change, failed to promote Development? Why did it fail? Who or what was or were the responsible(s)? What lessons can be extracted from its failure? Would any foreign aid program share the same fate? These are some of the questions this work aim to answer.

Previous attempts to answer these questions. A historiography on the Alliance for Progress

This work is not the first attempt to understand the Alliance Progress and its outcome. Seminal works in this regard include *The Alliance that lost its way: A critical report on the Alliance for Progress* (1970) by Juan de Onis and Jerome Levinson; *Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making* (1969) by Harvey S. Perloff; *The Twilight Struggle, The Alliance for Progress and the Politics of Development in Latin America* (1967) by William Rogers and *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective* (1988) edited by Ronald Scheman. All these works shared a common element. Not only were the authors involved in Alliance's implementation, but they also have direct access to relevant actors in the making of the program. From this advantageous point of view, those authors identified crucial dynamics behind the making the Alliance for Progress and its relationship with the program's inability to promote Development.

In *The Alliance that lost its way: A critical report on the Alliance for Progress* (1970) Juan de Onis and Jerome Levinson present a general account on the Alliance for Progress from its announcement until the early 1970s. The authors identified structural as well as conjunctural elements that explain the shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress. On the structural side, the authors discussed the negative effects that excessive idealism had on the program's goals. For them, idealism was the main responsible behind the delusional belief that Latin American ruling class could promote Development.¹⁰ Similarly the authors mentioned, though not in length, how the lack of U.S. domestic support and the shifts under the pressure of interest groups played an essential role the Alliance's inability to promote Development.¹¹

On the conjunctural problems that undermined Alliance for Progress, De Onis and Levinson emphasized U.S. progressive disappointment with Latin American reformist. That dissatisfaction became especially prevalent after the overthrowing of João Goulart in Brazil, Manuel Prado in Peru and Arturo Frondizi in Argentina. According to the authors, those setbacks gradually convinced Kennedy and his administration to abandon the democratic ideals of the program.¹² Moreover, as fear of communist expansion compromised his domestic position, Kennedy started to reappraise military juntas.

These authors also believed that the foreign aid contradictions problems played a major role in the Alliance's failure. The most significant contradictions were foreign and domestic pressures for speedy results and the domestic problems that the Alliance for Progress created inside the U.S. political system. This was especially relevant in the case of the Treasury Department officials who saw the program as a foreign exchange leakage. Equally relevant was the effect of those contradictions on the U.S. Congress. This branch of the government voiced serious opposition toward crucial elements of the program, including long-term commitment.¹³

Another contradiction was Latin American problems for accepting foreign support. While the governments needed foreign support, they feared foreign economic domination.¹⁴

In addition to political elements, the authors also identified several economic problems that explain the Alliance's shortcomings. Those problems included Latin American debt and its inability to capitalize the growth of markets. The authors assigned a relevant role to the contradictions between monetarist and structuralist economic policies, which had a major impact on how the Alliance's bureaucracy understood and attempted to solve Latin American inflation. According to monetarist approach, inflation was the consequence of financial mismanagement whereas structuralist economists believed that inflation resulted from monopolies that made free markets impossible. For that reason, the latter group focused structural reforms to Latin American economies, such as land reform, while monetarist assigned more importance to balanced budgets.¹⁵ These two visions collided more than once on the projects that the Alliance for Progress should finance. However, by 1963 the monetarist approach gained hegemony in the program and the government started allocating funds exclusively to those countries with financial stability.¹⁶ On this transition, U.S. Congress had a major role, since the Hickenlooper Amendment placed U.S. business interest at the top of Washington's agenda on Latin America.

Based on their analysis, De Onis and Levinson identified and proposed a change on the paradigm behind assigning aid. For them, the key to an appropriate U.S. policy toward Latin America is the distinction between Development objectives and security considerations.¹⁷ De Onis and Levinson suggested that the United States should focus on providing assistance directly to Latin American government or U.S. leadership capable of dealing with population policy, agrarian reform and urban development.¹⁸ The authors also encouraged the United States to use multilateral institutions to allocate aid, since they are apolitical and technical.¹⁹ As a final

recommendation to improve the Alliance's chances to succeed, the authors argued that "only through a commitment to support development in its economic, social and political aspects can the United States help bring stability to all the Americas."²⁰

William Rogers's analysis in *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: The Twilight Struggle, The Alliance for Progress and the Politics of Development in Latin America* (1967) devoted attention not only to the Alliance's political-bureaucratic problems, but also to more profound political challenges. According to Rogers:

The problem is broader than economics. Foreign assistance has accomplished much, but it cannot bear the entire burden. Political leadership is essential, in the United States and Latin America. The American people, and particularly the Congress and the press, have focused on nonessentials, and tended both to overestimate the importance of a large U.S. aid effort and to overestimate the extent to which the one rich partner of the Alliance can trade its help for essential reforms. The Executive has learned only slowly that the United States must devote all the resources and style of its presidential leadership and diplomacy to the single-minded task of supporting development in the hemisphere.²¹

Rogers discussed the following variables that explain the Alliance's problem to promote Development. First, he mentioned how USAID (Agency for International Development) failed to convince Latin American leadership on the need for reform and criticizes USAID for failing to identify "targets of opportunities" or moments on which change was actually possible.²² Rogers does not argue that only USAID is to be blamed, but the State Department was as responsible because it refused to take a clear stand in favor of Latin American Development.²³

In addition to the limitations inside the Executive Office, Rogers also discusses how Congress distorted the whole process through what he calls "bookkeeping exercise."²⁴ He identified Representative Passman (D-Louisiana) as primarily responsible.²⁵ Passman's attacks, Rogers argued, resonated well with the large majority of Congressmen who had a little understanding of the region. According to Rogers, most Congressmen did not know about the

accomplishment that Latin American industries brought or the pluralistic effects of new union, church and business leadership created.²⁶ This ignorance, Rogers argued, explains Congressional distrust toward both USAID and State Department, which was impacted the Alliance's budget.²⁷ Nevertheless, the President had an important part on the Alliance's failure and the excessive identification of the program with Kennedy's image. According to Rogers, this mistake obscured the fact that the Alliance for Progress was Latin American and its success ultimately depended on them.²⁸ Even worse, because the Alliance for Progress was so identified with Kennedy, once the President died, the program lost most of its momentum and political capital, both in the United States and Latin America.²⁹

Based on all those elements, Rogers drew several conclusions. First, the United States should support progressive forces of change in Latin America, in the same way that it should embraced the progressive forces inside the United States. He wrote that "[a] broader acceptance of civil rights, and a massive attack on the pockets of domestic poverty find their parallels in the Alliance drive for development and social justice elsewhere in the hemisphere."³⁰ Rogers argued that the role of the United States should be the one of a supporter, not of a maker. According to him, "Latin America's Development must be a Latin American effort. The problems are Latin American. The solutions must be Latin American."³¹ He concludes that an alliance between progressive forces, both in the United States and Latin America, can promote Development.

Offering a more technical perspective on the Alliance's failure, *The Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making* (1969) by Harvey Perloff focused most of its analysis on three elements. The first was Latin American inability to absorb aid. By 1964, there were 2.5 billion on undisbursed aid.³² According to Perloff, this problem can be mostly attributed to Latin American organizational and managerial problems.³³ A second element referred to the

domestic political problems that recipient countries faced. For instance, the political party on the opposition to the President controls Congress and from that place refuses to enact the necessary legislation.³⁴ A third problem was USAID's allocation practices. Probably based on his experience as member of the Alliance's Committee of Nine, Perloff condemned how USAID financed many projects only based on the principle that those projects were "ready to go." Unfortunately, as Perloff mentioned, on many occasions, those projects had little influence on creating structural conditions for Development.³⁵

Based on this analysis, Perloff proposed a major overhaul of the Alliance for Progress. At the center of this transformation: the enactment of a new charter for the program. According to Perloff, the Alliance for Progress should abandon unrealistic goals, such as the promotion of health and education, as well as vague and haphazard concepts, like social and political progress. Instead of those elements, the author believes that the program should focus on issues such as external assistance, national self-help and regional integration.³⁶ Founded on those issues, Perloff argued, recipient and provider governments can answer the crucial question on Development: "how to fashion development strategies that bring the countries to the stage where the conditions needed for sustained growth and development are well established in the national fabric."³⁷

Perloff then proposed three specific strategies to improve the prospect of the Alliance for Progress. First, the program should reinforce a regional approach. For him, national strategies do not create actual conditions for Development. Second, Perloff proposed removing crucial Development blocks, including deficiencies in human resources, rigid and hierarchical social structures and immature political development as well as the inadequacies of capital resources.³⁸ Perloff also suggests placing the Alliance and the national development activities on a rational basis, which focus on the challenges to achieve development, such as survey of natural

resources. Finally, Perloff proposed strengthening foreign assistance, which would require a “serious” preparatory stage since Latin American countries need to establish the necessary institutions and gather the necessary level of political support.³⁹

Scholars in the United States were not the only ones concerned with understanding the Alliance’s inability to promote Development. From a Latin America, a dominant perspective came from *The Alliance That Lost Its Way* (1967) by Eduardo Frei Montalva, which inspired the title of De Onis and Levison’s book. Although Eduardo Frei did not conduct research, his experience working with the Alliance for Progress as President of Chile between 1964 and 1970 gave him a unique insight on the shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress. According to the former President, the Alliance for Progress had two positives aspects. First, it established the basis for hemispheric cooperation with a clear ideological orientation toward a democratic revolution in Latin America. Second, it represented a change in the hitherto prevalent concept of financial and economic assistance given by the United States.⁴⁰ For that reason, Frei argues, the problem of the Alliance for Progress was not an issue of design. Instead, it was a matter of implementation. Frei explained:

The problem is that what was fundamental to the Alliance for Progress- a revolutionary approach to the need for reform-has not been achieved. Less than half of the Latin American countries have started serious programs of agrarian reform. Drastic changes in the tax system are even scarcer, while the number of genuinely democratic regimes, far from increasing, has actually declined. In other words there has been no strengthening of the political and social foundations for economic progress in Latin America. This is the reason why the ultimate objective of the Alliance- the formation of just, stable, democratic and dynamic societies-is as distant today as it was five years ago.⁴¹

Frei proposed to reinforce the multilateral spirit of the Alliance for Progress where the provider country would not be able to demand specific types of structural reforms before allocating aid.⁴² For most recipient countries, Frei insisted, providers’ demands only delayed aid

allocation. Those delays had important consequences, since they prevented local governments from capitalizing popular support. He explained that “[p]eople do not support governments because they have dutifully complied with the directives from this or that international organization; they support them when they offer a promising political and economic alternative to present frustrations, and the hope of moving into a better future.”⁴³

Building from these arguments, *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective* (1988) edited by Ronald Scheman presented a remarkable collection of chapters and most of the authors participated directly on the making of the Alliance for Progress. The authors include Arthur Schlesinger, Adolf Berle, Douglas Dillon, Walt Rostow, Teodoro Moscoso and Felipe Herrera Lane. Scheman’s book offered important insights on understanding the Alliance’s accomplishments and shortcomings. On the accomplishments, Scheman highlights the Alliance’s role legitimizing peaceful revolution, both in the United States as well as Latin America. Moreover, the Alliance for Progress also legitimized Development planning, building of infrastructure and financial communities overseas.⁴⁴ Scheman argued that the Alliance for Progress was extremely successful on building confidence amongst lenders on Latin American capacity to absorb large amounts of capital. He noted this legacy explains the influx of over \$200 billions in loans to Latin America from U.S. banks during the 1970s.⁴⁵

As for the Alliance’s failure to promote development, Scheman’s collection includes two contributions that were especially enlightening. One those was “Myths and Reality” by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., which examined the failure of the Alliance for Progress in response to the “unrelenting pressure from national- security bureaucracy.”⁴⁶ The bureaucracy generated a set of programs that, in theory, helped Development by creating conditions of political stability. Yet, those programs quickly acquired importance on their own, and progressively destroyed the

possibilities for Development. To exemplify his point, Schlesinger discussed how U.S. police training programs provided Latin American status quo with the necessary weapons to suppress of forms of dissent and agents of change.⁴⁷ For that reason, Schlesinger concluded, “national-security pressures did more in the early years than capitalist pressures to deform the *Alianza*.”⁴⁸ For Schlesinger, the Alliance for Progress died with Kennedy because with his death the two essential pillars of the programs, structural change and political democratization, ended.⁴⁹

The other contribution was “Did the Alliance ‘lost its way’ or were its assumptions all wrong from the beginning and are those assumptions still with us?” by Howard Wiarda. Like many authors before him, Wiarda explored the contradiction between short-term political objectives and long-term Development goals. However, he is the first one to discuss how the limitations of the architects of the program influenced the Alliance’s failure. For Wiarda, those architects were woefully ignorant of or naïveté toward Latin America.⁵⁰ That ignorance, Wiarda argued, explains why the Alliance for Progress was not based on the reality of Latin America and it ignored issues such as personalisms, lack of institutionalization in politics, continuing importance of family and patronage ties, clique ad class rivalries. All those elements, Wiarda concluded, defined neat ideological categories that prevented Development.⁵¹

Although this dissertation’s analysis demonstrates that those elements were not as relevant to understand the Alliance’s problems to promote Development, Wiarda was correct to identify a relationship between the architects’ ignorance and the program inability to address the political dimension of Development. Different from Rogers’s analysis, Wiarda discussed how the Alliance architects focus exclusively on economic considerations, ignoring or inadequately dealing with issues of greater relevance, such as social, cultural and political factors.⁵²

Another new area of inquiry that Wiarda opens refers to what he calls “intellectual imperialism,” and he noted “it was we who knew best and who could presumably bring the benefits of our civilization to Latin America. Both Latin American intellectuals and politicians were view in this superior and patronizing way.”⁵³ This mindset, Wiarda argued, influenced U.S. architects to believe that Latin American were incapable of solving their own problems and the architects only depended on models of Development that were either U.S. models or derived from the U.S. experience.⁵⁴

On the Latin American side, most of the contributors to Scheman’s book agreed that Latin American culture and values was a major hindrance to Development. Notably Teodoro Moscoso, who quoted Carlos Rangel, argued that the Alliance “failed to take into account the cultural impediments to development inherent in the ancestral customs and traditions of Latin American society.”⁵⁵ Besides ideas similar to Wiarda, unfortunately Moscoso did not provide further details. Arthur Schlesinger, on the other hand, was a bit more specific. To him, Latin American nationalism had a major role on the Alliance’s inability to build a regional spirit.⁵⁶ Ronald Scheman concluded the anthology noting that the Alliance for Progress ultimately failed due to U.S. fixation with communist revolutions. This fixation blinded U.S. officials to more relevant problems such as Latin American structural rigidities, the inertia of the system and the impact of populist rhetoric as well as a nationalistic perspective on toward Development.⁵⁷

This first generation of scholars built the basic columns for discussion on the variables that influenced the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Those studies still have limitations because those authors were either the makers or close to the makers of the program, their conclusions biased and lenient on Kennedy, his advisors and themselves. Moreover, since the first generation of scholars was more concerned with understanding the reasons behind the

Alliance's inability to promote development, they devoted very little attention to discuss how those limitations happened in each country.

One of the first books breaking with that tradition was *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (1999) by Stephen Rabe. Differently than previous authors, Rabe blamed the Alliance's failure on Kennedy. To Rabe, Kennedy's paramount concern was not the promotion of Development, but it was fighting and winning the Cold War.⁵⁸ The President was only enthusiastic about liberal democracies if they supported Cold War objectives. If democracies were unwilling to collaborate, the White House had no problem supporting dictatorships. Rabe offered many examples, including Kennedy's opposition toward the independence of British Guiana and the recognition of Guido's government in Argentina. Although José María Guido became president after the army overthrew Frondizi, Guido's commitment with Kennedy's Cold War objectives awarded him U.S diplomatic recognition. Rabe concluded that Kennedy had become unjustly awarded with a pro-democratic halo. Kennedy was a cold warrior. For that reason, since he was unwilling to ignore his Cold War commitments, Kennedy undermined the basic principle of the Alliance for Progress: development and democracy must exist together.⁵⁹

Another book in the same vein is *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (2007) by Jeffrey Taffet, which discussed the making of the Alliance for Progress from a regional perspective, identifying some general dynamics behind its implementation. Using the example of Chile, Colombia, Brazil and Dominican Republic, Taffet corroborated the argument that attempting to use aid to achieve moral goals and long-term economic development will always fail if aid also is used to advance short-term foreign policy aims.⁶⁰ Because Washington quickly came to envision economic programs as a foreign policy

tool, Taffet argued, U.S. policymakers view certain countries with more interest than others.⁶¹ For instance, the United States used foreign aid in Brazil to isolate Goulart or to fight Allende in Chile, while in the Dominican Republic use it to support the post-Bosch government. Ultimately, Taffet says, “aid was used as a means to promote U.S. interest, encourage friends, and punish enemies.”⁶² According to Taffet, a crucial factor on the evolution of the Alliance for Progress was the discrepancy of power between the United States and Latin America. That element at the end transformed the program into a traditional U.S. aid program to the region.⁶³

This generation of scholars is important to understand how the limitations discussed by the first generation prevented the Alliance for Progress from promoting Development. Instead of hearing that short-term political objectives undermined objectives, we have an idea on how that correlation happened in Argentina or Dominican Republic. Similarly, we know how Congressional anti-communism influenced Kennedy’s preferences for Cold War objectives, as Rabe mentioned in the case of British Guiana.⁶⁴ As importantly, Rabe and Taffet were the first ones mentioning the incompatibility of U.S. and Latin American interest in relationship with the Alliance’s failure. However, there is still uncharted territory.

How is this dissertation different? What is its contribution?

On methodological terms, this is the first study that explains the failure of the Alliance for Progress based on research both in the United States and Latin America. Based on that methodology, it represents the first attempt to build a true Inter-American understanding of the Alliance for Progress and therefore, it offers new and crucial insights toward the crucial questions on any analysis of this program. Why did the program fail to promote Development?

Previous scholars, from De Onis and Levinson to Wiarda, were prolific in identifying factors that explain the Alliance's failures, but this generation lacked of a coherent narrative that unites those elements. As a result, those studies either discussed one dominant factor or they present a list of elements, with little connection amongst them. Although most scholars focused from the beginning on the contradiction between short-term political and long-term Development objectives, their narratives did not discuss in length *how* and *why* those factors gained prominence on the making of the Alliance for Progress. Addressing part of this problem, the second generation, explained *how* those factors influenced the Alliance's failure in specific countries. Unfortunately, this generation did not offer new ideas on the *why* the Alliance for Progress failed to promote Development. Even though they mentioned the contradiction between the U.S. and Latin American interest, they did not explain *how* and *why* that contradiction influenced the program failure.

Different from previous works due to its new methodology, this research offers a single cause-effect historical narrative on why the Alliance for Progress failed to promote development. Specifically, this study analyzes the *how* or general implementation of the Alliance for Progress in order to answer *why* it failed. To accomplish this objective, this dissertation, unlike its predecessors, centers its analysis on the relationship between U.S. and Latin American interest, societies, elites and the making of the Alliance for Progress.

To discuss that that relationship, this work analyzes the intentions and expectations that the U.S. and Latin American makers had before enrolling into this new enterprise. Similarly, it explains the different conflicts that aroused amongst those actors. Since this research rests on an Inter-American approach, it discusses the causes behind the conflicts that the Alliance's implementation created in both the United States and Latin America. In doing so, this work

explains the intimate relationship between those conflicts and the domestic problem the respective makers (Presidents and Executive officials, for example) had to confront. Understanding the Inter-American articulation between domestic and foreign occurrences is crucial to this analysis, since there resides the explanation to why Alliance for Progress failed and why any foreign aid program will share the same fate.

To implement this analysis, this dissertation uses Argentina and Venezuela as case studies. It is important to clarify that this work does not describe in detail how the Alliance for Progress was implemented in each country. Instead, the goal is to understand how those countries interacted with the Alliance for Progress and the United States and *why* they did it in different ways. Both presidents were the ideal partners of the Alliance for Progress with very similar background and ideals. Arturo Frondizi in Argentina and Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela were democratically elected presidents with grand plans for their countries. While Frondizi expected to industrialize Argentina and to transform the country into a world power with an independent foreign policy, Betancourt wanted to build a stable democratic political system capable of surviving military pressure. Consequently, both presidents were equally interested in collaborating with the Alliance for Progress, and obtaining the necessary capital to finance their respective plans. Both presidencies did not relate with the Alliance for Progress in the same way and their grand plans ended very differently. To understand those differences, it is necessary to analyze each president's domestic situations and their capacity to generate enough political capital to implement change.

Betancourt and Frondizi were at very different domestic contexts. First, Betancourt's project was a multi-partisan program with the support of Venezuelan main political parties. Moreover, Betancourt's project was breaking with an unpopular tradition of military

dictatorships. Conversely, Frondizi's plan not only was mono-partisan, but he also was attempting to transform Argentina against Perón's popular legacy. Although Peronist could not participate in elections, they were very powerful in workers' unions and grassroots organizations, including *Confederación General del Trabajo* (CGT).⁶⁵ Second, the Venezuelan president had a superior understanding of the U.S. political system. Even though Arthur Schlesinger defined Frondizi as "the most pro-American president in Argentinean history,"⁶⁶ Betancourt's standing with and connections to U.S. officials were unparalleled.

Based on those differences, Betancourt and Frondizi were at very different places not only to satisfy the Alliance's requirements, but also in different positions to interact with Inter-American political developments as well as U.S. interest and requirements. As a result, the analysis of their respective situation offers an avenue to study a wide range of conflicts and possibilities that a democratic government faces while attempting to promote Development. The reason why no military dictatorship included in the analysis is because the objective of the Alliance for Progress, formally at least until 1964, was to promote Development related to democracy. An analysis of a military dictatorship in connection with the program may be useful to denounce hypocrisy, but it does not help to understand why a program based on those two coordinates, democracy and economic growth, cannot promote Development.

To understand the intricacies behind the Alliance's inability to promote development, it is necessary to incorporate U.S. domestic situation on the analysis. For the United States, the Alliance for Progress created conditions of conflict both inside and outside of the Executive branch. Inside the Executive branch, the main conflict took place between State Department and USAID officials. As it will be explained throughout this dissertation, this conflict was not a

traditional bureaucratic struggle to defend a parcel, but an ideological conflict regarding the purpose of foreign aid and its relationship with foreign policy objectives.

Outside of the Executive branch, the sharpest opposition came from several U.S. Congressmen who were skeptical on the Alliance for Progress. Their skepticism was prevalent on issues such as long-term funding and accountability. Moreover, many Congressmen doubted the effectiveness of the program to protect U.S. interest overseas. Unfortunately for Kennedy, those voices could not be ignored since Congress controlled funding for his foreign and domestic initiatives. The latter were essential for boosting U.S. economy after the early 1960s crisis.⁶⁷ Kennedy had to be careful in addressing Congressional reservations or the continuity of his foreign aid initiatives could be imperiled. Due to these conditions, U.S. Congress became one of the most relevant actors in the making of the Alliance for Progress.

The Inter-American narrative that results from the interaction amongst those elements explains the conjunctural reasons behind the Alliance's inability to promote Development. Those conjunctural reasons show why Rómulo Betancourt, Kennedy's closest ally, had problems acquiring aid and why Frondizi could not even complete his presidency. In addition, this Inter-American narrative also unveils the structural contradiction that explain the Alliance's problems and termination. Understanding those contradictions is crucial, because they show why foreign aid is intrinsically unable to promote development in the Third World.

This study is organized in three sections. The second chapter addresses the antecedents of the Alliance for Progress, the context of its announcement and the effects that Inter-American political development had on its early evolution. To explain that evolution, this chapter analyzes the effect that Congressional reservations as well as the Bay of Pigs had on the struggle between State and USAID officials. Additionally, this chapter highlights the contradictions between Latin

American and U.S expectations as well as the relationship between Latin American nationalism and the ultimate *U.S.-Americanization of the Alliance for Progress*.

The third chapter discusses how these contradictions influenced the implementation of the Alliance for Progress in Argentina and Venezuela. It explains how and why the aforementioned conjunctural problems prevented the Alliance for Progress from promoting Development. For that reason, this chapter devotes important attention to understand the destabilizing effect that the Alliance's requirements had in Argentina and Venezuela. Moreover, it explains how those effects made impossible for Latin Americans to satisfy the requirements for granting aid. Those findings clarify why the Alliance for Progress was ultimately a damaging program for unstable democracies.

Lastly, the fourth chapter examines Latin American as well as U.S. efforts to reform the Alliance for Progress in response to the predominant feeling of disappointment. This remains important because the discussions that followed the first year of implementation show the structural contradiction that any foreign aid program will confront. While discussing the U.S. and Latin American colliding interest as the program evolved, this chapter discusses how and why those confrontations explains the termination of the Alliance for Progress as conceived on March 13, 1961 with the Mann Doctrine (March 1964).

Before concluding with the introduction, there are some issues that deserve an expansion. First, this work does not explore or seek to understand the Alliance for Progress for the ten years the program officially existed. Instead, it will only focus on the period between its announcement and the Mann Doctrine (1964). After 1964, the program lacked of the revolutionary and experimental elements that made it unique in 1961. Therefore, an analysis beyond that period

does not help to understand the program's inability to promote Development as a result of economic growth and political democracy.

Second, the Alliance for Progress was an attempt to depart from the traditional paradigms that had inspired the history of the Inter-American system. Since this research argues that the Americas work as a regional entity, it dialogues with important scholarship on the history of this system. That dialogue would be explained on the conclusion, but there are two books that deserve special attention: *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (2007) by Greg Grandin and *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (1991) by Kathryn Sikkink. While Grandin's book is important to understand U.S. tradition to experiment on Latin America, Sikkink's analytical framework was crucial to understand the political/institutional challenges behind the promotion of Development.

Third, since the Alliance for Progress was a foreign aid program, it is impossible to analyze it without mentioning the literature on the subject. The arguments in favor and against foreign aid will be discussed on the conclusion. Briefly however, from the methodological perspective, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (2006) by Carol Lancaster is essential. Although she does not study the Alliance for Progress, her understanding of foreign aid in relationship with ideas, institutions and interests truly helps to understand the Alliance's dynamics. Her conclusions about USAID can be applied to the Alliance for Progress: "No government agency with USAID's responsibilities combined with limitations on its authority could have avoided becoming the whipping boy for perceived failures of foreign aid."⁶⁸

It is also impossible to talk about the Alliance for Progress without making a reference to Modernization theory. However, this work will not introduce new arguments on understanding the intellectual and practical genealogy of this theory, but there are many valuable books on the

subject, including Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (2007); *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (2011) by David Ekbladh or *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War. Modernization Development, and the Global Cold War* (2003) edited by David Engerman and other authors. Similarly, this book also does not discuss the intellectual genealogy of Developmenalism. On that subject *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil* (1996) by Joseph Love and *El Desarrollismo* (1983) by Julio Nosiglia offers an excellent analysis.

This dissertation does inform discussions regarding the impact of this ideology on decision-making, especially on how U.S. officials understood the Alliance for Progress. Of particular importance, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (2011) by Michael Latham is informative. Amongst his arguments, there is one that the reader should keep in mind about the conjunctural limitations of the Alliance for Progress on relationship to Betancourt and USAID bureaucracy:

Because the universal assumptions of modernization promoted disregard for the significance of local history and culture, defining them as transitory matters, modernizers also reduced crucial problems to matters of mere administration and technical expertise. The cultural and ideological appeal of modernization, moreover, often blinded its advocates to evidence of policy failure.⁶⁹

A final clarification, The methodology behind this work unveils international and transnational dynamics difficult to capture on existing concept. For that reason, it introduces two new concepts. The first one is *dynamic of collaboration*. This concept refers to the conditions under which two or more elements establish a relationship. As the next chapter discusses, this dynamic is tightly related to each actors' domestic conditions as well as the effects that foreign

elements produce on them. The *dynamic of collaboration* creates the basis for the *system of collaboration*, which is the system that results from the conditions that the dynamic or dynamics of collaboration creates. In other words, the system of collaboration represents the crystallization of the dynamics that the different elements in the international systems established.

For instance, Venezuela and the United States established a particular relationship based on their specific domestic conditions. Based on those conditions, they established a specific *dynamic of collaboration*. This dynamic crystallizes into a specific *system of collaboration*, which imposes duties and more rigid rules that determines how each country interacted with each other. Based on the *system of collaboration* that resulted from the *dynamic of collaboration* between the United States and Venezuela, the latter become too important to fail. Similarly, the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress*, as discussed in the chapter two, is the prime example of the *system of collaboration* that ruled the making of the Alliance for Progress.

A discussion on Development

As a foreign aid program aiming to promote Development as a result of democracy and economic growth, the Alliance for Progress offers unique insights into the challenges of Development promotion. To understand the scope of those challenges, it is important to clarify certain concepts. Development refers to the economic and political stage orchestrated around a paradigm supported by the majority of the population, regardless of class, gender or ethnicity. The elements that compose that paradigm are irrelevant, as long as they enjoy domestic legitimacy. This is different from either pure economic growth or development paradigms imposed over the population by foreign or domestic elites.

Similar to the Alliance for Progress itself, this dissertation is based on the notion that Development is a political and an economic problem. For that reason, Development can only exist in the context of democracy. As Amartya Sen argued, Development is about freedom.⁷⁰ Measuring Development by any other variable not only fails to capture the people's interest on improving the social pact, but also it obscures the true challenges of achieving Development. Precisely for this reason, the Marshall Plan and the Alliance for Progress were radically different and those differences will be examined in the conclusion. As will be clear throughout, the challenges of Development, or the redefinition of the structure of power, are far more complex than the challenges of economic growth or economic recovery.

This understanding of Development requires a clear idea on how this thesis uses the term elite. In most situations this work uses elite to refer to people in positions of privilege in society. However, the money or power is not what defined them as elite. Instead, it is their assumption that progress results from the struggle amongst individuals for supremacy. Regardless of the money or position in society, that thinking encourages and justifies the importance of the individual over society as well as the existence of social differences that creates elite.

This book makes references to key terms associated with development, which will be defined and explained. These terms include: Modernization, Developmentalism, modernizing, modernize, Developmentalist, *developmentalist*. While modernization is the theory developed by Walt Rostow based on the U.S. Development paradigm, Developmentalism refers to the paradigm for Development cultivated in Latin America at CEPAL/ECLAC and followed by many Latin American presidents. Those two ideas acquired practical life on concepts such as modernizing, modernize, Developmentalist, *developmentalist*. The first two refer to the process a country endeavors to implement Modernization. Developmentalist refers to the person who

subscribes to Developmentalism whereas *developmentalist* refers to a plan seeking to transform society based Developmentalism. On this work, *developmentalist* refers to Frondizi's plan.

Chapter II.

Conceptualizing and Building the Foundation of the Alliances for Progress

A New Understanding of Foreign Aid: The Foreign Aid Bill (1961) and the Alliance for Progress

The Alliance for Progress was part of a major effort to redefine the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. To the Kennedy administration, disputing with the Soviet Union the support of the Third World societies required a major overhauling of U.S. foreign aid programs. That transformation aimed to demonstrate that capitalism, not communism, offered the best path for Development in the Third World. Kennedy expected to transform the sixties into a decade of economic and social development.⁷¹

To prove that capitalism was more viable for Development, the Administration relied on a paradigm drafted in U.S. universities known as Modernization theory. Popularized by Walt Rostow, the theory became the center piece of the new foreign aid effort. He not only wrote one of the foundational books on Modernization theory, but served in a prominent position on the Kennedy Administration. First as Deputy National Security Adviser then as chair of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Rostow became a defining force on how the U.S. officials committed with new approach understood Development and the Alliance for Progress.⁷²

According to Rostow, a country's process toward Development can be separated in five stages. Those stages went from traditional societies to societies of high mass consumption. Based on this, U.S. scholars and officials alike believed that the First World could assist traditional societies to complete those stages by helping them to achieve the point of "take off." Once

society had achieved that point, they believed, developing societies could complete the process on their own. Accomplishing this was not a simple task.

Modernization theorists believe that modernizing societies not only need financial support from the First World, but also they require assistance on designing coherent Development plans with achievable and firm set goals that remove of all barriers to advance toward Modernization.⁷³ Consequently, proponents placed emphasis on developing human resources as well as creating international bureaucracies in charge of Development planning, and hoped those institutions should become a *de facto* development ministry.⁷⁴

According to Rostow, the promotion of Modernization was not just a humanitarian duty, but the only way to defeat communism in the long-run.⁷⁵ Modernization theorists worked under the assumption that leftist appealing in the Third World results from the failure of those societies to become modern capitalist societies. Thus, it follows that those theorists believed assisting those nations achieving the stage of high mass consumption was crucial for winning the Cold War. Since modernization theory offers a paradigm to win the Cold War in the Third World, it is not a surprise that it became the corner stone of Kennedy's foreign aid overhaul and the inspiration for his Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid delivered on March 22, 1961.

Kennedy's speech started with a diagnosis of the situation and highlighted three conclusions. The first mentioned the existing foreign aid programs and concepts are largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for U.S. needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world. Next, economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations threatened the national security of the United States. And lastly, the 1960s offered a unique opportunity for industrialized nations to convert less-developed countries into self-sustain economies.⁷⁶ Kennedy then proposed a new

understanding of foreign aid with the intention of making “a historical demonstration that in the twenty century . . . economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand.”⁷⁷

This new policy on foreign aid would be based on several key elements. All foreign aid initiatives would be under the supervision of a new single organization called Agency for International Development (USAID). Based in Washington and the host-country, this agency would coordinate different aid programs in order to avoid duplicity, fragmentation and rigidity in Development planning.⁷⁸ While the Washington office would coordinate different foreign aid efforts, country missions would assist local governments to design modernization plans that were tailored to their respective needs and potential.

Understanding that those plans could not be completed without secure financing, the Administration believed that the United States should be prepared to offer long-term support for those plans. Unless the United States was willing to make a long-term commitment, as opposed to yearly ones, Kennedy explained that the recipient country would not have an incentive for Development planning.⁷⁹ Kennedy further noted that other industrialized nations would not participate on this effort, unless they saw decisive U.S. support.⁸⁰ Long-term commitment, Kennedy concluded, was essential to secure the multilateral spirit of this effort.⁸¹

As Greg Grandin explained on *Empire's Workshop* (2006), the United States had used Latin America as a testing ground for new policies and initiatives. As argued here, Kennedy was no exception. As soon as he announced the Alliance for Progress, it was clear that this program was the first attempt to implement the new approach to foreign aid. That relationship was evident on the recurring references to long-term planning and long-term financing as prerequisites for creating conditions for taking off. Moreover, Teodoro Moscoso was Coordinator of the Alliance

for Progress and regional administrator for Latin American for USAID. The latter shows that the Administration understood both initiatives tightly related with each other.

Using the Alliance for Progress as the prototype of the new approach to foreign aid was not only logical, but also very reasonable from Kennedy's point of view. It would help coordinating the different activities related with the Alliance for Progress as well as legitimizing the program in the context of winning the Cold War struggle in the Third World, which could be crucial for attracting Congressional and public support. Unfortunately, this decision created more problems than solutions because the Alliance for Progress evolved differently than USAID experts expected. By opening the Alliance for Progress to Latin American input, U.S. officials lost control of the program principles and understanding. Officials were not prepared for this.

Latin American Perspective on Development and the Alliance for Progress

Contrary to what Modernization theorist assumed, recipient countries not only had needs, but coherent ideas regarding their own Development.⁸² Since the early 1950s, Latin American intellectuals had been researching the conditions and solutions for Development, and emerged with the framework for Developmentalism. This Development paradigm did not remain hidden in a university lab, but through Comisión Económica Para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) or Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), developmentalism influenced a new generation of politicians eager to distance themselves from the populist leaders who dominated Latin American politics since the 1930s. This new generation included Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Arturo Frondizi in Argentina, Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil, Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile, José Figueres in Costa Rica and Alberto Lleras Camargo in Colombia.

Although those leaders had political differences, all of them shared a sense of entitlement and responsibility with the destiny of their respective countries. Equipped with CEPAL arguments, those figures believed that their generation would be the responsible for developing of the continent.⁸³ Importantly, some of these politicians understood that they were Washington's only alternative to fight communism by democratic means.⁸⁴ As a result, when Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, this new generation gained a sense of entitlement regarding their participation and agency on the making of this program.

Kennedy's rhetoric and actions highlighting the collaborative nature of the Alliance for Progress did very little to discourage those feelings. One of those actions was the Puerto Rico meeting in December 1960. Few days after Kennedy's election, Rómulo Betancourt received an invitation from Chester Bowles, future Undersecretary of State, to participate in a meeting with José Figueres, President of Costa Rica and the Governor of Puerto Rico Luis Muñoz Marín. During that meeting, Chester Bowles explained Kennedy's special interest in the region, particularly on issues such as strengthening democracies and problems of economic growth.⁸⁵

Actions like those ones quickly convinced Latin American liberals that the Alliance for Progress was not a program to implement Modernization theory, but it represented the continuation of their ideas. In November 1960, for example, the Venezuelan in charge of affairs in Washington, Carlos Pérez de la Cova, reported that Kennedy's new initiative would be based on the ideas of the Pan American Operation (1959), the Meeting of the 21 (1959) as well as the Bogotá Conference (1960).⁸⁶ This was also reflected in José Antonio Mayobre's speech to CEPAL/ECLAC's general assembly in 1963:

. . . what is today the intercontinental program of development inspiring the Alliance for Progress, embodied the principles and ideas developed by CEPAL in fifteen years of work . . . In reality the Alliance for Progress represents the U.S.- American acceptance of the policies already defined by Latin Americans.⁸⁷

Many Latin Americans were eager to participate in the making of the Alliance for Progress even before Kennedy announced it. José Antonio Mayobre, Venezuelan Ambassador in Washington, is a prime example. In early February, and knowing about Kennedy's intentions, Mayobre gathered a group of Latin American intellectuals living in Washington, including Raúl Prebisch, Felipe Herrera Lane, Jorge Sol Castellanos amongst others. Mayobre's intention was to discuss the Latin American perspective toward the new program. Later, Mayobre personally transmitted the results of those conversations to Kennedy, and based on his account, almost all of them became part of Kennedy's speech on March 13, 1961.⁸⁸ Latin American entitlement and input on the conceptualization of the Alliance for Progress had important effects on the evolution of program. They opened a Pandora's Box that neither the United States nor Latin America was equipped to handle.

The Alliance for Progress would reflect not only U.S. ideas and expectations, but also Latin American aspirations and understanding on development. This feature is crucial to understanding the paradigmatic differences between USAID's paradigm and the Alliance for Progress. First, the Alliance for Progress had more ambitious objectives than USAID did. The Alliance for Progress was not confined to create conditions for "taking off," but expected "to complete the revolution of the Americas."⁸⁹ Indeed, Kennedy proposed a development plan where democracy and economic progress were tightly related. Kennedy described the program as an alliance of free governments, leading social change under the spirit of George Washington, Those Jefferson, Simón Bolívar, José deSan Martín and José Martí.⁹⁰ Despite the ideological differences amongst those figures, the underlying thinking was that Development can only result from political and economic transformation or, as the Alliance for Progress argued, Development without democracy could not exist.

That idea of promoting democracy was never part of the general mission of USAID. In fact, during his Special Message on Foreign Aid, Kennedy never alluded to the need to complete unfinished revolutions.⁹¹ Instead, Kennedy only mentioned political elements of Development in relationship to Military Assistance Program (MAP) and he did it solely to justify the continuation of those programs. In addition, the relationship between political factors and USAID was extremely dim. Military Assistance Programs were not under its authority and appropriation was part of Department of Defense's budget.⁹² In contrast, the USAID defined the purpose of aid as:

To promote economic and social development, to enable the recipient countries to maintain armed forces of importance to the Free World, to help maintain immediate economic and *political stability* in strategically important countries, to help to assure availability of U.S. military bases abroad, and to help support international organizations. (emphasis added)⁹³

As argued in this dissertation, political stability and promoting democracy are not compatible and are in fact are contradictory. This is because the promotion of democracy implies a problem of legitimacy on the current political system; otherwise democratic promotion would not be necessary. For this reason, promoting democracy requires an alteration in the distribution of power, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of the political system. This alteration creates political instability. In exploring the Alliance for Progress, this argument is evident.

The relationship between democracy and Development was not the only difference between USAID and the Alliance's paradigm. The programs also had a dissimilar understanding of one of the most appealing elements of the Alliance for Progress: multilateralization. USAID understood multilateralization as a strategy to secure funding from different sources.⁹⁴ In contrast, the participants and designers of the Alliance for Progress had neither a clear nor a common understanding of the concept and its relationship with program. For instance, before

Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, Richard Goodwin explained to George Ball how the \$500 million would be multilaterally administered.⁹⁵ Others, such as Dean Rusk, understood multilateralization as a political tactic to shield Latin American governments from accusations of being puppets of U.S. imperialism.⁹⁶

Considering that the Alliance for Progress was part of USAID, those differences exemplified the chaotic beginnings of the program. Unfortunately in crafting this initiative, USAID and the Alliance for Progress not only lacked a universal criterion to understand the level of collaboration, but also it lacked of an ideological common ground. From the U.S. perspective, USAID and the Alliance for Progress were inspired by Modernization theory. For Latin Americans, the Alliance for Progress rested upon their conversations and traditions on Development, whose cornerstone was Developmentalism.

Modernization and Developmentalism differed on key elements. First, Developmentalists assigned more importance to capital investment than to social investment. According to their paradigm, Development could only be achieved through industrialization. For that reason, Developmentalist focused most of their attention to build energy sources, bridges and roads. Although they recognized the importance of social investment for the promotion of Development, Developmentalists also understood that those types of investment required a long-term source of funding. By focusing on capital investments, they expect to build those sources.

Developmentalist preference for capital investment reflected the negative experiences that Latin American politicians had with populist leaders. This situation was especially true in Argentina, where Perón built an impressive social network that helped millions after the Second World War, which became financially untenable during the 1950s. Not surprisingly, Frondizi harshly criticized Alliance for Progress for placing too much attention on the prerequisites for

Development such as housing and education, instead of fomenting local industries.⁹⁷ As Frondizi explicitly said to Kennedy on their meeting in Palm Beach, “[w]ith the Alliance for Progress you need to avoid developing Peronism on an American scale.”⁹⁸

Modernization theorists, however, were not specific on their preference toward either social or capital investment. In fact, the rhetoric behind the USAID used them indistinctly. Instead USAID experts placed more attention to what they define as self-help measures. Those measures refer to the willingness of the recipient country to mobilize local resources. Classical examples of self-help measures were Development programming, land reform and tax policies designed to raise equitable resources for investments. Other ideas related with self-help measures included the independence on external sources of funding to solve balance payments crises, encouraging infant industries to spur exports and the promotion of government honesty.⁹⁹

Another key difference between Modernization and Developmentalism refers to the role the State had in the development process. Although most Developmentalists believed that private initiative was important for industrialization, they regarded the State as the conductor of the Development symphony.¹⁰⁰ This understanding should not be a surprise because Latin American States played a major role promoting social advancement. Clear examples of this are Perón in Argentina, Popular Front in Chile and Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Although their capacity to develop sustainable democratic societies may be questionable, the socioeconomic policies implemented during those years brought social and economic progress to Latin America.

Lastly, Developmentalism and Modernization also differs on abiogenesis. Indeed, Modernization theory was conceived to fight and win the Cold War. As Rostow argued, “[i]n the short run . . . communism must be contained militarily. In the long run, we must rely on the development, in partnership with others, of an environment in which societies which directly or

indirectly menace ours will not evolve.”¹⁰¹ For this reason, Modernization theory inspired the new approach to foreign aid and the creation of USAID. In contrast, Developmentalism was not conceived as tool to fight communism in the Third World, but as a paradigm to achieve Development through a different path than U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism. Whether Developmentalism had its origins on the teaching of Manoulescu, the lessons of Latin American reality post- 1929 or a combination of both, the reality is that Developmentalism was paradigm of Development conceived in the Third World for the Third World. Therefore, Developmentalists approach to Cold War affairs was less dogmatic as they were not concerned with international communist plot for suppressing the regions’ free will.

In summation, not only did Developmentalism and Modernization assigned dissimilar values to social and capital investment, State and private initiative, but had different motivations for thinking about Development. In order words, Modernization and Developmentalism theorist and practitioners had a dissimilar understanding of Development and the Alliance for Progress. Since this program was under the jurisdiction of USAID, those differences were a source of conflict between Latin American government and U.S. officials. Those differences, though, should not be understood as an intrinsic problem, but as a challenge with potential. Different ideologies offer the opportunity to grow from collaboration. However, that collaboration required an Inter-American bureaucracy capable of addressing those differences and building consensus. Unluckily, the Inter-American dynamic of collaboration made that impossible.

As most marriages testify, a partnership between groups or states, equal or unequal, evolves as a result of the interaction between each partner’s preconditions and the system that the implementation creates. In the case of the Alliance for Progress, collaboration between the United States and Latin America would not be the result of their willingness and good wishes.

Instead, it would result from the interaction between their preconditions and the restraints that their respective societies imposed on them. Even more importantly, the dynamic of collaboration induced each partner to ignore the paradigmatic differences previously outlined, and focus on the immediate problems. This problem seriously weakened the Alliance's prospects to succeed.

To understand this dynamic, it is necessary to comprehend U.S. domestic conflicts regarding the Alliance for Progress. As importantly, it is important to understand how those conflicts interacted with the Inter-American processes that took place between the announcement of the program and the closing of the Punta del Este Conference on August, 1961. All those elements created the system of collaboration on which the Inter-American making of the Alliance for Progress took place until March 1964.

State Department, Agency for International Development and the Dispute Over Foreign Aid

The Foreign Aid Bill of 1961 centralized all foreign aid initiatives on the Agency for International Development (USAID) headed by an administrator, which is in charge of providing direction and aid allocation. Even though the administrator reported directly to the Secretary of State and the President, the bureaucratic transformation quickly became a source of conflict.

Although the new approach to foreign aid received public support from the entire cabinet, not everybody in State Department agreed with the idea of sharing responsibility over foreign aid. One of them was George Ball, who objected to removing foreign aid from the State Department and described it as a major mistake. He explained that foreign aid was a one of most important weapons State Department had to advance foreign policy objectives. For that reason, Ball argued, removing foreign aid from State Department may result in two totally different

foreign policies.¹⁰² Ball's prediction became quickly became a reality as it proved that State Department officials and USAID understood the new approach to foreign aid very differently.

Although both bureaucracies conceived the new approach to foreign aid as tool to confront communism and as mean to achieve foreign policy objectives, they had different ideas on how to use aid. On one hand, USAID and Modernization theorists believed that by overcoming poverty, communist appeal would be reduce. This remained the sustaining paradigm of both the Foreign Aid bill of 1961 and the Alliance for Progress. Although State Department officials were not opposed to that idea, they mostly regarded this new approach to foreign aid as a strategy to increase the appealing of assistance programs. Three days before Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, Dean Rusk wrote a memorandum to Kennedy describing:

I believe that most of us who have worked on this program feel that we have come to an important crossroads. In all likelihood, a fresh, positive aid program, scaled to the requirements and presented with persistence and boldness, has a much better chance of Congressional approval and popular acclaim than another round of the old Mutual Security bill with the now standards figures on military assistance, "defense support", "special assistance", and all the rest.¹⁰³

Creating a more appealing brand name for Mutual Security Agreements was not the only motivation for State Department officials, but also regarded the new approach as a tool to legitimize the position of the United States in international forums, such as the United Nations. Similarly than the government's interest in the Civil Rights movement,¹⁰⁴ State officials believed that a multilateral approach to Development will empower the position of the United States amongst the republics resulting from the decolonization process. Those intentions were made clear in the telegram from L.D. Battle, Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy in March 1962:

The great bulk of U.S. diplomatic activity still takes place at the bilateral end of the spectrum. With the proliferation of independent countries (105 now, 130 in ten years), the United States will find an increasing amount of diplomatic activity on behalf of our vital interests conducted through multilateral channels ...Institution- building in the purely regional field may have to fabricate a base in the economic area before it can move successfully to the political and security field. This is likely to be the lesson of the Common Market in Europe. *It is the gamble of the Alliance for Progress*” (emphasis added).¹⁰⁵

While State Department officials regarded the new approach to foreign aid as a new tool to conduct international affairs as usual, USAID officials and Modernization theorists believed that Modernization and multilateralization were objectives by themselves.¹⁰⁶ For the latter, Modernization Theory was a game changer that could destroy the root causes of communist appealing. Unlike the State Department, USAID had a messianic understanding of foreign aid, and therefore, they attributed an intrinsic value to the tool.

Different approaches to a problem are not something new in a complex bureaucratic apparatus, such as the U.S. government, but the USAID/State Department confrontation was different. Both offices were trying to accomplish different objectives using the same tool. Unfortunately since the Foreign Aid Bill did not create effective procedures to reconcile differences, confrontation replaced coordination over foreign aid and foreign policy.¹⁰⁷

In August 1961, the State Department wrote a memorandum to President Kennedy, describing the offices’ difficulties to provide leadership and authority to “achieve the optimum combined impact of the U.S. and local country resources on the overall security and development programs.”¹⁰⁸ Regardless of the country and time, those bureaucratic problems can paralyze a government’s capacity to respond to foreign challenges. An example of those paralyzing effects was the USAID mission to British Guyana. Discussing that mission, President Kennedy commented to Foreign Service officials in March 1962:

We have been fiddling with the question of sending an aid agency to British Guiana to my knowledge for four or five months. [classified] the aid agency is in it, the Department is in it, Defense has some ideas, and the result has been that we've waited month after month.¹⁰⁹

The bureaucratic problems that the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961 introduced did not last, and Kennedy ultimately followed State Department's understanding of foreign aid. Kennedy's decision can be explained by the supervision State Department had over the Administrator of USAID. Additionally, the newly created agency had little chance to compete with the well-established the State Department. However, that seniority would have been of little use, if the political conditions both in the United States and Latin American would have been different.

Convincing Congress and U.S. Constituencies on the New Approach to Foreign Aid

In the struggle with the State Department over foreign aid, USAID had a major weakness. In contrast to the State Department, USAID had to demonstrate that its approach was not just logical, but the best for accomplishing foreign policy objectives. USAID needed to build political capital amongst U.S. officials, public and members from Congress. Congress was the most relevant since it controlled the yearly budget allocation and sanctioned any bureaucratic transformation. Unluckily for USAID, Kennedy's relationship with Congress was problematic.

Although the Democratic Party controlled the Eighty-Seventh Congress, the White House could not rely on their support. According to Sorensen, that struggle cannot be understood solely as a competition between two branches of the government, but also as a confrontation between two generations of politicians.¹¹⁰ Kennedy was thirty-five years younger than the first Speaker of the House Samuel Rayburn (D-Texas) and twenty-six years younger than the Second Speaker, John William McCormack (D-Massachusetts). In 1935, when Samuel Rayburn was the head of

the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and John William McCormack was presiding the Special Committee on Un-American Activities Authorized to Investigate Nazi Propaganda, John Kennedy was graduating from high school and voted “most likely to succeed.” In the same year, Adlai Stevenson was already chief attorney for the Federal Alcohol Control Administration and Lyndon Johnson became head of the Texas National Youth Administration.

That generational difference influenced how Conservative Democrats and Kennedy’s officials addressed national issues, including economic debates. Following the advice of John K. Galbraith, the Kennedy Administration decided to increase public spending in order to boost the economy out of 1960s crisis. Unfortunately for Kennedy, this idea was unpopular amongst Republicans as well as powerful southern Democrats. Amongst those Democrats is possible to mention Wilbur Mills (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the House of Ways and Means Committee and Harry Byrd (D-Virginia), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. For them, a balanced budget was still the golden rule of economics.

Sorensen remembered that due to Kennedy’s “continuing confrontation with the conservative coalition of both houses, the President could not afford any additional antagonism.”¹¹¹ Yet, the Kennedy Administration decided to advance on the most radical transformation of foreign aid in the history of the United States. His new approach not only introduced a massive transformation on bureaucratic procedures, but also it increased public spending and empowered the Executive branch. From the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961, the Executive branch acquired a new tool called borrowing authority. This tool allowed the White House to promise long-term financial support for Modernization programs in the Third World. As Kennedy expressed in his Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, the White House could not demand long-term planning, unless it also could offer assurance of long-term financial

support.¹¹² Based on the borrowing authority provision, long-term financial support would become an informational item in the yearly appropriation, not requiring an affirmative action by the Appropriation Committee. Those new powers aroused Congressional concerns and reservations, very similarly than the comprehensive Education Bill of 1961 did.

As Stephen Skowronek discussed, any enlargement of the Executives capacities had faced opposition from the other branches of government.¹¹³ The Eighty-Seven congress was not the exception. For them, long-term borrowing authority not only weakened Congressional control over tax payers' money and appropriations, but also it contravened the very essence of the Constitution. During the hearings for the Foreign Aid Bill, Representative Vaughan Gary (D-Virginia) expressed those concerns to Dean Rusk:

I think you are taking away from us our constitutional prerogative because the Constitution of the United States says no money shall be withdrawn from Treasury of the United States except by appropriation . . . What I am concerned about is the right to borrow from the Treasury without an appropriation. There you are clearly, in my judgment, bypassing the constitutional requirement that no funds shall be withdrawn from the Treasury except by appropriation.¹¹⁴

In addition to those questioning the constitutionality of the provision, borrowing authority also faced opposition from fiscal conservatives. For them, borrowing authority not only violated the Constitution, but also it created conditions for irresponsible spending. To prevent this, Congressional leaders such as Representative Otto Passman (D-Louisiana) and Representative John Rhodes (R-Arizona) demanded that any loan authorization should include assurances or conditions so that the money would be used properly.¹¹⁵ From those Congressmen, Latin American governments should demonstrate true commitment with their development and, then, the White House should request allocation from Congress. Representative Passman expressed this argument while interviewing Lincoln Gordon on Foreign Aid Bill:

What would be wrong- since it is a good, worthy program, overall- with requesting these countries to go ahead and pass legislation, land reforms, tax structures, and firm up their projects, and then come to you and sit down across the table and have something firm you could come back with before the committee and Congress and say, “We have been looking over a reclamation project and we will be able to reclaim so many thousands of acres and the cost will be thus and so?”¹¹⁶

Fear of reckless spending and enlargement of Executive powers were not the only source of criticism to the Foreign Aid Bill. Other Congressmen questioned the effectiveness of foreign aid to protect Washington’s interest overseas. They believed the Executive should demand assurances that U.S. money would not be used to finance “neutralist” governments or “third way” countries.¹¹⁷ In the same direction Representative Gerald Ford Jr. (R-Michigan) believed that it was necessary to offer protection to U.S. companies against expropriation.¹¹⁸

Unfortunately for the Administration and Executive officials committed with the USAID approach, Congressional reservations were neither illogical nor irrelevant. For an average voter in the early 1960s, controlling the White House from reckless spending in the middle of a crisis was not a bad idea. Moreover, being poisoned by Cold War and nuclear fear, voters could easily sympathize with Congressional reservations regarding the efficiency of Modernization to protect U.S. foreign interest. Those conditions made the Congressional debate surrounding the Foreign Aid Bill long and exhausting. In fact, President Kennedy decided to cancel his trip to the Punta del Este Conference in August 1961 to secure the enactment of this legislation.¹¹⁹ Even though the Kennedy Administration had many problems of understanding, building trust with Latin American leaders was not one of them. Kennedy and his advisors should have been aware about the relationship between President’s presence and the program’s legitimacy amongst Latin American republics. Yet, as President Kennedy expressed to President Frondizi, the Foreign Aid Bill was essential for the success of the Alliance for Progress.¹²⁰

Despite Congressional opposition, the Administration passed the Foreign Aid Bill, including the borrowing authority for five years. The Administration was able to accomplish this not by convincing Republicans and Democrats on the quality of the bill, but by aligning Congressional leaders who already sympathize with the new approach. Since the late 1950s, important congressional leaders such as Senator Fulbright (D-Arkansas), Senator Aiken (D-Vermont) and Senator Morse (D-Oregon) traveled to Latin America to understand regional demands for a new approach to Inter- American relations. Using their support, in September 1961 the Foreign Aid Bill passed and established the legal basis for his new approach.

Although Kennedy and his advisors could congratulate themselves on the passing this legislation, the path chosen was too shortsighted for a program that require a farsighted strategy. Instead of cultivating a relationship with moderate Republicans, the Administration refused to discuss mechanisms to make the foreign aid transformation a bipartisan issue. As Art Burgess, Senate Republican Policy Committee, told Mike Manatos, of the Congressional Liaison office, the Foreign Aid Bill would have received ample support from Republicans if the White House agreed on creating a bipartisan “watchdog” committee.¹²¹ Similarly, after meeting with Republican Senators Boggs, Bush and Prouty, Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury, believed that “there is not ‘hardnosed’ opposition amongst the ten to five year borrowing authority.”¹²² Nevertheless, the White House refused to indulge Republican concerns.

That strategy had serious effects on the long-term relationship the Republican Party established with the foreign aid transformation and the Alliance for Progress. In fact, Republican opposition toward foreign aid only increased over the years. While in the first session, Republican opposition toward the Foreign Aid Bill was 41.9% and Latin American Aid

Appropriation was 33.1%,¹²³ during the second session, the opposition toward the Foreign Aid Bill recommitment was 78.6% and the Foreign Aid Authorization was 60%.¹²⁴

Under such conditions, neither USAID nor the Alliance for Progress had a strong political base upon which their continuity could rely on. Moreover, the monopartisan strategy made the Administration excessively dependent on the majority that enacted the Foreign Aid Bill. If USAID and the Alliance for Progress became a successful tool to prevent the expansion of communism and protect U.S. interest overseas, those Congressmen would enjoy the political benefits. If the program failed, the same Congressmen would be politically liable and their opponents would be ready to capitalize. As a result, it would not take long for those Congressmen to reconsider their position, as what it happened in 1963. Even worse, since Kennedy did not have the support of most Southern Democrats, the opposition to the Foreign Aid bill and the Alliance for Progress had the potential to become bipartisan.

Kennedy's strategy to enact the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961 had important consequences for Alliance for Progress' future. First, Congressional supporters and critics became powerful actors in the making of the program. Regardless of the tenor and level of Congressmen concerns, the Administration was simply incapable of ignoring them without endangering the financial and political continuity of the program. Second, this fragile political base placed a lot pressure on USAID as well as the Alliance's officials and supporters to deliver on the promises made during the hearing process. Their failure could not only alienate Congressional supporters, but also it could empower State officials who did not share their understanding of foreign aid. The problem for USAID and Alliance's officials was that political developments in Latin American would make that task impossible.

The Bay of Pigs and Its Effects on the Making of the Alliance for Progress

The Cold War was a crucial force behind the search for new alternatives to fight communist appealing. The Alliance for Progress and the creation of USAID exemplify the point. However, it would be a mistake to confuse the original inspiration with the strategy to use those devices. In the case of the Alliance for Progress, the original inspiration was to prevent another Fidel Castro in Latin America, not to oust him from power. For that the United States had another plan conceived before Kennedy became President, which resulted on the Bay of Pigs.

The strategy built from the Bay of Pigs and the Alliance for Progress was reasonable. While the Bay of Pigs removed the direct cause of concern, the Alliance for Progress created conditions that prevent the appearance of new ones. However, events did not evolve as predicted and the Bay of Pigs was a disaster. It exposed the Administration to international ridicule and it improved Castro's reputation as viable check against U.S. imperialism. Those were not the only problems that the Bay of Pigs created. It also forced the Kennedy Administration to use the Alliance for Progress for accomplishing not only Development objectives, but also short-term political objectives. This decision was not just a consequence of Kennedy's willingness to show his credentials as cold warrior, but a mandatory step for placating domestic demands.

As almost all Congresses in the early years of the Cold War, the Eighty-Seventh Congress was extremely anti-communist, which was evident during the hearing process for the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961. Congressional skepticism on the new approach's effectiveness to stop communism as well as the fears of supporting neutralist countries demonstrates the point. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, that anticommunism erupted again. Congress immediately started demanding more collaboration from Latin American republics to the fight against Fidel Castro. Only a month after the Bay of Pigs, the House of Representatives passed a resolution requesting

Organization of American States (OAS) to approve a collective action against Cuba.¹²⁵ These demands were not just the result of Congressional anti-communism, but also reflected concerns from the U.S. public.¹²⁶

Since the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative was already very difficult and the prospect of approving the Foreign Aid bill was not clear, the Administration had little room to resist Congressional demands. Moreover, Congressional pressure resonated well with the State Department's understanding of foreign aid. In addition, U.S. officials committed to the new approach to foreign aid, and therefore, more interested in isolating the program from short-term political considerations, only had the political momentum as their leverage. USAID had not even been created yet.

The State Department preeminence over the making of the Alliance for Progress was neither an immediate nor an automatic process. Even though the first steps in that direction took place few days after the Bay of Pigs, the association between the Alliance for Progress and short-term political objectives was not evident until June 1961.¹²⁷ During that month, Adlai Stevenson traveled throughout Latin America with the intention of laying the groundwork for the upcoming meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. For that tour, State Department instructed Stevenson to accomplish two other objectives: seek ways to improve economic, social and political cooperation in the hemisphere; and transform the negative political atmosphere created in the region after the Bay of Pigs. Building upon those objectives, Stevenson should also explore, not mobilized, Latin America's willingness to support collective action against Cuba.¹²⁸

Since ideological basis of the Alliance for Progress had been already announced, the Administration could not publicly renounce those objectives. Rather, Kennedy and his advisors added new objectives to the program. Increasingly, the Alliance for Progress became a tool not

only for promoting Development, but also for securing Latin American support for collective action against Cuba through the Organization of American States.

This evolution eroded the Alliance's capacity to achieve its goals. The program's success would now be measured by its ability to fulfill its long-term Development goal as well as its capacity to accomplish a short-term political goal. In other words, the Alliance for Progress was expected to promote Development based on economic growth and Democracy and, at the same time, to create conditions to punish Castro and Cuba. This transformation had serious consequences for the Alliance for Progress. It forced weak Latin American democracies to deliver on two areas that the making of the program proved to be mutually exclusive. Moreover, if the Alliance for Progress failed to accomplish any of those objectives, reservationists would have a new reason to reduce the program's funding or even demand its termination. Evidently, the prospects of the Alliance for Progress were not the best. However, and as sad as it may seem, there was not another viable alternative.

After the Bay of Pigs, USAID understanding of foreign aid and the Alliance for Progress was insufficient to defend U.S. foreign interest and, therefore, to build U.S. domestic support for the continuity of the program. Not only Castro was already in power, but also USAID solutions were not realistic. However, the State Department's approach to foreign aid not only satisfied the requirements to confront the new international scenario, but helped address Congressional and public demands of punishing Castro. Considering the little room Kennedy had to navigate and get Congressional support, tightening the Alliance for Progress to short-term political goals became the most reasonable alternative. That decision became even more reasonable after Stevenson presented his conclusions on Latin America.

During the tour, Stevenson met with many Latin American leaders and government officials. The goal was to gather their impressions and expectations on the Alliance for Progress. Yet, most of those conversations left the Ambassador with uneasy feelings. Regarding Latin American expectations, Stevenson informed that most Latin American governments view the upcoming Punta del Este meeting as a foreign aid feast, where each country would attempt to get as much aid as possible, without committing themselves with structural social reforms.¹²⁹ Stevenson, though, believed that if Congress enacted the new foreign aid legislation, particularly long-term commitment, Latin American governments would deliver on self-help reforms.¹³⁰ Stevenson's hope that Latin American governments would commit to structural reforms was not extensive to Latin American willingness to support a collective action against Cuba.

In his report, Stevenson made clear that the current environment was not ideal to United States plans. Indeed, almost every Latin American government believed the U.S. problem with Cuba was a bilateral issue. According to Stevenson, those governments argued that:

only after the political situation has been improved by an implementation (dollar infusion) via Alianza para el Progreso can a given government thus fortified, tackle the blocking of the export of communism from Cuba, i.e. assist US to settle the Cuban problem (*I detected blackmail overtones in several quarters*).¹³¹

Those words empowered and justified the State Department understanding of foreign aid. On one hand, it justified U.S. reservations on Latin American preparedness and willingness to correspond Washington's financial commitment with concrete actions. On the other, it created the impression that Latin American democracies would use the issue of sanctions against Cuba as a blackmailing tool in order to extract more aid from the United States.

Latin American actions, meanwhile, did little to placate those fears. First, many U.S. officials interpreted Latin American objections with an Inter-American Committee on the

Alliance for Progress as a lack of commitment with self-help measures.¹³² During the weeks before the Punta del Este meeting, U.S. officials promoted the idea of creating a committee composed by a group of Development experts. This group would assist Latin American governments on designing and evaluating Development projects. Since many diagnoses identified Latin America's lack of human resources as one of the reasons behind underdevelopment, this group appeared as a solution. Rather, for reasons explained later, many Latin American republics opposed the creation of such Committee and for some U.S. officials this proved that Latin American governments' were unwilling to do their part.

Moreover, although most Latin American governments showed some willingness to collaborate with the United States in their struggle with Cuba, their support was at different levels. Betancourt, for instance, favored a solution through the OAS and promise to ask other parties' opinions on the Cuban situation and mentioned the possibility of Venezuela leading the process. Frondizi, in contrast, was less interested in pursuing such strategy. Instead, he recommended the United States to consult with key hemispheric allies, like Argentina, if they were to be useful in a confrontation and capable of withstanding domestic repercussions.¹³³

Stevenson's conclusions not only increased U.S distrust on Latin American real commitment with the Alliance for Progress, but also encouraged the Administration to continue on the path that the Bay of Pigs fomented. The Kennedy Administration progressively relied on State Department paradigms to understand and to implement the Alliance for Progress. Even still, Latin American democracies still had one more chance to alter that path. They refused to take advantage of it and Latin Americans were the first who distrusted the multilateral advantages of the Alliance for Progress.

Distrust in Multilateralism and the U.S.-Americanization of the Alliance for Progress

Since the Alliance for Progress was conceptualized as a multilateral program, not only did U.S. confrontations play a role in the making of the program, but so did Latin American limitations. One of the most significant was Latin American nationalism. Latin American governments constantly made references to the collective search for the problems of Development, but in practice were incapable of abandoning their outdated nationalisms. This problem was evident from the start of the Alliance for Progress.

As early as the Meeting of the 21 in Buenos Aires (1959), Latin American elite demonstrated that their approach to Development was based on a nationalistic, not regional, understanding.¹³⁴ Developmentalism proved to be an expression of this. Each country expected to reach Development by encouraging their own national industries and had little interest in creating partnerships with neighbor economies. Such beliefs were not a departure from previous practices. Indeed, Latin American economies always competed in international markets as providers of raw materials. Most Latin American governments ignored the variable of regional integration as part of their strategy for Development. In fact, Central American Republics were disappointed that regional integration was not at the top of the agenda for the Punta del Este Conference.¹³⁵ This nationalism prevented the creation of an Inter-American bureaucracy capable implementing a multilateral Alliance for Progress.

After Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, the White House and Latin American governments agreed on meeting again about the necessary procedures to implement the program. In August 1961, the meeting took place on at the city of Punta del Este. Once the Conference started, delegations advanced very quickly on most issues, except on the creation of a committee of experts in charge of evaluating each Development plan. This issue created a

division between large and small Latin American countries.¹³⁶ The large countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, believed that the committee should only make non-mandatory recommendations or else it would interfere with national sovereignty.¹³⁷ Separately, smaller countries led by Uruguay supported the creation of a strong committee that would help to reduce the bilateral advantage that large Latin American countries had over the United States.¹³⁸ Accordingly, smaller republics hoped the committee would secure equal access to aid.¹³⁹ The smaller republics were not blinded by paranoia, but inspired by the correct understanding of their larger neighbors' intentions that were clear in the Uruguayana Conference.

In response to the Argentinean initiative, on April 21 and April 22, 1961 President Frondizi and President Quadros from Brazil met in Uruguayana to discuss their participation on the Alliance for Progress. According to Frondizi, an alliance with Brazil would help Argentina exercise more influence on the Alliance for Progress as well as become a prominent actor in Latin American affairs.¹⁴⁰ At the Uruguayana Conference, Frondizi attempted to convince President Quadros to abandon his neutralist position and insisted Quadros should circumscribe Brazilian participation in international affairs through Inter-American forums.¹⁴¹ Argentinean-Brazilian coordination, Frondizi believed, would help both countries defend their priority on accessing the Alliance's funds.¹⁴² For Frondizi, a developed Argentina and Brazil would produce a multiplier effect on neighbor economies and instead of allocating aid equally among all countries, Frondizi believed focusing on Argentina and Brazil would make aid more effective.¹⁴³

If somebody ever argued that intelligence can make people delusional, President Frondizi proves the point. Although President Frondizi's ideas made economic sense, his strategy for implementation had three major weaknesses. First, President Quadros had already obtained a loan offer of \$100 million from the United States in response to his neutralist position toward

Cuba.¹⁴⁴ Second, President Quadros was not an ideal ally for a long-term hemispheric policy. As his resignation four months after the Uruguayana Conference proves, Quadros was in a more fragile political position than Frondizi. Third, Frondizi expected that his strategy would be unnoticeable for the other Latin American republics, which was unlikely after Brazilian diplomats overtly commented to other delegations that Argentina and Brazil would set the agenda at the Punta del Este Conference.¹⁴⁵

Due to such factors, it is not surprising that Frondizi's strategy became a monumental failure and fueled Latin American distrust. Suspicions increased more after Douglas Dillon decided to visit Buenos Aires and Brasilia on the days prior to the conference. Many Latin American governments expressed their reservations to the Secretary of the Treasury. For them, such trip destroyed the very essence of the Alliance for Progress as a multilateral enterprise.¹⁴⁶ In fact, Chilean Foreign Minister instructed his ambassador at the Conference to warn Douglas Dillon on the effects of granting privileges to Argentina and Brazil. According to the Chilean government, it would destroy the unity of the hemisphere and the regional system.¹⁴⁷

Such environment of distrust poisoned the discussion of the committee of experts' powers and Committee of the Nine Wise Men. The dialog became was so divisive that Frondizi proposed the creation of a special emergency fund to support development projects from smaller countries.¹⁴⁸ Though the fund was never created, U.S. commitment to land reform, the promise of a thousand millions of aid for the year ending in 1962 and the creation of an emergency fund for those countries that complete Development plans before sixty days made the agreement possible. On August 17, 1961, Latin American delegations approved the Charter of the Alliance for Progress and established a powerless Nine Wise Men Committee.

Based on this Charter, Latin American governments were not mandated to submit their Development plans to the Nine Wise Men Committee and the committee could only add modifications if the receiving country allowed it.¹⁴⁹ Since the committee could not influence funds allocation, Latin American governments left the Nine Wise Men Committee completely abandoned and ignored. Unfortunately, built upon a meaningless Inter-American organization, the Alliance for Progress had no chance of becoming a true multilateral foreign aid program. Enslaved to nationalist ideology, Latin Americans themselves transformed one of the most revolutionary elements of the program into a chimera.

The United States would have never support a Committee of Nine Wise Men with capacity to determined capital allocation as this was not Kennedy's intention and Congress would have never approved such initiative. However, the Committee of Nine Wise Men could have helped Latin Americans to establish a place for political coordination and promotion of the Alliance's objectives among U.S. circles of decision-making. Without that, Latin American governments had to rely on their bilateral capacity in convincing U.S. officials to grant them aid.

This bilateralism not only weakened Latin American collective capacity to influence the making of the program, but it also created perfect conditions for the *U.S.- Americanization of the Alliance for Progress*. Without an Inter-American bureaucracy capable of influencing the making of the program, U.S. domestic struggles, perspectives on Development and short-term political objectives hegemonically informed the making of the Alliance for Progress. This evolution had serious consequences for the prospect of the program.

Due to the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress*, Latin American democracies could only rely on their bilateral capacity to access aid. In other words, their capacity to access funds would depend exclusively on their bilateral capacity to adjust and to understand U.S. domestic

struggles and aid requirements. Unfortunately, the conditions created by the Bay of Pigs and the predominance of State Department made that adjustment extremely difficult for most of them. Ultimately, the implementation of the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* became politically too expensive for most Latin American republics. How that system of collaboration influenced the implementation of the Alliance for Progress and how Latin American democracies dealt with those conditions will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter III.

Implementing an U.S.-American Alliance for Progress and the Conjunctural Problems of the Alliance for Progress

On Chapter two, this dissertation analyzed how the system of collaboration that supported the Alliance for Progress came into existence. How and why short term goals and long term goals became part of the program, even though, they were not part of its original design. As importantly, that narrative shows that the foundations upon which the implementation of the Alliance for Progress took place were not set on March 13, 1961. Instead, that moment only marked the beginning of a spiral interaction between different Inter-American dynamics.

On the side of the United States, a crucial dynamic was the confrontation between USAID and the State Department on the purpose of foreign aid. A satellite to that confrontation was Congressional reservations and anticommunist. This institution acquired special importance as the debate on the Foreign Aid bill showed how fragile Congressional support was. Those three elements dialogued with the Bay of Pigs as the catalyst and the result was the combination of short-term political objectives and long- term Development objectives. On the Latin American side, the most important dynamic was the debate around the powers of the Nine Wise Men Committee. Since Latin Americans were unable to overcome their nationalisms, they ultimately created a powerless committee, which destroyed the possibilities of enforcing multilateralism.

The interaction between U.S. understanding on the Alliance for Progress as a tool for accomplishing short and long term objectives with a powerless Inter-American committee created the foundation for the program. This foundation, or *U.S. Americanized Alliance for*

Progress, was a system of collaboration hegemonically informed by U.S. limitations, interests and understanding of Development. Moreover, without a collective body, Latin American could only depend on their bilateral capacity to address and to adjust to those limitations and interest.

This chapter explores the implementation of the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress*. It explains how and why the Alliance for Progress that grew from that foundation was politically too expensive for Latin Americans to implement. In part, those problems resulted from the combination of short-term political objectives and long-term Development goals. However, underneath that was U.S. inability to understand the true challenges of promoting Development. USAID and State Department officials were neither ideologically nor technically prepared to understand the political externalities of a Development campaign. Washington's Ambassadors had little incentive to understand those challenges since their promotion depended solely on their capacity to enforcing U.S. priorities overseas.

In May 1961, Walter Hirschman wrote *Second Thoughts on the Alliance for Progress* that recommended the Alliance's architects "recognize that with this new policy we are entering uncharted territory. Unlike the Russians, we do not have much experience in promoting social change abroad."¹⁵⁰ Though his assertions about Russia could be challenged, the implementation of the Alliance for Progress demonstrates his diagnosis about U.S. case was accurate. The U.S. officials did not understand the meaning of social change, especially if that concept was not organized around a Modernization paradigm. Indeed, they did not grasp the relationship between Development campaigns, altering internal power and political instability. As the Venezuelan and Argentinean examples demonstrate, those limitations were crucial to understand the conjunctural reasons behind Alliance's inability to promote Development.

Although Presidents Betancourt and Frondizi represented the type of leaders the Alliance for Progress expected to help, their dissimilar domestic situation provided them with different levels of political capital. Indeed, each president had a dissimilar capacity to support collective action against Cuba and enact Development legislation and an important part of the Alliance's success would depend on Washington's capacity to understand those differences. The following sections analyze the cases of Argentina and Venezuela to understand the different levels on which the program's implementation failed to promote Development and why.

Argentina, Frondizi and the Destabilizing Consequences of Mixing Development Goals with Short-term Political Objectives

When Arturo Frondizi became president in 1958, his main objective was to industrialize the economy and to transform Argentina into a Developed country.¹⁵¹ For that reason, his priorities were not monetary stabilization policies, but instead he focused on increasing energy production, improving means of transportation and innovating industrial production.¹⁵² For Frondizi, industrialization was not just as an economical issue, but was a way to reposition Argentina as a world power with an independent foreign policy. He knew that an independent foreign policy requires the ability to support it.¹⁵³

Yet, 1958 was not an opportune time and proved less than stable for the Argentinean economic and political system. Indeed, Argentina suffered rampant inflation, and industrial equipment was old and unproductive.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the federal reserves were exhausted and Argentinean foreign credit did not exist. Politically, Frondizi had to deal with a society extremely polarized around Perón's legacy and challenges from communist and socialist. Radicals, at the same time, were divided in two political parties, including Frondizi's party own *Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente* (UCRI) and *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo* (URCP).

Based on this divided situation, Frondizi became president with little political capital, but ambitious goals. However, Frondizi was hopeful that his *developmentalist* project would give him enough political capital to placate any major opposition. Armed with that confidence, Frondizi focused all his efforts on creating conditions to advance as quickly as possible in the direction of his plan. He focused on three areas: stabilizing the economy, improving Argentinean foreign credit and increasing the production of oil. While the first two areas were essential to capitalize the transformation, the third was crucial to energize the industrialization.

Due to the troubled economy, Argentina was unable to overcome these issues on its own and needed foreign capital, but foreign capital is not usually invested in an economy is falling apart. Thus, the Argentinean Minister of Finance implemented a general plan to stabilize the economy by reducing fiscal deficit and controlling the rampant inflation. Those policies would not only stabilize the economy, but it also helped Argentina build foreign credit from a reputation of fiscal responsibility. The government hoped that capital would be invested in different industrial activities, including oil production. The Argentinean government understood that industrialization required a stable supply of energy and in 1959, Frondizi signed several contracts with U.S. oil companies to exploit Argentinean oil fields.

These policies were a major success. As stabilization policies improved Argentinean balance of payments, the oil contracts translated into important savings for the national treasury. Meanwhile, some Argentinean foreign credit was restored.¹⁵⁵ In fact, Frondizi's policies were applauded inside U.S. circles,¹⁵⁶ including politicians and businessmen.¹⁵⁷ The Argentinean government planned to cultivate those relationships and during his first trip to the United States in 1958, Frondizi highlighted the advantages that Argentina offered to foreign investors.¹⁵⁸ He

even received support directly from the White House when in 1960 President Eisenhower and other U.S. officials publicly endorsed Frondizi's plan.¹⁵⁹

However Frondizi's foreign endorsements did not translate into domestic support. His stabilization plan resulted in the aggressive reduction of social programs and salaries, and turned into social unrest. In contrast to other Latin American countries, Argentina developed a middle class based on aggressive social spending and high prices of raw materials during Perón's presidency. This social agenda helped Perón's popularity throughout his presidency, but made it difficult for any future president to reduce those benefits without creating a popular reaction.

The first signs of trouble came when organizations denounced Frondizi's plan and oil contracts signed with U.S. companies. According to the Peronists, communists and socialists, Frondizi's measures not only targeted the working class,¹⁶⁰ but the oil contracts also increased Argentinean dependency on foreign powers.¹⁶¹ Communist and socialists had small political bases and were not significant actors. The Peronists, despite their illegality, controlled unions and had massive popular support. In February 1958, Frondizi sent his closest advisor, Rogelio Frigerio, to Venezuela to meet with William Cooke, Perón's representative, to sign a secret pact in which Juan Perón agreed to encourage Peronist support for Frondizi's candidacy. In return Frondizi promised to move forward with the legalization of a Peronist Party.¹⁶² By late 1958, the alliance was over and many Peronists regarded Frondizi as a traitor to Argentina.¹⁶³

Frondizi would have been able to live with this opposition because the Peronists did not have representation in Congress. Frondizi's major problem was his policies also alienated important members of his own party, the UCRI. Whereas, Representative Nelida Bigorra, leader of the internal opposition, argued that Frondizi's stabilization plan betrayed the principles of the party, resulting in complete disappointment amongst rank and file members.¹⁶⁴ Like Peronists,

socialists and communists, Bigorra and her group also opposed the oil contracts with foreign companies. She argued the wealth should remain in the hands of the state and the extraction should be entrusted to the Argentinean State Oil Company (YPF).¹⁶⁵

Fronzizi's internal opposition grew so fierce that the UCRI dissenters organized a summit at Rosario in February 1958. At the end of the meeting, UCRI rank and file members demanded a new economic policy that defended state-owned companies and independent foreign policy supported by the principle of non-intervention.¹⁶⁶ They also wanted political reforms, including the reincorporation of union leaders to the General Confederation of Workers and the end of the political persecutions, especially via the Plan Conintes. This Plan allowed Frondizi to temporarily suspend the Constitution in case of political instability.¹⁶⁷ By 1960, this plan had become extremely controversial, especially after Frondizi wanted to introduce new dispositions, including capital punishment to coerce political dissidents. Frondizi's unpopularity and political isolation only increased.¹⁶⁸

Besides political organizations, Frondizi's plan also provoked criticism from union leaders and rank and file workers, who believed Frondizi betrayed the working class.¹⁶⁹ On November 7, 1960, the problems came to ahead when the most important union organization called for a general strike to protest Frondizi's veto of a law that improved workers' pensions. Frondizi defended his decision by saying the law would have negative effects on the stabilization and higher pensions would increase inflation.¹⁷⁰

By mid-1960, the political situation in Argentina was tense. The Venezuelan Ambassador in Buenos Aires said that Frondizi's plan did not have clear support from any powerful political organization. Under those conditions, it was impossible to achieve stability. *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo* (UCRP), socialist and communist groups were in direct opposition to

Fronidzi's plan. Meanwhile, the liberals and conservatives did not have enough power to become stabilizing allies.¹⁷¹ By 1959 Fronidzi lacked support of major political organizations and his only source of political power was the military.¹⁷² However, the Armed Forces' support depended on Fronidzi position's with the Peronists and communist, which mean his remaining support would not last very long.

It is important to note that Fronidzi's opposition did not directly condemn his *developmentalist* project, but rather they criticized the strategy to achieve it. Their problem was the stabilization plan and the oil contract with foreign companies. For that reason, Fronidzi was able to outmaneuver his opposition, even after UCRI lost the senatorial elections for Buenos Aires in February 1961. However, Fronidzi could lose that ability if his *developmentalist* project failed to show result, which made the Alliance for Progress every important to Fronidzi.

According to Fronidzi's economic advisers, U.S. monetary support would be crucial for the transformation of Argentina. With funding and support from the Alliance, the Argentinean government could complete public works without creating inflation or removing capital from private companies.¹⁷³ Fronidzi believed Argentina was in an ideal position to receive funding, since his government had already demonstrated commitment to self-help.¹⁷⁴ He knew resources were limited and mounted a diplomatic offensive to secure Argentinean access Alliance's funds and influence the paradigm behind aid allocation. Regarding the latter objective, Fronidzi wanted to make sure that the Alliance for Progress was directed to capital rather that social investments.¹⁷⁵ Both objectives were achieved at Uruguayana meeting.

Yet, he had problems implementing this strategy. Fronidzi had a limited understanding of the U.S. process of decision-making. For instance, on February 16, 1961 during his first meeting with Arthur Schlesinger, Fronidzi requested the revision of the Food for Peace Program.

According to the Argentinean President, that program was problematic for the Argentinean economy since it lowered the international prices of wheat.¹⁷⁶ Although Frondizi's analysis was economically reasonable, it ignored the role that the Food for Peace Program played in legitimizing the entire foreign aid initiative with Midwestern U.S. congressmen. Frondizi refused to acknowledge that reality and he raised the issue more than once to U.S. officials even after his advisers explained the relationship between Food for Peace and Congressional support.¹⁷⁷

Frondizi was also not in a position to openly support a collective action against Cuba. In June 1961 the Argentinean president explained to Adlai Stevenson, that his relationship with the United States was extremely difficult. Due to his oil policy and stabilization measures, many accused Frondizi of being too close to the United States. At the same time, the armed forces accused the Argentinean President of being too soft on communism infiltration.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the issue of Cuba sanctions became Frondizi's biggest problem.

Sanctions against Cuba opened a new front of political and social instability.¹⁷⁹ Peronists, communist, socialist as well as members of UCRI and UCRP opposed to breaking relations with Cuba. While communists and socialists opposed them for obvious reasons, Peronists and radicals sustained their opposition on the principle of independence on foreign affairs. Frondizi's *developmentalist* plan hoped to transform Argentina into a world power based on an independent foreign policy. Break with Cuba would deprive Frondizi's government of the little political capital he had left after the stabilization measures and the oil contracts.

Even more problematic, the discussions on sanctions against Cuba encouraged the political agency of an actor with questionable democratic credentials. Although the Argentinean armed forces were one of Frondizi's last sources of political stability and one of his strongest safeguards against Peronist influence, their fervid anti-communist transformed them into a

democratic liability. This was evident with the military reaction against Frondizi after the President met with Ernesto “Che” Guevara on August 18, 1961. Frondizi and Guevara exchanged views on Kennedy’s pressure to break with Cuba and Frondizi’s repressive policies toward communist guerrilla.¹⁸⁰ The Argentines’ military reacted with great animosity to this encounter. In fact, former Interim President Pedro Aramburu, Lieutenant General of the Argentinean Army, even publicly demanded an explanation for this meeting.¹⁸¹ The army’s pressure proved so strong that Frondizi, three days after the meeting, delivered a message to the nation and explained that Argentinean foreign policy was western oriented and his government operate the way Cuba did.¹⁸²

Based these two crucial limitations, Argentina was not in the best position to take advantage of the *U.S. Americanized Alliance for Progress*.¹⁸³ Though this system of collaboration not only gave preeminence to U.S. interests and ideas, but Latin American governments could only rely on their bilateral capacity to influence it. For this reason, Frondizi’s limited understanding about the decision-making in the U.S. and his inability to become an active member in isolating Cuba endangered Frondizi’s ability to access Alliance’s funds, and the continuity of his *developmentalist* project. As the Argentinean Minister of Foreign Affairs reported to Frondizi, Cuba became an “imminent menace for the political and economic objectives achieved almost by itself and at a high electoral cost.”¹⁸⁴ On September 1961, those fears became evident during the Frondizi and Kennedy meetings.

During those conversations, Frondizi discussed Argentinean accomplishments and highlighted the sacrifices his country had made to comply with the Alliance’s requirements. He then requested ample U.S. support for his *developmentalist* project, which could be in the form of direct aid allocation and open political endorsement for specific projects.¹⁸⁵ The U.S. political

endorsement was as important because it would improve Argentinean international credit and Frondizi could negotiate better terms with European or U.S. lenders.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, an endorsement could help Argentinean access to U.S. meat markets as well as military equipment.¹⁸⁷ Consequently, U.S. political endorsement was crucial on assisting Frondizi to build domestic support and debilitate his opposition.¹⁸⁸ As the Argentinean Minister of Foreign Affairs told Dean Rusk:

If President Frondizi does not have enough elements to quickly boost Argentinean development, to increase the living standards of Argentinean workers and to show them the advantages of his program, the situation of the country can evolve in an undesirable manner.¹⁸⁹

The United States offered neither political nor economical support. Contrary to Washington's expectations, Frondizi could not promise support for a collective action against Cuba. Frondizi said his administration was under relentless attacks from the left who accused him of being an U.S satellite and from the right who criticized him for not being sufficiently friendly with the U.S.¹⁹⁰ Instead of offering support for collective action against Cuba, Frondizi suggested that enforcing the principles of the Alliance for Progress was the best mechanism to fight Castro's influence in Latin America.¹⁹¹ However, U.S officials interpreted his refusal to support action against Cuba as a lack of commitment to the Alliance for Progress.¹⁹²

The United States decided not to give Frondizi aid and this demonstrates one of the crucial shortcomings of the State Department influence in the Alliance's process of decision-making. U.S. Ambassadors had a powerful agency on the program and supervised USAID country missions by reporting how deserving a government was for receiving aid. In October 1960, Roy Rubottom Jr. was appointed Ambassador on during the Eisenhower administration after serving as an Under Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs between 1957 and 1960.

Those experiences deeply shaped his understanding of Inter-American relations and explain his interest on the defense of the principle of hemispheric collective security under the leadership of the United States.¹⁹³ Rubottom believed in the democratizing effects that armed forces, including Argentinean, had on Latin American societies, claiming they fomented stability and progress.¹⁹⁴ An example of this was his defense of Inter-American military cooperation at the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1960.¹⁹⁵ These ideas, however, were a major problem to Frondizi. They delegitimized Frondizi's argument that Development was the only path to halt communist appeal. Moreover, Rubottom's ideology induced him to build ties with Argentinean armed forces and Argentinean elites. Both groups were the most skeptical on Frondizi's commitment to fight communism. At the same time, they were Rubottom's main source of information, and therefore, Washington's source of information on Argentinean affairs.

In May 1961, Frondizi requested that Kennedy remove Rubottom from his post.¹⁹⁶ The Argentinean President argued that U.S. Ambassador was a disruptive force in Argentina politics and accused Rubottom of aiding Frondizi's opponents.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the Argentinean President affirmed that almost all military tension were in response to Rubottom's actions.¹⁹⁸ During his September 1961 meeting with Kennedy, Frondizi again requested Rubottom's removal saying that Rubottom did not share the Alliance's principles. To prove this, Frondizi explained how Rubottom played a crucial role in the military revolt lead by General Toranzo in mid-1961.¹⁹⁹

Rubottom's close connection with Frondizi's opponents was not the only problem. Even more damaging was Rubottom's inaccurate intelligence on Frondizi's capabilities to deliver on the Alliance's economic and political requirements. Likely due to the influence of his acquaintances, before the September meeting Rubottom described how the U.S.-Argentinean relationship was in progressive decline. According to his reports, Frondizi was "playing outer

limits U.S. patience crucial subject of Castro-Cuba.”²⁰⁰ Ignoring Frondizi’s political limitations, Rubottom informed the State Department that electoral setbacks as well as the influence of key advisers, such as Rogelio Frigerio, explained Frondizi neutrality on the Cuba.²⁰¹ Despite Frondizi’s political isolation and need of foreign support to continue his *developmentalist* project, Rubottom informed that Frondizi was in control of Argentinean politics.²⁰²

Regarding the September meeting, Rubottom suggested that Kennedy should emphasize to Argentinean officials the importance of Cuba and Castro.²⁰³ Predicting that Frondizi may focus exclusively on financial assistance, Rubottom said that, “ready approval of these, without careful examination of their merits or without linking them to effective political collaboration with the U.S. would have adverse consequences”²⁰⁴ Rubottom had a deep impact on the outcome of the September meetings and his reports justified the already growing U.S. distrust on Latin American commitment with the Alliance for Progress. Instead of listening to Frondizi’s needs, Kennedy highlighted the reluctance of U.S. public and Congress in supporting the Alliance for Progress.²⁰⁵ U.S. officials used that argument to justify how important a resolution against Cuba was to secure the continuity of the program. Dean Rusk explained to Frondizi how he had already testified before forty-five Congressional Committees and warned that if the Organization of American States remained silent on the issue of sanctions toward Cuba, those problems would increase.²⁰⁶ Kennedy later said that in order to request more money from Congress:

He would need to show that Latin American countries had made major efforts in land and tax reforms, mobilization of capital and effective use US funds. Western Europe and Latin America were vital areas for US and present administration was willing to make national effort to provide resources with would help Argentina and others to succeed in economic and social development, provided they did full share, including concerted effort to prevent inroads of communism from within or without.²⁰⁷

Undoubtedly, Congressional pressure for collective action against Cuba endangered the continuity of the Alliance for Progress. The real problem was that U.S. officials, probably under the influence of Rubottom's report, were unable to understand Frondizi's limitations. That ignorance was evident in the Affair of the Cuban letters. During September meetings, U.S. officials provided Frondizi with some letters that Cuban exiles supposedly extracted from the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires. Those letters contained information describing Castro's participation in organizing and financing communist guerrillas in Argentina. The State Department certified their authenticity and had its Ambassador in Buenos Aires encourage Frondizi to use them to justify Argentinean support for a collective action against Cuba.²⁰⁸

Although Argentinean authorities promptly found the letters were fraudulent, those letters still created a new set of problems. On the one hand, it justified and encouraged armed forces to pressure Frondizi to break relations with Cuba. On the other, the letters introduced unneeded political tension between extreme left and extreme right, and resulted in institutional and social chaos.²⁰⁹ While Argentinean society was polarized before, this affair not only endangered the continuity of Frondizi's *developmentalist* project, but also made it more difficult to work with the United States.²¹⁰ By 1961, the Alliance's funding was the only alternative Frondizi had to show quick results and capitalize economically and politically his *developmentalist* project. Yet, since the U.S. participation on this affair was evident, Frondizi had even less chance of supporting collective action against Cuba. If he proceeded on that path, Frondizi would be incapable of defending himself from accusations imperialistic subjugation. And, as a result, the political legitimacy of his *developmentalist* project based on economic and political independence would have been destroyed.²¹¹

The Cuban letters transformed the United States and Kennedy into a political liability. In fact, responding to this affair, the Argentinean President decided to cancel a national speech praising the Alliance for Progress.²¹² At the same time, President Frondizi sent a personal letter to Kennedy explaining that an alliance between Argentina and the United States could not be cemented on political impositions.²¹³ The environment that the Affair of Cuban Letters created in Argentina is clear in this cartoon titled “Attention to the female thief”²¹⁴



Image 2. The image shows Frondizi and Kennedy hugging as the statue of liberty robs Frondizi. Many Argentinean circles believed Frondizi’s friendly relationship with the United States was a waste of time and any aid would sacrifice Argentinean interest.

Despite the general reaction to the Affair of the Cuban letters, Washington still tried persuading Frondizi to support collective action against Cuba because U.S. analysts considered

Argentina was fundamental to isolating Castro.²¹⁵ Despite Frondizi's warnings, U.S. officials delusionally believed that President could comply with the Alliance's political and economic requirements. For them, Frondizi's refusal was partially due to the influence of Rogelio Frigerio, but was also a strategy to extract greater economic assistance from the United States.²¹⁶

Since Frondizi needed support from the Alliance for Progress and Kennedy needed Argentinean support the collective action against Cuba, both presidents tried to solve their differences. Ultimately, they could not address each other needs and the relationship between Argentina and the United States became fruitless. Months after the September meetings, Presidents Kennedy and Frondizi exchanged several letters in which Kennedy requested Frondizi support the Colombian proposal to exclude Cuba from the OAS.²¹⁷ During late 1961, Kennedy met with President Frondizi two times and applied direct pressure. On November 26, 1961 the first meeting took place in Trinidad where Frondizi expressed his reservations with Washington's strategy to isolate Cuba because it threatened hemispheric unity.²¹⁸ On Christmas Eve 1961, Kennedy and Frondizi met again in hopes of convincing one another.

During those meetings, Kennedy and Frondizi were pragmatically discussed Cuba. The OAS already agreed on a Meeting of Consultation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about sanctions against Castro. Frondizi again expressed his opposition to discussing sanctions at the continental level because there was not unanimity.²¹⁹ Without continental unity, he argued, the discussions would produce serious political difficulties in countries like Chile and Brazil.²²⁰ Describing his own situation, Frondizi explained that his government would have to deal with serious domestic problems regardless of the position he adopted.²²¹ Frondizi also shared his concerns regarding pressures from the Argentinean armed forces for condemning Cuba, highlighting the role that U.S. intelligence sources played on stimulating them.²²² During the

meeting, Kennedy explained his own difficulties dealing with the U.S. public and Congress. He mentioned how Congress may not authorize funds for the Alliance for Progress, unless the OAS approved sanctions against Cuba. In response to that, Frondizi said that at least U.S. opposition did not threaten the continuity of the government as the Argentinean one did.²²³

Kennedy requested Frondizi to propose a resolution that Argentina could support in one last attempt to build a common ground.²²⁴ In early January, Frondizi sent his proposal that supported continental unity based on the idea of representative democracy and condemnation of any sort of intervention of one country on other countries affairs, such as financing of guerrillas. Notably, the proposal did not provide for the application of sanctions, but relied exclusively on severance of diplomatic and commercial relations to stop foreign intervention. Frondizi again justified his opposition to sanctions on the internal difficulties that the exclusion of Cuba would create. He argued such discussion would unify political opposition on the belief that sanctions had been adopted under U.S. pressure.²²⁵ Those political sectors, he explained, included communists and Peronists. The United States, naturally, did not accept Frondizi's proposal.

With mutual misunderstanding and discord, on January 22 1962 Foreign Ministers of the countries members of the Organization of the American States met in Punta del Este. The objective was to discuss Cuba's expulsion from the organization. As Argentinean officials warned, those discussions had serious effects among unstable Latin American democracies and the prospects of the Alliance for Progress.

Punta del Este (1962) and Cuba's Exclusion

Similar to August conference, delegations were divided on two groups. The first group included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, which opposed mandatory sanctions against Cuba and rejected its exclusion from the OAS. On the opposite side in favor of Cuban expulsion as well as mandatory economic and diplomatic sanctions were Central America, the Caribbean and the United States. In the middle was Haiti, which worked with both groups to find a conciliatory resolution. While the first group justified their decision on the principle of non-intervention and lack of domestic support for such resolution, the second group focused on pleasing U.S. constituencies and securing the Alliance for Progress.²²⁶

Although many countries, including Venezuela, had active communist guerrillas, the United States centered its argument on the weakening effect that moral sanctions would have on Kennedy's position to request more funding for the Alliance for Progress. This argument gained popularity amongst U.S. constituencies even before the Conference begun. On January 8, 1962, the *New York Times* published an editorial about "the Cuban Problem and OAS," which criticized Latin American republics for accepting Alliance's aid, but refusing to push for sanctions against Cuba.²²⁷ Likewise, *Life Magazine* encouraged Kennedy to act unilaterally if the OAS did not support economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba.²²⁸ Though Latin Americans could dismiss those editorials as propaganda, they certainly could not do the same about Congressional actions.

Days after OAS planned to meet in Punta del Este, Congressional leaders expressed support for strong action against Castro. Congressman Selden (D- Alabama), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent a letter to McGeorge Bundy requesting "a very strong line, with economic sanctions and a break in

diplomatic relations with Cuba, even if it has to be done without the support of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.”²²⁹ Congress was so interested that it sent an observation committee to the conference and was in charge of lobbying for a resolution of Cuban sanctions. The committee did not remain idle and congressional leaders, such as Representative Merrow (R-New Hampshire), met with different Latin American delegations, explaining their interest on a strong resolution against Castro and communist subversion.²³⁰

The Congressional Committee was a key actor in the conference’s progression and became important in strengthening the U.S. Representatives’ position. Latin Americans observed firsthand the relationship between sanctions against Cuba and future appropriation for the Alliance for Progress.²³¹ Congressional role was so significant that Dean Rusk requested Senator Wayne Morse to postpone the Committee’s return to the United States until the conference reached a resolution.²³² This, however, had unintended consequences. Because of Congressional presence at the meeting, U.S. delegates did not have the freedom to negotiate in the most divisive elements, including breaking diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba and its expulsion from the OAS. In fact, Dean Rusk rejected a resolution sponsored by Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti and Mexico that admitted the incompatibility between Cuba and the Inter-American principles because it did not contain those proposals.²³³

By the end of the conference, Washington was able to pass a resolution that excluded Cuba from the OAS with fourteen votes (Haitian support was obtained through an aid package.) and six abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico). Even though this resolution satisfied the United States, its political consequences would be a disaster for Latin American democracies as well as for the Alliance for Progress.²³⁴ Two days after the OAS adopted the resolution, the State Department started receiving alarming reports that described the

destabilizing effects that the Punta del Este caused on all the nations that abstained. Though the reactions varied in the countries, in the best cases, including Bolivia, Brazil and Chile, the resolution bolstered fears on the continuation or expansion of U.S. aid. In the worst cases, such as Argentina and Ecuador, it encouraged rightist sectors in the armed forces to severe relations with constitutional presidents, creating ideal conditions for military coups.²³⁵

The reactions caused some U.S. officials to criticize the strategy followed at the meeting and many criticized how that resolution alienated key Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. According to Samuel Belk, staff member of the National Security Council, the Punta del Este weakened U.S. position in the western hemisphere since it built a majority of the wrong kind.²³⁶ Belk described how U.S. officials arrived to Punta del Este assuming that the only way to make it meaningful was by excluding Cuba from the OAS. In surrendering to Congressional delegation pressure and “hardliners nations,” he argued that the State Department sacrificed the possibility of ample support for a future measure. This was especially true, Belk argued, because all Latin American governments shared the idea that Cuban system was incompatible with the Inter-American system.²³⁷ Belk criticized the actions, noting Lincoln Gordon was the only official who took a firm stand to bring the United States and the ABC (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) positions together.²³⁸ A month after the meeting, Kennedy echoed Belk’s argument in speech to Department of State officials:

we got on the road to Punta del Este really in April or May. Then, we permitted Colombia to make the position, which rather pleased us because they were out front, but then we got carried away without knowing really deciding whether we wanted unanimity or sanctions . . . My view was that we would argue for sanctions and settle for unanimity.²³⁹

Even though Kennedy supported to Belk's argument, his administration did not have an alternative to placate Congressional and domestic pressure. The exclusion of Cuba was the price Latin American governments and the White House agreed to pay for securing financial continuity of the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy was eager to demonstrate his Cold Warrior credentials, especially after the Bay of Pigs, and it is possible that even without Congressional and domestic pressure he would have wanted sanctions against Castro. Yet without such pressure, Kennedy would have had more freedom for developing a strategy along the lines that Belk suggested. Nevertheless, Argentina suffered from the consequences of the sanctions.

Fronidizi and the Aftermath of the Punta del Este Conference

As Frondizi predicted to Kennedy, forcing the Argentinean government to take a public position on Cuba triggered domestic demonstrations that included all relevant actors in Argentinean politics.²⁴⁰ The armed forces were first one to react. As soon as the news about Frondizi's abstention became public, they demanded diplomatic relations with Cuba.²⁴¹ For the armed forces, Frondizi's abstention was ideological and it represented the first step to pro-communist positions.²⁴² Meanwhile, the new U.S. Ambassador, Robert McClintock, was not helpful.²⁴³ McClintock, former Ambassador in Cambodia and Lebanon during the 1950s, was not particularly attached to the Alliance's principles.²⁴⁴ Rather, McClintock's main interest was in protecting U.S. interests overseas. In accomplishing that, McClintock saw the Argentinean military as essential for safeguarding democracy and U.S. objectives. In fact, the U.S. Ambassador believed that if Frondizi outmaneuvered the army the outcome will not benefit the U.S and damage the military's push for democratic ideals.²⁴⁵

Meanwhile Frondizi had no allies to resist the pressure of the army. By February 8, 1962, that pressure was so unbearable that Frondizi broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Although the Argentinean government had resisted breaking with Cuba, the effects of its decision were beneficial to Frondizi in the short-term. Once Frondizi officially broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, the military reduced their interference in politics.²⁴⁶ At the same time, it helped Frondizi improve his relationship with the United States. State Department immediately instructed McClintock to inform Argentinean military that the United States favored an understanding with Frondizi.²⁴⁷ McClintock also endorsed Argentinean request for financial aid and on February 19 1962 Washington quickly authorized \$150 million “in light of political urgency outlined.”²⁴⁸

President Frondizi, though, was not satisfied with U.S. involvement in the institutional crisis. In fact, just days after the crisis was over, he wrote a personal letter to Kennedy asking him to take “measures that can put an end the activities of persons in any way connected with the United States who, by the most varied, profuse means, are engaged in the agitation.”²⁴⁹ Despite his anger with the United States, Frondizi could not distance himself from Washington. Without the Alliance’s funding, Frondizi could not win the election scheduled for March 18, 1962.

Unlike previous elections, Peronists were now allowed to participate and for first time Frondizi would have to compete against Perón’s legacy on the ballot. Indeed, the exclusion of Peronist from the political process was not an option anymore. During his conversations with the Felix Luna, Argentinean historian, Frondizi explained he feared that if Peronists were disfranchised they would take the battle in the street.²⁵⁰ While the Peronists were banned from publicly campaigning, they proved to be powerful grassroots movement, especially due to their participation in numerous unions, including General Confederation of Labour. By the month of the election, Peronists were in an ideal position to capitalize on Frondizi’s problems.

As Frondizi explained to McClintock, breaking with Cuba provided Peronists with perfect electoral ammunition.²⁵¹ Peronists accused Frondizi of being an U.S. puppet based, not only on the oil contracts, but also on Frondizi's surrender to Washington's foreign policy objectives. The Peronists also could use Argentinean discontent with Frondizi's stabilization policies to reinforce their denunciation of U.S. imperialism. USAID officials encouraged most of those initiatives as requisites grant more financial assistance. As the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires explained few days after the election:

The Peronist gains were due in large part to labor's dissatisfaction with Frondizi's economic policies. Austerity measures under US- backed stabilization program have hit the average man's pocketbook hard . . . All of this contrast with the many social welfare benefits and special privileges enjoyed by labor under Peron. Disenchanted with Frondizi, labor had nowhere to turn except to Peronista candidate.²⁵²

If Frondizi's policies would have created support from other groups then his situation may have not been so dire, but this was not the case. Besides alienating Peronist and leftist groups, Frondizi's economic policies also alienated the business community and conservatives, which resented Frondizi's inflexible credit policies and the slow rate of industrial production.²⁵³ Those sectors also criticized Frondizi's reluctance to break with Castro and reduce Peronist influence.²⁵⁴

Rejected by the left and right, Frondizi understood that only a transfer of capital could save his presidency. For that reason, he met with Ambassador McClintock to request immediate financial assistant. Frondizi explained that he had trouble campaigning on interior provinces, because local governments and officials had been unpaid for months.²⁵⁵ Frondizi's desperation was evident on his words to Ambassador McClintock in late February 1962: "If you can save me before March 18, I will start working for President Kennedy on March 19. I will show the

world how far Argentina has gone to meet objectives of the Alliance for Progress”²⁵⁶ Despite McClintock’s endorsement, several bureaucratic issues delayed the immediate issue of the \$20 million that Frondizi requested to stabilize the Argentinean peso.²⁵⁷ It is difficult to know if that aid could have changed the electoral result. In any case, aid did not arrive and Peronists won not only several interior Provinces, but also the Province of Buenos Aires. This result marked beginning of the end to Frondizi’s government and his *developmentalist* plan.

Peronist triumph had unwelcomed consequences for Frondizi and the United States. On one hand, *golpistas* elements inside the Argentinean military assumed a “told you so” position around which they unified the opposition against the President. It is important to remember that the Argentinean military was as much anti-communist as anti-Peronist. As a result, Peronist triumph, rather than communist threat, became the military’s main argument to overthrow Frondizi. For the United States, the Peronist triumph was also troublesome. As the U.S. Ambassador reported to the State Department, not only did the Peronists support public spending, but they also opposed to foreign capital, including Frondizi’s oil contracts.²⁵⁸

Frondizi had few options in this environment. If he prevented Peronists to become elected officials there would be a general strike, but if he did not the military would react.²⁵⁹ The United States became Frondizi’s only source of political power. In late March 1962, Frondizi explained to McClintock that Washington was only thing capable of preventing a military coup.²⁶⁰ By that moment, though, Frondizi was already a political cadaver, especially after intervening in those provinces where Peronists had won. Rogelio Frigerio, one of Frondizi’s closest advisors, explained that intervention as a strategy to win some time and prevent a military coup. For that reason, Frigerio argued, Frondizi did not invalidate the election.²⁶¹ This strategy backfired. It failed to reduce military pressure, but also destroyed any possibility of an alliance between

Peronism and UCRI. On Monday March 19, the Peronist coalition “62 organizations” called for a massive protest to defend the electoral triumph and Argentina became ungovernable.²⁶²

The U.S. Embassy reacted by designing mechanisms to influence Frondizi’s replacement instead of saving the constitutional regime.²⁶³ McClintock happily communicated to the State Department that the military held him in high esteem since he had refused to intervene in Frondiz’s favor.²⁶⁴ Although McClintock did not have a strong interest in keeping Frondizi in power, the State Department encouraged him to persuade the military to refrain from ending democracy. On March 23, 1962, George Ball wrote a memorandum to McClintock: “It is our strong desire and policy that Frondizi not rpt not (sic) be forced to resign by military and nothing should be done that might anyway encourage the military to take such action.”²⁶⁵ McClintock did not agree, rather he believed the U.S. should distance itself from Frondizi and refrain from announcing a restriction of aid to Argentina in case of a coup.²⁶⁶ Those funds, McClintock argued, should be used politically and secretly to influence the new *de facto* government.²⁶⁷ With neither domestic nor international support, Frondizi was completely isolated and on March 29, 1962 the military ousted him.

The key issue surrounding the coup was recognition. For U.S. officials, recognizing the new regime tested their commitment to the Alliance for Progress’ principles and despite McClintock suggestions, the State Department was not completely behind recognizing the new government. If the United States did not condemn the situation in Argentina, the military in other countries could be encouraged to follow a similar path, including Loeb in Peru, Stewart in Venezuela and Bernbaum in Ecuador. If the United States condemned Argentina, it would be more difficult to influence the new government.²⁶⁸ This situation became more troublesome when some media outlets blamed U.S. officials for Frondizi’s ousting by analyzing the

connection between forcing the President to break with Cuba and his overthrowing.²⁶⁹ On April 1, 1962 the *New York Mirror* demonstrated this in the following cartoon:²⁷⁰



Image 3. This cartoon is a clear criticism of American agency in Frondizi's fall from power. Frondizi (middle) as communists and Peronists destabilize him with Richard Goodwin providing the final touch to Frondizi's falling.

Political signals from key Latin American republics eased the transition from paralysis to action to Washington's benefit. Betancourt quickly condemned the coup, announcing that Venezuela would not recognize the new regime. As time went by, it became clear that Betancourt's reaction was politically and not ideologically inspired. On April 10, 1962, he transmitted a message to Kennedy stating that his position was not irreversible. As Betancourt explained, his action was in response to the fear of a coup in Venezuela.²⁷¹ Later, the U.S embassy in Caracas confirmed such fears, adding that Betancourt developed a poor impression on Frondizi after Punta del Este Conference.²⁷²

It quickly became evident that Betancourt was not alone in his willingness to support the post-Fronidizi regime. On April 17 McClintock reported, all Latin American Ambassadors in Buenos Aires, including the Chilean and the Brazilian, believed that their respective government should continue relations with Fronidizi's replacement.²⁷³ McClintock added that the military gave stability to Argentina and "only points up to now which military will definitely intervene are threats of increase in Communist strength or of a return of Peronist in power. In this, as I have previously pointed out, their line of policy is identical to ours."²⁷⁴ On April 18, 1962, the United States recognized Guido's government.

Fronidizi's removal from office and Kennedy's recognition of his successor drastically altered the Alliance for Progress. Immediately it encouraged the Latin American public and Development experts to question the Alliance for Progress with many insisting that the program was merely imperialistic. It also empowered U.S. criticisms to the program, especially from those who did not share the axiomatic relationship between democracy and Modernization. Only a few officials understood the relationship between the Alliance's requirements and Fronidizi's ouster. Inter-American skepticism became an important issue as parties start exploring alternatives to improve the Alliance for Progress, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

The combination of short-term political goals with long-term development objectives was crucial in explaining the Alliance's inability to promote Development, as many authors discussed previously. Yet, that relationship cannot be understood solely on the political use of aid to favor certain countries, but the problem is due to the consequences of that combination. As the example of Argentina demonstrates, the combination of short and long-term objectives deprived the host country from political capital. Without that capital, the government not only is unable to advance further on the reforms, but it cannot stay in power.

With the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress*, the program became too politically costly to be implemented due to the demands of democracy. However, the combination of short and long-term objectives was not the only reason why the Alliance for Progress failed to be satisfactorily implemented. Countries with the capacity to support self-help and the isolation of Cuba still had problems accessing aid. This reflected another conjunctural reason why the Alliance for Progress was unable to promote Development. These problems, as Venezuela demonstrates, are related with USAID limitations.

Venezuela, Betancourt and the Birth of an Ideal Partner

When Rómulo Betancourt became President of Venezuela in 1959, his main objective was establishing a stable Venezuelan political system. As most Latin American countries, Venezuela did not have a long history of electing presidents because most rulers came from the armed forces. In fact, Betancourt was only the second elected president in Venezuelan history and he became the first to complete his term. To protect Venezuela from another military dictatorship, Betancourt aimed to establish a social structure that satisfies most political parties. As soon as Marcos Pérez Jiménez resigned, Betancourt sent a letter from New York requesting the members of his party organize a truce with other organizations.²⁷⁵ That truce included Betancourt's party, *Acción Democrática*, COPEI (Christian Democrat) and *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD), and became the basis for the Declaration of Minimal Principles and Programs for Government, known as the *Punto Fijo* Pact.

The Venezuelan political parties agreed on supporting major reforms, including the creation of a welfare structure and land reform. *Punto Fijo* also endorsed state participation in economic affairs, especially the extraction of oil and minerals.²⁷⁶ This pact became essential to

Betancourt's administration after he won the election of 1958. Differently than Frondizi's plan, Betancourt's project became a multi-partisan enterprise, thus providing Betancourt with an enormous political capital to implement it. Betancourt then approached to the United States for financial support, but this proved complicated.

Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Venezuela's latest dictator and Betancourt's predecessor, was a close U.S. ally in the fight against communism. As a testimony of his services, in February 1954 Pérez Jiménez received the American Legion of Merit award. Betancourt perceived this relationship as problematic because a close association with the United States could alienate many of his supporters, but Betancourt had to convince U.S. officials that, even though he was different than Pérez Jiménez, he still could be was a trustful ally.

Significantly, his years exiled in the United States gave Betancourt an understanding of U.S. politics and its relationship with the Cold War. He understood how important it was to improve the image of his government with U.S. constituencies. For that reason, Betancourt orchestrated a massive media campaign, putting important U.S. journalists on payroll. Those journalists highlighted how Betancourt was not only the best, but the only viable alternative to communism.²⁷⁷ This campaign was very successful. In fact, one of those articles made it to Congressional Records.²⁷⁸

Meanwhile, Betancourt also invested time cultivating good relations with several Congressmen. One of them was Representative Charles Porter (D-Oregon), who became one of Betancourt closest allies. Porter not only defended Betancourt's government, but also encouraged the White House to expel Pérez Jiménez so the latter could be prosecuted in Venezuela.²⁷⁹ That support became more explicit after Congressman Porter visited Venezuela. Once he returned to the United States, Porter told the press that Venezuela was becoming an

exemplar democratic nation.²⁸⁰ Porter also became a major advocate of the Betancourt Doctrine and requested the White House isolate Trujillo, one of Betancourt most powerful enemies.²⁸¹

Venezuelan public relations campaign would have been useless, if Betancourt's actions did not offer concrete examples of those claims, which led to Betancourt overtly distancing himself from Cuba. During his inauguration speech in August 1959 at the 5th Meeting of American Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister Arcaya said, “[a]lthough there are some common points between Cuba and Venezuela, our country has its own national and international policy, and it does not belong to any alliance for Cuba.”²⁸² Similarly, in 1960 Betancourt refused to attend the Conference of Underdeveloped Countries because it was mostly communist countries were attending.²⁸³

In contrast to Frondizi, Betancourt distanced himself from Cuba without being called a U.S. puppet or creating domestic instability. Unlike other countries in the region, Venezuelan-Cuban animosity did not result from U.S. imposition, but from their own bilateral dynamic. The origin of that animosity was Castro's decision to replace Venezuelan oil with Soviet oil in mid-1960. Although some Venezuelan sources understood this measure as a justification to nationalize U.S. companies,²⁸⁴ Betancourt considered this action a direct attack to Venezuelan national interests²⁸⁵ because Venezuela exported 70,000 barrels per year to Cuba.²⁸⁶

Betancourt's well cultivated image, connections in the United States and his distance from Cuba had a positive impact on Washington. In late 1960, Betancourt faced a serious political crisis when the Minister of Foreign Affairs transferred public employees to the private sector, where labor conditions were worse.²⁸⁷ U.S. newspapers as well as the State Department officials readily blamed communist infiltration for the social unrest.²⁸⁸ Similarly in January 1960, Serafino Romualdi, Executive Secretary of the AFL-CIO Inter-American Affairs Committee,

asked Betancourt to become the image of non-communist unionism in the region.²⁸⁹ Congressional leaders, likewise, were pleased with Betancourt.

While reporting to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator George Aiken (R-Vermont) insisted that Rómulo Betancourt demonstrated that Latin American leaders were capable of achieving goals and encouraged the U.S. to extend ample support to Betancourt's government.²⁹⁰ More explicitly, Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) wrote a personal letter to the Venezuelan President:

Your statesmanship and foresightedness of the economic program that you are seeking to carry out in Venezuela made such a favorable impression upon me that when I got back to Washington, *I appointed myself as an unofficial ambassador of good will on behalf of the things you are trying to do for Venezuela* (emphasis added.)²⁹¹

Betancourt was in an ideal place to become a model ally for the Alliance for Progress. *Punto Fijo* gave Betancourt a political basis with ample support among the major Venezuelan political parties and since *Punto Fijo*'s economic principles were similar to those proposed by the Alliance for Progress, the self-help measures had support from Venezuelan ruling class. Betancourt also was not competing with the legacy of a populist leader, like in Argentina. As a result, *Acción Democrática* and COPEI could afford stabilization measures without seriously endangering the institutional stability.

After the Bay of Pigs, Betancourt also had enough political capital to be a relevant actor in the struggle against Castro. By 1961 diplomatic relations between Cuba and Venezuela were at their lowest point. Castro's identification with the Soviet Union not only affected Venezuelan oil markets, but also increased Betancourt's skepticism toward the Cuban revolution.²⁹² Such skepticism was not ideologically, but politically driven. Since early 1961, Betancourt struggled with communist and non-communist guerrillas that attempted to remove him from power.²⁹³ This

struggle convinced him that Cuba represented not only a threat to the U.S., but also to the whole hemisphere.²⁹⁴ On November 11, 1961 Betancourt not only decided to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, but become an active member in the struggle against Castro.²⁹⁵ For instance, Betancourt helped Cuban exile leaders associated with social democracy to finance their newspaper called *Bohemia Libre*.²⁹⁶ In the months leading up to the January 1962 Meeting of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Betancourt played a major role lobbying Latin American presidents, including Frondizi, to support sanctions against Cuba.²⁹⁷

Unlike other Latin American presidents, Betancourt could satisfy the Alliance's political and economic requirements without fully depriving his government from political capital. Being aware of this advantage, Betancourt did not hesitate to use them in Venezuela's favor. After Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, Betancourt sent a letter describing how he addressed the Venezuelan Congress announcing his commitment to the program.²⁹⁸ Betancourt also instructed the Venezuelan Ambassador in Washington to make the arrangements so Senator Morse could read that letter to the U.S. Senate. Morse happily complied.²⁹⁹

Placing pistachios next to the scotch, Betancourt was not the only one benefiting from this relationship, but Washington also gained. More than any other Latin American president, Rómulo Betancourt could help Kennedy to demonstrate that the Alliance for Progress was an effective tool to fight communism in Latin America. Based on those conditions, Betancourt and Kennedy developed a truly symbiotic relationship with the Alliance for Progress as their common denominator. For this reason, the Venezuelan President became extremely influential in the making of the program. An Argentinean report from Washington explained, "a bureaucrat from the Inter American Bank said that it is possible to feel the physical pressure from the White House to favor Venezuela."³⁰⁰ Betancourt's influence was so significant that the Argentinean

Embassy in Washington was concerned that Frondizi's refusal to support aggressive action against Trujillo could alienate Betancourt. According to them, a troubled relationship with Venezuela could endanger Argentinean possibilities to access foreign aid. As the Argentinean Ambassador in Washington transmitted to Frondizi:

It is necessary to understand that today Betancourt is the most important Latin American men amongst American circles, both in the White House and the State Department. *Every Latin American specialist that surrounds President Kennedy is Betancourt personal friend.* As a demonstration of their friendship, Kennedy requested Betancourt to name the American Ambassador in Caracas (emphasis added.)³⁰¹

The influence of Betancourt was obvious when Kennedy asked him to name the U.S. Ambassador in Caracas. Like Indiana Jones, Betancourt chose wisely. Differently than Rubottom, Teodoro Moscoso was truly committed to the Alliance for Progress' Development objectives. Born to a pharmacist businessman in Puerto Rico, Teodoro Moscoso spent most of his youth in both the United States and Puerto Rico and gained national prominence in Puerto Rico as the director of Operation Bootstrap. Although the Development accomplishments of this program are still a source of controversy,³⁰² this experience provided Moscoso with a unique insight into the intrinsic problems that those campaigns confront. Moscoso was the perfect complement to Betancourt's already established connections with Congressmen and U.S. bureaucracy. Betancourt could not have been better placed to implement the Alliance for Progress, or at least, that it seems.

U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress and USAID Country Missions

Although Rómulo Betancourt was in an ideal place to take advantage of system of collaboration that the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* created, the Venezuelan government had problems accessing aid and building a stable domestic situation. Those problems were not due to a lack of political capital or inability to comply with the Alliance for Progress' economic and political requirements. Rather, they were an expression of USAID's intrinsic limitations promoting Development with the Alliance for Progress. Betancourt's problems accessing aid unveils that the Alliance's problems for promoting Development were greater than combining long-term development objectives with short-term political aspirations.

In December 1961, *Acción Democrática*, Betancourt's party, needed to select its candidate for the 1963 presidential elections. The party was divided on three factions: left, Old Guard and Old Opposition. At that moment, Old Opposition was the ruling faction of the party and as such, they promoted Raúl Ramos Giménez as Betancourt's successor. Contrary to expectations, the Old Guard obtained the majority of votes for the General Convention. Arguing that Old Guard triumph resulted from fraud, the Old Opposition intervened on several provinces and removed local Old Guard leaders. The conflict between the Old Guard and the Old Opposition escalated and each faction expelled the other from the party, holding separate conventions in 1962. Although Betancourt tried to mediate in the conflict, he finally sided with the Old Guard, his faction. In response, the Old Opposition created a new party called ARS in early 1962.³⁰³

Although the majority of rank and file members stayed in *Acción Democrática*, the division of the party had serious consequences for *Punto Fijo*. Different from other groups that left the pact, the ARS had vital representation in the Venezuelan Congress. As a result, when

they left *Acción Democrática*, Betancourt lost the legislative majority to enact and finance key legislation, like land reform.³⁰⁴ Such legislation was fundamental for his political consolidation and unless he could obtain U.S. aid, his political project would be over before he expected.³⁰⁵

Betancourt took advantage of the Alliance's predominant bilateralism and used his connections to increase Venezuelan access to foreign aid. Ambassador Moscoso became a crucial ally and wrote several letters to the U.S. Department of Agriculture requesting immediate support for Venezuela's land reform. Moscoso assured them that the agricultural attaché in Caracas would help lay the basis for the program, even if it was too overwhelming for him.³⁰⁶ Moscoso was also essential in defending the Venezuelan case for receiving aid. He not only defended the participation of the Venezuelan State on economic planning, but Moscoso argued that the Alliance's future depended on Washington's willingness to support Betancourt.³⁰⁷

Moscoso's reports and Betancourt's good standing in U.S. circles likely influenced the State Department to choose Venezuela as one of the two Latin American countries Kennedy visited on late 1961. According to the State Department, Kennedy's trip to Caracas had two objectives, including showing Venezuelans that Presidents Kennedy and Betancourt had a solid partnership and help Kennedy get Betancourt's perspective on the Alliance and other hemispheric issues, especially Cuba and British Guiana.³⁰⁸ The meeting gave Betancourt an ideal platform to explain his problems and to secure prompt and effective foreign aid.

With Kennedy in Venezuela, the meetings circled around two areas of collaboration, namely, economic and political. On the economical side, Betancourt requested an increase on the Venezuelan quota for exporting crude oil and residual exports to the United States, and asked Kennedy to lobby amongst U.S. commercial banks to postpone payments of the Venezuelan debt for 1962.³⁰⁹ On the political side, both presidents focused on Cuba. Betancourt not only

expressed his willingness to support a collective action against Cuba, but he also, encouraged Kennedy to give more support to Castro's opposition.³¹⁰

Kennedy enthusiastically endorsed Betancourt positions on Cuba, echoing his support for collective action in the context of the OAS. Yet, he was less decisive about Betancourt's economic petitions. Although he promised to study a possible increase on residual exports, Kennedy explained that increasing crude oil quota was not a possibility.³¹¹ Regarding Venezuelan debt with U.S. commercial banks, Kennedy agreed on transmitting his good intentions. However, he did not promise a concrete action.³¹² At the end of the meeting, Kennedy was much happier than Betancourt with the outcome of the trip.

For U.S. officials, Kennedy's trip was a complete success and it reaffirmed the belief that the Alliance for Progress was working.³¹³ Not only did Kennedy visit two democratically elected presidents, Betancourt and Lleras Camargo, but he also visited two countries with strong a commitment with the program. Both Venezuela and Colombia, two stable democracies, showed a strong commitment with Kennedy's policy toward Cuba. It could not have gone better for him.

From Venezuela's perspective, the visit had mix results. Betancourt's biggest accomplishment was Kennedy's political endorsement. Unlike Nixon's time, the Alliance for Progress created a favorable U.S. image with Venezuelans. This was demonstrated by the warm welcome Teodoro Moscoso and other U.S. officials received in Caracas.³¹⁴ Kennedy's endorsement provided Betancourt with important political capital that he could use to confront his growing opposition.³¹⁵ However, those accomplishments had little importance if they were not accompanied with financial aid.

By early 1962, Moscoso's actions and Kennedy's visit had not translated into actual economic aid. Once the Punta del Este Meeting of 1962 concluded, Betancourt contacted

Moscoso, who was recently appointed Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and urged him to accelerate the allocation of loans to Venezuela.³¹⁶ Contrary to Betancourt's expectations his letter did not impress much on U.S. bureaucracy and by mid-February, the United States still had not allocated new resources to Venezuela. Betancourt became frustrated and started a prolific epistolary exchange with other friends, including Serafino Rumualdi.³¹⁷ Betancourt was so desperate for aid that warned Moscoso that “if things do not move fast, despite your support, I will discuss it at the presidential level.”³¹⁸ As Betancourt explained, he could not fight communist influence only through violent means. He needed to show Development results.³¹⁹

As a faithful ally, Moscoso continued lobbying and even though he convinced U.S. commercial banks to postpone repayments for Venezuelan loans, this activity was insufficient for Betancourt.³²⁰ In May 1962, Betancourt contacted Kennedy directly and complained about the slow pace that U.S. bureaucrats dealt with loan allocations. While recognizing his own mistakes in preparing loan applications, Betancourt made clear those loans were fundamental for the continuity of Venezuelan democracy.³²¹ Betancourt repeated those arguments a few weeks later, to Moscoso's replacement, Allan Stewart. Betancourt explained how he had sacrificed his own political capital by supporting the Alliance for Progress. Despite that commitment, Betancourt complained, he had no results to show for the upcoming elections.³²²

By mid-1962, Betancourt's connections with U.S. high-ranking officials and clear anti-communist credentials had proven useless for accessing aid. To understand why this happened, it is important to remember the Alliance for Progress' premise that foreign aid should be allocated to countries with the capacity to absorb it. In order to establish such capacity, recipient country must design a Development plan stating objectives and a realistic schedule to achieve them. That

plan was the basis for different Development projects and the respective loan application. Each loan application required an explanation on the usefulness and impact of each project.³²³

Consequently, though the State Department was influential and Ambassadors relevant in negotiating short-term loans, USAID officials were essential for the Alliance's implementation. Besides encouraging self-help and design Modernization plans, USAID field personnel controlled the distribution of loans.³²⁴ Additionally, USAID country mission wrote the technical reports that informed other branches of aid allocation, including the Inter-American Development Bank and Ex-Im Bank. Therefore, the collaboration between USAID country missions and Latin American governments were crucial.

Collaboration was not something that came automatically because Latin American and U.S. officials believed that the Alliance for Progress represented their respective aspirations and ideologies. Latin Americans considered the Alliance for Progress was a continuation of Operation Pan America, and CEPAL's discussions on Development. Differently, U.S. officials understood the program as the implementation of the new approach to foreign aid. Those differences were very important. Modernization theory and Developmentalism had dissimilar understanding of Development and the means to achieve it.

For that reason, since the Alliance for Progress lacked of an Inter-American body capable of building common ground between those differences, another consequence of the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* was the unilateral imposition of USAID variables. The USAID country missions were the sole judge behind the worthiness of a Development project and Latin American governments had to adapt to the conditions USAID required. Unfortunately, and assuming that Latin American governments was willing to please USAID country mission in every regard, the collaboration was still impossible.

Before 1964, USAID country missions did not have clear criteria to allocate funds.³²⁵ While some general guidelines gave preference to those countries nearest to “take off” conditions, other assigned more importance to those countries enforcing self-help.³²⁶ By 1964, USAID officials did not even have a clear definition of self-help. There was not clarity whether it was capital investment from local resources, fiscal and economic policies, social and economic reforms, economic growth rates or democratic practices.³²⁷ Moreover, Latin American republics had little incentive to work with USAID country missions. They were not only poorly staffed, but often bypassed by U.S. Ambassadors on deciding aid allocation. Thus, USAID missions had failed to inspire confidence on local authorities.³²⁸

Since Latin American governments were unable to establish fluid relationships with USAID country missions, aid allocation was always delayed.³²⁹ Those delays frustrated and alienated the recipient country because they simply could not rely on the essential funding to maintain a minimum level of domestic support.³³⁰ Many presidents also resented how USAID country missions ignored Latin American experience and ideas for their own Development. Since Betancourt was in the most ideal position to take advantage of the Alliance’s funding, his example is paradigmatic.

In mid-1962, Venezuela requested a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank for a housing project. While Betancourt blamed IDB and its requirements for cost breakdowns on the housing units, Inter-American Development Bank argued that the Venezuelan organization in charge of the project was unprepared for administering low-cost housing contemplated under both loans.³³¹ This conflict escalated to where Betancourt defended his experience implementing housing programs and condemning U.S. tutelage over loan application.³³²

As Moscoso explained to Kennedy, problems between aid grantors and recipient countries were extremely common and the Administration had to “stimulate enough compromise on both sides to get the project moving.”³³³ It is very likely that USAID country missions were right on questioning the ability of many Latin American organizations to prepare aid applications. However, the cost of that inefficiency was considerably lower than dealing with a military coup. This rationale explains another major limitation of USAID, namely, they did not understand the political essence of Development.

In mid-1962, the Alliance bureaucracy issued a report discussing the inability of Latin American governments to promote Development. This report highlighted six factors with the most important ones being the lack of human capital, the incapacity to properly prepare Development plans and the absence of national support for those programs.³³⁴ USAID officials recommended that host governments emphasize social justice and show quick results.³³⁵

As the examples of Argentina and Venezuela demonstrate, such suggestions were not realistic to increase political capital and to overcome the opposition from democratic and non-democratic forces. Both case studies prove the biggest menace to the Alliance for Progress was not lacking human capital, but the inability of democratic regimes to stay in power and resist pressure from those groups that reject the readjustment of the structure of power that any Development campaign requires. This is why prompt aid allocation is politically so relevant. As Eduardo Frei mentioned, people do not support a government that complies with foreign requirements. Instead, populations need to see the effects of the Development campaign in order to support the transformation. The government leading the transformation is absolutely incapable of upsetting the opposition from development without that support.

Moscoso was among the few who understood the political nature of Development and explained to Richard Goodwin the political challenges of the Alliance for Progress in the following terms:

The urgency of the measures necessary to benefit the great Latin American masses will displace the privileged minorities and the governing classes in order to make possible the changes in the structure . . . The old governing classes can no longer offer a solution. And the problem lies in which social classes and interest are going to manipulate the money and the reforms.³³⁶

Elite will reject transformation on the structure of power that threatens their position in society. This opposition will increase proportionally to the level of egalitarian principles that inspired the Development campaign. Due to the combination of short and long-term objectives were prevalent in the case of Argentina, the opposition did not have an apparent role, but was there nonetheless. In that case the main opponents to Frondizi's industrial transformation were the interests associated with the agro-exportation model.³³⁷ Although Frondizi's *developmentalist* project offered Argentinean elite an opportunity to consolidate their position in society, they preferred to sell grain instead of making cars.

Venezuela was another matter because the opposition was different. As Robert Alexander explained, Venezuelan business community was not "an entrenched rural oligarchy". Even though many of them held substantial rural properties, they also had interest in the urban areas. This included manufacturing, commerce and banking, which meant they were willing to accept land reform with proper compensation and even expected some economic benefits for increasing "peasant" salary. Moreover, Perez Jimenez's nepotism with government contracts alienated important member from the business community.³³⁸ Eugenio Mendoza, a leading figure in the

most powerful economic group in Venezuela, participated in the provisional government that in 1958 replaced Perez Jimenez.

A transformation project with business support will likely alienate sectors close to the working class, and this happened in Betancourt's case. He not only appointed businessmen as member of the cabinet, but he also opposed Cuba and supported the United States. From late 1960, communist guerrillas became Betancourt biggest challenge and the actions of those guerrillas were not the real problem, but their effect on the army was. Although the Venezuelan armed forces remained fairly under control, the increasing communist agitation encouraged them to take more active role. As Latin American history testifies, armed forces with active role in politics almost always threatened the continuity of democracy. This was evident in mid-1962.

Less than a month after Betancourt wrote a letter to Kennedy requesting prompt allocation of aid, he had to face a massive communist revolt in Puerto Cabello. Although this revolt lasted only one day, it seriously eroded Betancourt's relationship with the army. This revolt not only openly had Castro's support,³³⁹ but it resulted in heavy losses for the Venezuelan armed forces.³⁴⁰ The right leaning elements inside the army started demanding strong action against all communist groups without distinction. Betancourt explained in a conversation with Ambassador Allan Stewart that he could not afford another communist revolt without provoking a military reaction and he did not want to get in a position similar to Frondizi.³⁴¹ Few days later, Ramón J. Velazquez, Presidential Secretary, told Stewart his reservations regarding Betancourt's capacity to resist pressure from rightist factions in the military.³⁴²

Betancourt canceled civil liberties in responding to the pressure from the armed forces. By decree, he suspended the communists and Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), another leftist party, from Congress. As part of the same agreement with the army, Congress adjourned

on July 6th, 1962 and did not meet again until 1964. During that period, the Venezuelan government with the collaboration from the Venezuelan's Supreme Court declared illegal both organizations and prosecuted the members from both groups.³⁴³

Betancourt's actions only created more problems. Since Communist Party and MIR became illegal, many of their cadres moved into non-electoral strategies to achieve power. By 1963, guerrillas were nearly out of control. On June 4, 1963, U.S. intelligence reported Venezuela was the place "where Castro sympathizers have perhaps a stronger toe-hold than in any of the other states, [and it] may present an early test case for the new Krushchev- Castro approach."³⁴⁴ This impression was likely reinforced after a branch of the Armed Forces of National Liberation broke into the United States Army Mission to Venezuela. The rebels disarmed all occupants, stole their weapons and lit the building on fire. This attack was detailed in the following picture published by *El Mundo* on June 6, 1963.³⁴⁵



Image 4. “Historical Photograph.” It shows an officer of the U.S. Army walking around in his underwear after the attack on the United States Army Mission. Picture taken by Héctor Saldoval working for *Últimas Noticias*.

Venezuelan intelligence reported that the main support for Venezuelan guerrillas came from Cuba via Colombia and Mexico.³⁴⁶ As a result, in February 1963 Cuba returned to the top of the agenda during Betancourt's his visit to the United States. During the visit, Bentacourt said the OAS should approve a new resolution isolating Cuba, similar to one during the Cuban Missile Crisis.³⁴⁷ Indeed, the communist guerrillas and Cuba were Betancourt's major political liability and forced him in a difficult situation. If Betancourt repressed excessively, his government could be accused of violating the constitution, which was problematic because the Venezuelan Congress met last in June 1962. Conversely, if Betancourt did not suppress with enough force, he would risk a coup by losing confidence from Venezuelan army.³⁴⁸ This seemed likely given that the Dominican Army ousted President Bosch in September 1963. Addressing that risk, Ambassador Stewart reported to State Department:

if present trend of military coups continues and Venezuelan elections results in choosing of president without clear cut mandate and lack of or barely workable majority in Congress, there is grave danger of coup.³⁴⁹

Betancourt was in urgent need of foreign aid to show results, win elections and secure the continuity of the project. Development results offered the best counterbalance to the negative externalities of the struggle against communist guerrillas. Fortunately for Betancourt, Venezuela was too important to fail. After Kennedy's trip to Venezuela, Washington officials knew that the destiny of the Alliance for Progress and Venezuela were tightly integrated.³⁵⁰ For instance, in July 1962 the U.S. Embassy in Caracas reported:

Due new policies toward Latin America, visit President Kennedy and flourishing oil production [*sic*]. Venezuela, the key country in Latin American today's fight against Communism- Castroism, now showing signs winning the battle [*sic*]. I do not think this opportune time give slightest indication our support weakening or permit belief be encouraged that Betancourt can make it on own from this time onward [*sic*]. He not quite well off [*sic*].³⁵¹

Washington worked hard to save Betancourt and the White House implemented a double strategy to strengthen his government. First, the U.S. embassy, including its military mission, deployed all their influence to convince Venezuelan armed forces to favor the constitutional path.³⁵² The State Department instructed his Ambassador to lobby Venezuelan officers about how important Betancourt was for the United States.³⁵³ Secondly, the Kennedy administration provided Betancourt with the required financial support to implement *Punto Fijo*. In November, 1962, Kennedy and Betancourt signed the Agreement to Guarantee Investment, which guaranteed private investment in Venezuela.³⁵⁴ Thus, Washington extended unparalleled aid to Venezuela, as shown in the following chart.

Table 1. Total aid per capita allocated through the Alliance for Progress (*)

Country	Population by 1961	Total support through Alliance for Progress 7/1/61 to 2/28/1963	Total support per capita. (in dollars)
Argentina	20,951,000	\$165.0 millions	Around \$7.87
Brazil	74,949,000	\$289.0 millions	Around \$3.85
Colombia	16,487,000	\$163.8 millions	Around \$9.93
Mexico	39,107,000	\$164.0 millions	Around \$4.19
Venezuela	7,870,000	\$112.6 millions (**)	Around \$14.30

Sources:

- Population: ECLAC. Data bases and Statistical Publications
<http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas&idioma=i>
- Funds: "Funds made available to Latin America under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress. Period of Operation: 7/1/1961 to 2/28/1963, p. 42" *Kennedy Library, Papers of Teodoro Moscoso, Series 2, Box 2, Folder Report on the Alliance for Progress by Juscelino Kubitschek, 6/63*

Notes:

- (*) I did not include Chile, since support for this country was larger than other countries as a result of the relief package passed by Congress after the earthquake of 1960. Such amount of aid had no relationship with the Inter-American making of the Alliance for Progress. Further information on the position of Chile and the Alliance for Progress could be found in Taffet, Jeffrey, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*, (Routledge, New York) 2007
- (**) According to other sources, assistance to Venezuela was larger. However, I did not use those sources because they lack the corresponding information for other countries. As a result, the methodological comparison impossible:
 - a. 238.4 millions- including loans from BID and World Bank by 1962. "Informe del embajador argentino en caracas, Fernando Ricciardi al Ministro de Relaciones exteriores General de Brigada (RE), D. Juan Carlos Cordini" *Archivo Chancillería Argentina*, Caja AH/ 0247, Area productora: Departamento de America de Sur, Fecha 1962, Serie: 47/ America del Sur, Tema: Alianza para el Progreso. S. Topografica: C75, A62
 - b. 304,781,000, including loans contracted and loans application pending by February 1963. "Memorandum from William H. Brubeck, Executive Secretary to Ralf Duncan on the Briefing book for President's Betancourt's visit to Washington, February 19- 21, 1963, February 15th, 1963. President Betancourt's visit to Washington, February 19- 21, 1963, Position Paper Alliance for Progress Program in Venezuela, February 6, 1963" *Kennedy Library, Paper of John Kennedy, National Security File*, Box 193, Folder Countries, Venezuela, Subjects, Betancourt briefing book 2/ 63, Tabs I, II, III

United States support was essential for Betancourt's survival, since it neutralized the possibility of a military coup. Despite their ability and organization, communist guerrillas were in no real capacity to occupy the government. U.S. aid also secured the required financial support for implementing social reforms. Without that financial support, Betancourt would have been

unable to demonstrate that civilian governments were more successful addressing the population needs than military ones. This paved the way for Betancourt to become the first elected president to complete his period in Venezuelan history.

However, Venezuela's happy ending did not represent a triumph of the Alliance for Progress and its capacity to promote Development. Instead, it was the result of the symbiotic relationship that the United States and Venezuela established since the beginnings of the program. On one hand, the United States provided Betancourt with the necessary economic and political capital to stay in power and to implement *Punto Fijo*. On the other hand, Betancourt's ability to comply with the Alliance's political and economic objectives helped the United States to prove that Alliance for Progress could succeed.

Venezuela established a symbiotic relationship with the United States as a result of several conditions that were uncommon not only to other Latin American democracies, but to most of the Third World. Betancourt's project had strong support from major Venezuelan parties, but also the Venezuelan president had an unparalleled understanding of the U.S. process of decision-making. Due the active communist guerrilla in Venezuela, Betancourt could politically afford condemning Cuba without triggering popular demonstrations or risking accusations of being an imperial puppet. Betancourt's connections with high ranking U.S. bureaucrats, including Moscoso, also allowed him to become one of Washington's most valuable assets. This allowed Betancourt to bypass the limitations associated with USAID and the *Punto Fijo* that dominated Venezuelan society until the *caracazo* in early 1990s. However, believing that Betancourt's success proved that the Alliance could work, it would be equal to argue that because W. E. B. Du Bois went to Harvard in 1888, every African- American could do it.

The Alliance for Progress, Argentina, Venezuela and the Little King Syndrome

The Alliance's implementation failed as a result of the combination of a feeble common ground, Inter-American political developments and ignorance regarding the political nature of Development. The experimental nature of the Alliance and the new approach to foreign aid provided the whole initiative with an extremely weak starting point. Not all U.S. officials and branches of the government were committed with the program's paradigm. Moreover, neither U.S. nor Latin American officials shared the same understanding of the Alliance for Progress. While USAID officials understood the program as a way to implement Modernization theory, Latin American governments believed it was a continuation of CEPAL's paradigm. Modernization and Developmentalism had different origins and contradictory elements. Those elements created a weak foundation for the implementation of the Alliance for Progress and the political progression of Inter-American affairs unveiled the consequences of that weakness.

Due to post-Castro political demands, the United States developed a double strategy to address communist influence in Latin America. While the Bay of Pigs would remove the immediate threat, the Alliance for Progress would prevent another one to appear. However, the failure of the Bay of Pigs empowered voices inside the State Department that never agreed on separating Development goals from short-term political goals. Those voices directly spoke to Congressional skepticism about the effectiveness of the Alliance for Progress to protect U.S. interest overseas. The Kennedy administration then turned the Alliance for Progress into a Frankenstein that combined short-term political as well as long-term Development goals, which had disastrous effects on domestic Latin American politics.

The original design of the Alliance for Progress established mutually exclusive objectives. The Alliance's legitimacy with Latin American constituencies depended on its

detachment from the daily Cold War confrontations or Latin American democracies would have to confront domestic opposition against a new imperialist program. Dean Rusk, in fact, explained that one of the most important features of a multilateral foreign aid program was to shield the host country from accusations of political dependency on U.S. foreign policy objectives.³⁵⁵

Perhaps even worse, Latin American republics never assumed the responsibility that a multilateral foreign aid program required. By creating a powerless Nine Wise Men Committee, Latin American republics resigned to the only Inter-American body capable of counterbalancing to U.S. understanding of the Alliance for Progress. The predominant bilateralism from Latin American inability to overcome outdated nationalism created perfect conditions for an *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress*. This, in turn, empowered U.S. priorities and limitations in the making of the program and fed the U.S.-incapacity to understand the political challenges of promoting Development in Latin America. Executive, State Department and USAID officials were neither trained nor interested on understanding those challenges and for that reason, did not understand the consequences of combining short-term political objectives with long-term Development goals.

Instead of focusing exclusively on Development objectives, fragile Latin American democracies were forced to comply with self-help measures and stand against Cuba. This combination was fatal for many democracies. U.S. demands to isolate Cuba depleted Latin American governments from the necessary political capital to enforce self-help measures and remain in power. Latin American democracies were unable to advance self-help measures, including tax reforms, land redistribution and balance budget, while publicly supporting collective action against Cuba without endangering their continuity. This is best demonstrated

with Frondizi's case. As a result of satisfying the Alliance's requirements, Frondizi alienated land based elites, Peronists, socialists, communists and even his own party.

The Alliance for Progress not only introduced social and political instability, but also it accentuated the differences between those capable of surviving the pressure. Since the allocation of aid was tied to Latin American capacity to satisfy goals, the Alliance for Progress rewarded more stable democracies with a better understanding of the U.S. process of decision-making and political capital to address Washington's interests. Conversely, less stable democracies with little knowledge on the U.S. political system and less political capital were left alone. They were forced to confront the negative externalities of complying with the Alliance's requirements without aid.

As the case study of Venezuela testifies, even democracies able to satisfy the Alliance's requirements and well-connected to U.S. policymakers had problems receiving aid. Based on the Alliance's design, the collaboration between USAID missions and recipient governments was essential to determine how relevant a project was to accomplish Development. Unfortunately, the Alliance for Progress lacked of an Inter-American bureaucracy where U.S. and Latin American officials could build a common ground around their ideological differences on Development. For that reason, the recipient government had to adjust, without a voice, to the conditions and requirements that USAID unilaterally defined.

Without clear a criteria on what self-help means and the little incentive local governments had to work with theses missions, the collaboration was nearly impossible. Moreover, since USAID country mission did not understand the political dimension of Development, the allocation of aid was always delayed. This contradiction is the only possible explanation for the \$2.5 billion of undisbursed aid that Perloff discussed.³⁵⁶ Yet, some

exemplars, such as Presidents Betancourt and Lleras Camargo, became too important to fail. They bypassed USAID limitations and were able to consolidate their projects. However, these were exceptions and not the rule.

In sum, since U.S. bureaucracies were unable to understand the large amounts of political capital democracies required to promote Development, the implementation of the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* became politically too expensive for Latin American democracies. The implementation of this program failed because it demanded more than what Latin American democracies could deliver. *Little Prince* by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry explains this problem well. After Little Prince questioned the King's authority, because despite the King's command, it was necessary to wait couple of hours before seeing the sunset, the King responded:

One much required from each one the duty which each one can perform...Accepted authority rests first of all on reason. If you ordered your people to go and throw themselves into the sea, they would rise up in revolution. I have the right to require obedience because my orders are reasonable.³⁵⁷

Although the United States was not a king and Latin Americans were not servants, the implementation of the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* followed a similar path. U.S. inexperience promoting Development and its limitations in understanding its political pitfalls condemned Washington to work as a bad king that introduced instability to already weak Latin American democracies. As a result of the *Little King Syndrome*, the Alliance for Progress became a political liability for these democracies. It is no coincidence that there were less democratic governments in Latin American after the Alliance for Progress come into existence.

Not surprisingly, starting in 1962, Latin American governments proposed radical transformations to the program to increase its effectiveness. They believed one of the main

problems behind the Alliance's shortcomings was the lack of Latin American agency in the making of the program. Such discussions coincided with Washington's own reflections regarding the future of the Alliance for Progress. Those discussions are crucial to observe the structural contradiction that prevented the Alliance from promoting Development. How that process took place and how those intentions interacted with each other will be analyze next.

Chapter IV.

Saving the Alliance for Progress: Structural Contradictions and Colliding Recipes

By 1962, key figures in the United States and Latin American were dissatisfied with the Alliance for Progress. While most Latin American governments struggled to meet the program's requirements, U.S. bureaucrats became increasingly disappointed with the lack of results in Latin America. However, neither party was prepared to abandon the program. They believed that with the proper adjustments the program could work as intended. By 1961, U.S. and Latin American officials began addressing the Alliance for Progress' conjunctural problems, but did so without acknowledging its structural contradiction. Consequently, the solutions did little in improving the U.S.' understanding of Development campaigns and likewise failed to improve Latin America's ability to achieve Development through on economic growth and democracy. Ultimately, these changes created the conditions that led to the Alliance for Progress's end as a multilateral and revolutionary foreign aid program.

Latin American Reservations and Demand for More Participation

After a year of implementation, most Latin American republics were not pleased with the Alliance. Continual conflicts with USAID country missions and aid delays encouraged Latin American republics to designate two prominent men in proposing solutions to the problems. The chosen ones were former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek and former Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo, who were selected from their experience implementing the program. As former presidents, they had first-hand understanding on the problems governments

faced when trying to comply with Alliance requirements. Moreover, both men belonged to a generation of politicians whose background transformed them into ideal allies of the program.

In 1963 two separate reports were issued after a year of research and both identified the lack of Latin American input as the central weakness. Kubitschek's opening statement stressed:

. . . my observations have led me to believe that the imperfect understanding prevalent in certain circles of the United States Government in relation to the other countries of the hemisphere continues to limit its vision and to influence its conduct. Between the auspicious statements of the President of the United States and the execution of the program of the Alliance for Progress lies an almost frozen expanse . . . ***In lieu of a vital dialogue of the Americas, a sort of discouraging monologue has been going on*** . . . Its administrators [from the Alliance] have remained entangled in the same traditional difficulties that have hitherto obstructed the kind of broad and thorough-going collaboration that would be capable of advancing hand in hand with the people of Latin America on the way to prosperity (emphasis added.)³⁵⁸

According to Kubitschek, the absence of an Inter-American bureaucracy and the program's lack of concrete objectives and obligations created a "vicious circle: lack of decisive measures at the one pole [the United States] precisely because the other [Latin America] had not yet complied with its part of the obligations."³⁵⁹ In other words, Kubitschek argued, the program not only lacked clear common ground, but also it did not have an efficient Inter-American bureaucracy capable of developing it.

For that reason, Kubitschek proposed the creation of an Inter-American Development Committee, which would enforce joint deliberations and decisions among the participating countries. This committee, he argued, would create ideal conditions for the Alliance's success. It would reinforce the principle that national Development should be the result of regional development. Moreover, it would create ideal conditions for the actual *Latinization* of the program, which Kubitschek defined as:

. . . *the participation, at the level of decision, by the Latin American countries* is a centralized, dynamic, and active directing agency—seems to us the first great step to be taken to correct those present evils which offer such great hindrance to the execution of the program (emphasis added.)³⁶⁰

If the committee existed during the previously examined case studies then it potentially could have corrected many of Alliance's limitations. It could have created a specific bureaucracy sensitive to the challenges resulting from Development campaigns. Instead of relying on the State Department's communication network, U.S. policymakers could have assigned importance to previously ignored issues, such as Frondizi's situation or destabilization consequences. Moreover, an Inter-American Committee could have increased the Alliance's character as a Latin American effort. This feature could have helped recipient governments to build political capital amongst Latin American constituencies. As Venezuelan diplomacy expressed in 1963, the absence of an Inter-American bureaucracy encouraged a linear identification of the program with the United States.³⁶¹ Many U.S. officials shared some blame for this. In fact, the State Department criticized those officials for the little efforts publicizing the Alliance as an Inter-American project. Instead, U.S. officials often referred to the Alliance's programs as a U.S. aid projects.³⁶² These issues made it difficult for Latin American governments to shield themselves from accusations of imperialistic puppetry or political dependency.

It is possible to see that after two years of difficult implementation, based on Kubitschek's conclusion, Latin Americans realized that without an Inter-American bureaucracy, the *Latinization* of the project was impossible.³⁶³ Many Latin Americans also understood that without the *Latinization* of the program, the prospects of receiving timely aid were slim. Notably Manuel Seoane, Special Representative of the OAS at the meeting on the Alliance for Progress in Argentina, described how essential Latin American input was for introducing flexible loan

requirements and establishing a “good faith loans” principle.³⁶⁴ Seoane argued, those countries with enough moral credit should be granted economic assistance and could postpone the fulfillment of the requirements for later.³⁶⁵

Seoane’s arguments reflected a broader Latin American understanding as Betancourt was not the only president who complained about USAID requirements. Lleras Camargo argued that U.S. demands for self-help were mainly responsible for rejecting many programs. According to him, Latin Americans believed the demands were a U.S. excuse to maintain the same aid policy that always existed.³⁶⁶

Programming, they [Latin American critics of the Alliance for Progress] said, is a new science, requiring information about ourselves that we do not have and teams of experts that we lack; furthermore, *it will postpone foreign aid indefinitely* (emphasis added.)³⁶⁷

Lleras Camargo argued that the Alliance for Progress’ *Latinization* was not only important for lowering aid requirements, but also to counterbalance bilateralism as the predominant path to obtain aid. Lleras Camargo blamed not only the lack of an Inter-American bureaucracy, but also Congress. This institution, Lleras Camargo argued, preferred bilateralism since “that bilateral procedure will bring the most political and even economic advantages by measured investments, calculated in accordance with the national interest of the financing country.”³⁶⁸ This tendency, he argued, had seriously relegated those countries that uplifted the principles of the program to secondary positions.

Following the same argument, Lleras Camargo also argued that the *Latinization* was essential to reduce Washington’s pressure over must-be-programs that distorted the whole foreign aid initiative. The Colombian President argued those recommendations transformed the Alliance for Progress into a new expression of U.S. intervention on countries’ local politics.³⁶⁹

Lleras Camargo asserted that those programs reinforced reactionary nationalistic discourse to oppose the reforms the program promoted.³⁷⁰

Indeed, both reports were precise on identifying crucial conjunctural problems, but failed to offer solutions to the problems. They placed faith on a powerful Inter-American Committee capable of counterbalancing U.S. influence and Congressional opposition. Two elements may explain this confidence. Namely, most Latin American governments had an enormous trust on Kennedy and the Kennedy Administration quickly endorsed the idea.

Since the Alliance for Progress' first announcement, Washington supported the creation of an international institution capable of assisting Latin American governments with Development planning and so the Kennedy Administration welcomed the creation of an Inter-American Committee. In February 1963, Kennedy made that clear to Betancourt during his visit to the United States.³⁷¹ The Inter-American Committee offered major advantages to Washington. Not only would it create better conditions for coordinating U.S.-Latin American policy, but Washington to stress U.S. limitations and satisfy Latin American demands. This, in turn, would help United States and Latin American jointly discuss common strategies for accessing sources of funding.³⁷² In addition, such a body would reduce U.S. responsibility to bilaterally apply standards of performance.³⁷³ U.S. officials identified with the Alliance's principles, such as Arthur Schlesinger, openly endorsed the *Latinization* of the program believing it would transform a mostly U.S. program into a real regional effort. This, they hoped, would increase Latin American interest and commitment and, therefore, it would help the program to succeed.³⁷⁴

Though it appeared that the Alliance for Progress could become a multilateral foreign aid program with a decentralized process of decision-making, the late 1963 creation Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ICAP or CIAP in Spanish) did not produce those

results. The United States and Latin American had different ideas about the committee's responsibilities. While Latin American governments conceived CIAP/ICAP as a place for fund allocation decision and lowering loan requirements, U.S. officials believed that CIAP/ICAP should seek extra-hemispheric cooperation and foment an exchange of information.³⁷⁵ An effective Inter-American Committee, U.S. officials argued, would attract European capital and encourage Latin American authorities to take responsibility for the program's success.³⁷⁶

While Latin America governments expected to empower CIAP/ICAP along the lines of the Kubitschek or Lleras Camargo report, the United States did not. In a few months before the creation of CIAP/ICAP, David Bell explained to President Kennedy that there was an agreement in the government of the United States that:

. . . contrary to President Kubitschek's concept; no U.S. funds should be turned over to the CID [Committee for Inter-American Development- tentative name for CIAP]. There is also an agreement that the CID should not be expected to make recommendations to the United States (or any other donor), on the total amount of aid it should make available, or on the specific allocation of aid funds to any particular country.³⁷⁷

Since U.S. officials were clear in explaining this, CIAP/ICAP never captured the interest of regional Development experts. Eduardo Mayobre, son of José Antonio Mayobre, noted that famous economists, including Raúl Prebisch and José Antonio Mayobre, declined CIAP/ICAP's chairmanship. They realized that CIAP/ICAP would not have a real agency in the Alliance for Progress and preferred continue their work at the United Nations and CEPAL/ECLAC.³⁷⁸ Describing the general feeling around CIAP/ICAP, Mayobre remembered how after Latin American nations nominated Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, which Paul Rosenstein-Rodan commented, "they nominated the best of the second class."³⁷⁹

The general disappointment with CIAP/ICAP not only impacted Latin American intellectuals, but extended to Latin American presidents. Since the Alliance for Progress had failed repeatedly to develop an Inter-American character, Latin American presidents with a distant relationship with the United States abandoned the program completely. Brazilian President João Goulart was one of them and notably in a November 1963 speech at the IA-ECOSOC, he completely ignored the Alliance for Progress. He instead encouraged Latin American leaders to work at the United Nations in order to alter global inequalities.³⁸⁰

CIAP/ICAP was a stillborn institution and the last chance to enforce the Inter-American spirit of the program ended as well. The responsibility for this outcome was shared. Latin American Development experts and presidents could have built power from the organization. However, their refusal to participate on an irrelevant institution is not hard to understand as well. Unfortunately, the powerless CIAP/ICAP encouraged Latin American distrust in Washington's true intentions to support a revolutionary foreign aid program. The powerless CIAP/ICAP was the last justification Latin Americans needed to abandon the program, especially after Kennedy's assassination.

If Latin Americans understood Kennedy's limitations and motivations to reject a powerful CIAP/ICAP, they might have chosen another path. As this Inter-American analysis of the Alliance for Progress demonstrates, each party was neither equipped nor willing to understand the other party's situation. Latin Americans did not comprehend that the Kennedy administration had a different set of motivations to revise the Alliance for Progress. Those sets of motivations for Latin American and U.S. problems were not complementary, but contradictory. The origins and effects of that collision will be analyzed in the following section.

U.S. Reservations and the Alliance for Progress

When Latin American governments appointed Presidents Kubitschek and Lleras Carmargo to evaluate the Alliance for Progress, U.S. officials started their own discussions to improve the program. Those officials did not start this process out of own their initiative, but in response to growing domestic opposition to the Alliance for Progress.

Contrary to what the Administration would have hoped, Congressional reservations with the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961 did not disappear. Many Congressional leaders remained opposed to long-term borrowing beyond the annual basis.³⁸¹ Moreover, fiscal conservatives in Congress never stopped demanding tight control over fund allocation, clear deadlines and evidence of progress.³⁸² Those demands not only show the level of Congressional skepticism with the new approach to foreign aid, but also demonstrate how ignorant Congressional leaders were about the limitations Latin American democracies faced. That ignorance was the natural consequence of Congressional limited knowledge and communication with Latin America.

Congressional sources, unlike the Kennedy administration, for information consisted of personal friends and Congressional commissions, which were limited in scope and precision. For example, the late 1961 Congressional mission that visited Latin American focused mostly on rural areas.³⁸³ These Congressmen acquired a first-hand approach on the problems of those in needed, but missed the location where decisions were actually made. As the Argentinean experience demonstrated, Congressional leader would have acquired a better understanding of the Alliance's limitations by listening Frondizi about the building political capital than visiting shanty towns and lamenting how poor people lived.

Congressional leaders developed a clear understanding on Latin American poverty, but a limited on challenges of Development. Congressional position toward loans for balance of

payments exemplifies this. In August 1962, the Subcommittee on American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations prepared a report discussing the operation of the Alliance for Progress that was especially critical toward loans for balance on payments.³⁸⁴ Those loans, according to the Subcommittee, only subsidized consumption for middle and wealthy classes.³⁸⁵ Those loans, it argued, should be granted openly and with the precondition of demanding structural reforms that solve those problems in the long term.³⁸⁶ As Frondizi and Betancourt's examples demonstrated, those loans were not requested for subsidizing consumption, but in many cases were for federal employees salary or stabilizing national currency. Those loans did not necessarily translate into Development, but they created conditions for it, especially political stability. However, even Senator Morse, a strong supporter of the Alliance for Progress and Latin American democracies, endorsed the report.

Those ideas were not just the result of Congressional ignorance, but also an expression of their distrust on Latin American Development policies. Since early 1962, several members from Congress started voicing their concerns with the expropriation of U.S. companies, especially in Brazil.³⁸⁷ In response, Senator Hickenlooper introduced a major amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill that would stop aid to any country that did not provide fair compensation to U.S. citizens and companies after expropriation.

The White House openly questioned this amendment, under the argument that it could disrupt the Alliance for Progress and empower communist and nationalistic criticisms to the program. Moreover, it could discourage Latin American governments to pursue policies with the potential to affect U.S. citizens, like land reform.³⁸⁸ Although Congressmen listened to Presidential criticism, the Hickenlooper Amendment on its original form was attached to the Foreign Aid bill in 1962.³⁸⁹

Unfortunately, U.S. bureaucratic problems did not discourage Congressional skepticism about the Alliance for Progress. Due to their inexperience promoting Development, U.S. officials had serious problems coordinating different agencies involved with the Alliance for Progress as was evident during Congressional budgetary discussions. At those hearings, officials described how their section was vital, while others could be suitable to cuts.³⁹⁰ This practice, naturally, resulted in cuts for all sections. By early 1963, this political ataxia remained prevalent. David Bell, USAID administrator, suggested that the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy “should consider how to materialize the Departments so as to get the whole Administration effectively behind the foreign aid legislation.”³⁹¹

Creating even more difficult conditions for the Alliance for Progress, after a year and a half, the new approach to foreign aid failed to capture the interest and commitment of the U.S. public. According to an August 1962 Gallup poll administered, the U.S. public placed “too much foreign aid” second out of six topics in order of importance for public discussion.³⁹² The public’s skepticism encouraged Congressional leaders to transform foreign aid and the Alliance for Progress into an electoral issue. Representative Passman (D-Louisiana) was exemplar in this regard.³⁹³ Representative Passman, according to Argentinean Foreign Service informed, became well-known blaming foreign aid as a crucial factor in the federal deficit.³⁹⁴

Congressional concerns, reservations, misinformation and even ideology would have been secluded among a minority, if the Alliance for Progress would show some positive results. Since that was not the reality, Congressional skepticism thrived and became contagious. Teodoro Moscoso explained to President Kennedy, “[t]he *number* and *quality* of projects will have to be materially increased if we are to be in a position to approve projects for AID funding at the rate of \$500 million in FY 1963 as proposed in legislation now before Congress.”³⁹⁵ Since most of

the available resources were underused stemming from Latin America's inability to meet loan requirements, U.S. bureaucracy had problems convincing Congress for more funding.

By mid-1962, the Alliance for Progress and the entire foreign aid program was facing a troublesome political scenario. Even before the hearings for the budget for FY1963 commenced, some officials started expressing concerns about the effects that Congressional opposition could have on continuing the program.³⁹⁶ In June 1962, Walt Rostow argued that unless the Alliance for Progress showed some drastic results, the program would have problems surviving.³⁹⁷

Executive officials started exploring alternatives to make the program more accountable and acceptable to Congressional leaders and the U.S. public. The officials built the alternatives around the same practices that sustained U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress. They tried to strengthen the Alliance for Progress with neither understanding the problems of Development nor listening to those in charge of implementing it. This led to Mann Doctrine in March 1964.

Confronting Congressional Opposition and Conceiving Mann Doctrine

Walt Rostow was one of the first officials who discussed the need to reform the Alliance for Progress. According to him, it should focus on only a few ideal countries.³⁹⁸ As he explained to Fowler Hamilton, “[f]rom our old common experience in the target business, we both know that concentration of effort is the key to a breakthrough; and a breakthrough is what we badly need.”³⁹⁹ In August 1962, Chester Bowles presented a proposal suggesting a new basis for aid allocation and argued Congressional reservations and public detachment were consequences of the programs' lack of coherent procedure with the loans, grants and technical assistance.⁴⁰⁰ Bowles proposed ignoring political elements in aid allocation and placing all the attention on economic needs, will and capacity to implement policies.

Bowles proposed to classify countries in four categories based on a series of questions that assess government honesty, popular support and its capacity to create a favorable environment for private investment. Out of those four categories the United States should focus on those countries with fewer resources, but were “demonstrating outstanding competence and courage in mastering their own resources for rapid economic and social progress.”⁴⁰¹ Those countries included Colombia and El Salvador, and excluded Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. The latter, Bowles argued, had enough internal resources, but were not using them properly.⁴⁰²

Bowles report is relevant because it demonstrates the limiting effects Modernization theory had on U.S. understanding of the challenges the Alliance for Progress’ implementation. As Michael Latham argued, “[t]he problems [of the Alliance for Progress] appeared serious, but, focused on cultural values rather than contested resources or class structure, U.S. planners simply attempted to instruct Latin Americans about the benefits of modernization would provide for all”.⁴⁰³ Ian Roxborough was more explicit in this regard:

One of the great weaknesses of much modernization theory was not that it was ahistorical, but rather that its account of the actual historical development of the west was a misleading and mistaken one . . . The historical record simply does not match the picture of Western development one gleans from the works of modernizations theorist. That view of Western history stressed the lack of conflict and the continuities of the process: it tended to collapse a complex series of long-term changes into a single transition.⁴⁰⁴

U.S. officials influenced by Modernization theory were did not understand the readjustment of the structure of power that Development entails. Since they could not understand that political nature, officials were unable to offer coherent solutions in overcoming the opposition to Development. However, Bowles’s proposal is not only important for this reason.

His proposal also demonstrates that by mid-1962 the paradigm behind the Alliance for Progress, economic growth and democracy as prerequisites for Development, was under scrutiny.

With domestic criticism increasing, U.S. officials were less interested in addressing Latin American demands. Instead, they focused on building domestic support by demonstrating the Alliance's capacity to show results. This intention was reinforced by Congressional hearings on the Alliance's budget for the FY1963. During those hearings, even Congressmen committed to the new approach believed it was hard to continue financing the program unless serious changes were introduced.⁴⁰⁵ Starting in late 1962, the Administration took several steps to reform the program and make it more acceptable to both U.S. public and Congress.

The Bureau of Budget reduced the proposed appropriation for the Coordination of the Alliance for Progress for 1964 by two hundred million dollars.⁴⁰⁶ The Administration then started reaching out to liberal Republicans because they, Kennedy expected, may help counterbalance Southern Democrats less identified with the new foreign aid approach.⁴⁰⁷ Those actions offered some relief. However, Kennedy's feeble majority in Congress convinced his Administration that more needed convincing should be accomplished to show foreign aid and the Alliance for Progress was a viable tool for defending U.S. interests. Consequently in early 1963, Kennedy organized the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World.

Headed by Lucius D. Clay, this Committee was mandated to assess USAID initiatives, including the Alliance for Progress. The Clay Committee, as became known, did not seek to improve USAID's capacity to promote Development, but offer coherent responses to U.S. reservations. The Administration expected to increase program support amongst the public and Congressmen, and this objective was evident in the Committee's opposition.⁴⁰⁸

The members of the Clay Committee had little to no experience implementing Development programs. General Clay was the most knowledgeable one. Unfortunately his experience leading the economic recovery of the occupied Germany after the World War Two was of little use to understand the challenges that democracies faced while promoting Development. No democratic government could have stayed in power and promote Development, while enforcing a diet of 1,000 calories as Clay did in Germany.⁴⁰⁹ Out of the other members of the committee, only Edward Mason had devoted time understanding ways to use foreign aid as a foreign policy. The other members were a former Secretary of the Treasury, a member of the Brookings Institute, an oilman, a corporate lawyer and finally a doctor expert on rehabilitation. The only one with some experience with social movements was a former representative of the American Federation of Labor on the National War Labor Board during World War II.⁴¹⁰ However, the disconnection that the AFL had to Latin American labor movements is evident and unnecessary to demonstrate.

As a consequence of its composition, the Committee demonstrated a very naïve understanding on the challenges of Development. According to their report, Development depended mostly on two factors: will and discipline.⁴¹¹ As Venezuela and Argentina demonstrate, those words are rhetoric, and useless to comprehend the challenges of Development. Probably related was the Committee's inability to conceive a Development paradigm different than the capitalist one. The Clay report insisted that the U.S. should not grant aid to foreign governments that allowed the government to own companies and commercial enterprises that compete with private business.⁴¹² Even though they accepted that the U.S. had no right to intervene in another country's internal affairs, they also reaffirmed that foreign nations lack the right to intervene on U.S. "pocketbook".⁴¹³ This parochial understanding of

Development deeply influenced the Committee's rejection of multilateralization and the Clay report recommended U.S. be the sole for loan allocation criteria.⁴¹⁴

The Clay Committee suggested several ways to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid. One proposal was to recruit other First World countries to build a new international organization without the Soviet Union.⁴¹⁵ This International Committee would not only satisfy U.S. need for alleviating the deficit, but defend the capitalist paradigm for Development. Even though the last idea contravened the Alliance for Progress' spirit or at least how Latin Americans understood it, its impact was not as radical as the Committee's proposal regarding long-term planning.

According to the Committee, long-term planning prevented Development. This element, it argued, directed attention to theory rather than to the implementation of practical policies, such as public and private investment programs.⁴¹⁶ The Committee suggested increasing technical collaboration that could help on the implementation of those policies. Since long-term planning was not required, the Committee recommended a radical reduction of USAID country missions and aid allocation.⁴¹⁷ The Committee's believed the Alliance for Progress' main problem was the lack of Latin American commitment and willingness. The Committee argued

:

Our offer of a multilateral alliance and our performance subsequent to that offer should have proved the strength of our commitment to this program. Latin American understanding of and willingness to fulfill the undertakings of leadership, self-help, and self-discipline agreed to in the Punta del Este Charter, however, with notable exceptions have yet to be proved.⁴¹⁸

Latin American leaders, according to the Committee, were responsible for the Alliance's failures. Those governments had neither stimulated the will for Development nor created conditions for private capital flow.⁴¹⁹ Although the Committee recognized that some issues precluding Development were not related with lack of commitment, they believed that Latin

American societies could have done more.⁴²⁰ For this reason, the Committee recommended that Latin Americans should pursue monetary stability, social budgeting, elimination of subsidies to government enterprises and improvement on the utilization of the land. Yet, Frondizi enacted all those policies, but Development campaigns' externalities combined with the Alliance's unrealistic requirements brought his government to an end. The report ignored those factors and insisted on textbook policies with zero resonance with reality.

The Clay Committee advocated for a colonialist approach toward Development, concluding that "Latin America must be encouraged to see its essential choice between totalitarian, inefficient state controlled economies and societies on the other hand and an economically and politically freer system on the other."⁴²¹ Only through accepting capitalism, the Committee argued, "the development of Latin American would be assured."⁴²² Finalizing their analysis on the Alliance, the Committee concluded that the Military Assistance Programs should continue since Latin American armies served suppress local guerrillas. However, they recommended suspending any transference of advance weaponry.⁴²³ As it is evident, the Clay Committee was very consistent. They not only rejected other paradigms toward Development, but believed in the military's role to prevent their adoptions.

After reading the report, Kennedy expressed deep concerns on the Committee's attack to the whole foreign aid program. In fact, he believed that the Committee's conclusions would make it more difficult to move "the program through."⁴²⁴ Kennedy was right because the Clay Committee provided new ammunition to the critics of the program. The Clay Committee not only provided new ammunition to the critics of the program, but also eroded its prospects. Based on this dissertation's arguments, it is evident that the Clay Committee did offer neither coherent nor realistic solutions for the challenges of Development. It ignored the consequences of altering

that structure of power and expressed strong opposition for loans to create political stability.⁴²⁵ Those loans, as demonstrated, were essential for reducing social unrest provoked by those opposed the socioeconomic transformation or those who want immediate results.

Moreover, since the Committee ignored creating a bureaucracy devoted to addressing development problems, it created ideal conditions for future problems. Without well-supported USAID country missions, the collaboration between host and recipient countries would be even harder. As previously argued, the absence of collaboration resulted in Latin American inability to satisfy loan requirements, which caused aid delays. By weakening USAID country missions, the Clay Committee empowered even more State Department's agency on aid allocation, and focus on short-term objectives. Since the Clay Committee proposed a radical aid budget reduction, U.S. officials would be less inclined for betting on neutral governments that may turn against the United States. The Clay Committee was uninterested in understanding these consequences.

The White House knew the report could not be ignored and tried to embrace some of the Committee's recommendations. The Administration announced a reduction on the requested appropriation for the FY1964 from \$4.9 to \$4.5 billion.⁴²⁶ The White House also requested David Bell, Administrator of USAID, to minimize the differences between the Clay Report and the proposed Foreign Aid Bill for FY 1964.⁴²⁷ However, as Bell attempted to reconcile the Clay Report with Kennedy's vision, it became evident that this was impossible.

There were many areas where the Clay report and USAID paradigm were in direct contradiction, according to Bell. One of those areas was the Committee's rejection of supporting state-own companies that competed with private endeavors. Equally troublesome was the Committee's insistence on forcing the recipient country to sign investment guarantee agreements as legal requisite before receiving aid.⁴²⁸ This added was in addition to the Committee's request

for limiting U.S. voluntary contribution to the aid agencies, even those related with the United Nations, as well as reducing the allocation to \$4 billion, instead of the \$4.5 billion requested by USAID.⁴²⁹ The Administration likely understood that the Committee advocated for dismantling the USAID approach and the Alliance for Progress as proposed on March 13, 1961.

The Clay report became powerful a weapon for Congressional leaders who had been criticizing the USAID paradigm and the Alliance for Progress. Many U.S. officials commented about how during the discussions for the FY1964, Representative Passman (D-Louisiana) not only became more argumentative and confrontational regarding foreign aid, but also announced a trip to Latin America with Representative Gary (D-Virginia).⁴³⁰ The Clay report not only empowered traditional reservationists, but it also affected traditional supporters.

With dwindling commitment from the U.S. public on foreign aid in general, Congressional reservationists had all the incentives to use the report and foreign aid as an electoral weapon. This likely influenced traditional supporters to reconsider their identification with foreign aid and the Alliance, which included Senators Fulbright and Morse.⁴³¹ Even though the President convinced some of them to resist, others embraced the ideas of the Clay report.⁴³² Senator Gore (D-Tennessee) was an example of someone once a traditional supporter of the program, but changed after the Clay report. Gore not only attacked Kennedy's plan for reducing the balance of payments, but also insisted that the best solution for a balance budget was reducing aid allocation and bringing troops back from Vietnam.⁴³³

Foreign aid and the Alliance became politically too expensive for the Administration and its priorities were in other places. Even though foreign aid may improve the lives of the oppressed and the reputation of the U.S. in Third World countries, those people did vote in U.S.

elections. Rather, those who voted were not enchanted with foreign aid and the Kennedy administration understood it must focus on matters related to reelection in 1964.

As Robert Dallek explained, by late 1962 the President's hope for reelection was based on improving the economy.⁴³⁴ In order to accomplish this, the Administration focused on tax cuts and tax reform as means to secure long-term growth and increase revenue.⁴³⁵ Unfortunately, important Democrats in Congress, including Representative Mills (D-Arkansas) and Senator Gore (D-Tennessee) did not agree with reducing taxes during a period of economic growth. Between 1961 and 1963, the GDP grew steadily and unemployment remained at 5.7% and those Democrats said that the tax cuts would only benefit the rich and hurt the poor.⁴³⁶ Without those tax cuts, Kennedy thought, the economy would fall into a recession in mid-1964.

For that reason, Kennedy was willing to postpone reforms that would alienate Democrats and Republicans from supporting his tax bill. Those kinds of reforms included anything related to public spending, such as education and Medicare.⁴³⁷ Critics of Kennedy's tax bill argued that a tax reduction would only increase fiscal deficit and many Republicans and Democrats expressed possible tax reduction support as long as it was paired with cutting federal expenditure.⁴³⁸ The Administration had little room to resist Congressional demands for reducing appropriation for foreign aid and the Alliance for FY1964. In fact, more than one Congressman suggested to White House officials that Alliance financial allocation be considered separately from the rest of the foreign aid budget in order to isolate the program from general foreign aid criticism.⁴³⁹ This strategy was never implemented and a funding reduction for the Alliance from the requested 4.5 billion to the final 3 billion was approved for the FY1964.⁴⁴⁰

By enhancing Congressional criticism and justifying the budget reductions, the Clay Committee empowered U.S. officials who were either disappointed or never shared the

Alliance's paradigm. As a result of the lower budget for the FY1964, even officials committed to the Alliance's original ideals, such as Moscoso, considered changing the program. Those discussions progressively placed private capital and Latin American armies at the top of the Alliance's agenda, paving the road to the Mann Doctrine.

Ending the Alliance for Progress: Private Capital, Armed Forces and the Mann Doctrine

During the first two years of the Alliance for Progress, even though private capital and armed forces influenced the program, they were not agents in its making. Although their actions affected the implementation of the Alliance, they did not have agency in decision-making. This is not surprising given their reputation and history in Inter-American affairs. Since the late nineteenth century, the ties between U.S. businessmen and Latin American elite subjected the region to a structure of power based on the exportation of raw materials, unequal distribution of the means of productions and exploitation of local labor. With rare exceptions, Latin American armed forces had been instrumental implementing that model. They had been the foreman of the plantation. These actors had neither legitimacy nor the reputation to be principal partners in a program that expected to alter the same structure of power they have created, imposed and defended. Nonetheless, private capital and Latin American armed forces still had supporters, the problem was that such support was not ample enough to grant them agency.

In the case of Latin American armed forces, they failed to inspire confidence in officials, including Arthur Schlesinger and Teodoro Moscoso, committed with to the Alliance. The armed forces also failed to inspired confidence among Congressional leaders. In contrast, the military usually found strong support from State Department officials, who believed that Latin American armies could be reoriented to supporting democratic institutions and collaborating with

Development programs.⁴⁴¹ Those perspectives collided in discussions about the usefulness of Military Assistance Programs (MAP) to promote Development. While Congress rejected those programs, the Federal officials believed they were crucial in promoting “pro-US orientation and preparing them [Latin American military] to play a constructive role in national life.”⁴⁴²

Congress and State Department’s different perspectives about the usefulness of MAPs were not unusual. In the same year that Congress approved resources for the implementation of the Alliance, it also introduced cuts on the appropriation for Military Assistance Programs for FY1962. U.S. Ambassadors, Washington officials and country teams were not happy with this decision. They believed the U.S. was giving up their last resort to influence the politics in other countries.⁴⁴³ Congressional distrust on Latin American armed forces and opposition to MAP increased even more after the military coups in 1962.

After the coups in Argentina and Perú, some Congressmen brought special attention to the fact that a Sherman tank destroyed the gate at the Peruvian Government Palace and that an U.S.-trained officer arrested the Peruvian president.⁴⁴⁴ During the hearings for the FY1963, many Congressmen questioned the usefulness of Military Assistance Programs for accomplishing the objectives of the Alliance.⁴⁴⁵ They expressed open skepticism to providing training and weapons to people in charge of suppressing democratic forces.⁴⁴⁶ Those voices became so relevant that after the coup in Argentina, the White House composed a memorandum defending armed forces from the attacks of Senator Morse.⁴⁴⁷

When discussing about the role that private capital should play on the Alliance for Progress, Congress and U.S. executive officials switched places. The Alliance’s U.S. architects never assigned much importance to private capital who thought it would circumscribe their role to investors and collaborators with Latin American businessmen. As Lincoln Gordon explained

to Richard Goodwin before Kennedy announced the Alliance, “[p]erhaps the most important job for private enterprise in this program is to assist in the Development of healthy and responsible private enterprise within the Latin American nations.”⁴⁴⁸ Likewise in October, 1962, the Policy Planning Council recommended that the U.S. government reevaluate their predilection for free enterprise on Third World countries.⁴⁴⁹ According to the Council, U.S. incapacity to distinguish between state-run activities and communism had weakened its ability to influence country policies. It stated, “[o]ur greatest mistake has been to rest our case so largely on what we believed the private sectors and US private investment could contribute to the social and political stability of the modernizing states.”⁴⁵⁰ This memorandum explained how Act of Bogota, the Alliance for Progress and the Act of Punta del Este came from recognizing that “mistake.”⁴⁵¹

Congressional leaders insisted that private capital should play a pivotal role in the Alliance for Progress and this was evident as early as 1961. That year several members from Congress supported Javits Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. This amendment encouraged the President to give preference to private sources of funding, including loans to private companies, instead of a direct transfer of aid from government to government.⁴⁵² Very importantly, Javits Amendment was a bipartisan law, whose support came from those who had reservations with the Alliance and from its main supporters, like Senators Fulbright and Smathers.⁴⁵³

Since private investors and Latin American military lacked of homogenous support, their interests occupied a secondary role in the Alliance for Progress, but this changed in late 1962. The continual reduction on the Alliance’s budget, and later, the political effects of the Clay report encouraged the Administration to find other sources of funding. After strategies for enlisting Western European support failed, private investors became the Administration’s last

alternative to compensate for Congressional cuts. The Kennedy Administration and the Alliance for Progress would pay a high price for enlisting them on this foreign aid initiative.

Different from both Modernization and Developmentalism, businessmen were not looking to contribute to Latin American Development. Instead, their objective was to generate as much profit as they could. Not surprisingly, U.S. businessmen criticized the Alliance for encouraging social reforms.⁴⁵⁴ According to them, social reforms only contributed to the political instability that discouraged private investors.⁴⁵⁵ Thus, private investors believed that the U.S. government and the Alliance should focus on demanding self-help measures that encouraged sound fiscal and monetary policies.⁴⁵⁶ In mid-1962, the U.S. Ambassador in Costa Rica discussed the participation of private capital in the Alliance:

Because most of them [U.S. Business Community] range from conservative to reactionary outlook, Embassy does not consider them promising medium for pushing Alliance for Progress, which in Costa Rica is closely identified with President Kennedy.⁴⁵⁷

Despite the essential differences between the Alliance's objectives and the conditions demanded by the business community, the budget reality forced the Administration to listen to them. The first attempts to enlist private capital took place right after the approval for the budget for FY1963. Inspired by the general tenor of Congressional discussions, many officials began believing that the Alliance may lose its capacity to work if projected cuts for the FY1964 were implemented.⁴⁵⁸

U.S. officials progressively regarded private capital not only as a complement to government activities, but also as actual promoters of Development. That transition was evident on Moscoso's August 1962 speech at a Chase Manhattan Bank symposium on housing projects.

There, he praised Congressional decisions that encouraged the participation of private capital in Latin American housing projects. Moscoso specifically highlighted the provisions on the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961 that fomented private capital in Development programs.⁴⁵⁹

The Administration's new attitude to business along with Agreements to Guarantee Investments reduced total outflow of U.S. capital from Latin America. In the first nine months of 1962, the total outflow of U.S. capital from Latin America was forty-nine millions. By the end of that year, the outflow decreased to a total between twenty-four and eighteen millions.⁴⁶⁰ If the Administration expected to compensate for Congressional cuts, it required more than just reducing the outflow. In December 1962, Douglas Dillon described that if the United States failed to implement an active policy to attract private capital to Latin America, the prospects of the Alliance would be dim.⁴⁶¹

Addressing that issue was a priority in Kennedy's April 2, 1963 Special Message to Congress on Free World Defense and Assistance Program. Embracing the Clay report, President Kennedy announced the new guidelines and noted "the primary new initiative in this years' program related to our increased efforts to encourage the investment of private capital in the underdeveloped countries."⁴⁶² Moreover, Kennedy announced that Ambassadors and USAID country missions were instructed to forcefully explain the importance of using private resources and improving conditions for private investment, domestic and foreign.⁴⁶³

Although this guideline referred exclusively to private capital with the Alliance, it drastically impacted the armed forces' role too. Private capital required more than just words of encouragement and demanded political stability that could guarantee the necessary returns.⁴⁶⁴ At the same time the Administration started embracing private capital as a key collaborator for the Alliance's success, it was also interested in redefining the role of Military Assistance Programs

in Development planning. On February 27, 1963, the State Department sent a memorandum to all Latin American embassies and country missions discussing the importance of the programs:

The MAP program and the Alliance for Progress programs are mutually supporting elements of U.S. foreign policy. Internal security and civic action are the primary purposes of our Military Assistance Programs in Latin America.⁴⁶⁵

By empowering the Latin American military, the U.S. openly abandoned the Alliance for Progress' democratic principles. This transition was not a major problem for an important section of the U.S. government. By early 1963, many people lost faith on Latin American democracies. According to Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American affairs, the Alliance imposed challenges that Latin American democracies were not prepared to face. He explained:

What is needed and expected would strain the political maturity and capabilities of experienced and highly skilled political systems. ***In most of Latin American these issues must be resolved by immature and inexperience societies, seriously short of political and other skills*** (emphasis added.)⁴⁶⁶

Martin believed that the challenges that the Alliance imposed over Latin American democracies were not related with different perspectives on Development, the destabilizing effect of self-help measures or forcing commitment due to foreign crusades. Instead, Martin argued, those challenges resulted from:

Latin American legal and intellectual patterns of thought emphasize theory, doctrine and principle, and tend to be contemptuous of the Anglo- Saxon pragmatic approach, directed to reaching practical solutions by compromise. This combined with a considerable natural emotionalism in many countries, makes copying our example of peaceful revolution by law and the easy movement of political parties in and out of office, difficult if not unlikely.⁴⁶⁷

Martin's statement was understandable given the ideological background behind Modernization theory. As explained previously, Modernization theory aimed to induce Third World Development with a capitalist paradigm similar to the U.S. model. Although at the beginning, those officials were open to new ideas, as the possibilities of financial survival decreased their commitment to other approaches dropped. By mid-1963, even U.S. officials committed to the Alliance lost faith in Latin American democracies. For them, Latin American democracies were unable to create political stability. In September 1963, Adolf Berle wrote a letter to President Betancourt saying:

I have been-still am- unhappy about Latin America in general and I came to Venezuela wondering whether half my life's work, backing socially progressive democracy with freedom, might not have failed.⁴⁶⁸

Progressively, the component of democracy as the basis for Development disappeared. In October 1963, Martin told the *New York Herald* that U.S. government understood and embraced the participation of Latin American military in Development planning.⁴⁶⁹ He declared that Latin American militaries were not opposed to the Alliance's programs, but were potential collaborators. Addressing the problem of military dictatorships, Martin explained, "[w]e must see our leverage to keep these new regimes as liberal and considerate of the welfare of the people as possible."⁴⁷⁰ To demonstrate the practicality of that idea, Martin used the example of Argentina and Perú.⁴⁷¹

As the State Department communicated to their Ambassadors, Martin's words were not a *faux pas* or a misunderstanding, but the official position as it have been cleared by the President himself.⁴⁷² When Betancourt requested a clarification on Martin's words, the U.S. ambassador, once a supporter of the Alliance, repeated Martin's argument regarding the contradictions

between Anglo-Saxon values and Latin American democracies. The Ambassador insisted that democracy comes from the history of each society, and not from force imposition.⁴⁷³

At the same time Martin announced the Alliance for Progress' new directions, Latin American governments were discussing possible members for the Inter-American Committee. Although the marginalization of prominent Developmentalists noted this organization would have little influence, Washington's new approach clearly did not foster Inter-American confidence. As a Chilean diplomat commented to Schlesinger, Latin American democracies were displeased with the new approach, which brought armed forces into politics, weakening already fragile political systems.⁴⁷⁴

The unilateral transformation of the Alliance for Progress did not end. By late 1963, it was clear that Latin American Development would be based on the conditions dictated by private capital. It was equally clear that democracy would not be an essential component of Development and the Administration had little incentive to move in another direction. Congress quickly tolerated non-democratic governments and altering its traditional skepticism toward Latin American armed forces. On November 24, 1963, Congress approved an amendment (Public Law 88-205, HR 7885) to section 2305 of the Foreign Aid Bill of 1961, which removed restrictions to grant aid to foreign government established by force.⁴⁷⁵ On December 16, 1963, President Johnson signed this amendment into law.

Contrary to common assumptions, Kennedy's death did not alter the path of the Alliance for Progress. Rather his death merely created conditions for the rapid advance of a transformation already outlined. With the president's death, U.S. officials were mostly already disappointed with the Alliance and used this opportunity to reevaluate the whole program. Kennedy's death created an ideal scenario to advance on that direction. Unlike Kennedy,

Johnson did not have a special commitment to the program as it was not his program and it became a presidential liability with Congress. Johnson was neither familiar nor sympathetic with Modernization or designing alternatives to use foreign aid to protect U.S. interest overseas.

Johnson's perspective on foreign aid became evident when he nominated George Ball as the chairman for the committee to reevaluate the Alliance for Progress. Different from Moscoso and Schlesinger, Ball represented officials who believed the State Department should be in charge of determining how and when foreign aid should be allocated. Johnson's actions quickly encountered opposition from those who supported the Alliance's principles as was evident in Schlesinger's opposition to Thomas C. Mann's growing role with the Alliance.

Mann, a diplomat in Latin America during the 1940s and 1950s, was a classic "cold warrior" and had a crucial role on Arbenz's overthrowing (1954) in Guatemala. When Schlesinger discovered that Mann would have a prominent role, he wrote a letter to President Johnson rejecting the nomination. Schlesinger believed Mann was not suitable for the job since:

. . . he is not only out of touch with the vital forces in contemporary Latin America—the democratic left, labor, the students, the youth, the intellectuals—but actively unsympathetic to these forces. His association has been in the main with the past of Latin America, not with its future.⁴⁷⁶

Discussing Johnson's understanding of the Alliance, Moscoso predicted that his role as the U.S. representative at CIAP/ICAP would be to translate U.S. bilateral policy into a multilateral language.⁴⁷⁷ In March 1964, Johnson proved him correct when he announced his perspective on Foreign Aid to Congress. Johnson argued the U.S. should limit its responsibility with foreign Development by setting the example of responsibility and progress.⁴⁷⁸ He said the government would not abandon its allies with geopolitical significance.⁴⁷⁹ Johnson announced

that two-thirds of development lending proposed for fiscal 1965, including Alliance lending, would be focused on six countries: Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and India.⁴⁸⁰

Even if Latin American countries did not agree, they had no alternative. Johnson announced that he would not recommended additional authorizations for the Alliance for Progress and other USAID programs in the FY1965.⁴⁸¹ Embracing the Clay report, Johnson believed that the private capital should be engine for Development both in the United States as well as in the Third World.⁴⁸² For that reason, it was the responsibility of each country to create favorable conditions favorable conditions for private investments.⁴⁸³ In the same venue, Johnson also announced Mann would work improving the efficiency and quality of USAID. Mann's objective would be to reduce USAID personnel to a total of 1,200 for the FY 1965.⁴⁸⁴

When Mann announced that the U.S. would tolerate military dictatorships and encourage Latin Americans to rely on private capital for Development, he just was transmitting a decision made a long-time before.⁴⁸⁵ The Mann Doctrine, as will it became known, was the culmination of a process started in late 1962 after the cuts for the budget of the FY1963. Private capital and armed forces better address Kennedy's and Johnson's most pressing needs. While the private capital could compensate for Congressional cuts by forcing political stability, armed forces could create conditions that attract them. Indeed, both actors did not only have potential to secure the Alliance's financial continuity, but by satisfying Congressional reservations, the program stopped being political liability. Thus, the Administration could devote their political capital to address domestic issues, such as the Civil Rights movement and the growing discontent around Vietnam. Making this transition more appealing, Latin American armies and private capital demonstrated effectiveness and capacity to check communist influence in the region.

By relying on private capital and Latin American militaries to promote development, the U.S. destroyed the last revolutionary element of the Alliance. Without the component of democracy, the Alliance became one more foreign aid program, similar to Point Four. Interestingly enough, this new strategy for promoting Development mirrored same model that kept the region underdeveloped for the last one hundred years. By March 1964, the Alliance for Progress, as revolutionary foreign aid program, was dead.

Structural Contradictions and the Inability to Multilateralize the Alliance for Progress

How is it that Latin America and the United States moved from looking for solutions to abandoning the Alliance for Progress? The key to that answer was the structural contradiction of the Alliance for Progress. Latin America and the U.S. could not reconcile their contradictory and colliding interests and even though both embraced the message of collaboration, they could not and were not willing to multilateralize of the Alliance for Progress.

The making of the Alliance for Progress shows that competition and imposition was more common than collaboration. As this analysis demonstrates, the interaction between Inter-American conditions, domestic pressures, historical events and the challenges of promoting Development made the multilateralization almost impossible. Confrontation between the State Department and USAID, Fragile Congressional majority, U.S. domestic anti-Castro demands, different perspectives on Development, combination of short and long-term objectives demonstrate this. Yet, there were many occasions when collaboration could have played a significant role. However, neither Latin America nor the United States were willing to look beyond their interest. That spirit was evident on the two Punta del Este Conferences.

In August 1961, Latin American republics gathered at the first Punta del Este Conference to discuss the Alliance for Progress' implementation. At this Conference, large Latin American republics refused to establish a powerful Wise Men Committee. Though this was resisted citing potential interference in republics' sovereignty, the reason behind this decision was to preserve their bilateral advantage. That intention was clear in the spirit behind the Uruguayana Conference. Frondizi's objective was not to coordinate and empower Latin American positions in the making of the Alliance for Progress. Instead, his objective was to secure Argentinean priority accessing Alliance's funds based on an entente with Brazil.

Five months later, Latin American republics gathered again at Punta del Este to discuss Cuba's exclusion from the Organization of American States and economic and political sanctions. Ignoring Latin American warnings, the U.S. pushed for sanctions against Cuba as the only viable solution. Congress and the U.S. government allowed their desire of revenge for the Bay of Pigs to drive their actions at the meeting. Indeed, the United States refused to work out a consensus, and preferred to advance its own agenda by offering aid to Haiti.

The consequences these actions had on the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American system's multi-lateralization has been explained, but examples indicate something more. The U.S. and Latin America were not only unable, but unwilling to build the Alliance for Progress as a multilateral program. They never attempted to reconcile their different understanding of Development, the problematic loan applications, or domestic limitations. Built from that system of collaboration, the solutions each party proposed were incompatible and contradictory.

Latin American democracies expected to improve the Alliance for Progress by increasing their collective agency with the program's decision-making. They proposed the creation of a powerful Inter-American Committee for decision-making and money allocation. Without

understanding the political tradition of the United States and Kennedy's domestic limitations, Latin Americans expected the U.S. and Congress to accept such a committee.

Similarly, the United States, unable to understand the challenges of Development and responding to program criticisms, found refuge in the unilateral application of Modernization principles as mean to improve the Alliance for Progress. Neglecting the historical role that Latin American armies, elite and US business had suppressing Development in the region, the U. S. government expected or hoped those forces would create conditions for progress.

It is difficult to know how well each party knew the consequences of their actions. Nevertheless by March 1964, the structural contraction of the Alliance for Progress ushered the end of the Alliance for Progress as foreign aid program that promoted Development based on economic growth and democracy. This raises the question: Is this the destiny of any foreign aid program that hopes to promote Development through democracy and economic growth?

Chapter V.
Conclusion.
The Alliance for Progress, Foreign Aid and the Incapacity to Promote Development

This Inter-American analysis of the Alliance for Progress demonstrates how the program failed to promote Development due to a combination of conjunctural problems and a structural contradiction. The problems and contradictions were direct consequences of how the Alliance for Progress was conceptualized and its foundation established. Namely, there was not a common understanding of the Alliance's ideology. While Latin Americans believed it was a continuation of their ideas, U.S. officials assumed the Alliance was a new approach to foreign aid. Latin American republics refused to create an Inter-American committee capable of enforcing multilateralism or empowering a collective voice. This decision developed a system of collaboration where U.S. priorities, limitations, interests and conceptions shaped the Alliance for Progress without Latin American governments counterbalancing U.S. influence. Indeed, Latin American republics were left to their own bilateral a capacity to meet U.S. aid requirements. Those requirements were not only economical, but political.

For that reason, the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* created two important conjunctural problems that made the implementation of the program too expensive for Latin American democracies. On one side, the combination of short-term objectives and long-term goals deprived Latin American democracies from nearly all their political capital. By being force to fulfill self-help measures and isolating Cuba, Latin American democracies alienated the entire political spectrum. Left with little means to democratically confront their opposition, Latin

American government could only rely on foreign support to demonstrate the effectiveness of their Development plan. Unfortunately, this was extremely difficult.

The U.S.-Americanized Alliance transformed the USAID in the sole judge on defining which projects were worth funding. This quickly became a source of conflict. Latin America and USAID had dissimilar understandings on the paths for Development and the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, USAID lack of a clear criterion for self-help programs. Finally, Latin American governments had little incentive to work with USAID country missions, since short term loans were negotiated on political basis through Ambassadors. As a result, most loan applications failed to satisfy USAID standards and aid allocation was permanently delayed.

Based on these two conjunctural problems, the Alliance for Progress not only deprived Latin American governments of political capital, but also provided little means to increase it. These conjunctural problems gave birth to the *Little King Syndrome* where U.S. officials demanded more than what Latin American democracies could offer. Therefore, the Alliance for Progress became a political liability for most Latin American democracies. Even for those capable of fulfilling short-term political requirements, the Alliance for Progress still failed to readily provide means to create political capital. For that reason, excluding those too important to fail -Betancourt in Venezuela and Lleras Carmargo in Colombia -the *U.S.-Americanized Alliance for Progress* did not create Development conditions. Instead, the program's requirements introduced social and political instability. Frondizi's case is the best example on this regard.

However, those conjunctural problems were the mere consequence of the underlying structural contradiction that ultimately explained the Alliance's inability to promote Development based on democracy and economic growth. That structural contradiction was evident on the Inter-American unwillingness and incapacity to build a multilateral understanding

of the Alliance for Progress. Since Neither the United States nor Latin America were willing to build a true cooperative program, they could not understand nor satisfy the problems and contradictions that each other was facing. In other words, they could not reconcile their colliding interest. Built upon that practice, when the U.S. and Latin America started discussing ways to improve the program, they pursued solutions that only address their respective interests. Those solutions never took into account the interest of the other party. As a result, the United States and Latin American abandoned the Alliance as a revolutionary foreign aid program.

There is still one vital question. Would any foreign aid program seeking Development based on democracy and economic growth share the same fate?

A discussion on the struggle for Promoting Development.

As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation not only explains the conjunctural problems and the structural contradictions of the Alliance for Progress, but also it offers insights into the challenges of promoting Development. Based on those insights, this dissertation tackles a crucial question. Would any foreign aid program seeking Development based on democracy and economic growth share the same fate? In other words, Can the First and Third World build a common ground to collaborate in a Development campaign? The answer to this question is no. Let's examine the rationale behind this argument

As this work demonstrated, Development is a complicated subject. Development, as Amartya Sen argued, is about freedom. Understanding Development in this way is essential to distinguish it from economic growth and per capita figures, which can distort reality. A comparison male survival rate amongst U.S. whites, China, Kerala, India and U.S. black males is enlightening to exemplify the point. By age 5 survival rates of U.S. black, Chinese and Kerala,

Indian males is slightly more than 95%, while U.S. whites are much closer to 100%. By age 25, U.S. black, China and Kerala, India male rates are below 95%. U.S. whites are still over 95%. By age 65, U.S. black survival is a bit higher than 75%, Kerala, Indian is right below 80%, Chinese is slightly above 80%. U.S. white is slightly below 90%.⁴⁸⁶ The results are similar for U.S. black women.⁴⁸⁷ Moreover, if one asked Katrina's victims, those who attend to underfinance public schools that offer no opportunity or the victims of the New Jim Crow,⁴⁸⁸ Is it your living situation according the standards of a developed society? What would their answer be?

Those figures and reflections show that Development cannot be measure by income or economic growth. Although U.S. blacks had more purchasing power than the other groups, they lived much shorter than their national and Third World counterparts.⁴⁸⁹ As Amartya Sen stated, they do not have freedom to survive.⁴⁹⁰ Precisely for this reason, the Alliance's understanding of Development as a result of democracy and economic growth was revolutionary and accurate. And, for the same reason, the conceptualization and implementation of this program unveils how far the Third and First world can collaborate in accomplishing Development.

Defining Development in terms of freedom entails important challenges. As the French Revolution argued, freedom is about equality and ending subjugation. Consequently Development can only come from the redefinition of the social structure. At the same time, this redefinition can only be accomplished through a proper redistribution of the means of production and the transformation of the structure of power. This redistribution of the means of production as well as the changing in the structure of power creates the central paradox of foreign aid.

Development campaigns, by definition, take place in underdeveloped societies. Due to the international division of power, those underdeveloped societies are under a sphere of influence from a First World country. If one examines any underdeveloped society, it is clear

how industries and activities are in the hands of foreign companies. For example, the car industry in Mexico are owned by U.S. companies, mineral extraction in Chile is done through Canadian companies, and most oil wealth in Latin America is the hands of U.S. or Spanish companies. This scenario is not much different regarding the textile industry in Southeast Asia or the manufacturing industry in China.

The contradiction between foreign aid and Development is evident. The interests of a society seeking Development are intrinsically opposed to the interest of the First World. Would the President or Prime Minister of such countries support a Third World Development plan aiming to nationalize mineral resources, increasing labor wages, or enforcing labor control of factories? Would any First World president foment a Development plan in the Third World that encourages the growing of local industries that may compete with their own companies? Would any of them support a government that aim to end dependency? The answer to all those questions is no. The axiomatic nature of this answer is simple. Metropolitan elite and interest dominate the international system, including the political structure of the metropolis. For that reason, their interests are not dissociated from the interest of First World governments. The Alliance for Progress offered two crucial examples in this regard.

The first example was Hickenlooper Amendment in which the U.S. Congress made clear that the government would not offer foreign aid to countries that did not offer fair compensation to U.S. companies and citizens for national expropriation. Naturally, it was up to the companies to define how much a fair compensation was. Another example was the rejection of Frondizi's idea on an Inter-American Bank to finance Latin American manufactures. This proposal made economic sense, but the United States rejected it citing competition with U.S. companies.

This situation has not changed. In 2012, after the Argentinean government nationalized their oil resources, Respol immediately complained. Following that reaction, Spain and the European Union immediately label the action as arbitrary. On February 14, 2013 United Kingdom announced that it will oppose any Development loan to Argentina at the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank on account of “financial misconduct.” The United States announced a similar measure a year before.⁴⁹¹ The First World reacted in the same way after Venezuela renationalized its oil resources in 2009. Workers in the underdeveloped world can expect similar reactions once they start fighting for fair salaries. Technological as well as clothing industries in China and Southeast Asia will do everything in their capacity to suppress the movement and to empower the local elite responsible for keeping those conditions.

For the same reasons, foreign aid will never disempower local elite. They are the collaborators in preserving the international distribution of power. They are the allies in the maintenance of the open or closed door empire. In the case of the Alliance for Progress, it is not a surprise that private business and armies pleased U.S. domestic concerns and became the perfect allies to defend U.S. interest in Latin America. Venezuela under Chavez was not less democratic than the current regime in Saudi Arabia or Colombia under Uribe. However, only the one that nationalized oil resources was the object of international condemnation.

Under the conditions that the international system of power imposed, unless the recipient government is willing to forcefully destroy elites, it must modify its Development objectives or wait for its downfall. Any difference regarding a foreign aid allocation, including purpose and goals, will always resolved itself in the favor of the provider government. The metropolis, either government or multinational institution, controls the allocation of aid and the recipient

government can only rely on foreign support to outmaneuver domestic opposition. Domestic elite controls the capital and will not finance their disempowerment.

If Frondizi, for instance, would have sacrificed the political elements of his Development project, like independence on foreign affairs, at the September (1961) meeting, he would have received U.S. aid. This happened after Argentina broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Yet, Frondizi did not sacrifice the principles of his Development project. As a result, his government exhausted all his political capital and without financial support, could not overcome the political externalities caused by a meager redefinition of the Argentinean power structure.

The 1963 creation of a powerless CIAP/ICAP also helps understand the foreign aid paradox. The contradictory needs of the provider and the recipient government make it impossible to create an institution where those needs can build a common ground. Due to the international division of power, the multilateralization of a Development campaign based on democracy and economic growth is impossible.

Ultimately, foreign aid always benefits the provider more than the recipient. In the best case, instead of fomenting an economy capable of collaborating equally in the international system, foreign aid creates a destination for First World private capital. That foreign capital is the same one that created the conditions for underdevelopment. Thus, the only foreign aid that seems to work is related with social relief. This aid is important, but does not promote Development and keeps people alive in the context of inequalities.

Although it may be possible to argue that a Development campaign can be based on the collaboration with the metropolis and local elite, it is more likely any Development campaign conceived and supported by those who want progress would seek to end dependency and subjugation. Not surprisingly, any Development paradigm not based on democracy and

economic growth involves a forced imposition. Foreign aid, at its best, will create conditions for economic growth that will concentrate on the hands of the old or the refurbished elite. Elite, as we know, cannot coexist with Development, simply because it cannot coexist with Democracy. Democracy requires equality as a prerequisite of freedom. Since Development required the transformation of the structure of power behind the international, transnationals and national inequalities, a nation had two alternatives: to endure permanent inequalities through foreign aid or Develop through a revolution. Based on the structural contradiction of foreign aid, it is not a surprise that the Alliance for Progress was unable to build path “where, within the rich diversity of its own traditions, each nation is [would be] free to follow its own path toward progress.”⁴⁹²

This conclusion on foreign aid contradicts at least the two predominant perspectives about the capacity of foreign aid to promote Development. One believes that foreign aid does not promote Development and it created conditions that prevent it. In *The Aid Trap: Hard Truths about Ending Poverty* (2009), Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan argued the best solution to end poverty in the world is through a large-scale program of pro-business aid for poor nations.⁴⁹³ They affirm that aid does not lift people from poverty, but rather the private sector does since they are the job creators.⁴⁹⁴ Markets, they argue, have not worked in poor countries because they did not have the chance to operate. Poor country’s governments are anti-business.⁴⁹⁵ Hubbard and Duggan proposed a loan program to local business that countries can access only after reforming their internal markets to a pro-business structure. They concluded, “[s]witch to business or suffer the consequences.”⁴⁹⁶

Though fomenting local business may seem logical, it falls apart with the reality of underdevelopment. Hubbard and Duggan used World Bank Doing Business Report to outline the conditions businesses need to thrive. This ranking measures ten variables: starting a business,

dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, closing business.⁴⁹⁷ Using these factors, Singapore and its \$46,241 per capita (2011) ranks first.⁴⁹⁸ However impressive these numbers may be, Singapore ranks 29th on highest level of inequality above Ecuador and below Madagascar.⁴⁹⁹ Those numbers could be related with Singapore low public investment and flexible labor markets. Interestingly enough, according to the Labor Rights Report elaborated by the US government in 2002, those labor conditions are essential to understand Singapore's economic growth since 1960s.⁵⁰⁰ In other words, inequalities and lowering the living standards of the working class is crucial for a Development based on a business oriented strategy.

Those authors may argue that inequalities had nothing to do with Development and more money is more money regardless where it accumulates. However, it is telling that those pro-business measures were imposed under People's Action Party uncontested ruling since 1965. If during those years the People's Action Party would not have been accused of censorship, control over the media and gerrymandering to stay in power, it could be possible to argue that their agenda had the support of the majority of the population.⁵⁰¹ Unfortunately that does not seem to be the case neither in Singapore nor in Chile.

In this county, elite imposed the same paradigm during Pinochet's right-wing dictatorship. Like Singapore, Chile also appears as a good macroeconomic management example in those rankings. However, massive Chilean protests during 2012 show the majority in developing countries does not embrace a path to Development based solely on economic growth. Society demands social equality and democracy as the following presidents know: Fernando Collor de Melo (Brazil-1992), Hernán Siles, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Mesa (Bolivia-1985, 2003, 2005); Abdalá Bucarám, Jamil Mahuad and Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador- 1997, 1999,

2005) Alberto Fujimori (Perú- 2000). If Frondizi or Betancourt may have been willing to suppress democracy for forty years and dismantle social relief network, Venezuela and Argentina would be Developed nations based on Hubbard and Duggan's standards.

Those demands to reform the social pact along the lines of democracy and economic progress should not be a surprise. Developing nations had seen economic boom based on pro-business strategies. However, those strategies had been the main responsible behind the inequalities and poverty that exists in those nations today. As the Third World knows, a pro-business agenda may lift some people from poverty, but not produce Development. It would only reproduce oppression for those unable to take advantage of the boom.

From a humanitarian and liberal-internationalist point of view, the most notorious defenders of foreign aid are William Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs. In *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (2007) and *Reinventing Foreign Aid* (2008), William Easterly analyzed previous foreign aid programs aiming to offers solutions to the future. He criticized western efforts to impose Development strategies, placing special emphasis on the inability to collaborate with local officials. Easterly encouraged aid officials to support what he called searchers instead of planners. While searchers are usually local entrepreneurs with interests in problem solving, planners are western experts associated with international Development agencies. This distinction is interesting, but does not provide an explanation to foreign aid failures. More importantly, it is not explain how searchers can overcome the structural contradiction shown on this analysis of the Alliance for Progress.

Building upon similar paradigm on *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of our Time* (2005) Jeffrey Sachs wrote that "the time to end poverty has arrived."⁵⁰² Under this premise, Sachs endorsed the UN Millennium Project as coherent initiative to end poverty by the

year 2025. Drawing from his experience working on foreign aid agencies, Sachs highlighted the importance of planning and accountability and identified five pillars for Millennium Development Goals based poverty reduction strategy. First, differential diagnosis or the series of policies and investments that a country needs to follow in order to achieve Development goals. Next, he discussed an investment plan that determines size, timing and cost of the required investment. Thirdly, a financial plan that is essential to funding the investment plan. Then a donors plan to identify possible contributors and fill the financing gap. Lastly, a public management plan helping government and public administration implement the expanded public investment strategy.⁵⁰³ Among the five pillars, the public management plan is especially valuable. Sachs argued this plan must be based on six targets: decentralization of management of public investment, training public sectors, information technologies, measurable benchmarks, audits and monitoring and evaluation.⁵⁰⁴

If somebody ever said that there was nothing new in history and that everything repeats itself, the five pillars of the Millennium Development Goals proves it. Although Sachs neither referred to nor analyzed the Alliance for Progress, the similarities with Millennium Development Goals are remarkable. Yet, there are two important differences. While the funding of the Alliance for Progress mostly depended on the United States Treasury, the UN Millennium Project relays multilateral funding through multinational organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Second, the Alliance for Progress introduced the variable of democracy as an essential component behind Development. However, the UN Millennium Project purposely ignores democracy and to justify its exclusion, Sachs argued:

The links from democracy to economic performance are relatively weak, even though democracy is surely a boon for human rights and a barrier against large scale killing, torture, and other abuses by the state.⁵⁰⁵

While the importance of democracy in Development was already explained, it is extremely interesting to observe how little the strategies to promote Development have changed. In fact, some Development experts still believe in the possibility of the First World financing the destruction of the international distribution of power that explains their wealth and supremacy over the rest of the world. Even though Sachs and Easterly endorsed alternative Development paths, instead of the free-market dogma, it is wishful thinking to assume wealthy donors would finance the erosion of their own wealth. If this were possible, Congressional leaders would have not complained for the expropriation of U.S. companies in Brazil or other parts of the region.

Similar to the Alliance for Progress, it is possible that the UN Millennium Initiative will help attenuate inequalities and the poverty that results from it. However, it would not end poverty. The contradictions between the interest of donors and recipients would progressively erode the program's legitimacy. The program would never fulfill the goals that justify its existence. Three out six of the UN Millennium Public Management goals relate with accountability and four out five of the five pillars implied coherent planning associated with funding. Interestingly enough, Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan understood this problem well and correctly affirmed that "aid provides a natural outlet for anti-business ideas because they do not disturb the politics or prosperity of the rich country itself."⁵⁰⁶ This quote, unfortunately, confuses anti-business with anti-Development.

What about the Marshall Plan?

There cannot be a discussion about the effectiveness of foreign aid without analyzing the Marshall Plan. As history testifies, this plan was effective in helping Western Europe recover after World War II. However, and despite some comparison, the Marshall Plan was radically

different than the Alliance for Progress as well as most foreign aid programs. This plan did not aim to promote Development, but to finance the recovery of European economies. The U.S. group in charge of formulating some of the basic ideas behind the Alliance for Progress recognized this difference. According to them, unlike the Marshall Plan, the Alliance for Progress responded to the need to overcome “an ancient heritage of poverty, widespread illiteracy, and grave social, economic and geographical imbalances.”⁵⁰⁷

Due to these differences, the Marshall Plan did not have to face the structural contradiction of foreign aid: disempowering national and international elite. As Richard Kuisel discussed in *Seducing the French, the Dilemma of Americanization* (1993), many French businessmen were eager to import U.S. management practices to improve productivity. Moreover, encouraged by the possibility of accessing capital, European elite were willing to collaborate at levels that were not possible in previous generations.⁵⁰⁸ Michelle Cini explained, “what west (sic) European wanted first and foremost was the financial aid. The rest of the package could be taken or left. In practice, this meant that the Western Europeans supported the American line only insofar as it allowed them to access to the funds.”⁵⁰⁹

As explained throughout this study, problems Latin American governments faced were different. Since the ideas of Development were always associated with democracy, recipient governments worked as powerless arbiters between popular demands for equality and elite’s rejection of those ideas. In addition, those governments needed to satisfy U.S. requirements to receive aid. However, the requirements collided with essential components of the country’s Development plan, such as political independence in foreign affairs. Edward S. Mason, one of the economic planners for the Marshall Plan, captured part of this argument in a letter to Teodoro Moscoso. He explained the differences between the Marshall Plan and the Alliance for Progress,

noting the Organization for European Economic Cooperation worked for two reasons. First, it was built on the economic reality of European economic interdependence. Second, Washington “could, by and large, assume that European governments were capable of governing, given a necessary but temporary access to imports.”⁵¹⁰ Based on *Little King Syndrome* and the structural contradiction of foreign aid, Latin American governments could never fulfill that expectation.

Consequently, the Marshall Plan does not provide evidence that foreign aid can promote Development. It does demonstrate that foreign aid only works if the transformation does not disempower neither local nor international elite. However, the Marshall Plan does help to understand the negative externalities of foreign aid. As Anthony Carew explained in *Labor under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (1989), the Marshall Plan mostly benefited business interests and weakened labor unions by imposing collective bargaining restrictions in Italy and France.

Moreover, the Marshall Plan created perfect conditions for US companies to seize control of European economies. Between 1950 and 1970 U.S. investment in Europe increased by 1400%, in comparison to 556% in Asia and 320% in Latin America. In the same period, U.S. banks increased in Britain and Ireland from eleven to forty and in Europe from six to seventy-two.⁵¹¹ As Jean-Jacques Servan-Schriever argued, because of the Marshall Plan Europe had become “a new Far West for American businessmen. Their investments do not so much involve a transfer of capital, as an actual seizure of power within the European economy.”⁵¹² This explains the powerful propaganda apparatus associated with the Marshall Plan. As Brian McKensie explained in *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy and International History* (2008), the U.S. government deployed a massive campaign convincing France to adopting U.S. values and traditions. Even though McKensie argued that those efforts increased

animosity in the long-term, they helped reduce opposition in the short-term. On that opposition, Kuisel provided interesting information on leftist and rightist criticism to the Marshall Plan.

Other issues: Agency of Individuals, the Americas as a regional entity and the application of Historical knowledge

This research highlights the reasons behind the Alliance's shortcomings as well as the structural inability of foreign aid to promote Development. On top of all of that, this dissertation helps understand the complexities of decision-making as it demonstrates how powerless and even irrelevant individuals are. For instance, many analyses blamed Kennedy for the Alliance's failure since he did not defend the democratic principles of the program. Kennedy had a lot to be blamed for, but even if he would have been willing to sacrifice all his political capital defending those principles, Kennedy would have been unable to shield the program from Congressional reservations and to secure its financial continuity. In stable political systems, the capacity of an individual to revolutionize the environment is low, regardless of a political title (i.e. President.) Obviously leaders had agency, but that agency is similar to the influence a sailor had on the ocean. Unless a leader is capable of building enough political power and the system is under serious questioning, individuals cannot become Poseidon. Even in those conditions, the leader or leaders would be constrained by the conditions that his/her accumulation of power dictates.

Individuals are even more powerless in regions that work interdependently, as the Inter-American system operates. The Inter-American analysis of the Alliance for Progress demonstrates that the Americas exist as an interdependent world. Similar to the Mediterranean world Fernand Braudel analyzed in the *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the age of Philip II*. Though there are many differences between the Mediterranean and the Americas,

especially regarding the distribution of power. The supremacy of the United States in the Americas has been almost uncontested. Argentina and Brazil had been close, but always, too far

The Americas works as an Interdependent region shaped by the level of influence that one country's affairs had on the others and vice versa. Indeed, historical processes cannot be understood without an analysis that builds upon the interaction among the different elements of the region. For example, when Cuba expropriated U.S. oil companies, the decision immediately endangered Cuba's relationship with Venezuela. This incident marked the beginning of the confrontation that resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations between both countries. Similarly, U.S. insistence on breaking with Cuba created ideal conditions for a Peronist triumph in the March 1962 election that led to the military coup that removed Frondizi from power. In the same way, Latin American unwillingness, disinterest or inability to isolate Cuba made it extremely difficult for Kennedy to build a fluid relationship with Congress. Those examples demonstrate the existence of a region where historical processes occurred in an interrelated way and whose causes could only be found in the light of an Inter- or Trans-American understanding.

Many books have been written about the history of the Inter-American system, including important authors like Peter H. Smith, Lester Langley, Michael Kryzaneck, Walter LeFeber, Stephen Rabe, Greg Grandin and Alan McPherson. While the first three authors had created a good framework, the last four had been crucial to open new areas of discussions. Those areas of discussion included U.S. colonial policy in Latin America, repression of social and labor movements as well as Anti-Americanism in Latin America. *Close encounters of Empire, Writing the cultural history of U.S.: Latin American Relations* edited by Joseph Gilbert, Catherine Legrand and Ricardo Salvatore complements those with a daily perspective on Inter-American cultural relations. Through the analysis of cultural processes, it offers a methodological

framework that highlights Latin American agency in the imposition of U.S. paradigms. By resignifying those paradigms, Latin Americans forced their transformations. To exemplify that point, that book discusses issues such as U.S. influence on Puerto Rican sexuality or the adaptation of Banana companies to local practices.

Based on such works, there is a reasonable understanding of main historical processes in the history of US-Latin American relations. However, there is still plenty of uncharted territory. It is necessary to start advancing in a new direction, where the explanation for Latin American and U.S. processes lays in the conditions that the Inter-American world creates. An analysis with those ideas as the compass will offer a better understanding of *why* the system matured as it did. Until recently, post-modernism has been a prolific in understanding *how* individuals had lived. Underneath that perspective, however, it is possible to find the implicit assumption that the *why* of historical processes are already clear and everything has been written about them.

This study only scratches the surface in trying to understand the complexities that explain the history of the Americas. Probably those perspectives were less clear in the past, but the strong agency that Latin American votes had on Obama's reelection proves that an Inter-American perspective on U.S. and Latin American problems is unavoidable. This perspective is the only one capable of offering a coherent explanation to historical processes, such as the rise of Central American Maras, development of Reggeaton as well as the evolution of the U.S. labor movement after the World War II, especially amongst farm workers.

As with any historical process, the responsible for building this region are people. On one side, the continual interest of U.S. youth on traveling and learning about the southern part of the region. On the other side, Latin Americans immigrants who are redefining the concept of U.S. citizenship. Based on the Latino National Survey of 2006, sixty eight percent of second

generation Latino considers themselves strongly American.⁵¹³ However, sixty percent of the same group identifies itself based on their country of origins or as Latino.⁵¹⁴ Moreover, as Laird Bergad and Herbert Klein argued, the continual immigration of Latinos to the United States has reinforced the continual usage of Spanish as the home language. Since the 1980, the number of Latinos who speak Spanish at home had been, in average, seventy five percent.⁵¹⁵

Inspired by these figures as well as studies on Latino communities in San Jose, South East Los Angeles, San Antonio and East Harlem, scholars had proposed the idea of a Latino cultural citizenship. In *Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space and Rights* (1997) William Flores and Rina Benmayor defined Latino cultural citizenship as the “range of social practices which, taken together, claim and establish a distinct social space for Latinos in this country. Latino social space is evolving and developing new forms, many of them contributing to an emergent Latino consciousness and social and political development.”⁵¹⁶ These new kind of citizens are and will be the driving force behind this region.

For those reason, this study hopes to help advance the understanding of the Inter-American world. By not only providing an example on how to address Inter-American problems, but also by offering some insights in the methodological guidelines to confront them. Obviously, harsh criticisms to those methodologies and problems would be the best contribution to a new field called *Historia Americana* or History of the Americas.

Lastly as Ernest May and Richard Neustadt proved in *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (1986) and this study corroborates, Historia/History, as the memory of society, contains a valuable record of our accomplishments and mistakes. Those must be used for building the future. Not surprisingly, on a 2014 poll, government officials -including Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State, Ambassador to the U.N. - identified history as the most useful discipline for decision- making.⁵¹⁷ Based upon society's attempts to solve prevalent problems as well as its vice of repeating mistakes, profesores de Historia and History professors had a major responsibility with society's most pressing needs. Those needs include world poverty, war on drugs and people, protected democracies, failures behind affirmative policies or the negative effects of collective fear over civil liberties. Instead of looking at the past with contempt and condemning how previous generations failed, society requires and demands a historiography that understands the why of the past, thinking on the construction of the future. Una historiografía con responsabilidad cívica/ a historiography with civic responsibility is the basis/ es la base de Historia Actual/Current History.

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