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dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/76756
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree.en_US
dc.formatMonograph
dc.format.mediumElectronic Resourceen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherThe Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY.
dc.typeDissertation
dcterms.abstractThis dissertation contains three parts - three papers. My dissertation tries to bridge the gap between two perspectives: the socio-psychological model and the rational choice model in voting behavior. The first part investigates how partisans behave in the prediction market. Using an agent-based model, my simulation results show that participants’ initial beliefs about a candidate’s winning probability, confirmation biases in accepting information, and monetary incentives strongly increase changes in participants’ beliefs about the electoral outcome captured by price volatility in the prediction market. The second part explores the microfoundation about individuals’ behavioral motivations in evaluating political candidates. My experimental results suggest that party identification may be either enhanced or weakened through the lens of utility maximization as well as a partisan perceptual screen. The third part examines how expected government partisanship matters for specific industrial sector or firm profitability during an election period. The empirical findings from EGARCH models confirm that the probability of an ideologically different party winning influences the returns of the defense and health care sectors. For the firm level analysis, my result also shows that the public announcement of Palin as McCains running mate decreases both actual and abnormal returns of firms associated with Obama’s key policies.
dcterms.abstractThis dissertation contains three parts - three papers. My dissertation tries to bridge the gap between two perspectives: the socio-psychological model and the rational choice model in voting behavior. The first part investigates how partisans behave in the prediction market. Using an agent-based model, my simulation results show that participants’ initial beliefs about a candidate’s winning probability, confirmation biases in accepting information, and monetary incentives strongly increase changes in participants’ beliefs about the electoral outcome captured by price volatility in the prediction market. The second part explores the microfoundation about individuals’ behavioral motivations in evaluating political candidates. My experimental results suggest that party identification may be either enhanced or weakened through the lens of utility maximization as well as a partisan perceptual screen. The third part examines how expected government partisanship matters for specific industrial sector or firm profitability during an election period. The empirical findings from EGARCH models confirm that the probability of an ideologically different party winning influences the returns of the defense and health care sectors. For the firm level analysis, my result also shows that the public announcement of Palin as McCains running mate decreases both actual and abnormal returns of firms associated with Obama’s key policies.
dcterms.available2017-09-20T16:51:08Z
dcterms.contributorNorpoth, Helmuten_US
dcterms.contributorSmirnov, Olegen_US
dcterms.contributorLebo, Matthewen_US
dcterms.contributorDawes, Christopher.en_US
dcterms.creatorPark, Jeeyoung
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-09-20T16:51:08Z
dcterms.dateSubmitted2017-09-20T16:51:08Z
dcterms.descriptionDepartment of Political Scienceen_US
dcterms.extent150 pg.en_US
dcterms.formatApplication/PDFen_US
dcterms.formatMonograph
dcterms.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/76756
dcterms.issued2016-12-01
dcterms.languageen_US
dcterms.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:51:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Park_grad.sunysb_0771E_12924.pdf: 1729551 bytes, checksum: 3988889aa51afcd7c385d62baf09bbf2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 42370en
dcterms.publisherThe Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY.
dcterms.subjectMonetary Incentives, Partisan Bias, Partisanship, Political Information
dcterms.titlePartisanship, Political Information, and Money
dcterms.typeDissertation


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