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dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/76798
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree.en_US
dc.formatMonograph
dc.format.mediumElectronic Resourceen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherThe Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY.
dc.typeDissertation
dcterms.abstractThrough practice, erratic behaviors become consistent. Numerous daily actions, including health-related behaviors such as exercise, are guided by habits that function automatically. However, considerable variability exists in the time it takes for a new behavior to become consistent and automatic. To date, little research has examined why the speed of habit formation varies across individuals and situations. I tested whether focusing on the concrete procedures of action (concrete thinking) facilitates the development of behavioral consistency and automaticity more so than focusing on the abstract purpose of action (abstract thinking). In Experiment 1, I examined whether concrete vs. abstract thinking influences consistency of exercise behavior across a two-week period, and whether goal-related affect explains why differences in exercise consistency emerge. In Experiment 2, I aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 and to test whether concrete vs. abstract thinking leads people to develop a greater increase in subjective experiences of exercise automaticity across a two-week period. Experiment 3 examined whether concrete relative to abstract thinking promotes consistency and automaticity in repeated judgments that are executed increasingly rapidly across time. Although Experiment 1 provided initial support for the hypotheses, Experiments 2 and 3 did not. The present experiments suggest that concrete vs. abstract thinking does not moderate the speed at which repeated behaviors become automatic. Although numerous studies suggest that abstract and concrete thinking impact immediate acts of self-regulation, the present experiments suggest that changes in automaticity do not appear to be the mechanism through which mental construal promotes effective self-regulation.
dcterms.available2017-09-20T16:51:12Z
dcterms.contributorMoyer, Anneen_US
dcterms.contributorFreitas, Antonioen_US
dcterms.contributorLerner, Matthewen_US
dcterms.contributorBuhrau, Denise.en_US
dcterms.creatorSweeney, Allison Marie
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-09-20T16:51:12Z
dcterms.dateSubmitted2017-09-20T16:51:12Z
dcterms.descriptionDepartment of Social/Health Psychologyen_US
dcterms.extent68 pg.en_US
dcterms.formatMonograph
dcterms.formatApplication/PDFen_US
dcterms.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/76798
dcterms.issued2016-12-01
dcterms.languageen_US
dcterms.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:51:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sweeney_grad.sunysb_0771E_12889.pdf: 550783 bytes, checksum: b3035c10829b1443072b61fad65b69c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1en
dcterms.publisherThe Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY.
dcterms.subjectaffect, automaticity, construal level, goals, motivation
dcterms.subjectPsychology
dcterms.titleThe Making of a Habit: The Moderating Role of Construal Level on the Development of Automaticity
dcterms.typeDissertation


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