| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77302 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree. | en_US |
| dc.format | Monograph | |
| dc.format.medium | Electronic Resource | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dcterms.abstract | Models of Internet routing are critical for studies of Internet security, reliability and evolution, which often rely on simulations of the Internet’s routing system. Accurate models are difficult to build and suffer from a dearth of ground truth data, as ISPs often treat their connectivity and routing policies as trade secrets. In this environment, researchers rely on a number of simplifying assumptions and models proposed over a decade ago, which are widely criticized for their inability to capture routing policies employed in practice. This thesis makes the following two contributions: Investigating Interdomain Routing Policies. First we put Internet topologies and models under the microscope to understand where they fail to capture real routing behavior. We measure data plane paths from thousands of vantage points, located in eyeball networks around the globe, and find that between 14-35% of routing decisions are not explained by existing models. We then investigate these cases, and identify root causes such as selective prefix announcement, misclassification of undersea cables, and geographic constraints. Our work highlights the need for models that address such cases, and motivates the need for further investigation of evolving Internet connectivity. Study of attacks against Decoy router deployments. Second, we use our understanding of routing over the Internet and tools developed to study the effect of decoy router deployments over the Internet and come up with a way to figure out an optimal decoy router deployment, given a target AS. We introduce the notion of Helper ASes, which are autonomous systems that do not host a decoy router in their network but help out by performing targeted poisonings in their announcements in order to try and force traffic coming in from censoring countries through an AS hosting a decoy router. This allows us to greatly reduces the number of deployments required for the system to be effective. | |
| dcterms.abstract | Models of Internet routing are critical for studies of Internet security, reliability and evolution, which often rely on simulations of the Internet’s routing system. Accurate models are difficult to build and suffer from a dearth of ground truth data, as ISPs often treat their connectivity and routing policies as trade secrets. In this environment, researchers rely on a number of simplifying assumptions and models proposed over a decade ago, which are widely criticized for their inability to capture routing policies employed in practice. This thesis makes the following two contributions: Investigating Interdomain Routing Policies. First we put Internet topologies and models under the microscope to understand where they fail to capture real routing behavior. We measure data plane paths from thousands of vantage points, located in eyeball networks around the globe, and find that between 14-35% of routing decisions are not explained by existing models. We then investigate these cases, and identify root causes such as selective prefix announcement, misclassification of undersea cables, and geographic constraints. Our work highlights the need for models that address such cases, and motivates the need for further investigation of evolving Internet connectivity. Study of attacks against Decoy router deployments. Second, we use our understanding of routing over the Internet and tools developed to study the effect of decoy router deployments over the Internet and come up with a way to figure out an optimal decoy router deployment, given a target AS. We introduce the notion of Helper ASes, which are autonomous systems that do not host a decoy router in their network but help out by performing targeted poisonings in their announcements in order to try and force traffic coming in from censoring countries through an AS hosting a decoy router. This allows us to greatly reduces the number of deployments required for the system to be effective. | |
| dcterms.available | 2017-09-20T16:52:23Z | |
| dcterms.contributor | Balasubramanian, Aruna | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Gill, Phillipa | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Das, Samir. | en_US |
| dcterms.creator | Niaz, Mohammad Haseeb | |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2017-09-20T16:52:23Z | |
| dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2017-09-20T16:52:23Z | |
| dcterms.description | Department of Computer Science. | en_US |
| dcterms.extent | 59 pg. | en_US |
| dcterms.format | Monograph | |
| dcterms.format | Application/PDF | en_US |
| dcterms.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77302 | |
| dcterms.issued | 2015-12-01 | |
| dcterms.language | en_US | |
| dcterms.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:52:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Niaz_grad.sunysb_0771M_12379.pdf: 898920 bytes, checksum: 6fea9a17e2d44edc15ca3afb99c856b2 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 1 | en |
| dcterms.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dcterms.subject | Computer science | |
| dcterms.title | Measuring Routing Policies on the Internet | |
| dcterms.type | Thesis | |
