| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77413 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree. | en_US |
| dc.format | Monograph | |
| dc.format.medium | Electronic Resource | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| dcterms.abstract | This dissertation consists of two essays that study the economic impact of innovations when the buyers are not symmetric. Namely, when potential licensees involves both entrants and incumbent firms. In Chapter 2, a non-sequential licensing approach is analyzed. Licenses in this chapter are sold simultaneously by auction aiming to maximize the revenue of the innovator. The post innovation market structure, the diffusion of the innovation and the incentive to innovate are analyzed and compared with the case where licenses are sold only to incumbent firms and not to entrants. In Chapter 3, a sequential licensing approach is analyzed in a specific industry with one incumbent firm. An outside innovator holds a patent that allows him to bring in entry and the incumbent firm is willing to buy the ownership of the patent either to use it himself or to limit further entry. The innovator sells licenses (or patent right) to entrants (or incumbent firm) sequentially. It is shown, quite surprisingly, that before bargaining with the incumbent on the sale of the patent right, the innovator may benefit from selling a few licenses to new entrants. Such action reduces the total industry profit to be allocated but enables a better credible threat on the incumbent firm and hence may increase the innovator's payoff. As a result, the bargaining outcome is not ex-ante Pareto-efficient. | |
| dcterms.available | 2017-09-20T16:52:39Z | |
| dcterms.contributor | Tauman, Yair | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Dubey, Pradeep | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Brusco, Sandro | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Neyman, Abraham. | en_US |
| dcterms.creator | Zhao, Chang | |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2017-09-20T16:52:39Z | |
| dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2017-09-20T16:52:39Z | |
| dcterms.description | Department of Economics | en_US |
| dcterms.extent | 93 pg. | en_US |
| dcterms.format | Application/PDF | en_US |
| dcterms.format | Monograph | |
| dcterms.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77413 | |
| dcterms.issued | 2016-12-01 | |
| dcterms.language | en_US | |
| dcterms.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:52:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Zhao_grad.sunysb_0771E_13002.pdf: 1965337 bytes, checksum: e0d6ea7b94da2687f2f1d04789a1b1ad (MD5)
Previous issue date: 42370 | en |
| dcterms.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dcterms.subject | Auction, Bargaining, Patent Licensing | |
| dcterms.title | Sequential and Non-Sequential Licensing of Innovation with Potential Entrants | |
| dcterms.type | Dissertation | |
