| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77600 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree. | en_US |
| dc.format | Monograph | |
| dc.format.medium | Electronic Resource | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| dcterms.abstract | Research has shown that reciprocation increases individuals' willingness to cooperate. This study investigates how individuals learn to cooperate with reciprocating opponents. To do so, we evaluated individuals' expectations about the behavior of their opponents during an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). In four experiments, participants played with a Tit-For-Tat (TFT) algorithm that occasionally failed to reciprocate. In Experiment 1, we first established whether individuals actually develop expectations about their opponents by utilizing a concurrent task. Our results indicate that when the opponents did not reciprocate, participants engaged in greater cognitive processing and were slower to respond to the concurrent task. Experiment 2 examined whether delayed reciprocation affects expectations about reciprocation using similar methodology. Our results indicate that expectations were weaker when reciprocation was delayed. In Experiment 3, we investigated two possible paths through which people may learn to cooperate with TFT. Specifically, we investigated whether the expectations people develop concern their own payoffs or the behavior of their opponents. Our results indicate that participants' expectations concern both their own payoffs and opponents' behavior. In Experiment 4, we sought for convergent evidence and a finer temporal resolution by employing pupillometry. Our results indicate that participants exhibited greater pupil sizes when expectations about reciprocation were violated. | |
| dcterms.available | 2017-09-20T16:52:57Z | |
| dcterms.contributor | Rajaram, Suparna | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Luhmann, Christian C | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Freitas, Antonio | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Kline, Reuben. | en_US |
| dcterms.creator | Liu, Pei-Pei | |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2017-09-20T16:52:57Z | |
| dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2017-09-20T16:52:57Z | |
| dcterms.description | Department of Experimental Psychology. | en_US |
| dcterms.extent | 44 pg. | en_US |
| dcterms.format | Monograph | |
| dcterms.format | Application/PDF | en_US |
| dcterms.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/77600 | |
| dcterms.issued | 2014-12-01 | |
| dcterms.language | en_US | |
| dcterms.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-20T16:52:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Liu_grad.sunysb_0771E_12130.pdf: 560718 bytes, checksum: 14f934f26c641569bab0e0eb39a77923 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 1 | en |
| dcterms.publisher | The Graduate School, Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, NY. | |
| dcterms.subject | Cognitive psychology | |
| dcterms.subject | Learning, Prisoner's Dilemma, Reciprocation, Tit-For-Tat | |
| dcterms.title | Learning about a Reciprocating Opponent in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| dcterms.type | Dissertation | |
