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dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degreeen_US
dc.formatMonograph
dc.format.mediumElectronic Resourceen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.typeDissertation
dcterms.abstractThis dissertation analyzes the effect of compatibility and switching costs in the context of a two-sided market model. In the two-sided market, the platform provides service which enables two sets of participants, consumers and content developers, to interact. Contrary to the common prediction about compatibility in a one-sided market, compatibility might be harmful to social welfare in the two-sided market. Furthermore, switching cost is closely related to compatibility between platforms and it is magnified compared to the one- sided market. Therefore, applying one-sided analysis to the two-sided market may easily lead to incorrect conclusions. In the first essay of this dissertation, I model competition between two platforms in a two-period model. I explicitly consider the situation in which incompatibility brings about switching cost for the consumer. I show that compatibility increases the price for both consumers and content developers. Differently from a market with direct network effect, where compatibility always increases network benefit, consumers and content developers may be worse off under compatibility in the two-sided market. In the second essay of this dissertation, I build a model of dynamic duopoly competition when two-sided platforms face overlapping generations of consumers. I introduce a stochastic process of the cost of compatibility which evolves according to a Markov process. I focus on finding linear Markov perfect equilibria by solving stochastic dynamic programming numerically. The results show that a platform with a large installed base charges higher prices and obtains a larger market share and profit in the short run. I also examine the effect of compatibility and switching costs on social welfare and policy implications.
dcterms.available2018-03-22T22:39:09Z
dcterms.contributorTauman, Yairen_US
dcterms.contributorBrusco, Sandro.en_US
dcterms.contributorLiu, Tingen_US
dcterms.contributorLopomo, Giuseppe.en_US
dcterms.creatorKim, A Ram
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-03-22T22:39:09Z
dcterms.dateSubmitted2018-03-22T22:39:09Z
dcterms.descriptionDepartment of Economics.en_US
dcterms.extent88 pg.en_US
dcterms.formatApplication/PDFen_US
dcterms.formatMonograph
dcterms.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155
dcterms.issued2017-08-01
dcterms.languageen_US
dcterms.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Kim_grad.sunysb_0771E_13397.pdf: 12127790 bytes, checksum: 943f5b3e618b55c67b29382923ec0ed7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-01en
dcterms.subjectEconomics
dcterms.subjectCompatibility
dcterms.subjectNetwork externality
dcterms.subjectPlatform competition
dcterms.subjectSwitching costs
dcterms.subjectTwo-sided Market
dcterms.titleEssays on Two-sided Market: Compatibility and Switching Costs
dcterms.typeDissertation


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