dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155 | |
dc.description.sponsorship | This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree | en_US |
dc.format | Monograph | |
dc.format.medium | Electronic Resource | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.type | Dissertation | |
dcterms.abstract | This dissertation analyzes the effect of compatibility and switching costs in the context of a two-sided market model. In the two-sided market, the platform provides service which enables two sets of participants, consumers and content developers, to interact. Contrary to the common prediction about compatibility in a one-sided market, compatibility might be harmful to social welfare in the two-sided market. Furthermore, switching cost is closely related to compatibility between platforms and it is magnified compared to the one- sided market. Therefore, applying one-sided analysis to the two-sided market may easily lead to incorrect conclusions. In the first essay of this dissertation, I model competition between two platforms in a two-period model. I explicitly consider the situation in which incompatibility brings about switching cost for the consumer. I show that compatibility increases the price for both consumers and content developers. Differently from a market with direct network effect, where compatibility always increases network benefit, consumers and content developers may be worse off under compatibility in the two-sided market. In the second essay of this dissertation, I build a model of dynamic duopoly competition when two-sided platforms face overlapping generations of consumers. I introduce a stochastic process of the cost of compatibility which evolves according to a Markov process. I focus on finding linear Markov perfect equilibria by solving stochastic dynamic programming numerically. The results show that a platform with a large installed base charges higher prices and obtains a larger market share and profit in the short run. I also examine the effect of compatibility and switching costs on social welfare and policy implications. | |
dcterms.available | 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z | |
dcterms.contributor | Tauman, Yair | en_US |
dcterms.contributor | Brusco, Sandro. | en_US |
dcterms.contributor | Liu, Ting | en_US |
dcterms.contributor | Lopomo, Giuseppe. | en_US |
dcterms.creator | Kim, A Ram | |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z | |
dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z | |
dcterms.description | Department of Economics. | en_US |
dcterms.extent | 88 pg. | en_US |
dcterms.format | Application/PDF | en_US |
dcterms.format | Monograph | |
dcterms.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78155 | |
dcterms.issued | 2017-08-01 | |
dcterms.language | en_US | |
dcterms.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-22T22:39:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Kim_grad.sunysb_0771E_13397.pdf: 12127790 bytes, checksum: 943f5b3e618b55c67b29382923ec0ed7 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2017-08-01 | en |
dcterms.subject | Economics | |
dcterms.subject | Compatibility | |
dcterms.subject | Network externality | |
dcterms.subject | Platform competition | |
dcterms.subject | Switching costs | |
dcterms.subject | Two-sided Market | |
dcterms.title | Essays on Two-sided Market: Compatibility and Switching Costs | |
dcterms.type | Dissertation | |