| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78346 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work is sponsored by the Stony Brook University Graduate School in compliance with the requirements for completion of degree | en_US |
| dc.format | Monograph | |
| dc.format.medium | Electronic Resource | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | Application/PDF | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| dcterms.abstract | While large pharmaceutical companies continue to dominate drug development and patent acquisition, their timing of drug patent acquisition and subsequent payoffs remain poorly understood. In an effort to examine the patent acquisition timing in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, both empirical and theoretical approaches are used to analyze the effects of firm characteristics on the timing of patent purchases. In Chapter 1, I construct a unique dataset using publicly-available data provided by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and examine the purchasing behavior of public firms within the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. I focus on the role of firm size and composition in affecting the timing of patent purchases and the subsequent payoff; particularly, how firms’ R&D intensity and overall scale affect purchasing decisions and commercial success of the drugs. The quantitative results show that, on average, firms with larger scale and stronger R&D departments are more likely to purchase drug patents later; furthermore, a strong R&D department contributes positively to drug sales and market shares through a better selection process of patents. The economics intuition is that firms with a larger scale and greater emphasis on R&D investment have advantages in producing in-house innovation, so they tend to be more selective when buying from outsources. This results purchasing patents later in the drug development process and better subsequent performance of the drug patents they do purchase. In Chapter 2, which serves as the theoretical framework for the first chapter, I explore the incentives of drug firms in strategically selecting the purchasing time for outsourced drug patents. According to the theoretical framework, each drug patent has to pass n testing phases before its approval, and the buyer firm can choose to acquire patents at any stage (with k stages left) and pay a market price that is a function of the number of phases left. Overall trial cost for each drug project is a function of k. After purchase, the buyer firm needs to finish the remaining phases in order to make the drug patent marketable. Firms are heterogeneous in trial success rates, and choose their optimal timing of acquisition to maximize profit. The results show that the number of remaining stages (when patent is purchased) is a decreasing function of trial success rate. In other words, firms with better expertise benefit from delaying patent purchases. | |
| dcterms.available | 2018-07-09T13:50:29Z | |
| dcterms.contributor | Tauman, Yair | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Rizzo, John A. | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Zhou, Yiyi | en_US |
| dcterms.contributor | Clouston, Sean. | en_US |
| dcterms.creator | Li, Yupeng | |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2018-07-09T13:50:29Z | |
| dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2018-07-09T13:50:29Z | |
| dcterms.description | Department of Economics. | en_US |
| dcterms.extent | 43 pg. | en_US |
| dcterms.format | Monograph | |
| dcterms.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/11401/78346 | |
| dcterms.identifier | Li_grad.sunysb_0771E_13448.pdf | en_US |
| dcterms.issued | 2017-08-01 | |
| dcterms.language | en_US | |
| dcterms.provenance | Submitted by Jason Torre (fjason.torre@stonybrook.edu) on 2018-07-09T13:50:29Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
Li_grad.sunysb_0771E_13448.pdf: 351684 bytes, checksum: 3102bdabbc15ad9271d45274649272e6 (MD5) | en |
| dcterms.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-09T13:50:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Li_grad.sunysb_0771E_13448.pdf: 351684 bytes, checksum: 3102bdabbc15ad9271d45274649272e6 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2017-08-01 | en |
| dcterms.subject | Economics | |
| dcterms.subject | Marketing | |
| dcterms.subject | Patent Transfer | |
| dcterms.subject | Pharmaceutical | |
| dcterms.subject | R&D | |
| dcterms.title | Essays on Patent Transfer Behavior in The Pharmaceutical Industry | |
| dcterms.type | Dissertation | |
